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Washington

OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR

GERMAN DOCUMENTS COLLECTED BY KARL KAUTSKY

AND EDITED BY

MAX MONTGELAS AND WALTHER SCHÜCKING

Translated by the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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IN ONE VOLUME

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Since the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published, in 1916, two volumes of *Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War*, a number of additional German documents have appeared which throw considerable light upon the outbreak of the war and its termination.

Adhering to its belief that the publication of such documents is of service in the proper appraisement of the causes of the war and of the diplomatic maneuvers which were made to end it, the Endowment published in 1923 two volumes of a series of official German documents relating to the World War.

The present volume is a translation into English of the four volumes of *German Documents relating to the Outbreak of the War* which were collected and assembled by Karl Kautsky, edited by Count Max Montgelas and Professor Walther Schücking, and published at Charlottenburg in November, 1919—the collection familiarly known as the *Kautsky Documents*. In view of the importance of and general interest in these particular documents, and of the fact that they form a complete unit in themselves, it has seemed advisable not to incorporate them in the above-mentioned series of *Official German Documents*, but, rather, to issue them in a single volume disconnected from all other German documents.

The German editors of the original volumes have explained very fully in their Preliminary Remarks[1] the purpose and scope of the documents, the method of editing, etc. Therefore comment here upon these matters is unnecessary except where it relates solely to this print.

The translation of these documents was rendered very difficult by the mass of notes, cross-references, quotations and citations, which the translators endeavored to put into identical English wherever possible. As a large proportion of the notes refer to words and phrases and to alterations made during the course of construction of individual documents at the Berlin Foreign Office, or elsewhere, great care has also been taken to have these words and phrases fit as appropriately in the English as they do in the German.

Where English documents in the original are followed by a German translation, the English text as given by the German editors has been retained and the German text disregarded; where French documents in the original are followed by a German translation, the French text as given by the German editors has been used as the basis of the English translation. However, in the case of French excerpts in German documents, it has seemed advisable to include the French as well as the English translation. In the several cases of English documents emanating from the Kaiser and German officials, great care has been taken to reproduce them with all the idiosyncrasies of grammar which appear in the original text.

In view of the comprehensiveness of the indexes of persons and telegram numbers which were supplied by the German editors, a subject-index has been

[1] *Post*, p. 41.

deemed unnecessary. However, apparent omissions in the original indexes have been supplied in brackets and reference numbers to this particular print inserted.

In this volume references are made to the German White Book, the Austrian Red Book, and the other variously colored publications of this character, rather than to the cumbersome official titles which they usually bear.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT,
Director of the Division of International Law.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
April 1, 1924.

THE GERMAN DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

CONTENTS

SHOWING TIME OF DISPATCH AND RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS[1]

Preliminary remarks.....Page 41

PART I.—FROM THE ASSASSINATION AT SERAJEVO TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE SERBIAN NOTE OF REPLY AT BERLIN, TOGETHER WITH SEVERAL DOCUMENTS OF THE WEEKS PRECEDING

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
		June 15		
1	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	53
2	.....	Report of the Berlin *Lokalanzeiger* of June 14 on an article in the *Birshewija Wjedomosti*	.....	53
		June 16		
3	p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	55
		June 20		
4	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	57
		June 27		
5	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	57
6	.....	The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Imperial Chancelor.....	.....	59
		July 1		
6 *a*	.....	The Consul General at Serajevo to the Foreign Office.....	4.05 p.m.	59
		July 2		
6 *b*	10.20 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	60
7	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	61
8	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	7.45 p.m.	61
		July 3		
9	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	12.12 a.m.	62
10	.....	The Minister at Belgrade to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	63
		July 4		
11	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	64

[1] Date, Time of dispatch and Time of receipt refer to the Foreign Office; in connection with telegrams, etc., of the Emperor, to the Court. See Preliminary remarks, sec. III, *post*, p. 43. The four Tables of Contents of the original, one at the beginning of each volume, are here assembled for the greater convenience of English readers.—EDITOR.

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
		July 5		
12	.....	The Minister at Belgrade to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	67
13	.....	The Emperor of Austria to the Emperor.....	.....	68
14	.....	Memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian Government.....	.....	70
14 *a*	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	77
		July 6		
15	5.15 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	78
16	5.25 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest.....	.....	79
17	9.20 p.m.	The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia.....	.....	80
		July 7		
18	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	6.55 p.m.	81
		July 8		
19	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	10.40 p.m.	82
		July 9		
19 *a*	.....	The Minister at Belgrade to the Imperial Chancelor.....	.....	83
20	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	86
21	1.40 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest.....	.....	88
22	1.40 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia.....	.....	88
23	.....	Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	.....	88
24	.....	The Minister at Athens to the Foreign Office	6.35 p.m.	89
25	.....	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	89
26	.....	The Emperor to the Emperor of Austria.....	.....	89
		July 10		
27	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	91
28	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office.....	8.40 p.m.	92
29	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	10.32 p.m.	92
		July 11		
30	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	94

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
30 *a*	.....	The Minister in the Imperial Suite to the Foreign Office.....	2.10 p.m.	95
31	2.40 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	95
32	.....	The Minister at Belgrade to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	96
32 *a*	6.45 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister in the Imperial Suite.....	.....	97
33	9.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome.....	.....	97
		July 12		
34	.....	The Minister at Athens to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	98
35	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	12.38 p.m.	98
36	6.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	99
37	8 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	99
38	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office.....	10.30 p.m.	100
		July 13		
39	p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna and to the Minister at Bucharest (to the latter on the 14th).....	.....	100
40	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	7.08 p.m.	101
		July 14		
41	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	102
41 *a*	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	105
42	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	5.46 p.m.	106
43	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	8.43 p.m.	107
44	10.35 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome and the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest.....	.....	108
		July 15 and 17		
45	.....	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at Vienna and Constantinople	.....	109
		July 15		
46	.....	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	110
47	1.50 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome.....	.....	111
48	4 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	111

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
49	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	112
50	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	113
		July 16		
51	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	12.07 a.m.	114
52	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	1.55 a.m.	114
53	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	115
54	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	1.44 p.m.	117
55	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	2.05 p.m.	118
56	6.45 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Director General of the Hapag.....	.....	118
57	8.30 p.m.	The Foreign Office to the Imperial Chancelor	.....	120
58	.....	The Imperial Chancelor to the Secretary of State for Alsace-Lorraine.....	.....	120
		July 17		
59	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	1.20 p.m.	121
60	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	4.06 p.m.	121
61	.....	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	122
		July 18		
62	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	122
63	3.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest.....	.....	125
64	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	125
65	.....	The Counselor of Embassy at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	126
66	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	127
67	5.08 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister in the Imperial Suite.....	.....	128
68	.....	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	128
69	7.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister in the Imperial Suite.....	.....	129
70	9.10 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	130
		July 19		
71	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	2.30 a.m.	130
72	.....	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London (private letter)	.....	131

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
73	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	133
74	.....	The First Chief Quartermaster General of the Grand General Staff to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (private letter) ...	a.m.	133
75	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	.....	134
76	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	134
77	1.25 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	135
78	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	2.30 p.m.	135
79	.....	The Minister in the Imperial Suite to the Foreign Office.....	4.35 p.m.	135
80	.....	The Minister in the Imperial Suite to the Foreign Office.....	4.35 p.m.	136
81	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	9.17 p.m.	136
		July 20		
82	.....	The Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ..	.....	137
83	.....	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	138
84	12.15 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	138
85	12.51 p.m.	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	.....	139
86	.....	The Serbian Legation at Berlin to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	139
87	.....	The Counselor of Embassy at Vienna to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (private letter).....	p.m.	141
88	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	4 p.m.	143
89	8.15 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	143
90	9.35 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister in the Imperial Suite.....	.....	143
91	9.35 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	144
92	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	10.50 p.m.	144
		July 21		
93	1.15 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Petersburg.....	.....	145
94	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	145
95	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	147
96	.....	The Admiralty Staff of the Navy to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	.....	147

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
97	6.20 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna	.....	148
98	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office	6.40 p.m.	148
99	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office	7.08 p.m.	148
		July 21 and 22		
100	.....	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassadors at Petersburg, Paris and London	.....	149
		July 21		
101	6.50 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Foreign Office	.....	150
102	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office	7.55 p.m.	151
103	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	9.25 p.m.	151
104	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	9.25 p.m.	151
105	.....	The Emperor to the Crown Prince	.....	152
		July 22		
106	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor	p.m.	152
107	.....	Draft of an unsent order from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Hamburg	.....	153
108	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	2.31 p.m.	153
109	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	3.16 p.m.	154
110	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	3.52 p.m.	154
111	.....	The Acting Chief of the Admiralty Staff to the Foreign Office	p.m.	154
112	6.05 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna	.....	155
113	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	6.35 p.m.	155
114	6.55 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Belgrade	.....	155
115	7.03 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Imperial Chancelor	.....	156
		July 23		
116	.....	The Imperial Chancelor to the Foreign Office	1.25 a.m.	156
117	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office	1.25 a.m.	156
118	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	1.25 a.m.	158
119	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	9.56 a.m.	159
120	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor	a.m.	159

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
121	1.40 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Emperor	.....	162
122	2.40 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Athens	.....	163
123	2.40 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Stockholm	.....	164
124	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	3.10 p.m.	164
125	3.40 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Minister in the Imperial Suite	.....	165
126	4 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London	.....	166
127	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	4 p.m.	166
128	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor	p.m.	166
129	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	4.40 p.m.	167
130	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	5.25 p.m.	168
131	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	5.50 p.m.	169
132	.....	The Crown Prince to the Imperial Chancelor	.....	169
133	.....	The Minister in the Imperial Suite to the Imperial Chancelor	.....	169
134	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	10.10 p.m.	170
		July 24		
135	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office	1.35 a.m.	170
136	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	10.50 a.m.	171
137	.....	The Minister at Belgrade to the Imperial Chancelor	a.m.	171
138	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor	a.m.	172
139	.....	The Minister at Belgrade to the Foreign Office	1.38 p.m.	173
140	1.40 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London	.....	173
141	.....	The Minister in the Imperial Suite to the Foreign Office	1.38 p.m.	174
142	2.05 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna	.....	174
143	3.35 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Petersburg	.....	175
144	6.40 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople	.....	175
145	.....	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome	6.45 p.m.	175
146	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	7.30 p.m.	176

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
147	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	7.40 p.m.	176
148	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	8.10 p.m.	177
149	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	8.20 p.m.	178
150	9.15 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	179
151	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	9.20 p.m.	179
152	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	9.20 p.m.	180
153	9.45 p.m.	The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at Paris, London and Petersburg.....	.....	180
154	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	10.34 p.m.	181
155	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	11.23 p.m.	182
		July 25		
156	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	12.10 a.m.	183
157	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	1.16 a.m.	183
158	.....	The Minister at Belgrade to the Foreign Office	1.47 a.m.	185
159	.....	The Minister at Belgrade to the Foreign Office	2.33 a.m.	186
160	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	3.45 a.m.	186
161	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (private letter) ...	.....	188
162	.....	The Minister at Sofia to the Foreign Office...	11.55 a.m.	190
163	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	12.48 p.m.	190
164	1 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	190
165	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	1.26 p.m.	191
166	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	1.50 p.m.	191
167	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	2.14 p.m.	191
168	3 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Emperor.....	.....	192
169	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	3.25 p.m.	194
170	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	3.50 p.m.	194
171	4 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	195
172	.....	The Russian Chargé d'Affaires to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	p.m.	195
173	.....	The Minister in the Imperial Suite to the Foreign Office.....	4.11 p.m.	196
174	p.m.	Memorandum of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	.....	196

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
175	.....	The Admiralty Staff to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	p.m.	197
176	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	197
177	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	198
178	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	5 p.m.	198
179	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	5.21 p.m.	199
180	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	5.52 p.m.	199
181	8 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Copenhagen.....	.....	201
182	8.25 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	201
183	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	8.56 p.m.	202
184	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	9.03 p.m.	202
185	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office.....	9.03 p.m.	203
186	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	9.25 p.m.	203
187	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	9.25 p.m.	203
188	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	9.50 p.m.	204
189	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office.....	10.05 p.m.	204
190	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	10.30 p.m.	205
191	10.45 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	205
191 *a*	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	11 p.m.	206
192	11.05 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	206
		July 26		
193	2 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at Rome and Vienna.....	.....	207
194	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	3.28 a.m.	207
195	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje to the Foreign Office.....	4.08 a.m.	207
196	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	4.20 a.m.	208
197	1 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	208
198	1.35 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg.....	.....	209
199	1.35 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	209

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
200	1.35 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris	.....	209
201	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	1.56 p.m.	210
202	3 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna	.....	210
203	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor	p.m.	210
204	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor	p.m.	213
205	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor	p.m.	215
206	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor	p.m.	215
207	.....	The Naval Attaché at London to the Imperial Naval Office	p.m.	215
208	.....	The Roumanian Minister at Berlin to the Foreign Office	p.m.	216
209	.....	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at Vienna and Rome	.....	216
210	4.15 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna	.....	217
211	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	5.10 p.m.	217
212	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	6.15 p.m.	218
213	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	6.29 p.m.	219
214	6.25 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest	.....	219
215	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	7 p.m.	220
216	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	7.01 p.m.	220
217	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	7.01 p.m.	220
218	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	7.01 p.m.	221
219	7.15 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg	.....	222
220	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	7.58 p.m.	222
221	7.59 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	223
222	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	8 p.m.	223
223	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	8 p.m.	224
224	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	8 p.m.	224
225	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	9.30 p.m.	224
226	9.40 p.m.	The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna	.....	225

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
227	9.40 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome	.....	225
228	10 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna	.....	225
229	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	10.05 p.m.	226
230	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	10.05 p.m.	226
231	.....	The Emperor to the Foreign Office	10.23 p.m.	227
232	.....	The Secretary of State for Alsace-Lorraine to the Imperial Chancelor	.....	227
233	.....	Draft of an unsent telegram from the Emperor to the Czar	.....	228
234	.....	Draft of an unsent telegram from the Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassadors at Paris, London and Petersburg	.....	228
		July 27		
235	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	12.07 a.m.	229
236	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	12.07 a.m.	230
237	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	12.45 a.m.	231
238	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	12.45 a.m.	231
239	1.35 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome	.....	232
240	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	1.55 a.m.	233
241	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	1.55 a.m.	233
242	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	2.35 a.m.	233
243	.....	The King of Greece to the Emperor	7.32 a.m.	234
244	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Imperial Chancelor	a.m.	235
245	11.20 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	236
246	11.30 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna	.....	237
247	11.30 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris	.....	237
248	1 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London	.....	237
249	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	1.28 p.m.	238
250	.....	The Minister at Copenhagen to the Foreign Office	1.28 p.m.	238
251	.....	The Minister at Sofia to the Foreign Office	3 p.m.	238
252	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	3.40 p.m.	239
253	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor	p.m.	239
254	.....	The Director General of the Hapag to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	p.m.	240

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
255	.....	The Admiralty Staff to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	p.m.	241
256	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	4.15 p.m.	242
257	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	4.37 p.m.	243
258	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	4.37 p.m.	243
259	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	5.33 p.m.	244
260	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	5.45 p.m.	245
261	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	6.06 p.m.	245
262	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office.....	7.20 p.m.	246
263	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	7.20 p.m.	246
264	.....	The Administrator of the Consulate at Kovno to the Foreign Office.....	7.40 p.m.	246
265	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	8.40 p.m.	247
266	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	8.40 p.m.	248
267	9 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	248
268	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the Foreign Office.....	.....	249
269	9.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	249
270	9.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Emperor.....	.....	250
271	.....	Note of the Serbian Government in reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum.....	p.m.	250
272	10 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	254
273	10 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome.....	.....	254
274	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	10.30 p.m.	254
275	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	10.30 p.m.	255
276	.....	The Consul General at Warsaw to the Foreign Office.....	11 p.m.	255
277	11.50 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	255
278	11.50 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	257

PART II.—FROM THE ARRIVAL OF THE SERBIAN NOTE OF REPLY AT BERLIN TO THE PUBLICATION OF THE RUSSIAN GENERAL MOBILIZATION

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
		July 28		
279	2 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London	.....	261
280	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	4 a.m.	262
281	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	4 a.m.	262
282	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	4.36 a.m.	263
283	5 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	264
284	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje to the Foreign Office	7.05 a.m.	264
285	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office	7.20 a.m.	265
286	.....	The Minister at Christiania to the Foreign Office	8.30 a.m.	265
287	9.30 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome	.....	265
288	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor	a.m.	266
289	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor	a.m.	268
290	.....	Supplement to report of the Ambassador at Petersburg on July 26, 1914	Same as No. 289	268
291	.....	The Military Plenipotentiary at the Russian Court to the Emperor	a.m.	269
292	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Imperial Chancelor	a.m.	272
293	10 a.m.	The Emperor to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	.....	273
294	.....	The Consulate at Riga to the Foreign Office	11.55 a.m.	274
295	.....	The Administrator of the General Consulate at Moscow to the Foreign Office	12.10 p.m.	274
296	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	1.04 p.m.	275
297	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	2.25 p.m.	275
298	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office	3.16 p.m.	275
299	3.20 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna	.....	276
300	3.35 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg	.....	276
301	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	3.45 p.m.	276
302	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor	p.m.	277

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
303	.....	The Prussian Minister at Karlsruhe to the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Imperial Chancelor)	p.m.	278
304	.....	The English Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	p.m.	278
305	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office	p.m.	279
306	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office	p.m.	279
307	p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Prussian Ministers accredited to the Federated Governments	.....	280
308	.....	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	281
309	4.10 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna	.....	282
310	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	4.30 p.m.	282
311	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	6.39 p.m.	283
312	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	7.10 p.m.	283
313	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	7.25 p.m.	283
314	8.40 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London	.....	284
315	9 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg	.....	284
316	9 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest	.....	285
317	9 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest	.....	285
318	.....	The Minister at Sofia to the Foreign Office	9.15 p.m.	285
319	9.15 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Stockholm	.....	286
320	9.30 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Constantinople	.....	286
321	9.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest	.....	287
322	9.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje	.....	287
323	10.15 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna	.....	288
324	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	10.30 p.m.	289
325	11.35 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome	.....	289
326	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (private letter) ...	.....	290
		July 29		
327	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	12.02 a.m.	292

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
328	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	12.02 a.m.	293
329	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	12.50 a.m.	294
330	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	12.50 a.m.	294
331	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	12.50 a.m.	294
332	.....	The Czar to the Emperor.....	1.10 a.m.	295
333	.....	The Administrator of the General Consulate at Moscow to the Foreign Office.....	1.15 a.m.	296
334	1.45 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg.....	.....	296
335	1.45 a.m.	The Emperor to the Czar.....	.....	296
335 *a*	.....	The Consul General at Warsaw to the Foreign Office.....	2 a.m.	297
336	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office.....	2.45 a.m.	297
337	.....	The Military Plenipotentiary at the Russian Court to the Foreign Office.....	3.42 a.m.	298
338	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	6.15 a.m.	299
339	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor.....	.....	300
340	.....	The Imperial Chancelor to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	.....	301
341	12.50 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris.....	.....	302
342	12.50 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg.....	.....	302
343	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	2.52 p.m.	303
344	.....	The Military Plenipotentiary at the Russian Court to the Foreign Office.....	3.15 p.m.	304
345	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	3.33 p.m.	304
346	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	3.36 p.m.	305
347	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	305
348	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Consul General at Warsaw to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Vienna.....	p.m.	306
349	.....	The Grand General Staff to the Imperial Chancelor.....	.....	306
350	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	308
351	.....	Reporting Councilor von Bergen of the Foreign Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	p.m.	309
352	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	310

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
353	.....	The English Ambassador to the Imperial Chancelor.....	.....	311
354	.....	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople.....	.....	311
355	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	4.34 p.m.	312
356	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	5.07 p.m.	312
357	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	5.07 p.m.	313
358	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje to the Foreign Office.....	5.57 p.m.	314
359	6.30 p.m.	The Emperor to the Czar.....	.....	315
360	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office.....	6.40 p.m.	316
361	8 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	316
362	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	8.15 p.m.	317
363	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	8.15 p.m.	317
364	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	8.25 p.m.	318
365	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	8.29 p.m.	319
365 *a*	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	8.29 p.m.	319
366	.....	The Czar to the Emperor.....	8.42 p.m.	320
367	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	9.12 p.m.	320
368	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	9.12 p.m.	321
369	.....	The Administrator of the General Consulate at Moscow to the Foreign Office.....	9.30 p.m.	323
370	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	9.45 p.m.	323
371	9.45 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Copenhagen.....	.....	324
372	.....	The Grand General Staff to the Foreign Office	p.m.	325
373	p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the English Ambassador.....	.....	327
374	.....	Prince Henry of Prussia to the Emperor	.....	328
375	.....	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Brussels.....	.....	329
376	Same as No. 375	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Brussels.....	.....	330
376 *a*	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	10.12 p.m.	331
377	10.30 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	332
378	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	10.55 p.m.	332

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
379	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office.....	11 p.m.	332
380	11.05 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg.....	.....	333
381	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office.....	11.55 p.m.	334
382	.....	Two articles from the *Daily Chronicle* of July 29, 1914, with marginal annotations by the Emperor.....	.....	334
		July 30		
383	12.10 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	339
384	12.30 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	339
385	12.30 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	340
386	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	12.40 a.m.	340
387	12.50 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg.....	.....	341
388	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	1.30 a.m.	341
389	1.45 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest.....	.....	342
390	.....	The Czar to the Emperor.....	1.45 a.m.	342
391	2.40 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg.....	.....	343
392	2.55 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg.....	.....	343
393	2.55 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	343
394	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje to the Foreign Office.....	2.55 a.m.	344
395	2.55 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	344
396	3 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	345
397	3.05 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg.....	.....	346
398	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	5.40 a.m.	346
399	6 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	347
400	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	6.50 a.m.	347
401	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	7.10 a.m.	348
402	a.m.	Marginal annotations of the Emperor of July 30 a.m. to an article in the *Morning Post* of July 28, 1914: "Efforts towards Peace"....	.....	350
403	.....	The Minister at Brussels to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	351

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
404	.....	The Administrator of the Consulate at Kovno to the Foreign Office.....	a.m.	352
405	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	10.45 a.m.	352
406	11 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Minister at Stockholm.....	.....	353
407	11.15 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	353
408	11.15 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	354
409	11.30 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	355
410	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	11.50 a.m.	355
411	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	11.59 a.m.	355
412	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	12.13 p.m.	356
413	12.40 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg.....	.....	357
414	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	12.56 p.m.	357
415	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	1.55 p.m.	357
416	.....	The Minister at Belgrade (temporarily at Nish) to the Foreign Office.....	2.05 p.m.	358
417	2.15 p.m.	Prince Henry of Prussia to the King of England	.....	358
418	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	3.10 p.m.	359
419	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	3.10 p.m.	359
420	3.30 p.m.	The Emperor to the Czar.....	.....	360
421	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	3.32 p.m.	360
422	.....	The Consul General at Warsaw to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	361
423	.....	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to a number of German diplomatic representatives abroad (sent on the 30th and 31st of July).....	.....	362
424	.....	The Grand General Staff to the Foreign Office	p.m.	363
425	.....	Memorandum of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	.....	364
426	.....	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at The Hague.....	.....	365
427	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	365
428	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	366
429	.....	Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the Imperial Chancelor	.....	367
430	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	4.35 p.m.	367
431	4.45 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople.....	.....	368

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
432	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	5.20 p.m.	368
433	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	5.25 p.m.	368
434	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	5.56 p.m.	369
435	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	5.56 p.m.	370
436	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office.....	6.43 p.m.	370
437	7.15 p.m.	The Emperor to the Emperor of Austria.....	.....	371
438	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	8.45 p.m.	371
439	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	8.45 p.m.	371
440	8.55 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	372
441	9 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	372
442	9 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	373
443	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	9.20 p.m.	373
444	9.50 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	374
445	.....	The Military Plenipotentiary at the Russian Court to the Foreign Office.....	10.05 p.m.	374
446	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	10.05 p.m.	376
447	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	10.25 p.m.	376
448	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	10.25 p.m.	377
449	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	11.05 p.m.	377
450	11.20 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	378
451	.....	Draft of an unsent telegram from the Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna ...	.....	378
452	.....	The King of England to Prince Henry of Prussia.....	11.30 p.m.	378
453	11.50 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Athens.....	.....	379
454	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	12 midnight	379
455	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	12 midnight	379
456	.....	Protocol of the session of the Royal Prussian Ministry of State on July 30, 1914	.....	380
		July 31		
457	12.45 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Rome.....	.....	384
458	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	12.52 a.m.	384

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
459	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	12.52 a.m.	384
460	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	12.52 a.m.	385
461	1.30 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Paris.....	.....	385
462	1.55 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Petersburg.....	.....	385
463	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office.....	2.35 a.m.	386
464	2.45 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	386
465	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	4.35 a.m.	386
466	6 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	388
467	.....	The Consul General at Antwerp to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	389
468	.....	Memorandum of the Director of the Political Division of the Foreign Office.....	a.m.	389
469	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	10.05 a.m.	389
470	.....	The Princess of Pless to the Emperor.....	10.17 a.m.	390
471	.....	Unused draft of a telegram from the Emperor to the King of Roumania.....	.....	390
472	10.55 a.m.	The Emperor to the King of Roumania.....	.....	391
473	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	11.40 a.m.	391
474	12 noon	The Emperor to the Imperial Naval Office and the Admiralty Staff.....	.....	392
475	12.25 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest.....	.....	393
476	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje to the Foreign Office.....	12.50 p.m.	393
477	12.55 p.m.	The Emperor to the King of England.....	.....	394
478	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	1.35 p.m.	395
479	1.45 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	395

PART III.—FROM THE PUBLICATION OF THE RUSSIAN GENERAL MOBILIZATION TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR ON FRANCE

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
		July 31		
480	2.04 p.m.	The Emperor to the Czar	.....	399
481	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	2.05 p.m.	400
482	.....	The Emperor of Austria to the Emperor	2.45 p.m.	400
483	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	2.50 p.m.	401
484	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	2.50 p.m.	401
485	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	2.50 p.m.	402
486	.....	The Minister at Luxemburg to the Foreign Office	2.50 p.m.	402
487	.....	The Czar to the Emperor	2.52 p.m.	402
488	3.10 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London	.....	403
489	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	3.25 p.m.	403
490	3.30 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg	.....	404
491	3.30 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris	.....	405
492	3.30 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Rome	.....	405
493	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	3.45 p.m.	406
494	p.m.	Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	.....	406
495	p.m.	Memorandum of Reporting Councilor Count Mirbach of the Foreign Office	.....	407
496	p.m.	Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	.....	407
497	.....	The English Ambassador to the Imperial Chancelor	p.m.	408
498	p.m.	Memorandum of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	.....	409
499	.....	The Minister of War to the Imperial Chancelor and to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	p.m.	409
500	.....	The Grand General Staff to the Imperial Chancelor	p.m.	409
501	4 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at Vienna and Rome	.....	409
502	.....	Unused draft of a telegram from the Emperor to the Emperor of Austria	.....	410
503	4.05 p.m.	The Emperor to the Emperor of Austria	.....	410
504	5.00 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Athens	.....	411
505	5.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Brussels	.....	411

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
506	6.00 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest	.....	412
507	6.00 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna	.....	412
508	6.45 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Constantinople	.....	412
509	.....	The Minister at Berne to the Foreign Office	6.47 p.m.	413
510	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	7.41 p.m.	413
511	.....	The Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg to the Foreign Office	7.50 p.m.	414
512	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office	8.25 p.m.	414
513	8.30 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London	.....	414
514	8.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Berne	.....	415
515	.....	The Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office	9.06 p.m.	416
516	.....	The Minister at The Hague to the Foreign Office	10.10 p.m.	416
517	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office	10.10 p.m.	416
518	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	10.30 p.m.	417
519	11.10 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome	.....	417
520	.....	The Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office	11.35 p.m.	417
521	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	11.35 p.m.	418
522	.....	Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	.....	418
523	.....	The Minister at Belgrade (temporarily at Nish) to the Foreign Office	Did not arrive	418
524	.....	The Grand General Staff to the Foreign Office	p.m.	419
		August 1		
525	.....	The Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office	12.30 a.m.	421
526	.....	The Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office	12.30 a.m.	422
527	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	12.30 a.m.	422
528	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	12.30 a.m.	423
529	1.50 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London	.....	424
530	1.55 a.m.	The Emperor to the King of Italy	.....	424
531	.....	The Councilor of the Embassy at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	3.05 a.m.	425

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
532	.....	The Minister at Copenhagen to the Foreign Office.....	3.20 a.m.	426
533	.....	The Consul General at Genoa to the Foreign Office.....	3.20 a.m.	426
534	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	3.55 a.m.	427
535	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	5.45 a.m.	428
536	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	.....	429
537	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	6.07 a.m.	429
538	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office.....	6.32 a.m.	430
539	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Russian Minister of the Household, Count Fredericks	.....	430
540	.....	The Minister at Brussels to the Imperial Chancelor.....	a.m.	431
540 *a*	.....	Memorandum of the Imperial Chancelor.....	.....	431
541	12.10 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome.....	.....	432
542	12.51 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Petersburg.....	.....	432
543	1.05 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris.....	.....	435
544	1.10 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	435
545	1.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Tokyo.....	.....	435
546	.....	The Czar to the Emperor.....	2.05 p.m.	436
547	2.30 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Constantinople.....	.....	436
548	.....	The Minister at Sofia to the Foreign Office...	3.14 p.m.	436
549	3.20 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia.....	.....	437
550	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	3.25 p.m.	437
551	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	3.25 p.m.	437
552	3.40 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Stockholm.....	.....	438
553	.....	From the protocol of the twenty-seventh session of the Federal Council.....	.....	438
554	.....	The Minister of War to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	p.m.	441
555	.....	Draft of an unsent telegram from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	441
556	p.m.	Memorandum of Minister von Bergen of the Foreign Office.....	.....	441
557	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	442

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
558	.....	The Prussian Minister at Stuttgart to the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Imperial Chancelor)	p.m.	442
559	.....	The Minister at Brussels to the Imperial Chancelor	p.m.	443
560	.....	The Danish Legation to the Foreign Office	p.m.	443
561	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	4.10 p.m.	444
562	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	4.23 p.m.	444
563	4.40 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest	.....	445
564	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	5.21 p.m.	445
565	.....	The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office	5.21 p.m.	446
566	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	5.21 p.m.	446
567	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	5.28 p.m.	446
568	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	5.40 p.m.	447
569	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	5.45 p.m.	447
570	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	6.04 p.m.	448
571	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	6.10 p.m.	448
572	6.15 p.m.	Reporting Councilor Dr. Hammann of the Foreign Office to the Director General of the Hapag	.....	449
573	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	6.34 p.m.	449
574	.....	The King of England to the Emperor	7 p.m.	450
575	7.02 p.m.	The Emperor to the King of England	.....	451
576	.....	The Embassy at London to the Foreign Office	7.15 p.m.	451
577	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	7.15 p.m.	452
578	7.15 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London	.....	452
579	7.20 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London	.....	453
580	.....	Lord Rothschild to the Emperor	7.30 p.m.	453
581	.....	The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office	7.40 p.m.	454
582	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office	7.40 p.m.	454
583	.....	The President of the Bureau of International Peace to the Emperor	8.07 p.m.	455
584	.....	The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office	8.12 p.m.	455
585	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	8.30 p.m.	456
586	8.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople	.....	456

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
587	8.45 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Paris	.....	457
588	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office	Not received	457
589	.....	The Swiss Minister to the Foreign Office	p.m.	457
590	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	9.06 p.m.	458
591	.....	The Senatorial Committee for Imperial and Foreign Affairs of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg to the Foreign Office	9.07 p.m.	458
592	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo to the Foreign Office	9.16 p.m.	458
593	9.40 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Petersburg	.....	459
594	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	.....	459
595	.....	The English Embassy to the Foreign Office	.....	460
596	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	10.02 p.m.	460
597	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office	10.17 p.m.	462
598	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	10.17 p.m.	462
599	.....	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	9.45 p.m.	463
600	10.30 p.m.	The Emperor to the Czar	.....	463
601	.....	The Emperor of Austria to the Emperor	10.30 p.m.	464
602	.....	The Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	10.45 p.m.	464
603	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	11.10 p.m.	465
604	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office	11.10 p.m.	465
605	11.30 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London	.....	465
606	.....	The Minister at Luxemburg to the Foreign Office	11.35 p.m.	466
607	11.55 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassadors at Vienna and Rome	.....	466
608	.....	Draft of an unsent telegram from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Paris	.....	466
609	.....	The Grand General Staff to the Foreign Office	p.m.	468
		August 2		
610	.....	The English Embassy to the Foreign Office	a.m.	470
611	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	12.10 a.m.	471
612	.....	The King of England to the Emperor	.....	471
613	12.50 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassadors at Vienna and Rome	.....	472
614	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	1.07 a.m.	472

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
615	.....	The Ambassador at Madrid to the Foreign Office.....	1.35 a.m.	473
616	.....	The Minister at Copenhagen to the Foreign Office.....	2.40 a.m.	473
617	.....	The Minister at Lisbon to the Foreign Office .	2.40 a.m.	474
618	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier to the Foreign Office.....	3.13 a.m.	474
619	.....	The Minister at Luxemburg to the Foreign Office.....	3.57 a.m.	475
620	4.35 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	475
621	.....	The Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	4.50 a.m.	475
622	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje to the Foreign Office.....	5.20 a.m.	476
623	6.02 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office.....	.....	476
624	6.10 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg.....	.....	476
625	6.20 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Paris.....	.....	477
626	6.20 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	477
627	6.35 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	477
628	6.35 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Rome.....	.....	478
629	a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor	.....	478
630	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	8.52 a.m.	479
631	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	8.55 a.m.	479
632	9.10 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris.....	.....	479
633	9.45 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris.....	.....	480
634	.....	The Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	.....	480
635	11 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	480
636	11 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Senatorial Committee for Imperial and Foreign Affairs of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg.....	.....	481
637	.....	The Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	11.10 a.m.	481
638	.....	The Grand Duchess of Luxemburg to the Emperor.....	11.10 a.m.	482

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
639	.....	Draft of a note to the Luxemburg Government submitted by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army.....	.....	482
640	11.30 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Minister at Luxemburg.....	.....	483
641	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	11.47 a.m.	483
642	11.55 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris.....	.....	483
643	12.15 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	484
644	.....	The Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (?).....	12.25 p.m.	484
645	.....	The Consul General at Basel to the Foreign Office.....	12.45 p.m.	484
646	12.50 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Minister at Bucharest.....	.....	485
647	.....	The Minister at Luxemburg to the Foreign Office.....	1.20 p.m.	485
648	2.05 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Brussels.....	.....	486
649	2.10 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg.....	.....	487
650	.....	The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office	2.40 p.m	487
651	3 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Lisbon.....	.....	487
652	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	3.20 p.m.	488
653	.....	The Minister at Christiania to the Foreign Office.....	3.43 p.m.	488
654	.....	The Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	p.m.	488
655	.....	The Chief of the Admiralty Staff to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	p.m.	489
656	.....	The Belgian Minister to the Foreign Office ...	p.m.	489
657	.....	Draft of an unsent communication from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office.....	.....	490
658	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	490
659	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	491
660	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	491
661	.....	Article from the *Berliner Tageblatt* of August 2, 1914, with marginal annotations by the Emperor.....	.....	492

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
662	.....	The Chief of the General Staff of the Army to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	493
663	.....	The Chief of the General Staff of the Army to the Foreign Office.....	.....	496
664	4.35 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome.....	.....	496
665	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier to the Foreign Office.....	5.06 p.m.	496
666	.....	The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office.....	5.19 p.m.	497
667	5.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	497
668	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	5.40 p.m.	498
669	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	5.50 p.m.	498
670	.....	The Chief Command of the 8th Army Corps to the Grand General Staff.....	.....	499
671	6 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at The Hague.....	.....	499
672	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	6.05 p.m.	500
673	.....	The Minister at Sofia to the Foreign Office...	6.05 p.m.	500
674	6.15 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at The Hague.....	.....	501
675	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	6.20 p.m.	501
676	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	6.48 p.m.	502
677	6.55 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ministers at Brussels and The Hague and to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	504
678	.....	The Consul General at Basel to the Foreign Office.....	7.30 p.m.	504
679	.....	The Senatorial Committee for Imperial and Foreign Affairs of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg to the Foreign Office.....	7.40 p.m.	504
680	.....	The Central Telegraph Office to the Cipher Bureau of the Foreign Office.....	8.25 p.m.	504
681	.....	The Minister at Berne to the Foreign Office ..	8.40 p.m.	505
682	9.05 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Brussels.....	.....	505
683	9.15 p.m.	Aide-de-Camp (on duty) von Mutius to the Foreign Office.....	.....	505
684	.....	The Minister at Luxemburg to the Foreign Office.....	9.36 p.m.	506
685	.....	The Senatorial Committee for Imperial and Foreign Affairs of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg to the Foreign Office.....	10.25 p.m.	506
686	.....	The Central Telegraph Office to the Foreign Office.....	10.27 p.m.	506

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
687	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	11.04 p.m.	507
688	.....	The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office	11.04 p.m.	507
689	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	11.40 p.m.	508
690	11.45 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome.....	.....	508
		August 3		
691	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	12.05 a.m.	509
692	.....	The Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office.....	12.05 a.m.	509
693	12.25 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	510
694	12.25 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Rome.....	.....	511
695	.....	The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office	12.25 a.m.	511
696	12.55 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	511
697	1.15 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Minister at Sofia	.....	512
698	1.15 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	513
699	.....	The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office	1.22 a.m.	513
700	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	2.17 a.m.	514
701	2.35 a.m.	The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Berne.....	.....	514
702	.....	The King of Greece to the Emperor.....	3 a.m.	515
703	3.10 a.m.	Circular dispatch from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ministers at Berne, Copenhagen, Stockholm and Christiania ...	.....	516
704	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	3.32 a.m.	516
705	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	3.55 a.m.	517
706	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	4.05 a.m.	518
707	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	4.05 a.m.	518
708	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	4.05 a.m.	518
709	.....	The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office	4.30 a.m.	519
710	6.45 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	519
711	6.45 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople.....	.....	519
712	6.45 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople.....	.....	520
713	9.15 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at London and Rome.....	.....	520

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
714	9.30 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London	.....	520
715	.....	The Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office to the Emperor	.....	520
716	10 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Paris	.....	521
717	.....	Draft of an unsent telegram from the Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassadors at London and Rome	.....	521
718	.....	Information Division of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy to the Foreign Office	.....	521
719	.....	Draft of an unsent telegram from the Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassadors at London and Rome	.....	522
720	.....	The English Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	a.m.	523
721	a.m.	Memorandum of Reporting Councilor Count Montgelas of the Foreign Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	.....	523
722	.....	The French Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	a.m.	524
723	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office	.....	524
724	.....	The Danish Legation to the Foreign Office	.....	525
725	10.15 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at London and Rome	.....	526
726	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office	11.31 a.m.	526
727	.....	The Minister at The Hague to the Foreign Office	11.51 a.m.	526
728	11.55 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Minister at Sofia	.....	527
729	12.05 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest	.....	527
730	.....	The Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg to the Imperial Chancelor and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	12.05 p.m.	527
731	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	12.25 p.m.	528
732	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office	12.25 p.m.	528
733	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office	12.45 p.m.	529
734	1.05 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris	.....	530
734 *a*	.....	Mutilated text of the Declaration of War on France	.....	531
734 *b*	.....	Text of the declaration of war presented at Paris	.....	531
734 *c*	.....	Announcement of the declaration of war on France through the Wolff Bureau	.....	532

PART IV.—FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR ON FRANCE TO THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
		August 3		
735	.....	The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office	1.10 p.m.	535
736	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	1.37 p.m.	535
737	.....	The Consul at Hongkong to the Foreign Office	1.37 p.m.	535
738	.....	The Minister at The Hague to the Foreign Office.....	1.37 p.m.	536
739	.....	The Grand General Staff to the Foreign Office	1.45 p.m.	536
740	.....	The Prussian Minister at Munich to the Foreign Office.....	2.05 p.m.	537
741	2.10 p.m.	The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Madrid and to the Minister at Lisbon.....	.....	537
742	2.20 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	537
743	2.40 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia and to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest.....	.....	538
744	2.48 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	538
745	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	3.20 p.m.	538
746	.....	The Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	3.37 p.m.	539
747	3.45 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	539
748	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	3.45 p.m.	540
749	.....	Memorandum of the Cipher Bureau of the Foreign Office.....	.....	540
750	3.50 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	541
751	3.55 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople.....	.....	541
752	.....	Memorandum of Count Mirbach, Reporting Councilor at the Foreign Office.....	.....	541
753	.....	Memorandum of Count B. Wedel Reporting Councilor at the Foreign Office.....	.....	542
754	.....	The Italian Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	p.m.	542
755	.....	The King of Italy to the Emperor.....	With No. 754	542
756	.....	The Italian Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	p.m.	543
757	.....	The Italian Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	p.m.	543
758	.....	The Prussian Minister at Munich to the Minister for Foreign Affairs (the Imperial Chancelor).....	p.m.	544

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
759	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office.....	.....	544
760	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	544
761	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	p.m.	545
762	4.05 p.m.	The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Belgrade (temporarily at Nish).....	.....	545
763	4.05 p.m.	The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Athens....	.....	546
764	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	4.33 p.m.	546
765	.....	The King of the Belgians to the Emperor	p.m.	547
766	5.10 p.m.	The Emperor to the Emperor of Austria	.....	548
767	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	5.12 p.m.	548
768	.....	The Governor of Düsseldorf to the Imperial Chancelor.....	5.15 p.m.	549
769	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	5.33 p.m.	550
770	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	6.28 p.m.	550
771	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	6.28 p.m.	550
772	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	7.17 p.m.	551
773	.....	Official communication, published through the Wolff Telegraph Bureau.....	p.m.	551
774	7.25 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome.....	.....	552
775	.....	The Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	p.m.	552
776	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	7.35 p.m.	553
777	7.45 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	553
778	p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Emperor.....	.....	553
779	.....	The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office	7.58 p.m.	553
780	.....	The Emperor to the Imperial Chancelor	p.m.	555
781	.....	An article by the Foreign Office concerning the proceedings against Belgium, intended for the Press, but not published.....	.....	555
782	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	8.10 p.m.	556
783	p.m.	The Emperor to the King of the Belgians	8.20 p.m.	557
784	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	8.48 and 9.30 p.m.	557
785	.....	The Ambassador at Tokyo to the Foreign Office	9.14 p.m.	558
786	.....	The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office	9.45 p.m.	558

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
787	.....	The 16th Infantry Division to the Foreign Office.....	9.49 p.m.	559
788	.....	The Chief of the General Staff of the Army to the Foreign Office.....	10 p.m.	559
789	.....	The Minister at Christiania to the Foreign Office.....	10.10 p.m.	560
790	10.25 p.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	560
791	10.35 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Brussels.....	.....	561
792	.....	The Minister at The Hague to the Foreign Office.....	11.35 p.m.	561
793	.....	The Grand General Staff to the Foreign Office	.....	561
		August 4		
794	.....	The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office	12.01 a.m.	562
795	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	12.26 a.m.	562
796	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Peking to the Foreign Office.....	1.17 a.m.	563
797	.....	The Minister at The Hague to the Foreign Office.....	1.17 a.m.	563
798	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	1.41 a.m.	564
799	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	2.12 a.m.	564
800	.....	The Consul General at Copenhagen to the Foreign Office.....	3.40 a.m.	565
801	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	4.09 a.m.	565
802	.....	The Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office.....	4.12 a.m.	566
803	.....	The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office.....	5.45 a.m.	566
804	.....	The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army to the Foreign Office.....	a.m.	566
805	9.20 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Brussels.....	.....	568
806	9.55 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome.....	.....	568
807	.....	The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army to the Foreign Office.....	.....	568
808	.....	The Admiralty Staff of the Navy to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	a.m.	569
809	.....	The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office	10.06 a.m.	569
810	10.20 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	569
811	.....	The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office	10.52 a.m.	570
812	a.m.	Memorandum of Count Mirbach, Reporting Councilor at the Foreign Office.....	.....	571

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
813	.....	The Grand General Staff to the Foreign Office	11.15 a.m. and 3 p.m.	571
814	11.40 a.m.	The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	572
815	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	11.45 a.m.	572
816	11.50 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia.....	.....	573
817	11.50 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	573
818	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	12.55 p.m.	573
819	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	1.21 p.m.	574
820	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	1.37 p.m.	574
821	.....	The Admiralty Staff of the Navy to the Imperial Chancelor.....	p.m.	575
822	.....	The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	575
823	.....	The English Ambassador to the Foreign Office	p.m.	576
824	.....	The English Ambassador to the Foreign Office	p.m.	576
825	.....	The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	577
826	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	577
827	.....	Memorandum of Counselor of Legation Esternaux, Assistant in the Foreign Office	p.m.	577
828	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	578
829	4.05 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	578
830	4.10 p.m.	The Foreign Office to the Minister at Bucharest	.....	579
831	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	4.25 p.m.	579
832	4.25 p.m.	The Foreign Office to the Minister at Athens .	.....	579
833	.....	The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office	4.37 p.m.	579
834	.....	The Senatorial Committee for Imperial and Foreign Affairs of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg to the Foreign Office.....	4.56 p.m.	580
835	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	5.29 p.m.	580
836	6.08 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople.....	.....	581
837	.....	The King of the Belgians to the Emperor	6.20 p.m.	581
838	.....	The Minister at Christiania to the Foreign Office.....	6.55 p.m.	581
839	.....	The English Ambassador to the Foreign Office	7 p.m.	582
840	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	7.40 p.m.	582

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
841	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	7.40 p.m.	583
842	.....	The Commander of the 16th Infantry Division to the Foreign Office.....	7.47 p.m.	584
843	8 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Stockholm.....	.....	584
844	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	8 p.m.	584
845	.....	The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office	8.10 p.m.	585
846	.....	The Minister at Copenhagen to the Foreign Office.....	8.21 p.m.	585
847	8.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Bucharest.....	.....	585
848	9.05 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.....	.....	586
849	9.10 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the German Federated Governments.....	.....	586
850	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	9.30 p.m.	587
851	.....	The Ambassador at Madrid to the Foreign Office.....	9.30 p.m.	588
852	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	9.30 p.m.	588
853	.....	The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office.....	10.10 p.m.	589
854	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	10.10 p.m.	589
855	.....	The Minister at Copenhagen to the Foreign Office.....	10.10 p.m.	590
856	.....	The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office.....	10.45 p.m.	590
857	.....	The Minister at Sofia to the Foreign Office...	10.45 p.m.	590
858	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	10.50 p.m.	591
859	.....	The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office	11.06 p.m.	591
860	p.m.	Memorandum of Reporting Councilor von Bergen of the Foreign Office.....	.....	592
861	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	11.09 p.m.	592
862	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	11.30 p.m.	592
		August 5		
863	.....	The English Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	a.m.	593
864	12.25 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	593
865	1.15 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia.....	.....	594
866	.....	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia.....	.....	594

Doc. no.	Time of dispatch	Date and superscription	Time of receipt	Page
867	.....	The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office	1.16 a.m.	595
868	.....	The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office	3.21 a.m.	595
869	.....	The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	.....	596
870	.....	The Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.....	a.m.	597
871	.....	Memorandum of Reporting Councilor von Bergen of the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	597
872	10.45 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	597
873	10.45 a.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia.....	.....	598
874	12.20 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna.....	.....	598
875	2.30 p.m.	The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office.....	.....	598
876	.....	The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army to the Foreign Office.....	p.m.	598
877	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	4 p.m.	599
878	.....	The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office.....	7.40 p.m.	599
		August 6		
879	.....	The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office.....	a.m.	600

SUPPLEMENTS

	Page
SUPPLEMENT I.—The Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia	603
SUPPLEMENT II.—The Treaty of the Triple Alliance in its form of December 5, 1912, with the two additional protocols of the same date	607
SUPPLEMENT III.—The Austro-Hungarian-Roumanian Treaty of Alliance in its form of February 5, 1913, with Germany's declaration of accession of February 26, 1913	612
SUPPLEMENT IV.—Reports, telegrams and telephone conversations of the Bavarian Legation at Berlin	615
No. 1. The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	615
No. 2. The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	616
No. 3. The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	620
No. 4. The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	620
No. 5. The President of the Ministerial Council at Munich to the Legation at Berlin	621
No. 6. The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	622
No. 7. The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	622
No. 8. The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	622
No. 9. The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	623
No. 10. The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	624
No. 11. The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	624
No. 12. The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	626
No. 13. The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	627
No. 14. The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	628
No. 15. The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	629
No. 16. The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	629
No. 17. The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	629
No. 18. The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	630
No. 19. The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	631
No. 20. The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	632
No. 21. The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	632
No. 22. The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	632
No. 23. The Legation at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	632
No. 24. The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	633
No. 25. The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	633
No. 26. The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	634
No. 27. The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council (private letter)	634
No. 28. The President of the Ministerial Council at Munich to the Legation at Berlin	636
No. 29. The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	636
No. 30. The Legation at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	636
No. 31. The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	637
No. 32. The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	637
No. 33. The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	638
No. 34. The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council	639
No. 35. The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council (private letter)	640
Annex	641

	Page
SUPPLEMENT V.—Chronological review of the closing events as constructed by the Embassy at Petersburg, together with documentary evidence	642
SUPPLEMENT VI.—Memorandum of the Ambassador at Petersburg on the Russian policy from July 29 to 31, 1914	648
SUPPLEMENT VII.—Secretary of State Zimmermann (retired) to Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Baron von dem Bussche (private letter)	650
SUPPLEMENT VIII.—Memorandum of Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Baron von dem Bussche	651
SUPPLEMENT IX.—Ambassador to Vienna, Count B. Wedel, to Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Baron von dem Bussche (private letter)	652
INDEX OF PERSONS REFERRED TO IN DOCUMENTS	655
INDEX OF PERSONS SENDING DOCUMENTS	678
INDEX OF TELEGRAM NUMBERS	682

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

I. GENERAL

In November, 1918, Karl Kautsky was commissioned by the Popular Government to collect and edit those documents belonging to the Foreign Office relating to the preliminary history of the World War. The collection and arrangement of the material was accomplished by Karl Kautsky, with the assistance of Dr. Gustav Meyer, by the beginning of May, 1919. Among the others who have labored in assistance, a most prominent part was taken by Recorder Dr. Hermann Meyer of the Secret National Archives, whose services were placed at the disposal of the Foreign Office, at its request, by the administration of the National Archives, and the evidence of whose expert ability the reader will perceive throughout. Dr. Richard Wolff and Miss Nora Stiebel, Cand. Hist., were also engaged on the work from February to May.

The publication of the documents, deferred from time to time, was later committed by the Ministerial Cabinet to General Count Max Montgelas and Professor Walther Schücking, and was begun early in September of this year. The division of labor between the two editors was originally planned so that Professor Schücking was to work on the documents from the murder at Serajevo up to the time of the general Russian mobilization, and Count Montgelas on the documents dating from that event up to the declaration of war by England. While in the main this plan has been adhered to, it developed both for internal and external reasons that separate publication based on different periods of time was not feasible. For the diplomatic negotiations were continued beyond the date of the general Russian mobilization, and, furthermore, much of the accessory labor would, in case of the division of the publication, have had to be duplicated. The two editors agreed, therefore, to publish the work together, according to a uniform plan.

Nobody will deny that the political events of the last few weeks before the outbreak of the war stand in a close historical relation to the general political situation of the world. For this reason the Cabinet also gave instructions for the collection of those documents which are of value in the study of the more remote preliminary history of the World War. The undersigned, however, did not feel themselves called upon to withhold the publication of their work until the completion of that other undertaking, which was committed to Professor Mendelssohn Bartholdy (of Würzburg).

For purely objective reasons, as well as for those of general expediency, the editors have made few changes in the Kautsky collection. This collection appeared to their unprejudiced consideration to be an undertaking so carefully executed that material alterations would only have diminished its value. The whole number of the published documents amounts to 1123, of which 937 are quoted word for word, and 186 more are adduced in the notes so far as their essential contents are concerned. Apart from the reports of the Bavarian Legation, only twenty-two new documents have been added, among them some that

were not contained in the Kautsky collection for the reason that they were not in the possession of the Foreign Office, but in that of other departments of the Government. The remaining alterations are only of a technical nature pertaining to the final editing of the work. The notes have been occasionally shortened, and here and there occasionally supplemented. To most of the documents drawn up in a foreign language a translation has been appended[1]; in the case of very long documents, which have already been elsewhere officially translated, it was necessary, for reasons of time and space, to forego this plan. The completion of the cross-references between the separate documents, already laid out by Kautsky as a task to be done when reading the proof, has been put through. Also, there have been added Chronological Tables of Contents with Time Tables, an Index of Persons, an Index of Addressors, in which the documents are arranged according to the sources from which they emanated, and an Index of Telegram Numbers. The editors wish to lay stress on the fact that all the changes which they have effected in the Kautsky collection were carried out by agreement with Mr. Kautsky himself, and that the proofs have been submitted to him for correction.

In accord with the general purpose of the whole work, which is to serve politicians and historians as a scientific source of fact, collected that they might arrive at an unprejudiced judgment of events, Kautsky as well as the present editors rejected on principle all matter bearing the appearance of an opinion. We were guided by the thought that any kind of an introduction dealing with the matters themselves or any actual comment would introduce into the publication a motif of subjective evaluation which would best be left to the reader. Even plainly erroneous statements found in the printed documents have not been corrected. As an example of this class of error we would point to the statements concerning the laying-up (demobilization) of the English maneuver fleet, although the incorrectness of this announcement is shown as well by the French Yellow Book, No. 66, as by the English Blue Book, Nos. 47, 48 and 87. Nor have the erroneous announcements concerning bombings by French airmen in the neighborhood of Nuremberg, etc., been corrected in the notes.

Nevertheless, both editors considered it their duty to adopt a different method in regard to the memorandum[2] dated August 30, 1917, of the then Under-Secretary of State, Baron von dem Bussche, relating to a "conference of military authorities" at Potsdam on the 6th (or 5th) of July, 1914, as in this case it is not a matter of a document of the period covered by this work, but a matter of a subsequent documentary statement made by an official who had no part in the events of the year 1914, and who cites no authority for his statement. The investigation made by the Foreign Office of the former Imperial Court Marshal's office, of the Prussian Ministry of Public Works (for the Potsdam Railroad Administration), of the Imperial aides-de-camp then on duty, of the General and Admiralty Staffs, of the Ministry for National Defense, of the Chief of the Admiralty, and of the military officials referred to in the memorandum mentioned, resulted in additions to the documents of the Foreign Office which are appended to these Preliminary Remarks in a supplement on pages 46–9.

[1] [In most cases, the original language of the document has been translated for this print and the German translation disregarded.]

[2] See Supplement VIII, *post*, p. 651.

II. TEXT OF THE DOCUMENTS

All documents which have in any way been included in this publication have been printed without any abbreviations or any alterations of the text; even unquestionable orthographic errors have been reproduced without change, or the accepted correction is clearly designated as such. Only the introductory words "Reply to Telegram—" are, for the reader's convenience, occasionally replaced by a reference to the number of the corresponding document in the collection. Furthermore, a uniform spelling of proper names has been adopted, the punctuation in telegrams has been filled in, and the following abbreviations have been used throughout:

Y. M., H. M., for Your Majesty, His Majesty.[1]

Y. E., H. E., for Your Excellency, His Excellency.[1]

I. and R., for Imperial and Royal.[1]

Every document is accompanied by an indication as to whether the text is taken from the "engrossed copy", i. e., from the corrected copy kept in the archives, from the "original draft", or from the "decodification" of the Cipher Bureau, etc.

The signatures to written reports are reproduced as the signers were in fact accustomed to sign their names, for instance, "v. Bethmann-Hollweg, F. Pourtalès"; to telegrams, however, only the family name without any addition has been appended.

III. NUMERICAL ORDER OF THE DOCUMENTS

For the numerical order of the documents a strictly chronological arrangement has been adopted. In the case of all numbered documents, in relation to which the exact time of their being sent out from the Foreign Office to the General Telegraph Office or the time of their arrival at the Foreign Office (Cipher Bureau) is known, this time determined their order. It is, of course, to be considered that, for example, a telegram in cipher which was sent to the telegraph office at 11 a.m., had perhaps been completed in its first draft form by 10 a.m., thus earlier than a telegram coming in at 10 a.m., could be decoded and read. Furthermore, an urgent or short telegram in cipher, taken to the telegraph office at 10, might have been drafted later than a telegram not urgent, or a long telegram in cipher, first sent from the Foreign Office at 10.30. Finally, the coding officials could not be continuously busy at the office without any period for rest, so that many arrivals of important matter must have had to wait hours before being attended to. To take all these things into consideration was impossible; any attempt to do so could easily have given an arbitrary arrangement to the numerical order of the documents. The editors have therefore preferred to adopt systematically the time of receipt and departure from the Foreign Office as the foundation for the numerical order. With regard to telegrams, etc., of the Emperor, the times of their departure from or arrival at the court determined their order. And it must be remembered, besides, that messages sent from Petersburg, etc., are timed according to Eastern European time—1 hour before Central-European; those from Paris,

[1] [These and other abbreviations are not preserved in this translation.]

London, etc., according to Western European time, 1 hour later than Central-European.

Documents which are not telegrams are provided by the Foreign Office only with the receipt stamp "a.m." or "p.m." The arrangement of the numbers of these, therefore, in so far as other documents have not afforded indirectly further facts as to time, is only approximately correct. And, besides, it often occurred that only the most important arriving messages were decoded at once, and they were not entered in the journal and provided with the receipt stamp until quite a little later.

IV. NOTES

The compass and extent of the notes is explained by the endeavor to give to the important documents emanating from the local Foreign Office their original phraseology wherever actual alterations are concerned, even though they are of slight significance. For the original wording of a first draft deserves to be considered in attempting to determine the train of thought of the authors of such weighty documents, as well as their turn of mind. To give the name of the man whose hand was responsible for the draft of a political document is nothing but the establishment of an external fact, and does not at all necessarily prove that the official named was the true subjective originator of the record in question. There is a great possibility that, when the matter concerns a subordinate authority, the physical author of the document has drafted it according to directions which have been given him on the part of another. The draft may also be the precipitation of the joint council and discussion of several participating officials.

In the case of documents that have already been published in full or in part in earlier German White Books, reference is made to the appropriate place in the White Book. All the documents in this collection are literally reproduced, while in earlier publications, for the purpose of protecting the secrecy of the cipher, a general and customary paraphrase has been made use of. Reference to the color books of other nations, however, has only been made in exceptional cases.

V. MARGINAL NOTES

It is from Kautsky, also, that the marginal annotations of the Emperor have been taken to accompany the printed diplomatic documents. What fundamental influence on the current of events can be attributed to them, can not be investigated here. Occasionally it is made evident from the documents themselves that the marginal instructions arrived too late to be of any value in coming to a decision. In other cases the documents disclose that instructions were given that were not carried out. Very frequently they are plainly nothing but the manifestation of a momentary mood. In order to make it easier to determine what influence any of the Imperial expressions of opinion might have had, it is regularly noted whenever the document in question was returned with its marginal annotations to any official authority, or when the notes themselves were brought to the attention of the proper Berlin authority. The marginal notes of the Emperor and the words or sentences which he underlined in reading are distinguished

by being printed in italics, for instance, *Petersburg*, while the portions of a document emphasized by the author of it himself are indicated by the use of SPREAD TYPE.[1]

VI. DOCUMENTS FROM THE EMBASSIES, LEGATIONS AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES

The archives of the German Embassy at Vienna, called in toward the end of September, could be made use of at least to the extent of making it possible to correct discrepancies between the decodifications of the Foreign Office and the Vienna originals, and to determine the exact times of arrival of the dispatches sent from Berlin to Vienna. The Vienna documents are especially important for the investigator, as the Ambassador at that time often noted in brief notes in his own handwriting the manner in which he executed the instructions sent him from Berlin and the replies of the Vienna Cabinet thereto.

A review of the latest occurrences which had been prepared by the Embassy at Petersburg, had already been earlier introduced into the appendix by Kautsky.

The thirty-five reports, telegrams and telephone dispatches placed at the disposal of the editors by the Bavarian Legation in Berlin are included in the supplements on account of their importance.

On the other hand, a preparation of the documents of the late Ministry of War and the Imperial Naval Office, as well as of the General and Naval Staffs, was not possible because of the limitation of time.

VII. CLOSING REMARKS

The editors are not blind to the fact that, as their experience shows them, all the matters that were dealt with between the persons participating are not covered by the documents. It is even a matter of routine in the administration of internal affairs that just the particularly delicate matters are at first only discussed in PRIVATE LETTERS between the persons concerned. This custom, much to be deplored by the historian, may, for obvious reasons, have played a significant part in the transactions of the Foreign Office. Private letters of this nature may find their way into the documents, but not necessarily. For use in the present publication, the undersigned discovered quite a number of private letters in the archives.

And then, nowadays, telephone conversations play a certain rôle in the management of foreign affairs. See, for example, Nos. 441, 465 and 468, as well as Supplement IV. Nevertheless, it can not be determined whether, besides these, other telephone conversations were not held with foreign stations.

REGULAR memoranda on word of mouth transactions, even covering those between the Foreign Office and foreign diplomats, were not kept. The subjects of such transactions are, it is true, frequently mirrored in the instructions and reports to the representatives of Germany abroad. Nor was a formal daily report, such as that of the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, kept

[1] [In this translation the Editors' emphasis is indicated by small capital letters, as here, instead of spread type.]

going in Berlin. For the reasons suggested, it remains open to question whether the gaps in the military situation reports of the General Staff rendered to the Foreign Office during the critical period can not be explained by the fact that the subjects of the missing reports were submitted orally.

Quite apart from these gaps, complete light could only be shed on all that took place IF THE FORMER ENEMY NATIONS COULD COME TO THE DETERMINATION TO LAY OPEN THEIR ARCHIVES TO THE PUBLIC OF THE WHOLE WORLD WITH THE SAME UNRESERVED FRANKNESS THAT HAS BEEN SHOWN BY THE GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN REPUBLICS.

BERLIN, *Beginning of November, 1919.*

COUNT MAX MONTGELAS. DR. WALTHER SCHÜCKING.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE PRELIMINARY REMARKS

The court train of Emperor William left the Wildpark station at 9.15 a.m. on the 6th of July for Kiel. (Foreign Office, File 2138, October 1, 1919, a.m.)

The day-book of the Imperial Messenger (Foreign Office, File 26078, October 1, 1919) records neither on the 5th nor the 6th of July a "conference of military authorities."

The two aides-de-camp on duty know nothing of any conference of military authorities (Foreign Office, File 2140, October 11, 1919, a.m. and File 2167, October 17, 1919, a.m.)

There are further reports from:

BARON VON DEM BUSSCHE

(Foreign Office, File 27230, October 16, 1919)

Unfortunately I can not remember the source. Perhaps Müller. The date of the memorandum might possibly refresh my memory. It is also conceivable that I erred in describing the source as reliable.

ADMIRAL VON MÜLLER

(Foreign Office, File 28205, October 28, 1919, p.m.)

I can not have been the authority cited by Baron von dem Bussche. My day-book contains nothing concerning such an audience with His Majesty, which must have occurred during the period between June 29 and July 6, 1914 (presence of His Majesty at the New Palace before the Northland journey). Early on the 6th of July, however, the audience mentioned by Admiral von Capelle took place.

V. MÜLLER.

ADMIRAL VON CAPELLE

(Foreign Office, File 2139, October 11, 1919)

BADEN-BADEN, *October 8, 1919.*

On Monday, the 6th of July, 1914, between 7 and 8 o'clock in the morning, I received as Acting Secretary of State—Grand Admiral von Tirpitz was on leave

of absence—a summons by telephone to come at once to the Emperor William at the New Palace.

I met the Emperor in the garden all ready to begin his journey to the Northland. The Emperor walked up and down with me for a short while and told me briefly of the occurrences of the day before, Sunday. He added, according to my recollection, something of approximately the following tenor (private or official memoranda on the subject made at that period are probably not available): He did not believe in serious warlike developments. According to his view, the Czar would not in this case place himself on the side of regicides. Besides that, Russia and France were not prepared for war. (The Emperor did not mention England.) On the advice of the Imperial Chancelor, he was going to start on the journey to the Northland, in order not to create any uneasiness. Neverthless, he wanted to give me information of the strained situation, in order that I might consider what was to follow.

According to what precedes, no conference of military authorities took place in Potsdam on the 6th of July, as the Emperor started on his journey to Kiel immediately after the talk with me.

ADMIRAL (active list) v. CAPELLE.

GENERAL OF INFANTRY VON BERTRAB

(Foreign Office, File 2194, October 22, 1919)

BERLIN, *October 20, 1919.*

To the Foreign Office:

I reply very respectfully that on the 6th of July, 1914, His Majesty the Emperor informed me personally, without any witnesses, of his conception of the situation created by the measures undertaken by Austria, in order that I, as the senior officer of the General Staff at that time present in Berlin, might inform the Chief of the General Staff, who was staying at Karlsbad, about the matter. There were present in the background Her Majesty the Empress, an adjutant and a lackey. Immediately preceding, His Majesty talked—evidently to the same purpose—with a naval officer, also privately, the latter departing at once after the talk. After the Emperor had dismissed me, he entered his automobile to start on his Northland journey. No arrangements were made either during or at the conclusion of the conversation. In fact, His Majesty said definitely that he did not consider it necessary to make any arrangements, as he did not believe in serious complications as a result of the Serajevo crime.

v. BERTRAB,
General of Infantry.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL COUNT WALDERSEE

(Foreign Office, File 2215, October 25, 1919)

To the inquiry of the 23d instant $\frac{\text{File } 2190}{9126}$ I have the honor to reply as follows:

On the morning of the 8th of July, 1914, Lieutenant General von Bertrab, Chief of the Survey Staff, informed me that during my brief absence he had been summoned to Potsdam by the Chief of the Military Cabinet to see His Majesty the

Emperor. The latter had disclosed to him, for communication to the Chief of the General Staff—General von Moltke was at that time staying at Karlsbad—that he, the Emperor, had promised the Emperor Franz Joseph to stand behind him with the power of Germany should complications develop from the proceedings against Serbia planned on the part of Austria. No orders or instructions were issued through the medium of General von Bertrab; nor did any in relation to possible preparation for war reach the General Staff in any other way.

It may be emphasized here that General von Bertrab was summoned to Potsdam solely in his capacity as ranking Quartermaster General, and that he had nothing to do with the work of mobilization.

In the meantime the Emperor had started on his Northland journey. For me, who represented General von Moltke in all matters pertaining to war, there was nothing to initiate as a result of General von Bertrab's audience at Potsdam. The regular mobilization work had been concluded on the 31st of March, 1914. The army was, as always, ready.

On that very same evening of July 8, after I had got my bearings on the situation, I went on leave of absence into the country for recuperation. Neither were any orders for preparation issued by the Ministry of War, and, furthermore, the General Staff undertook no measures of any sort having war in view until immediately before the commencement of the war. Very soon after I did, the Chief of the Second Division, who worked under me on mobilization matters, started on his leave of absence.

I only returned to Berlin on the 23d of July, when the political tension commenced to reach its height.

COUNT WALDERSEE.

CENTRAL OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

(Foreign Office, File 27658, October 21, 1919)

Ministry of National Defense, Central Office.
No. 165. 10. 19. Z. R.
To the letters of October 3 and 4, 1919.

KÖNIGIN-AUGUSTA STRASSE 38/42, BERLIN, *October 16, 1919.*

To 1. The former Minister of War, now General of Infantry (active list) von Falkenhayn, was on leave from the 10th to the 24th of July, 1914, inclusive. He left Berlin on a tour of duty on the evening of July 8, 1914, entered upon his leave on the conclusion of his tour of duty, and upon returning from spending his leave with his family on the North Sea, again, on the 25th of July, 1914, took over the duties of his office. The leave of absence was granted orally, and no cabinet order was issued on the matter.

To 2. On the 5th or the 6th of July, 1914, no officers from the Prussian Ministry of War were summoned by the Emperor to any official conference.

WURTZBACHER.

Naval Captain Zenker

(Foreign Office, File 29387, November 12, 1919)

Berlin, *November 8, 1919.*

I was summoned to Wildpark on the 5th of July, 1914, to receive orders from His Majesty the Emperor. As I have in my personal possession no memoranda concerning the proceeding of my Imperial audience, I can only give information as follows from memory:

His Majesty the Emperor informed me, to be passed on to my official superiors, that at noon on the 5th of July the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires had inquired of him whether Germany would fulfil the obligations of her alliance in the event of an Austro-Hungarian conflict with Serbia and the strained relations with Russia that might perhaps result. His Majesty had promised this, but did not believe that Russia would enter the lists for Serbia, which had stained itself by an assassination. France, too, would scarcely let it come to war, as it lacked the heavy artillery for the field armies. Yet though a war against Russia–France was not probable, nevertheless the possibility of such a war must be borne in mind from a military point of view.

Still, the High Seas Fleet was to start its cruise to Norway as had been planned for the middle of July, as he himself was going to start on his journey to Norway according to schedule.

To my question, whether the Chief of the Admiralty Staff, who was then on leave, should be recalled, His Majesty replied in the negative.

I reported these advices on the 6th of July to the Acting Chief of the Admiralty Staff, Vice Admiral Behncke. What arrangements the latter may have made as a result I am not in a position to state, as I, as chief of the Tactical Division, had nothing to do with operation and mobilization matters.

Zenker,
Naval Captain.

To the Foreign Office, here.

PART I

FROM THE ASSASSINATION AT SERAJEVO TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE SERBIAN NOTE OF REPLY AT BERLIN

Together with Several Documents of the Weeks Preceding

No. 1

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

St. Petersburg, *June 13, 1914.*[2]

I have the honor of handing Your Excellency herewith the translation of a remarkable article which has just appeared in the *Birshewija Wjedomosti*, which, I *hear, emanates from the local Ministry of War*, and which is planned with the evident object of *exercising pressure on France to cause her to institute a three-year military service term.*

Against us!

The article explains, under the heading "Russia is prepared, France must prepare also," that Russia, which has just been making exertions for the strengthening of her defensive power such as *have never yet been made by any nation*, has a right to expect from France that the latter will also strengthen her army, which is only possible by the introduction of the three-year service system.

F. Pourtalès.

No. 2

Report of the Berlin Lokalanzeiger of June 14 on an article in the Birshewija Wjedomosti [3]

An Ally's Warning

Telegram from our foreign correspondent.

Petersburg, *June 13.*

This demands a clear, concise reply in the shape of action!

The article in the *Birshewija Wjedomosti*, already mentioned, which bears the heading "Russia is prepared, France must prepare also," and which was directly inspired by the Minister of War, General Suchomlinoff, has been the cause of a general sensation. The article reads:

> Russia does not permit herself to mix into the internal affairs of a foreign nation, but can not remain merely an unconcerned onlooker during a crisis in a friendly and allied

[1] From engrossed copy.

[2] Receipt notation of the Foreign Office: June 15, a.m. The report was submitted to the Emperor, and was returned by him on the 15th of June. According to an order noted on the margin by the Imperial hand, it was communicated by the Chief of the Military Cabinet to the General Staff, by the latter on the 25th of June to the Ministry of War. The supplement to the report became known to the Emperor by means of a telegram to the *Lokalanzeiger*. See No. 2.

[3] Returned by the Emperor on the 15th of June.

country. If the French parliament feels itself at liberty to comment on such internal affairs of Russia as army contracts, which are connected with certain economic advantages to the contractors, Russia can certainly not remain indifferent in the face of a purely political question, such as the three-year service term, which constitutes a cause of dissension between the parties of the French parliament. In Russia there is no divided opinion with regard to this matter. Russia has done everything to which her alliance with France obligates her, and she now expects that her ally will perform her obligations as well. It is known all over the world, what colossal sacrifices have been made by Russia to bring the Franco-Russian alliance to the point of the ideal. The reforms made in the Russian military departments during the training of Russia's armed forces exceed anything that has ever been done before in this line. The recruit contingent this year has, by the latest ukase of His Majesty, been *raised* from 450,000 *to 580,000 men*, and the *period of service has been lengthened by six months*. Thanks to these measures there are in service every winter in Russia *four* contingents of recruits under arms, making an army of *2,300,000 men*. Only the great and mighty Russia can permit herself such a luxury. Germany has at her command over 880,000, Austria somewhere over 500,000 and Italy rather more than 400,000 men. It is thus *quite natural* that Russia *should expect from France 770,000 men*, which is only *possible* under the *three-year term of service*. It must be remarked that these army increases in time of peace are exclusively for the purpose of effecting *rapid mobilization*. Russia is at the same time moving on toward new reforms, to the construction of a *whole network of strategic* railways, *for the most rapid concentration of the army in case of war. Russia wants the same thing from France*, which she can only do by realizing the three-year term of service. *Russia and France want no war*, but Russia is ready and France must be ready also.

Well! At last the Russians have shown their hand! Whatever German still refuses to believe that in Russo-Galicia they are working at high pressure for an early war with us, or that we should adopt the necessary measures for self-protection, deserves to be sent at once to the mad-house at Dalldorf!

God be praised!

Where are they to come from?

All against Germany!

Twaddle!

Stiff new taxes and monopolies, and into the Army and Navy with the 38,000 yet unenlisted men!

W.

With this sentence, emphasized in black-faced type, is concluded the much discussed article, from which it is plainly evident that Russia commenced her colossal armament projects *two years ago on the strength of agreements with France.*

What my General Staff has always asserted!

No. 3

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [1]

Absolutely confidential.
To be delivered personally. BERLIN, *June 16, 1914.*[2]

It will not have escaped Your Serene Highness that the article in the *Birshewija Wjedomosti*, which, as we know is conclusively traceable back to the War Minister General Suchomlinoff, has caused quite a sensation in Germany. As a matter of fact, probably never before has an officially inspired article so ruthlessly exposed the warlike tendencies of the Russian military party as this announcement in the press has done. In order to strengthen permanently the chauvinism of France, it has, it seems, been written too bluntly. On the other hand the reaction it has caused in German public opinion is unmistakable and serious.

While up to the present time it has been only the most extreme circles among the Pan-Germans and the militarists who have been crediting Russia with the carefully planned preparation of an early hostile attack on us, the calmer politicians also are now beginning to incline toward this view. The next result will be a cry for a renewed immediate and comprehensive increase of the Army. The effect of that will be, as things stand with us now, that the rivalry of the Navy will be aroused, as the Navy never wants to be left behind when anything is being done for the Army. Since His Majesty the Emperor, as I may remark quite confidentially, has already quite identified himself with this tendency of thought, I look forward anxiously to the outbreak of a new armament fever in Germany during the summer and fall.

Little as it seems possible to recognize with certainty the actual aims of Russian policy in the present uncertain state of her affairs, and much as we must count on the fact, in view of our own political arrangements, that Russia, of all the great European Powers, might be the most inclined to run the risk of an adventure in war, nevertheless, I do not believe that Russia is planning an early war against us. But she would doubtlessly like to do so, and we could not take it amiss if she, in case of another Balkan crisis, should enter the arena in a more forceful manner than she did during the last disturbances in the Balkans, secured as she is now by her comprehensive military equipment. Whether in such a case it would come to a general European conflagration, would depend exclusively on the attitude of Germany and England. If we should both stand forth with determination as the guarantors of European peace, an attitude which, so long as we should from the very beginning seek this object on the basis of a common plan, neither the Triple Alliance nor the Entente obligations could prevent us from assuming, war could be avoided. Otherwise any casual, even a quite subordinate conflict of interests between Russia and Austria-Hungary may fire the torch of war. A foresighted policy must consider in advance the possibility of such an eventuality.

Now it is plainly evident that the increased activities of the German chauvinists and armament fanatics can be just as much of a hindrance to such a cooperation between Germany and England, as the indefinite attitude of the English Cabinet,

[1] From the draft as written down by the Imperial Chancelor.
[2] Forwarded on the afternoon of the 16th of June.

secretly favoring French and Russian chauvinism. Germany will never be willing to renounce extensions of her Army corresponding to the growth of her population. An extension of the naval laws is not under consideration. But the putting of more cruisers into active foreign service and the arming and manning of battleships, etc., will constantly compel increased expenditure, though well within the limits of the naval laws. But there is a great difference, whether such measures are taken as the necessary consequence of a gradual peaceful development, or whether they are undertaken in a panic rush under the pressure of a public opinion excited and impregnated with the fear of war.

That Sir Edward Grey decidedly disavowed in the Lower House the rumors of an Anglo-Russian naval convention, and backed up his denial in the *Westminster Gazette* besides, is a very agreeable thing. Had these rumors proved true, even though only in the form that the English and Russian navies had come to an agreement to cooperate by fighting together against Germany in the event of a future war—an agreement similar to that made by England with France at the time of the Morocco crisis—Russian and French chauvinism would not only thereby have been greatly stimulated, but public opinion in our own country would have become subject to a not unjustifiable disquiet that would have found its expression in a "navy scare" and to the renewed envenoming of our slowly improving relations with England. In the midst of the nervous tension in the grip of which Europe has found itself during the last few years, the result might have proved incalculable. In any case, the idea of the common mission of England and Germany for the guaranteeing of peace would have been fatally endangered at the very beginning by the complications that would probably have arisen.

I request Your Serene Highness most respectfully to tender to Sir Edward Grey my especial thanks for his frank and honest declaration, and to accompany them unceremoniously but cautiously with the expression of the general considerations which I have indicated above.

I shall look forward with particular interest to your esteemed report [1] of the reception to be accorded you by Sir Edward Grey.

v. Bethmann-Hollweg.

[1] See No. 5.

No. 4

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

Confidential. VIENNA, *June 17, 1914.*[2]

After the departure of His Majesty the Emperor, Count Berchtold was invited to Konopischt by His Imperial and Royal Highness the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The Minister told me today that His Imperial and Royal Highness expressed himself to him as in the highest degree pleased with the visit of His Majesty the Emperor. He had thoroughly discussed all possible questions with His Majesty and had been met with a complete agreement of views.

The Archduke also spoke to Count Berchtold of what he had told our Most Gracious Lord with reference to Count Tisza's policies, particularly toward the non-Magyar nationalities. Toward the Roumanians, as His Imperial and Royal Highness had remarked, Count Tisza had used plenty of fine words, but his acts had not corresponded with his words. One of the principal mistakes made by the Hungarian Premier had been that he would not grant the Transylvanian Roumanians a few more representative seats.

Count Berchtold informed me that he had often and expressly attempted to influence Count Tisza in favor of greater concessions to the Roumanians. But his efforts had been in vain. Count Tisza had asserted that he had already made all the concessions possible to the Roumanians.

For my part, as I have already done in the direction of Count Berchtold, I shall make use of every occasion, according to the Imperial directions given to me, to impress also on the Hungarian Premier the necessity of winning over the Roumanians.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

By his internal policy, which, through the Roumanian question, has an influence on the external policy of the triple alliance, he must not endanger the latter.

No. 5

The Ambassador at London to the Imperial Chancelor [3]

LONDON, *June 24, 1914.*[4]

I took the opportunity on my visit today to express to Sir Edward Grey the thanks of Your Excellency for the frank and honest statement he made in the Lower House disavowing the rumors of an alleged Anglo-Russian naval convention. I stated in addition that Your Excellency welcomed his explanations so much the more gladly inasmuch as they tended not immaterially to dissipate the

[1] From engrossed copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: June 20, a.m. Report was submitted to the Emperor, was returned by him on the 21st of June, and was back at the Foreign Office on June 22.
[3] From the engrossed copy.
[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: June 27, a.m. See No. 3.

fears to which of late a large portion of the German people had been subject in connection with the state of our foreign relations. It was principally Russia that was supplying the food on which these fears fed, and was responsible for the resulting efforts for increases of our armed strength, and, in this connection, I could point particularly to the article in the *Nowoje Wremja*, which had aroused an unpleasant sensation in Germany. In view of the possibility that a new war in the Balkans might break out and that Russia might then decide to conduct a somewhat more active foreign policy, it seemed to us to be of the greatest importance that the intimate contact which had existed between us during the last crisis should be maintained in the face of all future occurrences, in order that we might successfully encounter any warlike policy on the basis of a common understanding. I further called the attention of the Minister to the fact that only by the maintenance of the German-British intimacy, coupled with our conviction that he too would endeavor in the future, by the use of his extensive influence at Paris and Petersburg, to oppose all adventurous impulses, would it be possible for the Imperial Government to check the armament fever that was on the rise in our own country at the present time, and to keep our defensive measures within their present compass. In doing this, I purposely avoided touching more particularly on our naval laws, as I have never brought up this ticklish theme with the Minister since my advent at London, and as he, too, has up to the present carefully refrained from discussing this subject with me.

The Minister took cognizance of my remarks with visible pleasure, and stated that he, too, was endeavoring to move forward with us hand in hand and to remain in close touch with us concerning all matters that came up. With this in mind, he had just discussed the present eastern situation, and believed that this was the way best adapted to our mutual aims. So far as Russia is concerned, he had not the slightest reason for doubting the pacific inclinations of the Russian Government. He did not need to begin now by assuring me that Count Benckendorff was pursuing no anti-German policy here. The Emperor Nicholas and Mr. Sazonoff always expressed themselves toward Sir George W. Buchanan in the most peaceable manner; though it could not be denied that Mr. Sazonoff had the desire that the Triple Entente should make a somewhat more robust appearance as a counterweight to the solid block of the Triple Alliance. But so far as concerned the article in the *Nowoje Wremja*, to which I had referred, he, the Minister, knew absolutely nothing. He added, smilingly, that just last evening he had seen in the specified paper a fierce attack on Great Britain on account of the Persian oil agreement. And so far as France was concerned, he knew from reliable sources and was furthermore strengthened in his opinion by foreign—for instance, American—reports, that the French felt not the least inclination toward a war.

There existed, so Sir Edward told me, no agreements between Great Britain and her Entente companions that had not been made public. He could reassert this to me as he had stated it in Parliament, and he was glad to be able to add that nothing would ever occur at his instigation to turn the head of this combination offensively against Germany. He also believed that in our country of late, a more satisfied view of this matter had begun to take hold. He wished, however, to be quite frank with me, not desiring that I should be led in any way to misunderstand him, so that he would take this occasion to tell me that in spite of the

facts mentioned above, his relations with the other two allies were today, as always, most intimate, and that they had lost none of their earlier cohesion. He stood in permanently close touch with the Governments concerned on all important matters.

I thanked the Minister for his confidential explanations, which he made in an agreeable and friendly manner, and replied that they offered us no ground for objection, as long as he made use of his powerful influence in favor of peace and moderation.[1]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 6

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Imperial Chancelor[2]

BERLIN, *June 27, 1914.*

In this conference,[3] as was to be expected, Lichnowsky was once again put completely into swaddling-clothes by Grey, and allowed his conviction that he was dealing with an honorable and truth-loving statesman to be strengthened anew. There is nothing left to do but to give Lichnowsky some naturally very cautious hints concerning the secret but absolutely reliable reports we are getting from Petersburg, which permit no doubt at all to arise as to the existence of permanent political and military agreements between England and France or concerning the initiation already in progress of transactions between England and Russia directed toward similar results.[4]

ZIMMERMANN.

No. 6A

The Consul General at Serajevo to the Foreign Office[5]

Telegram 11. SERAJEVO, *July 1, 1914.*[6]

Tonight it was reported here from Semlin *as a fact* that from ten to twelve conspirators were sent away from Belgrade independently of each other.

Three assassins at least were stationed here at Serajevo. My confidential informant, an absolutely reliable personage in a responsible position that keeps him informed on all sides, made answer as my FRIEND to my direct question, that he would most decidedly advise against the visit of His Majesty the Emperor to Vienna, on the ground of his knowledge of conditions at Vienna and of the system

[1] See No. 6, No. 20, note 3, and No. 30, note 4.
[2] Personally written by Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann.
[3] See No. 5.
[4] On the margin is the comment, in the Imperial Chancelor's own handwriting: "Lichnowsky is coming to see me Monday at 5 o'clock. Before then I should like to discuss the situation with you once more. B. H. 27."
[5] From the decodification.
[6] Filed at Serajevo, July 1, 1 p.m.; received at the Foreign Office, July 1, 4.05 p.m.; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 1, p.m.

of the Russo-Serbian terrorists. Personally, after all I have seen and heard here, I unconditionally endorse this advice.

The journey to Artstätte,[1] which is purely German and is small, and on that account easily controlled, is said to be unobjectionable.[2]

DR. EISWALDT.

No. 6B

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna[3]

Telegram 107. BERLIN, *July 2, 1914.*[4]

As a result of warnings which have been received from Serajevo,[5] of which the first, in fact, dates back to April of this year, I have been obliged to request His Majesty the Emperor to give up the visit to Vienna. What confirmed me in this determination was the fact that the journey was not an act of national or political necessity, but one concerned with the voluntary announcement of friendly feelings beyond a point required by etiquette; that there is apparently a wide-spread conspiracy at the bottom of the Serajevo crime; and that assassinations are well known to exercise a suggestive influence on the criminal elements. On the strength of these considerations, I was unable to undertake the responsibility of exposing His Majesty unnecessarily in a foreign land.

For public purposes, the giving up of the visit will be laid to the physical indisposition of His Majesty. His Majesty wishes, however, that the true reason be communicated to His Majesty the Emperor Franz Joseph personally. His Majesty has therefore written with his own hand the following instructions for Your Excellency, p. p.[6]:

> To Mr. v. Tschirschky for His Majesty Emperor Franz Joseph:
> His Majesty has been informed by His Excellency the Imperial Chancelor that a warning has been received by His Excellency from Serajevo, coming through confidential informants of the German consul, advising against the making of a journey to Vienna by the German Emperor. His Excellency the Imperial Chancelor thereupon stated to His Majesty, as his responsible adviser, that he was unable to accept the responsibility, and requested His Majesty to forego the visit. His Majesty was unable to turn a deaf ear to these arguments, and decided with a heavy heart and with deep grief to give up the journey. His Majesty has instructed the German Ambassador to inform Emperor Franz Joseph personally of the state of affairs at once, and to express to him how painful it was to him to have to come to this decision. For one reason, as it might be imputed to a lack of personal courage, for another, because His Majesty is thereby prevented from standing at the Emperor's side to comfort and to share his grief, as well as to be near the entire Austrian nation in their day of mourning. End.

I request Your Excellency, most respectfully, to carry out these Imperial instructions as quickly as possible in the appropriate form.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] Thus in the decodification for "Artstetten".
[2] See No. 6*b*.
[3] From the draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.
[4] Filed at the main telegraph office at 10.20 a.m.
[5] See No. 6*a*.
[6] [*Praemissis praemittendis.*]

No. 7

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor[1]

VIENNA, *June 30, 1914.*[2]

Count Berchtold told me today that *everything* pointed to the fact that the threads of the conspiracy to which the Archduke fell a sacrifice, *ran together at Belgrade.* The affair was so well thought out that very young men were intentionally selected for the perpetration of the crime, against whom *only a mild punishment could be decreed.* The Minister spoke very bitterly about the Serbian plots.

I hope not.

Now or never.

Who authorized him to act that way? That is very stupid! It is none of his business, as it is solely the affair of Austria, what she plans to do in this case. Later, if plans go wrong, it will be said that Germany did not want it! Let Tschirschky be good enough to drop this nonsense! The Serbs must be disposed of, and that right soon!

I frequently hear expressed here, even among serious people, the wish that *at last a final and fundamental reckoning should be had with the Serbs.* The Serbs should first be presented with a number of demands, and in case they should not accept these, energetic measures should be taken. *I take opportunity of every such occasion to advise quietly but very impressively and seriously against too hasty steps.* First of all, they must make sure what they want to do, for so far I have heard only indefinite expressions of opinion. Then the chances of every kind of action should be carefully weighed, and it should be kept in mind that Austria-Hungary does not stand alone in the world, that it is her duty to think not only of her allies, but to take into consideration the entire European situation, and especially to bear in mind the attitude of Italy and Roumania on all questions that concern Serbia.

Goes without saying; nothing but truisms.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 8

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[3]

Telegram 80. VIENNA, *July 2, 1914.*[4]

The news in the papers according to which the local Government has made a *démarche* at Belgrade to demand from the Serbian Government an inquiry into the assassination, is not correct. Up to the present no such steps have been taken. Whether they will follow later will depend on whether the local inquiry develops any really highly suspicious facts against Belgrade.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 2, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, returned by him on the 4th of July.
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Filed in Vienna at 6 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.45 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 2, p.m. Report communicated by the Foreign Office on the 3d of July by telegraph to the representatives at Rome, Bucharest and Belgrade, through the main telegraph office at 10.55 a.m.

No. 9

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 81. VIENNA, *July 2, 1914.*[2]

I have just delivered the Imperial message to His Majesty Emperor Franz Joseph, who was gracious enough to keep me with him nearly an hour. His Majesty Emperor Franz Joseph sends His Majesty his heartiest thanks for the exhaustive message forwarded. Deeply and honestly as he regretted not being able to greet His Majesty here, he nevertheless fully appreciated the pressing reasons that appeared to make compulsory the giving up of the visit at the present moment. It was also a relief to him to know that His Majesty was not exposed to the hazards of a foreign journey. The warnings from Serajevo and from Semlin, which had also reached here, were unfortunately so serious that it was impossible that they should be disregarded. It is true, that he would have been very glad to see His Majesty present with him at this time, in order to discuss many political matters with him. "For I see a very dark future," said His Majesty, "and conditions down there are getting more disquieting with every day. I do not know whether we can afford to look on quietly any longer, and I hope that your Emperor also realizes the danger to the Monarchy caused by the neighborhood of Serbia. What is particularly disquieting to me is the Russian practise mobilization which is planned for the fall, just for the time when we are making a shift of recruit contingents. For Mr. von Hartwig is master at Belgrade, and Pashitch does nothing without consulting him."

The Emperor then went thoroughly into the general political situation. With permission, I will reserve a fuller report on this for the future.

His Majesty the Emperor Franz Joseph again requested me at the end of the interview to convey to His Majesty his most earnest thanks for the communication forwarded through me. His Majesty could remain assured that he felt relieved at the Emperor's having given up the visit, painful as His Majesty's absence was to him.

His Majesty the Emperor Franz Joseph looked very well. His Imperial Majesty said, however, that he had not regained his strength in full measure, but that his appetite was good and that he hoped that the fresh air of Ischl, to which he intended to return as soon as possible—presumably on next Monday—would dispel the last traces of his illness.[3]

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Vienna July 2, 10.05 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office, July 3, 12.12 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 3, a.m.

[3] See No. 11.

No. 10

The Minister at Belgrade to the Imperial Chancelor[1]

BELGRADE, *June 30, 1914.*[2]

The terrible assassination at Serajevo, which was only made known here during the evening of June 15/28, presumably not to put too early an end to the popular celebration held on that day—the so-called Widowdan, in memory of the battle of the Amselfeld on June 15, 1389—has made a deep impression on Serbia. Not in the sense that the news aroused throughout the great masses of the people any feeling of special or heartfelt grief. As far as this goes, it can at best be said that unseemly or injurious public demonstrations have been refrained from. But because it was at once instinctively felt here that *the responsibility* for the deed of blood done by Serbians *would rest*, not only on their brethren in Bosnia, *but on all Serbdom.* After it had developed *Yes.* that both assassins had up to a few weeks ago been staying in Belgrade, the one, Princip, as a commercial student, the other, Cabrinovitch, as a type setter at the State Printing Office—after the latter had openly admitted that he had gotten his bombs from Belgrade, as had at an earlier time the assassin at Cetinje—public feeling here became *very depressed.* It is true that every effort is being made to blunt the point of the storm of suspicion and accusation by calling attention to the fiasco in the case of the accusations raised at the time of the Agram and Friedjung trials, and by continually insisting on the injustice of holding a whole nation responsible for the misdeeds of individual fanatics. But it will be difficult to disprove that the Kingdom of Serbia, and especially Belgrade, with its *unrestrained press*, *its fanatical Omladina Associations*, and its *licentious Greater-Serbia agitations*, furnishes a most fertile soil for the production of such eccentric spirits.

In this painful situation, the Government has deemed it suitable first of all to express as loudly and ostentatiously as possible its condemnation of the deed and its sympathy. In order at least to clear its skirts of the assassins, it has published a *communiqué* in which the unholy deed is damned in the severest terms. An inspired article in the *Samouprawa* points out how heavily this event falls on Serbia just at the present moment, when such complex and important transactions with the Monarchy are nearing their solution, and when Serbia, weary of her continuous disturbances, desires nothing more fervently than a period of undisturbed quiet.

[1] From the engrossed copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 3, a.m.; report was submitted to the Emperor; returned by him on the 4th of July. In accordance with Imperial marginal directions it was communicated on the 7th of July to the representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburg, London, Rome, Paris and Bucharest.

Among the general public, which is not checked by official political considerations, one hears, it is true, quite a different expression of opinion. Quite apart from comparisons far from good taste, such as *with the deed of Tell* and with that of the Serb Milosh Obilitsh, who *murdered* the Sultan Bajasid on the field of Amselfeld and is still *celebrated today as a national hero*, attention is being called to the fact that it was a very inconsiderate act to hold maneuvers in *fanaticized*[1] *Bosnia*,[2] and particularly at a time when the Widowdan was freshly affecting sensitive spirits with patriotic excitement. A considerable portion of the Serbian press has turned itself into the echo of this frame of mind and even goes so far as to talk of the *provocation of Serbian patriotic* feeling[3] by the holding of the maneuvers. Tactics such as these naturally are only intended to ward off the accusations which the general public in Austria-Hungary is directing against the *Greater-Serbian agitation systematically* carried on *in Serbia*.

Serbia's moral complicity in the *crime*, which cannot be denied, augurs a serious injury to the prestige of the nation, which had just been restored as the result of the two recent wars. This is felt by many of its warmest friends and well-wishers. Thus, my Russian colleague is said to have exclaimed, upon receiving the first news of the catastrophe: "Espérons que ce ne sera pas un Serbe."[4]

He must have known it!

V. GRIESINGER.

No. 11

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor[5]

Confidential. VIENNA, *July 2, 1914*.[6]

In connection with my previous report[7] I have the honor of further reporting as follows concerning my audience of today with His Majesty the Emperor Franz Joseph.

The Emperor approached me with elastic step upon my entrance into his cabinet, and requested me, after he had received my Imperial message, to take a seat at his writing-table. The Emperor then said that times were very serious. He did not know how long it might be granted him to live, but he feared that he was to be granted no peace during the last days of his life. The Emperor then spoke of the increasing danger "down there," and said "I see a very dark future," but that one had to look forward into the future and take all precautions possible

[1] "fanaticized" twice underscored by the Emperor.
[2] Question-mark and exclamation-point in the margin by the Emperor.
[3] Exclamation-point by the Emperor in the margin.
[4] [Let us hope that it was not a Serbian.]
[5] From a copy found in the archives.
[6] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 4, p.m. In addition there is the note: "Personally answered by the Under-Secretary of State." The reply is not in the archives.
[7] See No. 9.

at present. He would have been very glad to discuss with our Most Gracious Lord all the political affairs that were engaging him. But that, for the present, had become impossible. Instead of that he would send Prince Hohenlohe, who was well acquainted with his views, to Berlin at the earliest possible moment. He sincerely hoped that my Emperor would have full confidence in the Prince, for "he deserves it." He had commissioned the Prince to talk quite frankly and unrestrainedly with His Majesty the Emperor and his advisers.

The Emperor then touched on the Albanian question. In Albania everything was going very badly. One could do nothing with those people; every Albanian could be bribed, and one could rely on none of them. Prince Wied certainly had the best of intentions, but apparently he was not the man for the task placed before him, although he would not undertake to say whether some one else could accomplish it better. It was undoubtedly one's duty to uphold the Prince of Albania as long as possible, and to guarantee his personal safety. But farther he could not go. The Albanians would then have a chance to see how they could settle matters among themselves. Austria was interested only in the integrity of the Albanian nation. As long as that should be preserved, there was no thought here of any intervention.

Turkhan Pasha, also, appeared to be a very bad leader, who was now for the second time leaving his prince and his country in the lurch. That a person of such evil repute as Mr. Aliotti should have been sent from Rome to Durazzo, was regrettable, and was an evidence of the weakness of the Italian Government. On the other hand, Marquis di San Giuliano was in every way worthy, and fortunately things were now going decidedly better in connection with the relations with Rome.

It was pleasant that the relations with Greece had become warmer. With such sensible men as Mr. Venizelos and Mr. Streit one would certainly get further along this right road.

Although he, the Emperor, certainly did not think much of King Ferdinand, nevertheless Bulgaria was a great country and capable of important development. Bulgaria, with the exception of Greece, was the only Balkan nation that had no interests hostile to those of Austria. He therefore considered it proper to cultivate relations with that nation and to make them closer.

Roumania, on the other hand, was a sad chapter. "I know that your Emperor has full confidence in King Carol," were the words of His Majesty. "I do not have it." Although the King was trying to make himself as solid as possible in every direction by means of fair words, he, the Emperor, was firmly convinced that the King no longer had the power of directing his own country, but was guided instead by popular opinion. Furthermore, the King had recently stated perfectly plainly to Prince Fürstenberg that he did not feel himself capable of living up to his obligations to the Triple Alliance. The free-hand policy so often boasted of by him would necessarily lead to the point where he would have to take the field against Austria.

One gleam of light in the otherwise so murky political sky was the improvement of relations between Berlin and London, which had naturally had the result of a favorable retroactive effect on the relations between Vienna and London. In the course of recent years, Sir Edward Grey had, to his own advantage, changed

decidedly in the matter of political relations and His Majesty believed that the otherwise not exactly brilliant London Conference had had the good result that Germany and even Austria had been brought closer to the Minister, who was at present viewing our policy a little more justly than before. "If we could only separate England entirely from her friends, France and Russia," said His Majesty. I remarked here that His Majesty could be sure that His Majesty our Most Gracious Emperor and the Imperial Chancelor would continue to move forward on the road followed up to the present only by the exercise of great patience and perseverance, in order to convince England more and more of the congruity of our interests. But to force her completely apart from her present friends of the Entente would hardly be possible within any appreciably brief period. We should have to be content for the present with a gradually increasing improvement of our relations with England. Perhaps events would sometime take place in the world by which our efforts would be aided in accomplishing this object more speedily.

His Majesty, in conclusion, returned once more to the subject of his Serbian neighbor. The intrigues at Belgrade were intolerable. There was nothing to be accomplished by kindness to those people. His Majesty here referred to the position which Mr. von Hartwig occupied at Belgrade, and to the worry caused him by the so-called practise mobilization of the Russians in the fall, just at the time when the recruits are being enlisted here and the Army is not entirely prepared for the field. He hoped that my Emperor and the Imperial Government appreciated the dangers which threatened the Monarchy by reason of the neighborhood of Serbia. As he had said, it was necessary to plan for the future and to guard the status of the countries connected by the Triple Alliance. At this remark of the Emperor, I took occasion to say to His Majesty himself—as a few days before I had already stated very emphatically to Count Berchtold—that His Majesty could count absolutely on finding Germany solidly behind the Monarchy whenever it came to the point of defending one of the latter's vital interests. The decision on the question as to where and when such a vital interest was at stake, must be left to Austria herself. A responsible policy could not be founded on wishes or opinions, however comprehensible they might be. Before any decisive step was taken, it would have to be determined very carefully just how far one wished or would have to go, and by what means the goal aimed at was to be reached. First of all, before taking any step that might be fraught with weighty consequences, the general political situation should be considered, the probable attitude of the other Powers and nations estimated, and the ground carefully leveled and prepared. I could only repeat that my Emperor would stand behind every firm determination arrived at by Austria-Hungary. His Majesty eagerly agreed to my every word, and said that I was quite right.

The Emperor then mentioned that the sudden death of General Pollio was a great blow to Italy and also for us. "Everyone is dying around me," said His Majesty, "it is too sad."

The Emperor then spoke about his plans for the summer at Ischl, and about the prospects of the stag-hunts, and deigned to dismiss me in the most gracious fashion after an audience lasting nearly an hour.

While I have been writing this report—between twelve and one o'clock at night—I have been listening to the yelling and whistling of a great crowd which started

a demonstration before the near-by Russian Embassy. Numerous bodies of police have just succeeded in driving the throng away from the Embassy, and after a speech made by someone to the crowd, but which I could not understand, the mob is just retiring to the singing of "God save," etc., and the "*Wacht am Rhein.*"

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 12

The Minister at Belgrade to the Imperial Chancelor[1]

BELGRADE, *July 2, 1914.*[2]

As the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires informs me, he, himself of his own accord, yesterday, asked the Secretary General of the local Ministry of Foreign Affairs the question, what the Serbian Government *had planned in the matter of an inquiry in view of those phases of the assassination alleged even by the Slav papers to point to a connection with Serbia and Belgrade.* Mr. Grouitch said to him in reply that up to the *present nothing had been done*, and that the matter *did not concern the Serbian Government*,[3] and asked him for his part whether the Chargé d'Affaires was speaking in the name of his Government. Mr. von Storck *then spoke very plainly to him*, and expressed to him his extreme astonishment that any government which was continually asserting its desire to live on good terms with its neighbors should exhibit *such indifference.* The conference seems to have been conducted *on both sides with extraordinary excitement*, and ended by the Secretary General getting into immediate communication with the Minister of the Interior. It is furthermore reported that *last evening a number of searches and arrests* were made in the *quarter once inhabited by the assassins.* It is also said that closer inquiries are being made to find out what societies and nationalist associations the assassins belonged to, how they came into *possession of the bombs and whence the funds* said to *have been found* on them came. *Very significant.*

V. GRIESINGER.

[1] From the engrossed copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 5, a.m. The report was submitted to the Emperor, was returned by him on the 13th of July, and was back at the Foreign Office on the 16th. Was communicated on the 20th of July to the Embassy at Vienna according to Imperial marginal instructions.

[3] The words "present nothing had been done" and "did not concern" were twice underscored by the Emperor, and in the margin are two exclamation-points made by the Emperor.

No. 13

The Emperor of Austria to the Emperor

In his own handwriting.[1]

I honestly regretted that you were compelled to give up your intention of coming to Vienna to the funeral ceremonies. I should have been glad to express to you personally my heartfelt gratitude for your comforting sympathy in my deep sorrow.

You have proved to me again by your warm and sympathetic condolence that I possess in you a faithful and reliable friend, and that I can count on you on every serious occasion.

It would have been very agreeable to me to discuss the political situation with you; but as this was not possible at the present time, I am taking the liberty of sending you the accompanying memorandum prepared by my Minister of Foreign Affairs, which had already been drawn up before the frightful catastrophe at Serajevo, and which seems especially pertinent since that tragic event.

The perpetration of the assassination of my poor nephew is the direct result of the agitations carried on by the Russian and Serbian Panslavists, the sole object of which is the weakening of the Triple Alliance and the destruction of my realm.

According to all the evidence so far brought to light, the Serajevo affair was not merely the bloody deed of a single individual, but was the result of a well-organized conspiracy, the threads of which can be traced to Belgrade; and even though it will probably prove impossible to get evidence of the complicity of the Serbian Government, there can be no doubt that its policy, directed toward the unification of all the southern-Slav countries under the Serbian flag, is responsible for such crimes, and that the continuation of such a state of affairs constitutes an enduring peril for my house and my possessions.

This peril is increased by the fact that Roumania has contracted a close friendship with Serbia, notwithstanding her existing alliance with us, and permits within her own confines an agitation against us just as hateful as is that tolerated by Serbia.

It is hard for me to doubt the good faith and the good intentions of so old a friend as is Carol of Roumania; yet he has himself twice declared to my Minister during the course of the last few months that, in the face of the excited and hostile attitude of his people, he would not be in a position to live up to the obligations of his alliance with us in case of need.

At the same time the present Roumanian Government is quite openly supporting the aspirations of the Culture League, is favoring an approach to Serbia, and is striving, with Russian assistance, toward the construction of a new Balkan alliance, which can only be aimed against my dominions.

Even at the beginning of Carol's reign, political fantasies similar to those now

[1] From the official copy belonging to the Imperial and Royal Government, to be found in the archives, which, together with the memorial printed below as No. 14, was delivered on the 5th of July to Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann on the part of Austria-Hungary. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 5; copied and communicated to the Ambassador at Vienna on the 6th of July. See further the telegrams of July 6th to the representatives at Vienna, Bucharest, Sofia and Rome, Nos. 15, 16, 17 and 33. See also the German White Book of June, 1919, supp. V, 3.

being disseminated through the Culture League were disturbing the sound political common sense of Roumanian statesmen, and were putting the Kingdom in danger of becoming the pawn of political gamblers. At that time it was your grandfather of blessed memory who interfered through his Government in energetic and clear-sighted fashion, and set Roumania on the path on which she won to a position of credit in Europe and became a reliable supporter of law and order.

Once again the same danger threatens the Kingdom; I fear that good counsel will not alone avail, and that Roumania can only be retained for the Triple Alliance if, on the one hand, we render the establishment of a Balkan alliance under Russian patronage impossible by binding Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance, and, on the other hand, show Bucharest plainly and clearly that the friends of Serbia can be no friends of ours, and that Roumania can no longer count herself among our allies unless she breaks off her relations with Serbia and suppresses to the extent of her power those agitations aimed at the stability of my realm from within Roumania herself.

The efforts of my government must in the future be directed toward the isolation and diminution of Serbia. The first stage of this journey should be accomplished by the strengthening of the present position of the Bulgarian Government, in order that Bulgaria, whose real interests coincide with our own, may be preserved from a relapse into Russophilism.

When it is recognized in Bucharest that the Triple Alliance is determined not to forego a union with Bulgaria, but would, nevertheless, be willing to persuade Bulgaria to go into partnership with Roumania and guarantee the latter's integrity, perhaps they will retrace there the perilous step to which they have been driven through friendship to Serbia and by the *rapprochement* to Russia.

If this effort should prove successful, we might further attempt to reconcile Greece to Bulgaria and to Turkey; thus there would develop under the patronage of the Triple Alliance a new Balkan alliance whose aim would be to put an end to the advance of the Panslavic flood and to assure peace to our countries.

This can, however, only be possible when Serbia, which at present constitutes the pivot of the Panslavic policy, is eliminated as a factor of political power in the Balkans.

You, too, must be convinced, after the recent frightful occurrence in Bosnia, that a reconciliation of the antagonism that now divides Serbia and ourselves is no more to be thought of, and that the continuance of the peace policy of all European monarchs is threatened as long as this hearth of criminal agitation at Belgrade is left unquenched.

No. 14

Memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian Government[1]

Confidential.

After the great upheavals of the past two years, conditions in the Balkans have cleared up to a point at which it is now possible to review to a certain extent the results of the crisis, and to determine to what extent the interests of the Triple Alliance, especially those of the two Central Powers, have been affected by events, and what conclusions must be drawn to direct the European and Balkan policies of these Powers.

An impartial comparison of the situation as it exists today with that existing previous to the great crisis, compels the conclusion that, when considered as a whole and looked at from the point of view of Austria-Hungary as well as from that of the Triple Alliance, it can not be described as at all favorable.

It is true that a balancing of the books shows us some items on the credit side of the ledger. It has been possible to create an independent Albanian State to constitute a counterweight against the Serbian pressure—a State which, after a number of years and when its internal organization has been completed, can fairly be reckoned into the calculations of the Triple Alliance as a military factor. The relations of the Triple Alliance with the enlarged and reinvigorated Kingdom of Greece have gradually assumed such a character that Greece, notwithstanding her association with Serbia, need not necessarily be regarded as hostile.

But of greatest importance is the fact that Bulgaria has awakened from the hypnotic spell cast by Russia since the developments that led to the second Balkan war, and cannot be considered today as an executor of Russian policy. On the contrary, the Bulgarian Government is attempting the achievement of a closer relationship with the Triple Alliance.

These favorable considerations are, nevertheless, balanced by others less favorable, which outweigh the former in the scales. Turkey, whose identity of interest with that of the Triple Alliance was self-evident, and which constituted a powerful counterweight to Russia and the Balkan States, has been driven almost entirely out of Europe, and has suffered the loss of a material share of her standing as a Great Power. Serbia, whose policy has for years been directed by purposes hostile to Austria-Hungary, and which is wholly subject to Russian influences, has increased in area and population even far beyond its own expectations; the possibility of a further expansion of Serbia by a union with Montenegro is put within reach by its physical neighborhood to Montenegro and by the general spread of the Greater-Serbian idea. And last, during the course of the crisis, Roumania's relation to the Triple Alliance has materially altered.

While the Balkan crisis alone led to results which are in themselves far from favorable to the Triple Alliance, and which contain the germ of further developments especially unwelcome to Austria-Hungary, we can see also that Russian and French diplomacy have instituted a single-minded and systematic line of conduct aiming at the extension of the advantages already won, and at the modification of such results as, from their point of view, are disadvantageous.

[1] From an official copy from the Austro-Hungarian Government, deposited in the archives. See also the German White Book of June, 1919, supp. V, 4. Delivered with No. 13 on the 5th of July.

A brief review of the European situation shows quite plainly why the Triple Entente—more correctly the Dual Alliance, since England has maintained a reserved attitude ever since the Balkan crisis for comprehensible and very characteristic reasons—could not remain satisfied with the rearrangement of the Balkans that was made in its favor.

While the policy of the two Empires, and, up to a certain point, the policy of Italy, is conservative, and while the character of the Triple Alliance is purely defensive, Russian policy, like that of France, pursues certain paths opposed to the existing status of affairs, and the Franco-Russian alliance, the product of the parallelism of these paths, is, after all, of an offensive character. That the policy of the Triple Alliance has so far been able to maintain itself, and that the peace of Europe has so far been preserved against disturbance by France and Russia, can be laid to the military superiority unquestionably possessed by the armies of the Triple Alliance, particularly of Austria-Hungary and Germany, over those of Russia and France—a situation in which the alliance of Roumania with the Empires constituted a very weighty factor.

The idea of liberating the Christian nations of the Balkans from the dominion of Turkey for the purpose of using them as weapons against Central Europe has been for ages past the actual political mainspring of Russia's traditional interest in these peoples. In latter times there has been developed from this idea the plan—conceived by Russia and intelligently adopted by France—of uniting the Balkan States into a Balkan alliance, in order to eliminate the military superiority of the Triple Alliance. The first requirement necessary to this plan was that Turkey should be driven out of the territories occupied by the Christian Balkan peoples, in order that the strength of those States might be increased and left free to flow westward. This requirement was satisfied, on the whole, by the recent war. On the other hand, there occurred after the completion of the war, a division of the Balkan States into two groups of nearly equal strength, Turkey and Bulgaria on one side, the two Serbian nations, with Greece and Roumania, on the other.

The next task to which France and Russia jointly set themselves, after the conclusion of the crisis, was to patch up this division in order to make use of all the Balkan States, or, at least, of a decisive majority of them, for the upsetting of the European balance of power.

As there already existed an alliance between Serbia and Greece, and as Roumania had declared herself to be in partnership with both of these two nations, at least as far as concerned the results of the peace of Bucharest, the principal business of the Dual Alliance Powers was to heal the deep antagonism of Bulgaria toward Greece, and especially toward Serbia in the matter of the Macedonian question; then to find a basis on which Roumania might be willing to go over completely into the camp of the Dual Alliance and join even with the distrusted Bulgaria in one political combination; finally, if possible, to bring about a peaceful solution of the problem of the islands, in order to bridge the way for an approach toward or a union with the Balkan States on the part of Turkey.

Concerning the basis on which the composition of these antagonisms and rivalries could be attained and the new Balkan alliance be built up, according to the plans of Russian and French diplomacy, there can be no misunderstanding.

Under present-day circumstances, inasmuch as a common action against Turkey can no more be considered, an alliance of the Balkan States can only be aimed at Austria-Hungary, and could only be brought into being on the strength of a program the ulterior design of which would be to offer all participants territorial extensions by advancing their frontiers in echelon from east to west. A union of the Balkan States on any other basis is unthinkable; it is not only not precluded on this basis, but is even well on its way to become realized.

It is hardly to be doubted that Serbia would, under pressure from Russia, agree to the admission of Bulgaria into a league aimed against the Monarchy, accepting in the acquisition of Bosnia and its contiguous territories an equivalent for the price to be paid in the form of Macedonia.

The difficulties to be met at Sofia are more serious.

Russia made proposals to Bulgaria on the basis referred to above, even before the second Balkan war, and repeated them after the peace of Bucharest. Bulgaria, plainly thoroughly afraid of a union with Serbia, nevertheless refused to agree to the Russian plans, and has since pursued a policy with any aim rather than that of a peaceful understanding with Serbia under the egis of Russia. But the politicians in St. Petersburg have by no means given up the game for lost. Russian agents are working within the country itself for the overthrow of the present régime, while the diplomacy of the Dual Alliance is at the same time earnestly striving to bring about the isolation of Bulgaria in order to make her susceptible to Russian suggestion.

As Bulgaria sought and found a *rapprochement* to Turkey after the conclusion of peace, and as, on the other hand, the Porte discovered an inclination to form an alliance with Bulgaria and to enter into closer relations with the Triple Alliance, Franco-Russian influence has for some time been busily at work along the Bosphorus to counteract this Turkish policy, to draw Turkey over to the Dual Alliance and in this way to force Bulgaria to a change of face, either by means of a complete isolation or by the cooperative influence of Turkey. Reports from Constantinople, to a certain extent corroborated by Talaat Bey's visit to Livadia, would indicate that these efforts, at least so far as Turkey is concerned, have not been entirely fruitless. By hinting at the alleged plans of other Powers for the partitioning of Turkey's possessions in Asia Minor, and effectually assisted by France's shrewd utilization of Turkey's financial necessities, Russia has so far succeeded in overcoming Turkey's historic distrust of her that Turkish statesmen are earnestly considering a *rapprochement* toward the other group of Powers instead of an association with the Triple Alliance.

It is to the activity of Russian and French diplomacy also that Talaat Bey's journey to Bucharest can be attributed, a visit by which Roumanian mediation in the Island question was to be brought about, and by which, at the same time, the circumscription of Bulgaria was to be promoted through the opening of more friendly relations between Constantinople and Bucharest.

Up to the present time, these efforts at circumscription have had no apparent effect on Bulgarian policy, perhaps because so far Sofia has seen no reason for distrust of Turkish intentions. Nevertheless, Russia's expectation that a complete isolation of Bulgaria in the Balkans as well as in Europe will finally force her to desist from her former policy and submit to the conditions which Russia will

impose in order that she may again be received into the Russian fold and under the Russian protection, is fully justified.

Macedonia plays a preeminent rôle both in Bulgaria's internal and external policy. If it should be shown to those who hold her reins of power that the peaceful agreement as proposed by Russia and an alliance with Serbia constitute the only way by which even a portion of Macedonia can be saved to the Bulgarian interest, no Bulgarian government would dare to refuse to agree to this combination, notwithstanding all former disappointments. Only such action as would stiffen Bulgaria's backbone against Russia's threats and cajolery and would secure the nation against isolation, can prevent Bulgaria from finally acceding to the plan for a Balkan alliance.

So far as concerns Roumania, Franco-Russian activities were already moving at full speed even during the Balkan crisis; public opinion had been turned into a current of antagonism toward the Monarchy by astonishing tricks of misrepresentation and by the clever fanning of the Greater-Roumania idea, which is always glowing beneath the surface; while Roumania's foreign policy has been influenced to the point of a military cooperation with Serbia, which was scarcely in consonance with the obligations resulting from the alliance with Austria-Hungary.

These activities have by no means come to a stop since that time; they were and are still being continued to great effect, and by such impressive and demonstrative methods as the visit of the Czar to the Roumanian Court.

An ever-increasing revolution of Roumanian public opinion has been the accompaniment of all this, and it cannot be doubted that today large sections of the army, the intellectuals, and the common people have been won over to a new point of view, which has as its aim "the liberation of the brethren on the other side of the Carpathians." It is evident that the ground is most effectually prepared for the accession of Roumania to a possible future Balkan alliance.

Official Roumania has so far withstood the influence of this popular wave and of the Franco-Russian propaganda, that a public desertion into the camp of the Dual Alliance and a frankly hostile policy against Austria-Hungary cannot as yet be discerned. But it is undeniable that a significant tide in the policy of Roumania has set in, a tide which—without regard to the prospect of its future development in the same direction—has already had a considerable amount of influence on the political and military situation of Austria-Hungary, and even of that of the Triple Alliance as a whole.

Whereas earlier there existed, despite the secrecy of the compact of alliance, no particular and special cause for doubt as to Roumania's fulfilment of the obligations to which she was subject as the result of her understanding with the Triple Alliance Powers, it has several times been publicly asserted of late in authoritative Roumanian quarters that the guiding principle of Roumanian policy was the principle of a free hand—an assertion against which the Triple Alliance Powers were prevented from raising a protest because of the secrecy clause in the compact of alliance. Likewise King Carol has stated to the Imperial and Royal Minister, with the frankness belonging to his high character, that as long as he lived, his efforts would be directed toward preventing the Roumanian army from taking the field against Austria-Hungary, but that he was unable to prevail against the public opinion of the Roumania of today, and that in the case of an attack by

Russia on the Monarchy, any operation of Roumania on the side of Austria-Hungary was not to be thought of. The Roumanian Foreign Minister went a step farther—noticeably enough, immediately after the Czar's visit to Constanta—when he openly admitted in an interview that a *rapprochement* between Russia and Roumania had taken place, and that a community of interest existed between the two nations.

The status of Austria-Hungary's relations to Roumania at present can be thus described: the Monarchy stands fast by the terms of the alliance, and is ready today as before, to support Roumania with all its forces in case a *casus foederis* should develop; while Roumania, for her part, declines to be bound by the terms of her alliance, and offers the Monarchy the sole prospect of an attitude of neutrality. Even Roumania's bare neutrality itself is assured to the Monarchy only by the personal word of King Carol, which is naturally good only for the duration of his reign, and depends, besides, on the King's ability to keep the reins of foreign policy continually and completely in his own hands. That this might prove beyond the power of the Monarch at a time of national excitement throughout the whole country can be denied with all the less assurance since King Carol cites the popular feeling even at the present time as a reason for the impossibility of reliance on Roumania's fulfilling the obligations of her agreement. Nor, finally, must it be forgotten that Roumania is already at the present time bound to the Monarchy's bitterest enemy in the Balkans—to Serbia—by ties of friendship and identical interest.

Up to the present time the Monarchy has restricted itself to friendly discussion of the alteration of the Roumanian policy at Bucharest, not having seen so far any reason to draw serious conclusions from Roumania's constantly and more plainly veering course of action. This attitude of the Vienna Cabinet was originally determined by the fact that the German Government held the opinion that these were transitory divagations, the results of certain misunderstandings at the period of the crisis which would automatically straighten out if they were dealt with peacefully and patiently. But it has been made plain that these tactics of quiet patience and friendly representation have not had the desired effect; that the progress of the estrangement between Austria-Hungary and Roumania has not been checked, but has, on the contrary, been hastened. That no satisfactory result is to be looked for in the future as the effect of these tactics, is proved by the circumstance that the present "free-hand" situation is wholly of advantage to Roumania and only disadvantageous to the Monarchy.

Now we are forced to face the question whether or not Austria-Hungary can restore harmony to her relations with Roumania by bringing the matter to an open exposition, by giving the Kingdom the choice of either breaking off all its connections with the Triple Alliance; or—perhaps through the making public of its affiliation to the Triple Alliance—compel it to give sufficient guaranties that all obligations springing from the Alliance will be fully and completely carried out on its part. Such a solution of the problem would naturally, by reviving a thirty-year-old tradition, best satisfy the desires of Austria-Hungary. But under present circumstances it is not likely that King Carol or any Roumanian government would be willing, even in consideration of a possible extension of the terms of the compact, publicly to announce Roumania as a confederate of the Triple

Alliance in the face of the ruling popular feeling. Therefore, a categorical *aut-aut* on the part of the Monarchy might lead to an open break. Vienna is unable to form a competent opinion as to whether or not the German Government might be able to succeed by serious and impressive representations, perhaps combined in the end with an offer such as is referred to above, in getting Roumania to take a stand which could be regarded as a reliable guaranty for her full and lasting good faith toward her allies; but that, too, seems doubtful.

These circumstances appear practically to exclude the possibility of Austria-Hungary being able to build up the compact with Roumania so reliably and securely that it might be used as the pivot of the Monarchy's Balkan policy.

It would not only be useless, but, in consideration of the military and political importance of Roumania, it would be inexcusable carelessness, seriously endangering the power of self-defense, should the Monarchy continue to remain comparatively inactive in the face of the events now coming to light in Roumania, or should it fail to enter without delay upon the military preparations and political activities necessary to counteract, or at least to weaken, the effect of the neutrality and the possible hostility of Roumania.

The military value to the Monarchy of the alliance with Roumania consisted of the fact that, in case of war with Russia, the Monarchy would have been left free from the obligation of military action in the direction of Roumania, inasmuch as a respectable portion of Russia's military power would be tied up by the attack of a flanking Roumanian army. But the present relation between Roumania and the Monarchy, should an armed conflict break out today between Russia and the latter, would practically have a contrary effect. Russia would not now have to fear a Roumanian attack in any case, and would hardly have to line up a single man against Roumania, while Austria-Hungary could not even be sure of Roumanian neutrality, and would therefore be compelled to retain a correspondingly sufficient reserve of troops to guard against a Roumania now threatening *her* flank.

Up to the present, Austria-Hungary's military arrangements for the case of war with Russia have been based on the assumption of the cooperation of Roumania. If this assumption is wrong, if there is not even an absolute assurance against Roumanian aggression, the Monarchy will be forced to make other provisions for the case of war, and plan the construction of fortifications against Roumania.

Our political object should be to show Roumania by our actions that we are able to find other pillars of support for Austria-Hungary's Balkan policy. Any action to be undertaken for this purpose goes hand in hand with the real and timely necessity for devising new methods for counteracting the efforts of the Dual Alliance to erect a new Balkan alliance. Under the circumstances existing in the Balkans today, the only way to accomplish either the one thing or the other is for the Monarchy to accept the offer made a year ago by Bulgaria and repeated several times since, and to enter upon relations with that nation which would practically amount to an alliance. At the same time it should be the policy of the Monarchy to bring about an alliance between Bulgaria and Turkey, a plan to which both nations were up to a short time ago so favorably disposed that a compact was already drawn up, although it was subsequently left unsigned.

Here, too, a continuation of the attitude of patient expectation to which the Monarchy was led by a far greater consideration for the alliance than was shown in Bucharest, would prove a great disadvantage impossible to overcome. Further holding off, and particularly the neglect of any counteraction in Sofia would simply be playing into the hands of the systematic and intensive efforts of France and of Russia. Roumania's attitude actually saddles the Monarchy with the necessity of conceding to Bulgaria that support for which she has for so long been suing, in order to frustrate the otherwise scarcely evitable success of Russia's policy of circumscription. But this must be done as long as the road to Sofia and also to Constantinople still lies open.

The compact with Bulgaria, the definite terms of which will have to be more closely considered, will, of course, in general have to be so drawn up that the Monarchy shall not be placed at odds with the obligations of its alliance with Roumania. Nor should this step on the part of the Monarchy be kept secret, as it indicates no hostility toward Roumania, though it would serve as a solemn warning to the ruling authorities at Bucharest, to bring them to a consciousness of the full significance of a lone and permanent political dependence on Russia.

But before Austria-Hungary enters upon the measures herein mentioned, she deems it of the greatest importance to come to a full understanding with Germany concerning them, not only from considerations arising from tradition and from their close alliance, but particularly for the reason that important interests, both of Germany and of the Triple Alliance, are concerned, and because the successful preservation of those ultimately *common* interests can only be looked for if the equally united action of the Triple Alliance, particularly of Austria-Hungary and the German Empire, is opposed to the united action of France and Russia.

For if Russia, supported by France, is attempting to unite the Balkan States against Austria-Hungary, if she is striving to disturb still further our already ruffled relations with Serbia, this hostility is not being directed alone against the Monarchy as such, not merely against the ally of the German Empire, but against the most easily assailable section of the Central European bloc—greatly exposed both because of its geographical position and its internal structure—which bars Russia's road toward the realization of her aims for world-dominion.

It is the object of the Dual Alliance to break down the military superiority of the two Empires with the aid of Balkan armies, but that is not the ultimate aim of Russia.

While France is striving to weaken the Monarchy because she expects to be able thereby to further her plans for revenge, the intentions of the realm of the Czar go much further.

If one considers the development of Russia during the past two centuries, the constant extension of her territory, the enormous increase of her population, far surpassing that of all other great European Powers; if one considers the tremendous increase in her economic resources and in her military power, and then remembers that this great Empire is almost completely cut off from the open sea by treaties as well as by nature, then one can appreciate the necessity of the immanent and aggressive temper that has always characterized Russian policy from time immemorial.

It does not seem reasonable to impute plans of territorial conquest in the Ger-

man Empire to Russia; nevertheless, her extraordinary armament and military preparations, the extension of the Russian strategic railways westward, etc., are surely aimed at Germany more than at Austria-Hungary.

For Russia has come to understand that the realization of her designs on both Europe and Asia—designs born of her internal necessities—will, above all, conflict with some of Germany's most important interests, and would therefore meet with Germany's unavoidable opposition.

Russian policy is compelled by conditions that are unalterable, and is therefore constant and far-sighted.

The obvious intention of Russia to circumscribe the Monarchy, which is pursuing no international policy, is aimed at making impossible the opposition of the German Empire to Russia's ultimate aim and her economic and political supremacy.

For all these reasons, those responsible for the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary are convinced that it is no less a matter of common interest for the Monarchy than for Germany to take timely and energetic steps at the present stage of the Balkan crisis against the further developments systematically sought and striven for by Russia, developments which it may later be impossible to prevent.

The foregoing memorial had just been completed when the news of the frightful occurrence at Serajevo arrived.

The full signification of the ruthless assassination can scarcely be estimated today. In any case, if such a thing were further necessary, it has given unmistakable evidence of the insuperability of the antagonism between the Monarchy and Serbia, and of the danger and intensity of the Greater-Serbia exertions that will stop at nothing.

Austria-Hungary has left nothing undone in the line of willingness or conciliation, in order to arrive at a tolerable relationship with Serbia. But it has recently been proved that all these efforts were quite vain, and that the Monarchy will have to continue to count in the future as in the past on Serbia's stubborn, implacable and aggressive enmity.

So much the more imperious becomes the necessity for the Monarchy to destroy with a determined hand the net which its enemies are attempting to throw about its head.

No. 14A

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor[1]

VIENNA, *July 4, 1914.*[2]

Although the local Ministry of Foreign Affairs is earnestly striving to exercise a quieting influence on the press and to deter it from the publication of too violent articles, the excitement which is the result of the fateful attack on the Archduke and heir to the throne and on the Duchess of Hohenberg is appearing more and more.

[1] From the engrossed copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 5, p.m.

The press is calling attention to the fact that the threads of the conspiracy unquestionably center in Belgrade, and that an end to the Greater-Serbia intrigues in the southern territories of the Monarchy, fostered by the Kingdom of Serbia, must absolutely be made. Nor has the tone of the Serbian press contributed toward the quieting of local public feeling. Despite all the official assurances that the Serbian authorities extremely regret the assassination, as envenoming the relations between the Monarchy and Serbia, people seem to discover a sort of cynicism between the lines.

The statement of the semi-official *Samouprawa* to the effect that the Serajevo occurrence could not forcibly be made into a cause of strife between Belgrade and Austria-Hungary because the balance of the civilized world would be the judge of the occurrence, and that neither Serbia nor Austria-Hungary could fail to accept its judgment, is answered today in the *Deutsches Volksblatt*, which remarks: "If the Serbian press believes that it will be able to appeal to the general European public as arbitrator between ourselves and Serbia, let Belgrade be told that we consider the developments that are to result from the inquiry being conducted at Serajevo as a matter that will have to be settled solely by ourselves and Serbia. We concede to no one the right to intervene in this affair, and we shall settle it as our honor and the vital interests of the Monarchy shall dictate."

I do not wish to omit calling attention to the fact that an article such as that in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of the third instant[1] on the assassination at Serajevo and the resulting tension between the Monarchy and Serbia might easily be misunderstood here. The counsel toward quiet and reason contained in the article, in itself well worthy of consideration, will appeal only too little at the present time to local public opinion. For anything like this, the latter is in too much of a turmoil, as is evident from the regular nightly demonstrations directed against Russia and Serbia. In my humble opinion our press should restrain itself as much as possible, and avoid giving offense here at the present moment by unsolicited advice.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 15

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna[2]

Telegram 113.
Confidential. For Your Excellency's personal information and guidance.

BERLIN, *July 6, 1914*.[3]

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador yesterday delivered to the Emperor a confidential personal letter from the Emperor Franz Joseph,[4] which depicts the present situation from the Austro-Hungarian point of view, and describes the measures which Vienna has in view. A copy is now being forwarded to Your Excellency.

[1] No. 182.
[2] From the draft. Original in the handwriting of Zimmermann with a few alterations by the Imperial Chancelor. See also the German White Book of June, 1919, supp. IV, 5.
[3] At the Central Telegraph Office at 5.15 p.m.
[4] See Nos. 13 and 18, note 4.

I replied to Count Szögyeny today on behalf of His Majesty that His Majesty sends his thanks to the Emperor Franz Joseph for his letter and would soon answer it personally. In the meantime His Majesty desires to say that he is not blind to the danger which threatens Austria-Hungary and thus the Triple Alliance as a result of the Russian and Serbian Panslavic agitation. Even though His Majesty is known to feel no unqualified confidence in Bulgaria and her ruler, and naturally inclines more toward our old ally Roumania and her Hohenzollern prince, yet he quite understands that the Emperor Franz Joseph, in view of the attitude[1] of Roumania and of the danger of a new Balkan alliance aimed directly at the Danube Monarchy, is anxious to bring about an understanding between Bulgaria and the Triple Alliance. His Majesty will, therefore, direct his minister at Sofia to lend the Austro-Hungarian representative such support as he may desire in any action taken to this end. His Majesty will, furthermore, make an effort at Bucharest, according to the wishes of the Emperor Franz Joseph, to influence King Carol to the fulfilment of the duties of his alliance, to the renunciation of Serbia, and to the suppression of the Roumanian agitations directed against Austria-Hungary.

Finally, as far as concerns Serbia, His Majesty, of course, can not interfere in the dispute now going on between Austria-Hungary and that country, as it is a matter not within his competence. The Emperor Franz Joseph may, however, rest assured that His Majesty will[2] faithfully stand by Austria-Hungary, as is required by the obligations of his alliance and of his ancient friendship.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 16

The Imperial Chancelor to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest[3]

Telegram 33.
Confidential. BERLIN, *July 6, 1914.*[4]

Kindly seek an audience with His Majesty the King and express yourself to him according to the purport of the following instructions in the name of the Emperor and King.

The Emperor Franz Joseph has just called the attention of His Majesty the Emperor and King to the dangers threatened by the agitation being carried on by the Russian and Serbian Panslavists, in a personal and confidential letter.[5] The assassination of which the Archduke Franz Ferdinand was the victim was the direct result of this agitation, the object of which is the destruction of the Danube Monarchy and the weakening of the Triple Alliance. This danger is increased, the personal letter goes on to explain, by Roumania's close friendship with Serbia, by the hateful agitations carried on in Roumania against Austria-Hungary, and by Russia's efforts, which are supported by Roumania, to found a new Balkan

[1] Originally in the draft: "unhappily evident unreliability," altered by the Imperial Chancelor to "attitude".
[2] Here in the draft "under all circumstances," was crossed out by the Imperial Chancelor.
[3] From the draft. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting with some alterations by the Imperial Chancelor.
[4] At the Central Telegraph Office at 5.25 p.m. [5] See No. 13.

alliance with an aim inimical to the Danube Monarchy. In addition, King Carol has lately stated twice to the Austro-Hungarian representative that in case of need he would not be able to live up to the obligations of his alliance, in view of the excited and unfriendly feeling of the Roumanian people against Austria-Hungary. The Emperor Franz Joseph is therefore desirous of linking Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance. He would naturally arrange that an eventual agreement with Bulgaria should be so constructed that it would not conflict with the obligations of his alliance with Roumania.

His Majesty the Emperor and King, as is known to King Carol, has been a constant advocate at Vienna for an understanding with Serbia. Nevertheless, the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia have been getting continuously worse. In view of the assassination at Serajevo, which plainly appears to have been the result of a well-organized conspiracy and of the policy of uniting all southern Slavs under the Serbian flag, which has been encouraged by the Government at Belgrade; His Majesty the Emperor and King comprehends that the Emperor Franz Joseph considers an understanding with Serbia to have become impossible, and is attempting to disarm the dangers that threaten his house and his realm from Serbia by connecting himself with Bulgaria. His Majesty has given his consent that the Emperor Franz Joseph should show himself receptive to Bulgaria's advances toward the Triple Alliance.

His Majesty the Emperor and King would request King Carol, as a faithful relative, friend and ally, to consider whether, in view of the seriousness of the situation, he could not break away from Serbia and also take action against the Roumanian agitations directed against the stability of the Danube Monarchy. His Majesty the Emperor and King naturally places the greatest value on the maintenance of the heartfelt and trustworthy bonds of alliance with Roumania, and would, in case His Majesty the King should so desire, insist that an eventual agreement with Bulgaria should not only be arranged in full consonance with the obligations of the alliance with Roumania—which goes without saying—but should expressly guarantee the territorial integrity of Roumania.

I beg you to inform me briefly by telegraph and fully by letter of the execution of these instructions.[1]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 17

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia[2]

Telegram 23.
Confidential.

BERLIN, *July 6, 1914.*[3]

Austria-Hungary intends to adopt a receptive attitude toward Bulgaria's advances and to connect Bulgaria with the Triple Alliance as soon as may be practicable.[4] We have announced our consent to this. Your Excellency is authorized to support AT HIS REQUEST any steps that may be taken in this direction by your Austro-Hungarian colleague.

[1] See Nos. 28 and 41.
[2] From the draft. Original in the handwriting of Zimmermann.
[3] At the Central Telegraph Office at 9.20 p.m.
[4] See Nos. 13, 14 and 22.

It will correspond better to the requirements of the state of affairs if any special officiousness in the prosecution of this occasion be avoided on the part of the Triple Alliance, and the desired uniting of Bulgaria to us be represented as purely an interest of Bulgaria's.

ZIMMERMANN.

No. 18

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 83.
Confidential.

VIENNA, *July 7, 1914.*[2]

I was asked to be present today at a conference between Count Berchtold and the two Premiers, at which Count Hoyos read the reports of Count Szögyeny in which the latter advised them of the preliminary reply of His Majesty after the reading of the personal letter from the Emperor and of the memorandum, as well as about the succeeding conference had by him with Your Excellency. Furthermore, Count Hoyos read us a memorandum that he had drawn up concerning a talk on the same matter with the Under-Secretary of State.[3]

In regard to the latter memorandum, I may remark that Count Berchtold as well as Count Tisza, the latter most especially, wants it to be most plainly understood that everything that Count Hoyos said during this conference with the Under-Secretary of State is to be regarded only as his own personal opinion. (This limitation refers particularly to the fact that Count Hoyos stated that a complete partition of Serbia was under consideration here.)

Count Berchtold requested me, in the names of both Premiers as well as in his own, to express to His Majesty our Most Gracious Master as well as to Your Excellency, their most sincere gratitude for the attitude, so clearly in accord with the compact of alliance and with the dictates of friendship, which you have assumed.

The reports of Count Szögyeny correspond exactly to the tenor of the most graciously addressed telegram from Your Excellency on the sixth of the month, No. 113.[4]

In connection with this preliminary conference, a ministerial council is to take place, which today is to concern itself exclusively with those measures of an internal political nature which are to be taken in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Vienna at 3.25 p.m.; received at the Foreign Office at 6.55 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 7, p.m. Paragraph 1, with the exception of the last sentence, and paragraph 3, were telegraphed on the 8th of July by Jagow to the Emperor on board the *Hohenzollern*; at the Central Telegraph Office at 2.25 p.m.

[3] See No. 61.

[4] See No. 15.

No. 19

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 84.
Confidential.

VIENNA, *July 8, 1914.*[2]

After the conclusion of the official Ministerial Council yesterday, a conference concerning the attitude to be adopted toward Serbia was held in connection with it, at which a general idea of the reply received from His Majesty our Most Gracious Master was given to the ministers who had not been present at the preliminary conference which I had attended.

Two currents of opinion made themselves evident in relation to the proceedings against Serbia. One, that represented by Count Berchtold and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would make direct use, as the occasion of any action, of the Serbian policy in general and of the state of affairs created by the intrigues against the Monarchy which came to a culmination in the recent assassination; whereas the other, represented by Count Tisza, holds it to be advisable first to put concrete demands up to Serbia. I have the impression that Count Berchtold regards Count Tisza as an element of incumbrance.[3] The latter wishes to set down his point of view in a memorandum which Count Berchtold will not receive before this evening shortly before he starts on his journey to Ischl. Count Berchtold stated that he would advise his Emperor, in case the latter should adopt this point of view, at least to make demands of such a nature that the possibility of their acceptance would be precluded.

Count Berchtold also said quite CONFIDENTIALLY that according to Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf, mobilization could not be completed until after sixteen days. The Chief of the General Staff, so Count Berchtold tells me, has called attention to the decisive significance of Roumania's attitude in connection with the arrangement and progress of military operations.

The Minister further remarked that after thorough consideration he had come to the conclusion that it would be wiser not to enter upon the prospective alliance with Bulgaria at once, particularly as in such an event Roumania might be disturbed. On the contrary, he was going to advise Sofia most urgently to maintain an attitude of peace and quiet.[4]

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Vienna July 8, 8.10 p.m.; received at the Foreign Office at 10.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 9, a.m. Telegraphed on the 9th of July to the Emperor and to the Imperial Chancelor by Jagow, after a few abridgments; at the Central Telegraph Office at 1.25 p.m.

[3] The sentence "I have . . . incumbrance" lacking in Jagow's telegram to the Emperor and the Imperial Chancelor.

[4] See Nos. 21 and 22.

No. 19A

The Minister at Belgrade to the Imperial Chancelor[1]

BELGRADE, *July 6, 1914.*[2]

The fateful events of the past few weeks have directed public attention to so great an extent to the workings of the so-called *Narodna Odbrana* (literally translated *National Defense*), that a connected review of its inception, organization, aims and methods might be of particular interest at the present time.

The year 1908, in which Serbia rebelled fiercely against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the neighboring Monarchy, but, left in the lurch by Russia, was compelled to agree to the incorporation into Austria-Hungary of these "genuinely Serbian countries" and even had to admit to the whole world that she had "suffered no injury thereby," left in the soul of the Serbian nation a wound that would not heal. Shortly before, Serbia's hope of acquiring Macedonia and old Serbia had been greatly diminished by the outbreak of the Young Turk revolution, and the fruits *of an expensive propaganda rich in sacrifices* and *of many years' standing threatened* to become *a total loss.* The politicians of all parties regarded the future of the nation as endangered to the utmost; they were convinced that Serbia could protect herself against strangulation by her too powerful neighbors only by exerting all her strength. At that period the radical governments of Serbia commenced *seriously* to prepare themselves *for a struggle to the death*, and to *issue one war-loan after another.* In connection with all this, the idea of the *Narodna Odbrana* first came into being.

It was conceived as a patriotic and nationalistic *secret society* which *was to embrace not only the Kingdom of Serbia* but *every country containing Serbian elements among its population*, and was intended to develop and strengthen the feeling of homogeneity and racial unity, and to use every means to work out the practical realization of this unity on the strength of this foundation. Its shibboleth was: "Work for the *liberation of the subjugated* brethren." Among the leaders of this secret society, of which the honorary head was *General Bosidar Jankovitch (retired), later commander of the Ibar Division* in the Turco-Serbian war, were men of the most varied professions—officials, *officers* (particularly those belonging to the much-discussed body of the "Black Hand"), parliamentary representatives, merchants, laborers, and the like. Confidential agents of the society were established not only in the interior of Serbia but also throughout southern Hungary, Bosnia

[1] From the engrossed copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 9, p.m. Was submitted to the Emperor. According to the Emperor's marginal instructions was communicated to the Minister of Education, the Minister of the Interior and the Chief of Police of Berlin.

and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, old Serbia and Macedonia. But, taught by the disagreeable experiences which the earlier Jugoslav Club (Southern Slav Association) had undergone in Serbia, the new secret society avoided exposing itself to the danger of compromising itself by any written articles. There was especially no written constitution, nor were any written records made of its sessions. The sessions were held according to circumstances and by agreement, at the home of one or another of the leading members.

It was generally accepted that it was first of all the *young men*, with their *capacity of enthusiasm for muddled ideas of freedom*, who were to be won over. So the *Narodna Odbrana* commenced a systematic *incitement and fanaticization of youth*, especially of *youth in the schools*. In the Kingdom of Serbia the *Sokol* and *Duchanowzi associations* were particularly adapted to this end, as in these societies practical instruction in the use of arms was connected with the Greater-Serbia agitation. In the southern-Slav territories of Austria-Hungary, where public associations of this nature met with the opposition of the authorities, there were formed *secret conventicles* among the *students* of Serbian nationality everywhere, who intoxicated themselves with the reading of *chauvinistic literature smuggled out of Serbia and also of local Greater-Serbia papers*. Such Greater-Serbia papers exist in Serajevo, *Fiume*, *Agram*, in great numbers. In the latter city is, for instance, the *Srbobran*, an organ of the Croat assemblyman and Greater-Serbia agitator *Svetosar Pribicevitch*, *a brother of the Serbian Major*, *Milan Pribicevitch*, *now publicly mentioned in connection with the assassination at Serajevo*.

Living up to its aims, the *Narodna Odbrana* further turned its particular attention to the matter of the armed bands in Turkey. These it did not create, it is true, for the *Comitadjis* long antedated the society, but it *contributed greatly* to their increase and to *their better equipment*. It is due to its activities among the youth of the country that it was almost a daily occurrence that *pupils vanished from the gymnasia and students* from the universities, to *reappear in Macedonia as insurgents*, or that young officers *left the army and*, *provided with false passes*, *went* to *old Serbia*. If it should be asked what has become of these *Comitadjis*, now that the war is over and Macedonia has been conquered, the answer would be: a portion of them are employed by the State in various occupations (railroad, postal service, tax and excise service, police administration) where they are mostly holding down little sinecures; another portion *are loafing, averse to work and presumably supported by the Narodna Odbrana; prowling about* awaiting *an opportunity of putting their wild instincts to use once more*. There has been no lack of warning voices calling attention to the danger that these *Comitadjis* might, now that their work in Turkey is

over, look for a new field for their activities in *Bosnia and southern Hungary.*

As far as the means are concerned with which the *Narodna Odbrana* carries on the struggle for its various ends, it devotes itself principally to calling on the public for voluntary general contributions. In this matter it goes on the indubitably correct principle that *small contributions, offered in large quantities* supply a much more productive yield than larger individual gifts. On certain occasions, and especially on St. Vitus' Day (Widowdan) which falls on the 15th of June, which is dedicated to the memory of the downfall of medieval Serbia at the battle of the Amselfeld, public collections throughout all Serbia are arranged for, which regularly provide most respectable amounts. Then, it has become the custom to remember the *Narodna Odbrana* with legacies in disposals of property by will, and also to make offerings to the *Narodna Odbrana* in memory of departed members of a family. But the matter in no way ends with such voluntary contributions. Often enough the *Narodna Odbrana* sends its confidential agents to *rich merchants*, banks, etc., *even to such as, without being Serbs, stand in close business relations with Serbs*, or, as is commonly said here, "earn" in Serbia, and demands *contributions.* I was recently told of a case where such a confidential agent demanded a contribution from the local branch of the Banque Franco-Serbe, and when he was told that the bank could not make a contribution of over one hundred francs without the permission of the main office at Paris, *turned to temper and threats.* The State itself, although, in order to avoid responsibility, it has to insist that the *Narodna Odbrana* preserve its private character, by no means confines itself to the character of a passive bystander. There are *certain accounts inventoried under harmless titles in the State budget from which the Narodna Odbrana derives benefit.* With regard to the provision of *guns for pupils, of revolvers for insurgents*, it is notorious that *the nation has supplied them.* It is characteristic that neither the Ministry for Foreign Affairs nor the Ministry of War operates as the center for the distribution of public property for such purposes, or for the accounting in connection with it, but that it is done by the Ministry of *culture and education.*

The Serbian Government may give the most complete expression to its horror and indignation at the bloody deed committed at Serajevo; *it may assert its innocence with the utmost fervor and call attention* to how senseless and purposeless was the crime and how it injured far more than it helped the cause of Serbia; *there is one thing it cannot deny. It was the Serbian Government itself that created the atmosphere* in which such *explosions of blind fanaticism are alone possible. It was in its own country and under the eyes of its own authorities* that those elements, which have

Very good. laid Serbia bare before the whole civilized world and again degraded her as did the execrable regicide of the year of 1903, attained to their maturity.

V. GRIESINGER.

No. 20

The Ambassador at London to the Imperial Chancelor[1]

Confidential. LONDON, *July 6, 1914.*[2]

I visited Sir Edward Grey this afternoon and took occasion to discuss the whole European situation with him in a confidential manner.

I thought it necessary first of all to call to his attention the fact that as a result of the murder of the heir to the throne the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia had arrived at a point so critical that it could not help but be the cause of concern. The Imperial and Royal Government could not be blamed for refusing to let this new challenge go unexpiated or for demanding satisfaction from the Serbian Government, in view of the support which the conspirators had been proved to have received from Belgrade. Whether this would occur, or in what form, I did not know, but I believed, however, that it would be advisable from the present moment to have in mind the possibility of an increased straining of the relations between Vienna and Belgrade, in order that he, Sir Edward, would be in a position at the proper time to exercise his influence at Petersburg toward inducing them there to persuade Serbia into a state of submissiveness in regard to the Austrian demands.

Sir Edward appeared to have received so far no news concerning this matter. Nevertheless, he did not fail to recognize the danger that the situation might bring about, and appeared to comprehend that it would be difficult for any Austro-Hungarian statesman at the head of affairs to refrain for any length of time from the adoption of all severe measures. He promised me to keep in touch with us on this matter also, but withheld for the present any definite expression of opinion.

Next I mentioned, with reference to our last conversation,[3] that Russia's enormous armament and certain other indications, like the construction of the strategic railroads, had not failed, according to my personal impressions last gained in Berlin, to cause a certain uneasiness there. Russia's feeling for us and for Austria-Hungary was unquestionably not a friendly one. These facts, in connection with the Bosnian crime, had occasioned in our country a somewhat pessimistic view of the foreign situation. But as we felt convinced that our policy was in agreement with that of the British in the desire to maintain peace and to bring the different groups of Powers closer together, I believed that I could serve the ends of both sides by a conference with him.

Sir Edward repeated to me approximately what he had said to me but a short time before, namely, that he had no knowledge of any feeling at Petersburg inimical to Germany. Still less did he believe in any warlike intentions on the

[1] From the engrossed copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 9, p.m.
[3] See No. 5.

part of Russia, but he would turn his attention to the subject anew and return to it again with me when the occasion offered, as he also wished to remain in touch with us on all matters concerning foreign policy.

I remarked in conclusion that he must permit me—as I wished to be entirely frank with him and considered it to be important that he be fully instructed as to our feelings and conceptions—to touch on a rather delicate subject with him confidentially. We knew from his statements that no secret agreements of a political nature existed between England and Russia. We had naturally not the least reason for doubting his word, but regretted all the more for that reason that rumors were all the time arising purporting to have knowledge of a naval understanding for the purpose of mutual cooperation against us in case of war. I was in no position to be able to investigate the justice of these rumors, but I could very well understand that certain conferences between the naval authorities on each side would not fall in the category of political agreements or binding compacts, and that they might thus be consistent with his declarations. In such a case, however, I believed it my duty to call his attention to the fact that such agreements would necessarily have the effect of strengthening the unquestionable tide of nationalistic feeling in Russia, and, on the other hand, of strengthening in our country the clamor for increased armament, as well as of making it very difficult for the Government to oppose the demands known to him and overstepping the limits fixed by law for naval expenditure.

Sir Edward replied, without going any further into the question of a naval agreement upon which I had touched, that he had already told me a short time before that no new or secret understanding existed, but that the relations between the Allies bore, nevertheless, a very intimate character. From his reserve, and from his remark that he would return to the discussion of the matter with me later, I came to the conclusion that he wished to give thorough consideration to the whole question before he assumed a definite attitude toward me at my suggestion. In any case, he did not directly deny that the two fleets would be in touch in the case of a common war. But he emphasized again on this occasion that it was his endeavor to bring the two groups closer together, thus to prevent European complications and to render easier the coming to an agreement on all questions that might arise.

The Minister was distinctly impressed by my communications, and thanked me for the frank discussion that had been carried on in our customary agreeable and friendly fashion.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 21

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest[1]

Telegram 34.
Confidential. BERLIN, *July 9, 1914.*[2]

According to a recent report from the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna, Count Berchtold does not intend for the present to take steps at Sofia toward the CONCLUSION of an alliance with Bulgaria, and is going to advise quiet there for the time being. Count Berchtold has let himself be talked into this attitude for reasons arising from a friendly consideration of Roumania, and the expectation that Roumania will fulfil her obligations as an ally to their full extent in the event of a conflict.

Kindly inform His Majesty the King of the foregoing also, at your audience.

JAGOW.

No. 22

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia[3]

Telegram 25.
Confidential.
For your personal information. BERLIN, *July 9, 1914.*[4]

According to a communication from the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna, Count Berchtold does not intend to conclude at once the alliance with Bulgaria that has been planned, and is at present going to advise quiet there.[5]

JAGOW.

No. 23

Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs[6]

BERLIN, *July 9, 1914.*

The Austrian Ambassador expressed his thanks to me in the name of his Government today for the obliging reply made by His Majesty the Emperor and King and the Imperial Chancelor to the autograph letter of His Majesty the Emperor Franz Joseph and the *exposé*[7] brought here by Count Hoyos. The local government is to be informed immediately at the time—the time will depend, of course, on the outcome of the inquiry at Serajevo—of all decisions that are reached.

JAGOW.

[1] From the draft. Original in the handwriting of Bergen; final sentence of the telegram added in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[2] At 1.40 p.m. at the Central Telegraph Office. See Nos. 19 and 28.
[3] From the draft. Original in the handwriting of Bergen.
[4] At 1.40 p.m. at the Central Telegraph Office. See Nos. 17 and 19.
[5] See No. 162.
[6] In Jagow's handwriting. The Imperial Chancelor and Zimmermann took cognizance of the memorandum; returned by the latter on the 9th, by the former on the 10th of July.
[7] See Nos. 13 and 14.

No. 24

The Minister at Athens to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 195.
Absolutely and entirely confidential. ATHENS, *July 9, 1914.*[2]

Minister of Foreign Affairs told me with a request for secrecy that Greek Government was making use at this time of its fairly important influence at Belgrade to effect there some alleviation of the antagonism between Vienna and Belgrade. It was also due to Greek Government that the question of a union of Montenegro and Serbia had been put off for a long time, out of consideration for Austrian sensibilities.

QUADT.

No. 25

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor[3]

HOHENFINOW, *July 9, 1914.*[4]

I humbly hasten to submit to Your Majesty hereto appended [5] the draft of the desired Imperial reply to the autograph letter of His Majesty the Emperor Franz Joseph, with the suggestion that Your Majesty graciously complete it.

v. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 26

The Emperor to the Emperor of Austria[6]

BALHOLM, *July 14, 1914.*[7]

MY DEAR FRIEND:

It filled me with real gratitude that, at a time when events of the most tragic and agitating nature had overwhelmed you and were demanding from you the most serious of decisions, your thoughts should turn to our friendship and that you should take this as the occasion of your kind letter to me.[8] I regard the friendship for you,

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Athens at 4 p.m.; arrived at Foreign Office 6.35 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 9, p.m. Telegraphed by Jagow to the Emperor July 11; telegram filed at Berlin 1.10 p.m.; received at Court Office 7.30 p.m.

[3] From the original draft signed by Jagow. Copy in Bergen's handwriting.

[4] The original draft is dated Berlin, July 10, 1914; the engrossed copy of the Imperial report completed by the Imperial Chancelor and now also in the archives is dated at Hohenfinow, July 9, 1914.

[5] See No. 26.

[6] From the original draft. Copy signed by Bergen, with additions and alterations by Bergen, Zimmermann and Jagow. See German White Book of June, 1919, supp. V, 6.

[7] The drafts found in the archives, together with a clean, unutilized copy are undated. The written copy forwarded with the report to the Emperor dated July 9, received upon its return to the Foreign Office the date which the Emperor had written down on the Imperial report of the Imperial Chancelor (No. 25) which had accompanied it to the court: Balholm, July 14, 1914. The final copy perfected by the Emperor in his own handwriting was sent by Jagow on the 17th of July to the Ambassador at Vienna "with the request that it be transmitted to its high destination by the aid of the local government"; two copies of the holograph, of which one was for Count Berchtold, the other for the archives of the Embassy, were appended.

[8] See No. 13.

descended from my grandfather and my father to me, as a precious legacy, and see in its return by you the securest guaranty for the safety of our countries. Knowing my respectful attachment to your person, you will be able to judge how hard it was for me to give up the visit to Vienna and how much I was grieved at being compelled to forego imparting to you personally my sincere sympathy in your deep sorrow.

You will have received through your trusted Ambassador, most highly respected by myself, my assurance that you will find me and my Empire standing faithfully at your side in this dark hour, in full accord with our old and tried friendship and with the obligations of our alliance. To repeat this assurance to you here is to me a joyful duty.

The dreadful crime of Serajevo has thrown a blazing light on the pernicious agitations of mad fanatics and on the mischievous Panslavic disturbances that threaten the structure of the State. I must refrain from any interference in the dispute now going on between your Government and Serbia. But I regard it not only as the moral duty of all civilized nations, but also as a requirement for their self-preservation, to oppose with all possible means the active propaganda that takes above all else as the target for its attack the sturdy framework of monarchies. Nor am I blind to the grave danger that threatens your territories and, as a consequence, the Triple Alliance, as the result of the Russian and Serbian Panslavic agitation, and I realize the necessity of liberating the southern borders of your possessions from this weighty pressure. I am therefore prepared to further as well as I am able those efforts of your Government directed toward undermining the erection of a new Balkan alliance under Russian patronage and aimed against Austria-Hungary; also, to help bring about a connection between Bulgaria and the Triple Alliance, as a counterweight.[1] To that end, despite a certain hesitation, principally occasioned by the slight trustworthiness of Bulgarian character, I have had my Minister at Sofia notified to afford your representative there such support in any action taken toward this end as he may desire.

Furthermore, I have commissioned my Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to express himself to King Carol in accordance with your suggestions, and to point out the necessity, in view of recent events, of the renunciation of Serbia and of the suppression of the agitation directed against your country. I also requested him to place emphasis on the fact that I lay great weight on the continuance of the existing friendly relationship with Roumania, which, in the event of a connection between Bulgaria and the Triple Alliance, will necessarily suffer no diminution.

To conclude, let me express the heartfelt wish that it may be granted you to find recuperation during your stay at Ischl after this painful period.

With real attachment, your true friend,

WILHELM.[2]

[1] The words "as a counterweight" added to the draft by Zimmermann.
[2] The words "With . . . Wilhelm" were written by the Emperor with his own hand in the copy sent away.

No. 27

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor[1]

VIENNA, *July 8, 1914.*[2]

The "Communication from a Particular Source concerning the Russian Interpretation of the Austro-Hungarian Steps on the Occasion of the Assassination," [3] which appeared, the leading article in the paper, in yesterday evening's issue of the *Neue Freie Presse*,[4] was, I learned from one of the correspondents of the *Neue Freie Presse* who frequents the Embassy, *inspired by the Russian Embassy here.*

He had been called by telephone to the Embassy, where a secretary had received him on behalf of the Ambassador. Apart from the above-mentioned publication, it had been remarked that Russia *could not look undisturbed upon any encroachment on Serbia's political independence.* To the correspondent's inquiry whether the *Neue Freie Presse* should also make use of this remark, he received an answer *in the negative.* *Aha!*

As the correspondent further told me, he had already made use of his influence with Mr. Benedikt to the extent of persuading him not to permit the *Neue Freie Presse* to fall into the *popular howling* about possible *Russian plans of attack*, that was raised during the Balkan crisis. The paper's article this morning was moderate in tone.

I have the honor of respectfully including a clipping of the communication referred to, in the interest of completeness.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the engrossed copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 10, a.m. Report was submitted to the Emperor, returned by him on the 13th of July, and was back in the Foreign Office on the 16th. In obedience to the Emperor's marginal instructions, it was communicated to the Embassy at Petersburg on July 21.

[3] The article read: "As we are informed from a particular source, all classes in Russia are united in their condemnation of the assassination at Serajevo. The frequently repeated opinion of the Austro-Hungarian press that Russia would voice a protest if Austria-Hungary were to demand of Serbia an inquiry in Belgrade, is devoid of all foundation. The monarchical principle holds so strong a position in the realm of the Czar that Russia would never disapprove of such a step on the part of Austria-Hungary."

[4] No. 17911.

No. 28

The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 37. SINAIA, *July 10, 1914.*[2]

Secret commission executed.[3]

His Majesty the King does not believe that it would be possible to enter upon an alliance with Bulgaria, as the King is weak, possesses no authority, and the Government might be swept aside at any moment. Furthermore, there is no reliance placed on Bulgaria, and as soon as Russia would get wind of the agreement, she would hatch a revolution in Bulgaria. King then discussed political conditions in general. To the question which I finally put, what attitude would His Majesty take in regard to the two requests made by His Majesty the Emperor and King, His Majesty said that he could easily enough draw away from Serbia, that Serbia did not count for much with him; he could also put pressure on the agitations against Austria, but that in that case there must be some reciprocity shown in Hungary with regard to the Roumanians there, in order to make it easier for him. To my question whether His Majesty was averse to a connection with Bulgaria, the King returned a negative reply, but said, nevertheless, that Roumania could not conclude an alliance with Bulgaria at the present moment, but could do so in a year, perhaps. Such an alliance would in any case have to be arranged for at Sofia by Germany and Austria.

Report in detail follows.

WALDBURG.

No. 29

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[4]

Telegram 85.
Absolutely confidential. VIENNA, *July 10, 1914.*[5]

Count Berchtold gives me the following information concerning his yesterday's conference with His Majesty the Emperor Franz Joseph at Ischl:

As His Majesty's memorandum is two

His Majesty the Emperor discussed the state of affairs with great calmness. He first gave expression of his warm gratitude for the attitude of our Most Gracious Master and of the Imperial Government, and stated that he was quite of our opinion that

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Sinaia at 5.30 p.m.; received at the Foreign Office at 8.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 11, a.m. Communicated by telegraph on the 11th of July to the Emperor and the Ambassador at Vienna by Jagow, with minor alterations. In Jagow's telegram to Tschirschky, after communicating Waldburg's dispatch, he adds: "Kindly inform Count Berchtold of the foregoing in complete confidence." See No. 35.

[3] See Nos. 16 and 21.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed at Vienna at 8.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.32 p.m.; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 11, a.m. Sent on the 11th of July at 12.36 p.m. by telegraph by Jagow to the Imperial Court Office, after receiving slight alterations and with the omission of the words: Count Berchtold "said that he would be glad to know . . . in Berlin" and of the next to the last paragraph, "The Minister . . . prematurely." It arrived at the Court at 10 p.m. The decodification was returned by the Emperor on the 12th of July, and was in the Foreign Office on the 16th of July.

it was necessary *now* to come to some *determination*, in order to put an end to the intolerable conditions in connection with Serbia. His Majesty was quite clear as to the importance of such a determination, added Count Berchtold.

weeks old, it is taking a long time!

The Minister then informed the Emperor of the two methods under discussion here as to the approaching action against Serbia. His Majesty seemed to think that the difference between them might be bridged over. On the whole, however, His Majesty had shown himself more inclined to the view that *concrete demands should be leveled at Serbia.* Nor could he, the Minister, deny the advantages of such procedure. The odium of an unexpected attack on Serbia, which would otherwise fall upon the Monarchy, would thus be avoided and Serbia would be put in the wrong. This procedure would also make an attitude of neutrality at least, materially easier both for Roumania and for England. At present the formulation of appropriate demands on Serbia constituted the principal source of anxiety[1] here, and Count Berchtold said that he would be glad to know what they thought about it in Berlin.[2] He thought that among other things, it might be demanded that an agency of the Austro-Hungarian Government be established at Belgrade in order to keep an eye from there on the Greater-Serbia machinations, perhaps, also, to insist upon the dissolution of the associations and the dismissal of *some compromised officers.* The respite allowed for the reply must be made as brief as possible, say forty-eight hours. It is true, that even so short a respite would suffice to enable Belgrade to get advice from Petersburg. If the Serbs should accept all the demands made on them, it would prove a solution which would be "very disagreeable" to him, and he was still considering what *demands* could *be put* that would be *wholly impossible for the Serbs to accept.*

Of course, that was drafted as a foundation for the determination itself!

Very much so! And unambiguous ones!

They have had time enough for that.

All!

Hartwig is dead!

Evacuate the Sanjac! Then the row would be on at once! Austria must absolutely get that back at once, in order to prevent the union of Serbia and Montenegro and the gaining of the seacoast by the Serbians! To act like "gentlemen" to murderers, after what has happened! Idiocy!

Finally, the Minister complained again about the attitude of Count Tisza, which made energetic procedure against Serbia difficult for him. Count Tisza asserted that they must proceed "like gentlemen," but that was scarcely possible to accomplish when such important national interests were concerned and *especially against such an opponent as Serbia.*

The Minister would be glad to follow the suggestion of the Imperial Government about commencing even now to set public opinion in England against Serbia by means of the press—about which Count Szögyeny had telegraphed. But this must be done cautiously, in his opinion, in order not to alarm Serbia prematurely.

The Minister of War is *going on his leave* tomorrow, and Baron

[1] Tschirschky's words "constituted the principal source of anxiety" were changed by Jagow in the telegram to the Emperor to "is being considered"; "considered" was underlined by the Emperor, and is referred to by his marginal note: "they have had time enough for that."

[2] See No. 31.

Childish! Conrad von Hötzendorf is also going to leave Vienna for a time. This is being done, so Count Berchtold told me, *on purpose*,[1] in order *to prevent any disquiet.*

TSCHIRSCHKY.

About as it was at the time of the Silesian War!
"I am against all councils of war and conferences, since the more timid party always has the upper hand."

Frederick the Great.

No. 30

The Ambassador at London to the Imperial Chancelor[2]

Confidential. LONDON, *July 9, 1914.*[3]

Sir E. Grey asked me to call on him today and first of all communicated to me the memorandum which he made concerning our conference[4] which took place shortly before my visit to Berlin and Kiel. He said that he could add nothing today to the words he had uttered at that time, and could only repeat to me that secret agreements between Great Britain on the one hand and France and Russia on the other, which would entail obligations on Great Britain in case of a European war, did not exist. England wished to preserve an absolutely free hand, in order to be able to act according to her own judgment in the event of continental complications. The Government had to a certain extent obligated itself to Parliament not to commit itself to any secret liabilities. In no case would the British Government be found on the side of the aggressors in the event of continental complications.

But as he did not wish to put me on the wrong track—"as I did not want to mislead you"—he at once added that his relations to the Powers referred to had none the less lost nothing of their earlier intimacy. So that even if there existed no agreements which imposed any obligations, he did not wish to deny that from time to time "conversations" had taken place between the naval or the military authorities on both sides, the first of them as early as the year 1906, then again during the Morocco crisis, when they had believed here, he added, smiling, that we had intended to attack the French. But even these conversations, about which he knew in most cases nothing definite, had absolutely no aggressive intent, as English policy, now as before, was aimed toward the maintenance of peace, and would find itself in a very painful situation if a European war should break out.

I repeated to the Minister about the same sort of thing that I had recently told him, and gave him to understand that it would be desirable if such military conversations could be reduced to a minimum, as otherwise they might easily lead to serious consequences.

Since our previous conversation, added Sir Edward, he had informed himself

[1] The "on purpose" of Tschirschky was mistakenly given in the decodification of the Imperial Court office as "*von possumus*"; in the margin were two question-marks by the Emperor.
[2] From the engrossed copy.
[3] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 11, a.m. [4] See No. 5.

thoroughly about the feeling toward us that existed in Russia, and had found no reason for a disquieting view of it; he also seemed quite ready, if we should so desire, to use his influence in any way on the attitude of Russia. He had also already been endeavoring, in case the Vienna Cabinet should find itself compelled as a result of the murder at Serajevo to adopt a sterner attitude toward Serbia, to persuade the Russian Government to adopt a more peaceful view and to assume a more conciliatory attitude toward Austria. Very much would depend, as a matter of fact, Sir Edward thought, on the kind of measures that were under consideration, and on whether they might not arouse Slavic sentiment in such a fashion as to make it impossible for Mr. Sazonoff to remain passive under them.

In general, the Minister was in a thoroughly confident mood, and declared in cheerful tones that he saw no reason for taking a pessimistic view of the situation.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 30A

The Minister in the Imperial Suite to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 103. BERGEN, *July 11, 1914.*[2]

When the draft of the customary telegram of congratulation for the birthday of the King of Serbia tomorrow, as prepared by the Foreign Office, was submitted, His Majesty directed me to inquire of Your Excellency whether such a telegram appears necessary and unobjectionable at the present moment.[3]

WEDEL.

No. 31

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna[4]

Telegram 117. BERLIN, *July 11, 1914.*[5]

We can take no hand in the formulation of the demands on Serbia, as that is Austria's affair. It seems desirable to us, however, that Vienna should collect sufficient material to show that there exists a Greater-Serbia agitation in Serbia which threatens the Monarchy, in order that European public opinion should be convinced of the justice of Austria's cause as far as possible. It would be best to publish this material—not in parts but as a whole—shortly before submitting the demands, or the ultimatum, to Serbia.[6]

JAGOW.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Bergen July 11, 12.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 11, p.m.
[3] See No. 32*a*.
[4] From the draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 2.40 p.m. See No. 29.
[6] See No. 40.

No. 32

The Minister at Belgrade to the Imperial Chancelor[1]

BELGRADE, *July 8, 1914.*[2]

Mr. Pashitch talked with me for a long time today, as a result of the remonstrances of the military attaché, about the assassination at Serajevo and about the measures it is *intended* [3] to take in connection therewith and in order to prevent any further anarchistic outrages. He began first with the assurances of his most intense indignation and his deepest horror at the deed, and

Bosh!!!! then brought out the argument that of course a *civilized* [4] government could not *be held responsible* for the *excesses of immature and eccentric striplings*. The Austro-Hungarian press was shooting far beyond the mark. The supervision of the nationalist associations and their connections in the interior of the country and abroad was one of the *hardest tasks* of the Serbian Government. The democratic and liberal constitution of the country, especially as far as concerned the questions of associations and of the press, gave the Government practically no hold on them, and every attempt to increase the authority of the Government and to provide it with the power of effective control had been shattered by the opposition in the Skuptchina. As far as it lay in his power

Bosh! under the law as it was at present, he would *exercise stern control* over the nationalistic societies, and *rout out of them all those elements that used them simply as a cover*. Already even he had gotten into touch with the Minister of Education, in order to prevent, by severer regulation of the schools and of the athletic societies associated with them, the teaching and dissemination of misunderstood political theories in their halls, and the cramming and arousing of the youth of the country with such theories. Finally, the unrestricted trade and traffic in firearms and explosives was to be limited, and subjected to stricter precautions than before. Lawful regulation of these matters was *already being projected*,

Hot air! but had not yet been voted on by the Skuptchina.

V. GRIESINGER.

[1] From the engrossed copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 11, p.m. Report submitted to the Emperor, returned by him on the 20th of July, back at the Foreign Office on the 23d of July. The Emperor ordered it to be communicated to the Ambassador at Vienna, according to instructions on the margin, which, however, as a matter of fact, was not done.

[3] "intended" underscored twice by the Emperor.

[4] "civilized" underscored twice by the Emperor.

No. 32A

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister in the Imperial Suite[1]

Telegram 77. BERLIN, *July 11, 1914.*[2]

As Vienna has so far inaugurated no action of any sort against Belgrade, the omission of the customary telegram would be too noticeable and might be the cause of premature uneasiness.

Therefore I advise that it should be sent.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 33

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome[4]

Telegram 1.
Absolutely confidential. BERLIN, *July 11, 1914.*[5]

The Emperor Franz Joseph has sent to His Majesty the Emperor and King a private, personal letter,[6] in which the present situation is described from the Austro-Hungarian point of view, and which emphasizes the necessity of undertaking energetic measures against the disturbing activities being carried on by the Russian and Serbian Panslavists, by which the destruction of the Danube Monarchy as well as the weakening of the Triple Alliance is being attempted, and which was the occasion of the assassination at Serajevo.

We have left it to the Austro-Hungarian Government to take what steps may seem to it to be appropriate, and have promised our support according to the intent of the compact of alliance in case of need. We have furthermore announced our willingness that Austria-Hungary should enter into negotiations with Bulgaria with the object of her entering our alliance combination.

King of Roumania, informed by us of this intention, has assumed an attitude of reserve, but not of refusal.

The inquiries to which the assassination at Serajevo gave occasion have not yet been concluded. The Vienna Government may come to further determinations after the result.

Foregoing for Your Excellency's sole and personal information and guidance. To notify the Marquis San Giuliano might not be advisable at present on account of his predisposition toward Serbia, but I would ask you to call his attention to the immoderate tone of the Serbian press, and to state that it would hardly be possible for Austria-Hungary to accept such provocation with patience. Furthermore, it might be well cautiously to prepare Marquis San Giuliano for the fact that we are considering a *rapprochement* to Bulgaria, in which, however, any offense to Roumania will be avoided.[7]

JAGOW.

[1] From the draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[2] At 6.45 p.m. at the Central Telegraph Office.
[3] See No. 30*a*.
[4] From the first draft. Bergen's draft with alterations by Jagow.
[5] At 9.30 p.m. at the Central Telegraph Office.
[6] See No. 13.
[7] Last sentence added by Jagow to Bergen's draft. See No. 38.

No. 34

The Minister at Athens to the Imperial Chancelor[1]

Absolutely confidential. ATHENS, *July 6, 1914.*[2]

My Italian colleague informs me in strict confidence that the Italian Ambassador at Petersburg has sent a very alarming report to Rome concerning Russia's preparations for war. The report is said to be very exhaustive and goes into details. Mention is made of demands for money in enormous amounts by the Russian Government, which are said to have been granted by the Duma at a secret session or by a commission for war equipment.[3]

QUADT.

No. 35

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[4]

Telegram 86.
Confidential. VIENNA, *July 11, 1914.*[5]

As Count Berchtold went this evening to Buchlau over Sunday, I showed the telegram[6] to Count Forgach in strict confidence. The latter requests me to give Your Excellency his special thanks for the step at Bucharest and for the information. Count Forgach considered the King's reply to our Chargé d'Affaires more favorable than could be expected. That King Carol should at first have expressed scruples against an alliance with Bulgaria, was of course natural. On the other hand, it is advantageous that he did not declare himself definitely against it, and that he considered that to draw away from Serbia would be practicable.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Berlin receipt stamp: July 12, a.m. The Imperial Chancelor took cognizance of the paper on the 14th of July.
[3] Jagow remarks in regard to this on the margin: "If the news from Petersburg went to Rome and from thence to Athens, it must in any case be of a somewhat ancient date."
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Dated at Vienna: July 11, filed July 12, 11.20 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 12, 12.38 p.m. Communicated to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest "for his personal information" by Jagow on the 13th of July, after minor alterations had been effected. Sent off on the 14th of July, at 4 p.m.
[6] See No. 28, note 2.

No. 36

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London[1]

Telegram 155.
Confidential. BERLIN, *July 12, 1914.*[2]

The inquiry into the murder at Serajevo keeps making it appear more clearly that the instigators of the crime are to be found in the political and military circles at Belgrade. The possibility exists that Austria might on this account resolve on serious action against Serbia, and that this might lead to general complications. We should desire under all circumstances a localization of the conflict.[3] For this purpose it is necessary that public opinion throughout Europe should make it possible for the various governments to look on while Austria and Serbia decide their difference,[4] without taking sides. Therefore it is desirable that in the British press, too, a point of view should be created that would cause this assassination, like the earlier murder of the King and Queen of Serbia, to be regarded as an outburst of criminal immorality, incompatible with the civilized conscience of Europe, and that would render comprehensible the fact that the neighboring Monarchy should put itself in a state of defense against this permanent menace from the side of Serbia. Kindly try to influence the local press according to this suggestion as far as is feasible,[5] being careful, however, to avoid everything that might give the appearance that we were inciting the Austrians to war.[6]

JAGOW.

No. 37

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna[7]

Confidential.
Strictly for the confidential
information of Count Berchtold. BERLIN, *July 12, 1914.*[8]

According to secret reports, Russia and Serbia are in possession of reliable information that Austria-Hungary is unostentatiously strengthening her garrisons on the Serbian and Russian frontiers.

JAGOW.

[1] From the first draft. Drafted by Reporting Councilor von Radowitz, of the Foreign Office, on the 7th of July, with alterations by Zimmermann made on the 12th of July.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.30 p.m.
[3] The sentences "The possibility . . . conflict" altered by Zimmermann from Radowitz's original text: "Austria seems determined not to let this opportunity for a reckoning with Serbia pass. We are sympathetic to this point of view, but desire that any possible war may remain localized."
[4] "Decide their difference" altered by Zimmermann from Radowitz's original "go to war."
[5] "as far as is feasible" added by Zimmermann.
[6] See Nos. 43 and 48.
[7] From the first draft. Copy in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[8] Put in the mails at 8 p.m.

No. 38

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 2. FIUGGI FONTE, *July 12, 1914.*[2]

Marquis di San Giuliano told me that he had instructed the Italian representative at Belgrade immediately after the murder of the Archduke to counsel moderation to the Serbian Government very urgently. He also believed that this advice would be followed. Governments of democratic countries could not be held responsible for transgressions of the press. Austrian Government should not permit itself to be unfair in this matter. Furthermore, Italian Ambassador at Vienna reports today that Austrian Government has no fear of serious complications with Serbia.

A *coup de main* against King Ferdinand by the Russian party is to be feared in Bulgaria, according to a report from the Italian representative at Sofia.

FLOTOW.

No. 39

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna and to the Minister at Bucharest[3]

Confidential.
For your sole personal information, p. p. BERLIN, *July 13, 1914.*

Count Szögyeny read to me today a telegram from Count Czernin from Bucharest concerning an audience had by the latter with King Carol.

According to the telegram the King expressed himself to the Minister as follows:

1. He was certain that OFFICIAL Serbia condemned the Serajevo murder as did the rest of the world, and one should not treat official Serbia as one would the assassins.

2. He was certain that the Serbian Government would conduct the investigation conscientiously, but could understand how Serbia might not permit the investigation to be conducted by an Austrian commission.

3. He regretted the tone of the Serbian press, but also certain mischief-making of the Austro-Hungarian papers.

The King plainly desires a peaceful solution of the matter, but avoided expressing himself on the attitude to be assumed by Roumania in the event of a conflict.

In the course of the conversation the King, referring to statements of opinion made by some of the Roumanian politicians—Bratianu, Marghiloman and Take Jonescu—adopted them as his own, namely, that "since the murder of the heir to the throne, the future of Austria-Hungary appeared to be a gloomy one, and must be the cause of much pessimism among the Great Powers."

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Fiuggi Fonte on the 12th of July, at 7.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 13, a.m. The last paragraph "A . . . Sofia" telegraphed by Jagow on the morning of July 13 to the Minister at Sofia "solely for his personal information," the first two sentences "Marquis . . . followed" communicated "for his personal information" to the minister at Belgrade in an order of the 13th of July. See No. 33.

[3] From the draft in Jagow's handwriting. Sent to Vienna, with the omission of the last paragraph, on the afternoon of the 13th of July; sent to Bucharest in full on the 14th of July.

Count Berchtold asks Count Szögyeny to remind me, when informing me of this statement of the King's, that King Carol had already told the Austrian Minister during the course of the winter that he would not be able to conduct a policy against the trend of public opinion in his country.

Count Berchtold evolves from this a pessimistic view concerning the attitude of Roumania, but still hopes that the intervention of our Most Gracious Lord may succeed in keeping Roumania with the Triple Alliance.

Of the statements of the King regarding Austria-Hungary—when separated from their context, as Count Czernin reports them—it is difficult to judge. The King probably is not the only one who fears that the death of the Archduke at the present time may lead to serious consequences for the Monarchy. But that so cautious a politician as King Carol intended to hint to the Austrian Minister the possibility of the collapse of his fatherland can scarcely be supposed. In any case, no conclusion can be reached as to Roumania's future attitude merely on the basis of this statement, without further information.

On the other hand, it is possible, from the manner in which the statement is reported, to conclude that the author of the report is very much of a diplomatic dilettante.

JAGOW.

No. 40

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 87. VIENNA, *July 13, 1914.*[2]

Count Berchtold shares entirely Your Excellency's view[3] that the results of the inquiry at Serajevo should not be made public in detail, but that the trend of Serbian policy and its results should be set forth as a whole.

Minister is *now himself convinced that the quickest*[4] *action is required.* He hopes *to come to an agreement* tomorrow with Tisza on the wording of the note to be forwarded to Serbia; would then submit the note to the Emperor at Ischl on Wednesday, the 15th of July, whereupon it could be delivered immediately at Belgrade—consequently before Poincaré's departure.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Vienna July 13, at 3.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.08 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 14, a.m. The second paragraph telegraphed by Jagow to the Emperor on the 14th of July at 11.23 a.m., to whom the decodification was submitted at 5 p. m.

[3] See No. 31.

[4] The words "now himself convinced" and "quickest" twice underscored by the Emperor.

No. 41

The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Imperial Chancelor[1]

Absolutely confidential. BUCHAREST, *July 11, 1914.*[2]

His Majesty the King received me yesterday at half past twelve o'clock at Sinaia. I had the honor of being invited to the breakfast table, after which His Majesty conversed with me for a long time in the presence of the Prince of Roumania on the matters we had already discussed at the audience.

His Majesty listened with a lively interest to the arguments I made in the name of His Majesty the Emperor and King. At such points as treated of the friendly relations between Roumania and Serbia, as well as of the agitation against Austria-Hungary being carried on in Roumania, His Majesty nodded his head assentingly. His Majesty also indicated his assent to the statement that His Royal Highness had recently told the Austrian representative on two occasions that, in view of the hostile feeling in Roumania to Austria he would be unable to carry out the obligations of his alliance in the event of war, also when I referred to the fact that His Majesty the Emperor and King had always advocated at Vienna the coming to an understanding with Serbia. When the talk turned to Russia's efforts to found a new Balkan alliance directly antagonistic to Austria-Hungary, His Majesty interrupted me with the remark that *he knew nothing*[3] of any such purpose on the part of Russia.

At the conclusion of my arguments, His Majesty began by remarking that he did not believe that the Serbian Government could be found to have been connected with the assassination at Serajevo. He had already stated this to Count Czernin and asked him whether they were in possession of any evidence as to this at Vienna.[3]

Hereupon His Majesty stated, as I have already reported by telegraph, that he saw no prospect of an alliance with Bulgaria. When His Majesty mentioned that Roumania could not at once enter upon an alliance with Bulgaria, he referred to the last frontier incident, in which a Roumanian soldier was shot by a Bulgarian, as well as to the fact that the feeling in Bulgaria was very hostile to Roumania.

His Majesty stated further that the situation was for the moment very serious, but not hopeless. In Vienna they seemed to have lost their heads. It would be well for Berlin authorities to try to influence the Ballplatz, in order to do away with the

[1] From the engrossed copy. See Nos. 16 and 28.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 14, a.m. The report was submitted to the Emperor, was returned by him on the 20th of July, and was back at the Foreign Office on the 23d of July. Through marginal instructions the Emperor ordered it to be communicated to the Ambassadors at Vienna, Rome and Petersburg, which, however, was not actually done.

[3] In the margin question-marks and exclamation-points by the Emperor.

pusillanimous spirit[1] that was in the ascendency there. His Majesty did not speak *particularly complimentarily* of the political capacity of Count Berchtold. The King blamed the Bosnian governmental organization, and declared that nobody actually knew, even today, whether Austria or Hungary governed there.

While His Majesty had earlier described the ill-feeling against Austria-Hungary in the nation as a wave that would soon die down, he expressed himself yesterday by saying of it that the *agitation was a serious one.* His Majesty agreed with me when I expressed the opinion that it had grown so violent because here they began to *think that Austria was weak*, and at the same time the *self-consciousness of Roumania had enormously increased.* When I mentioned the fact that many people here believed that Transylvania would at a time not too far distant fall into the hands of Roumania, His Majesty said that he had sharply opposed this view here, and had often stated openly that he would *never consent to taking Transylvania by conquest.* After breakfast the conversation again returned to this subject, when the King said, turning to Prince Ferdinand: "We shall never live to see that, though your son may, perhaps."

His Majesty said, in speaking of Serbia, that first of all the *unscrupulous and disorderly nagging of the press* must be stopped; it was this that was to blame for all the *trouble and which kept public feeling constantly aroused.*

The press in Austria must be restrained, too, and be prevented from nagging Serbia too much. Sazonoff had told him that *Russia had no intention of going to war, as in that case there would be far too much danger of internal troubles;* but that she could not tolerate an Austrian attack on Serbia. In such an event, the King continued, *Roumania would be under no further obligations.*

Of Bulgaria, the King said that in the course of the conversation Sazonoff had spoken to him with such disrespect that he was *fairly forced to undertake the Bulgarian defense.* The King also discussed the question of the position of Greece in the event of an alliance with Bulgaria, and thought that an understanding between those two nations could only take place if *Greece should return Kavala.*

The King considers the political situation to be *very precarious*, particularly with regard to *Albania.* He showed that he was *very much dissatisfied at Italy's attitude* in that connection. He described it as especially incredible that such a minister as Aliotti should have been sent there. That man had at *one time had to leave London in haste on account of cheating at gambling.* Aliotti had once *actually threatened* the Prince *with having the troops withdrawn*, if the *Prince did not go aboard a ship.* *Rightly.*

In order to have the most effective influence on the feeling in

[1] In the margin question-marks and exclamation-points by the Emperor.

Serbia against Austria, His Majesty considers it to be absolutely necessary that steps in this direction should be taken at *Petersburg on the part of Berlin*.[1]

But it must be given them to understand that now it no longer concerned *merely the question of racial strife*, but very important dynastic interests instead. What had happened at Serajevo yesterday might *just as well* happen tomorrow *at Petersburg*. Therefore it was for Petersburg to take serious steps at Belgrade. He, the King, stood prepared for his own part to exercise a like influence on Serbia. Furthermore, he would give similar instructions to his Minister at Petersburg, who was very soon to go to Petersburg with the deputation of the regiment honorarily conferred upon the Czar. The King would greatly appreciate it if Germany should take measures at Petersburg along the line suggested, but he requested that he be not mentioned as the author of the idea. His Majesty returned several times to the necessity for such a step, and seemed to believe it very promising. When I took occasion after breakfast to mention to His Majesty, according to my instructions, the effectual result of His Majesty's recent *démarche* at Athens in the interest of the preservation of peace, at the same time notifying him of His Imperial Majesty's marginal annotation on Count Quadt's report,[2] the King showed himself to be visibly pleased, and said that His Majesty the Emperor now had the opportunity of likewise doing the cause of peace a great service, by a *démarche* at Petersburg.

Indeed!

I shall shortly report further on the impressions I gained from my conference with His Majesty.[3]

WALDBURG.

[1] In the margin a question-mark by the Emperor.

[2] The marginal annotation of the Emperor is to be found on the following telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to the Emperor on June 19:

Your Majesty's Minister at Athens telegraphs:

"*Roumania's* move, which is known here only to the King, the Premier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has had a tremendous effect, and I consider peace to be practically *assured*, if *Turkey* continues to *act cautiously*.

"Principal danger seems to me to lie in the fact that Greek Government is mixing the Island question into the present question at issue with Turkey, and might thereby present new demands concerning recognition. This intention did certainly exist at one time, but at present it appears to have been abandoned, as Streit assures me."

With the utmost respect,

ZIMMERMANN.

Vienna, Rome, Bucharest, London, Paris, Petersburg. The King has done us all a great service! We may all be very grateful to him! W.

It must be talked to very sharply! Very pleasing!

[3] See No. 66.

No. 41A

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[1]

VIENNA, *July 13, 1914.*[2]

The attitude of the local press is evidently formed on the plan, inspired by the Ballhausplatz, of not disturbing the public mind prematurely. At the same time care is being taken to give the widest possible circulation to the articles in the Serbian press by their complete reproduction, and attention is called to the fact that Serbia must have lost her standing in Europe entirely, through her demagogical intrigues which culminated in the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne. Thus, today's *Sonn- und Montagszeitung* remarks that fortunately Europe now knows how to take the deliberate misrepresentations that they are trying to spread abroad over the whole world from Belgrade. In England, particularly, people will not believe the lie that the Serbian subjects of the Monarchy in the southern territories are being oppressed. The Serbs themselves no longer believe that right is on their side.

In an apparently official *feuilleton* the same paper remarks:

> In view of the fact that the inquiry on the murder at Serajevo has not yet been brought to a conclusion, all the constructive theories as to the form and the details of the eventual diplomatic move of Austria against the government at Belgrade are premature and superfluous. The various reports that were spread about in the world concerning Count Berchtold's audience at Ischl have been most flatly refuted, and have eventually died down. Therefore Belgrade has become all the more loquacious. The Serbian papers have been endeavoring for days to show proof that the Monarchy has no right or title whatsoever to submit any demands, and are even defending themselves today against accusations which up to the present no one has brought. A particularly hasty gentleman at Constantinople, the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires in that city, has already commenced attempts at intimidation, to forestall the chance that Austria-Hungary might dare to begin a struggle with Serbia. The activities of the authorities remind one strongly of the man running through the forest and screaming for fear at the top of his lungs. He has to hear himself all the time, in order not to be overcome by fright.

The purpose of the Government to hold the press within bounds for a while yet, is made evident, also, by an official dispatch from the Budapest correspondent of the Vienna *Sonn- und Montagszeitung*, in which it is stated that the news of the summoning of a recent general Ministerial Council was denounced as untrue by a high authority. There was no necessity for a new Ministerial Council, as the general government had already made arrangements for any eventuality. The report had evidently arisen through an error. Count Tisza intended, as a matter of fact, to visit Vienna in a few days to inform himself as to the conclusion of the Serajevo inquiry, as the opposition in Hungary was preparing fresh interpellations concerning the Greater-Serbia movement, and Count Tisza wished to be able to amplify his last speech, in case there should be any necessity for doing so..

There have also been efforts to influence the Exchange, which has had a very strong downward movement in the last few days. The press is making appeals

[1] From the engrossed copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 14, p.m.

to the great banking institutions, whose duty it is said to be "to step into the breach when a grave danger threatens to bring about a general depreciation which, according to every prospect, is quite without any reason. The power of capital should by its attitude prove both to buyers and to the whole market itself what a poor counselor pessimism makes in bad times."

The *Montags-Revue* says:

> The question whether or to what extent the complicity of official Serbia in the tragedy of Serajevo can be shown, is one that can not yet be conclusively answered. But it is certain that the events and information of the last few days disclose the whole foolhardiness and effrontery of the Serbian Austrophobia.
>
> It will be worthy of approval, if every precipitate action, every giving way to temperamental impulses can be avoided while our Government is coming to its conclusions. Public feeling must also remain quiet—even if diplomatic differences over the tragedy at Serajevo should take the same course as earlier discussions, in which official Serbia first sneered at us with insipid denials, and finally made promises to us which there was not for one moment any serious intention of keeping. No one among us can be so naive as to expect concrete results from an inquiry into the question of the murderers' accomplices instituted at Belgrade. Even the agreement of the Belgrade Cabinet to a demand for the formal disavowing of the Greater-Serbia propaganda, or to that for the future suppression of this movement would in itself be a diplomatic success of very slight comprehensible value. Only deeds will be able to prove that under the weight of an international verdict, the authorities at Belgrade will adapt themselves to a reversal of policy that will make an actual clarification of their relation to Austria-Hungary possible.

Since the murder at Serajevo, the relations of Austria-Hungary to Serbia can only be determined and regulated on the basis of the most dispassionate realism. There are decisions to be made at Belgrade the effects of which will reach far beyond the objective consideration of a highly serious controversy. The affair is one which involves a final test of the common sense and insight of the national leaders of Serbia. If the test fails, the official policy of the Monarchy would lose an indispensable support by clinging to the methods made use of heretofore. For the people of Austria-Hungary, it would be unmistakable.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 42

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 5. FIUGGI FONTE, *July 14, 1914.*[2]

While Marquis di San Giuliano is still asserting that the reports from the Italian Ambassador at Vienna relating to Serbia do not sound pessimistic, he has, nevertheless, sought the opinion of Mr. Fusinato, expert in international law, about the international legal status, and tells me that according to the Italian interpretation,

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Fiuggi Fonte at 2.04 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.46 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 14, p.m. With the omission of the sentences "According . . . Berlin," and "Austrian . . . action," and with the addition of detailed explanations by Jagow, it was communicated on the 15th of July to the Ambassador at Vienna (see No. 46).

a government can only be held to account for crimes against general law, and not for political propaganda, if this propaganda does not find expression in action.[1] He fears, therefore, that Italy would not be able to support the Austrian accusation without setting itself in opposition to the deep-seated convictions of the Italian people and to liberal principles. I replied that the first thing to do was to await the Austrian accusation and see what it consisted of, but that, if a conflict should result, juridical questions would no longer be matters of concern, while political questions would be. Marquis di San Giuliano, however, insisted that the Italian Government could never take up arms against the principle of nationality. Minister is apparently trying to prepare us for the realization that, in case of further complications, he will no longer be able to stand by Austria. Austrian Government will have to reckon with this circumstance. According to my instructions I have not as yet initiated Marquis di San Giuliano into the conferences between Vienna and Berlin. Minister told me that Russia had been advising Belgrade to give way; it would be a good thing if all governments should follow this example.

Austrian Ambassador tells me quite confidentially that Vienna is determined on decisive action.

FLOTOW.

No. 43

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram 129.
Confidential.

LONDON, *July 14, 1914.*[3]

I have already attempted to get cautiously and confidentially into touch with public feeling in the manner suggested,[4] but in view of the well-known independence of the press here, I feel the assurance of but little result from that sort of influence. To brand the entire Serbian nation as a race of rascals and murderers, and thus to deprive it, as the *Lokalanzeiger* is endeavoring to do, of the sympathy of civilized Europe, presents difficulties; it is still more difficult to place the Serbs on the same level with the Arabs in Egypt and in Morocco or with the Indians in Mexico, as a high official personage has described them to the Vienna representative of the *Daily Telegraph*. It is much more to be expected that local sympathies here will turn instantly and impulsively to the Serbs just as soon as Austria takes to violence, and that the assassination of the heir to the throne, little enough liked here even now on account of his clerical tendencies, will be considered as being utilized merely as an excuse for injuring an inconvenient neighbor. The sympathies of Britain, and especially those of the Liberal Party, have almost always favored in Europe the principle of nationality in the struggles of the Italians against the Austrian, Papal or Bourbon domination, and during the Balkan crises have usually been on the side of the local Slavs. During the annexation crisis as well as at the time of the acute problems of last winter, English public opinion

[1] See No. 64.
[2] From the decodification.
[3] Filed at London July 14, 5.55 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.43 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 15, a.m.
[4] See No. 36.

leaned toward the side of Serbia and Montenegro, and it would thus have been very difficult at that time to have induced England to agree to energetic proceedings against King Nicholas.

No matter how fully the just and relentless punishment of the murderers might be understood and approved, just as little, I fear, would it be possible to capture public opinion in case the matter should be transferred to the political field and turned into a point of departure for military activities against a nation of criminals. In such an event the present Cabinet, already weakened by the effect of the internal crisis, would hardly prove able to support a policy contrary at once to the ethical sense of the nation and to the tastes of the (Liberal)[1] Party.[2]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 44

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome and to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest[3]

Telegrams 4, 36.
Confidential.

BERLIN, *July 14, 1914.*[4]

Should the outcome of the inquiry into the assassination at Serajevo cause Austria-Hungary to adopt severe measures against Serbia, we, like the rest of Europe, should be greatly interested in localizing any conflict that might eventually result. This would depend on public opinion throughout Europe making it possible for the various Governments to look on inactively while Austria and Serbia settled their difference. For this purpose it is necessary that the press in your locality should give space to the view that this conflict involves a matter which concerns only the two participants. Austria should not be blamed for placing herself in a position of defense against the continual menace to her existence contained in the harassing mischief-making of a neighboring country. The sympathies of the whole civilized world should be on her side in this struggle, as it is a struggle for the purpose of finally strangling a propaganda that does not even hesitate at assassination as a weapon of war, and that constitutes a stain upon European culture and an enduring menace to European peace by the unscrupulous and criminal manner in which it operates.

Kindly use your influence to the best of your ability on the local press in line with these suggestions, carefully avoiding, however, in so doing, everything that might arouse the impression that we were instigating the Austrians to war.[5]

JAGOW.

[1] "Liberal" lacking in the decodification, as the cipher group was unintelligible.
[2] See No. 48.
[3] From the first draft. Copy in Radowitz's handwriting.
[4] Telegram to the Central Telegraph Office at 10.35 p.m. on July 14.
[5] See Nos. 47 and 54.

No. 45

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at Vienna and Constantinople[1]

For Your Excellency's confidential information. BERLIN, *July 14, 1914.*[2]

Count Szögyeny read to me yesterday a dispatch from Count Berchtold in which the latter inquired of Margrave Pallavicini whether in his opinion Turkey could be won over to a union with the Central Powers of Europe. The Ambassador replied approximately to the effect that it could not be denied that for the time being there seemed to be in Constantinople a certain inclination to turn toward Russia. This tendency was even being strengthened by a lively distrust of Italy, caused by her aspirations in Asia Minor, which the Turks suspected. Turkey would be most likely to seek a support in Austria and the Triple Alliance if the Monarchy, by energetic and successful procedure against Serbia, should assure itself of a commanding position in the Balkans. In connection with this matter, Count Berchtold instructed Count Szögyeny to ask me whether in my opinion now was not the time to influence Turkey to conclude an agreement with the Central Powers.

I replied that in my opinion, which was further shared by the Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople, Turkey could only be regarded as a passive factor for some years to come, on account of the poor state of her army. She would be entirely incapable of aggressive action against Russia. Furthermore, she would, should we make her the proposal to join our group, unquestionably make demands of us on her part. However, we could not guarantee her absolute protection against an attack of Russia on Armenia, for instance. I believed that in her present circumstances, Turkey could absolutely adopt no other attitude than that of balancing here and there between the Powers, or else of joining herself to the strongest and most successful group. If Roumania stood firmly by the Triple Alliance and if, perhaps, Bulgaria should also seek to connect herself with us, it would unquestionably exercise some influence on the attitude of Turkey. To take steps at Constantinople at present in the line of Count Berchtold's suggestion seemed to me to be pointless, if not—in view of the demands for a *quid pro quo* which we should have to expect and could not fulfil—very dubious.

JAGOW.

[1] From the draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] Dispatched to Vienna on the 15th, to Constantinople on the 17th.

No. 46

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna[1]

Confidential. BERLIN, *July 15, 1914.*[2]

The Imperial Ambassador at Rome telegraphs: "While Marquis di San Giuliano . . . follow this example."[3]

Just as Italian public opinion is in general touched with Austrophobia, it has always proved itself up to the present time as Serbophile. So that there is no doubt in my mind that in case of an Austro-Serbian conflict, it would take a pronounced stand by the side of Serbia. Any territorial extension of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, even an extension of its influence in the Balkans, would absolutely horrify Italy, and would be regarded as damaging to Italy's position there. As the result of an optical illusion, the actually far greater Slavic menace is not visioned at all, in view of the mistakenly conceived danger from her neighbor, Austria. Entirely apart from the fact that the policy of the Italian Government depends not immaterially on the expression of public opinion, the view mentioned above is entertained by the majority of Italian statesmen. Every time the threatening of Serbia by Austria came into question, I have noted an extraordinary nervousness in their manner. Should Italy take the part of Serbia, the Russian lust for strife would unquestionably be materially encouraged. Petersburg would count not only on the presumption that Italy would not fulfil the obligations of her alliance, but that she would turn directly against Austria wherever it was possible. A collapse of the Monarchy would of course also offer to Italy the prospect of winning various territories that she has long coveted.

In my opinion, therefore, it is of the greatest importance that Vienna should come to some understanding with the Cabinet at Rome regarding its aims to be sought in Serbia in case of war, and should retain Italy on her side, or—as a conflict with Serbia alone would not mean a *casus foederis*—keep her strictly neutral. Italy has, according to her compact with Austria, a right to claim compensation for every change that takes place in the Balkans to the advantage of the Danube Monarchy. This, then, would constitute both the object and the bait of negotiations with Italy. According to our information, the cession of Valona for instance, would not be regarded at Rome as an acceptable compensation. In fact, Italy seems for the present to have abandoned her desire to fix herself firmly on the *altera sponda* of the Adriatic.

As I may remark in strict confidence, the acquisition of the Trentino is probably the only thing that would be regarded as ample compensation by Italy. This morsel would truly be a dainty enough one to close the mouth even of the Austrophobic public opinion. That the surrender of an ancient portion of the territory of the Monarchy would be very hard to reconcile with the feelings of the rulers as well as of the people of Austria cannot be ignored. But on the other hand the question is, of what value is Italy's attitude to Austrian policy, what

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] Sent to Vienna July 15.
[3] Here Flotow's telegram of the 14th of July (see No. 42) is included, with the omission of the sentences "According to my . . . and Berlin," and "Austrian Ambassador . . . decisive action."

price will Austria be willing to pay for it, and how does the price compare with the gain sought to be won elsewhere?

I beg Your Excellency to make Italy's attitude the subject of a thorough and confidential discussion with Count Berchtold, and, if need be, to touch upon the question of compensation at the same time. Whether at such a conference the matter of the Trentino can be mentioned, I must leave to your judgment and to your knowledge of feeling there.

The attitude adopted by Italy will in any event have considerable influence on Russia's attitude toward the conflict with Serbia; and should a general conflagration arise out of the latter, it would be of great military importance for us.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I will remark further that we have given no information to the Roman Cabinet concerning the transactions between Berlin and Vienna, and that as a consequence the compensation question has not been discussed between us.

v. JAGOW.

No. 47

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome[1]

Telegram 5.
Confidential. BERLIN, *July 15, 1914.*[2]

Please report by wire whether Your Excellency needs funds for influencing local press, and if so, what sum?[3]

JAGOW.

No. 48

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London[4]

Telegram 159.
Confidential. BERLIN, *July 15, 1914.*[5]

I would remind you, with the suggestion to make the most appropriate use of it, of the assassination of King Alexander and Queen Draga, as well as of the attitude adopted then and maintained for years by public opinion and by the Government in England toward Serbia, as a result of that event. The same system is ruling in Serbia even today; the same powers are also probably at work in the Greater-Serbia agitation.[6]

We are concerned at present with a preeminent political question, perhaps the last opportunity of giving the Greater-Serbia menace its death blow under comparatively favorable circumstances. If Austria neglects this opportunity, her prestige will have come to an end, and she will constitute a still weaker factor of

[1] From the original draft. Copy in Radowitz's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.50 p.m.
[3] See Nos. 45 and 54.
[4] From the first draft. Copy in the handwriting of the Director of the Political Division of the Foreign Office, Minister von Stumm, with alterations and emendations by Jagow.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 4 p.m. See Nos. 36 and 43.
[6] The sentence "The same . . . agitation" added by Jagow to the Stumm draft.

our association. As, under the circumstances of England's intimate relationship to Russia, which is well known to Your Excellency, any other orientation of our policy seems for the time being to be excluded, it is for us a matter of vital interest to uphold our Austrian Ally's status in the world. Your Serene Highness comprehends of what significance to us England's attitude will be in the event of possible further results of the conflict.[1]

JAGOW.

No. 49

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor[2]

Absolutely confidential. VIENNA, *July 14, 1914.*[3]

Count Tisza came to see me today after his conference with Count Berchtold. The Count said that he had always been the one who had advised caution, but that every day had strengthened him in the conviction more and more *that the Monarchy would have to come to an energetic decision*[4] in order to prove its vitality and *to put an end to the intolerable*[5] *conditions in the southeast.* The tone of the Serbian press and of the Serbian diplomats was so *presumptuous as simply not to be borne.* "It was very hard for me to come to the decision," said the Minister, "to give my advice for war, but I am now firmly *convinced of its necessity, and I* shall stand up for the greatness of the Monarchy to the utmost of my ability."

Absolutely.

Fortunately *full agreement* and *determination*[6] prevail among the authorities here. His Majesty Franz Joseph judges very calmly of the situation, as Baron Burian, too, who has talked with His Majesty at Ischl during the last day or two, reports, and will certainly hold out to the bitter end. Count Tisza added that *Germany's* unconditional assumption of a stand *by the side of the Monarchy* had a great influence on the firm attitude of the Emperor.

The note to be forwarded to Serbia had not yet been completed today in its final wording. This will not be done before Sunday. With regard to the time of its delivery to Serbia, it was decided today that it would be better to wait until Poincaré's departure from Petersburg, that is until the twenty-fifth. Then, however, immediately upon the expiration of the respite granted Serbia, in case the latter should not submit to all the demands,

Too bad.

[1] The three last sentences "If Austria . . . the conflict," added to Stumm's draft by Jagow. See No. 52.

[2] From the engrossed copy.

[3] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 15, p.m. Report submitted to the Emperor, returned by him on the 20th of July, back at the Foreign Office on the 23d. In accordance with Imperial marginal instructions, communicated to the General Staff on the 26th of July.

[4] "come to an energetic decision" twice underscored by the Emperor.

[5] "intolerable" twice underscored by the Emperor.

[6] "determination" twice underscored by the Emperor.

mobilization would follow. The note is being composed so that the possibility of its acceptance is *practically excluded.*[1] It was considered particularly important that it should demand not only assurances and promises, *but deeds.* In the composition of the note it was necessary, according to his view, to take care that it should be intelligible to the great general public—particularly in England—and that it should put Serbia plainly and clearly in the wrong.

Baron *Conrad* had made a *very good impression* on him at the last conference. He had spoken with great decision and calmness. Within the next few days they must, it was true, be prepared to have the people begin complaining again that *indecision and delay held sway here.* But that mattered little, if they only knew in Berlin that such was not the case.

In conclusion Count Tisza pressed my hand warmly, and said: "Together we shall now look the future calmly and firmly in the face." *Well, a real man at last!*

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 50

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor[2]

Absolutely confidential. VIENNA, *June 14, 1914.*[3]

After Count Tisza had left me,[4] Count Berchtold requested me to come and see him, so that he might inform me for his part of the results of today's conference. To his great pleasure, a *general agreement* on the *tenor* of the note to be transmitted *to Serbia* had been arrived at. Count Tisza had agreed to his, the Minister's, views in a very pleasing way, and had even introduced a sharper tone at various places. However, the impossibility of delivering the note at Belgrade by the sixteenth or eighteenth had been demonstrated on technical grounds. The French text was to be gone over once again definitively at a ministerial conference next Sunday morning at nine o'clock. Then he would presumably submit the note to the Emperor at Ischl Tuesday. He *would guarantee* that His Majesty *would give his approval to it.*

At today's conference it was unanimously agreed that it would be advisable in any case to await the departure of Mr. Poincaré from Petersburg before taking the step at Belgrade.[5] For it was best to avoid if possible the celebration of a fraternization at *What a pity!*

[1] "excluded" twice underscored by the Emperor.
[2] From the engrossed copy.
[3] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 15, p.m. Report submitted to the Emperor, returned by him on the 20th of July, back at the Foreign Office on the 23d of July.
[4] See No. 49.
[5] Exclamation-point by the Emperor in the margin. See Nos. 93, 96 and 108.

Petersburg, under the influence of champagne and of Messrs. Poincaré, Iswolski and the Grand Dukes, which might have an effect on the assumption and possible fixation of an attitude on the part of both nations. It would be much better to have the toasts gotten over with before the delivery of the note. Thus the delivery could follow on the 25th of July.[1]

Count Berchtold requested me, as Count Tisza had also done, expressly and repeatedly, not to leave my Government in the slightest doubt that the presence of Poincaré at Petersburg was the sole reason for the delay in the delivery of the note at Belgrade, and that they could feel absolutely assured in Berlin that there was *not a thought of hesitation or uncertainty in existence here.*

The Minister finally told me that after the final rendering of the text on Sunday, he would immediately forward the note to the Imperial Government for its absolutely confidential information, even before submitting it to his own Emperor.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 51

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram 7. FIUGGI, *July 15, 1914.*[3]

Marquis di San Giuliano fears that Austria is planning territorial acquisitions in the conflict with Serbia that Italy could not tolerate. I replied that I believed that Austria simply wanted to prevent the continued menace of the Greater-Serbia propaganda. Minister states that prevention of that by violence is impossible. Propaganda would simply become secret. It was earnestly to be desired that Austria should show moderation.

FLOTOW.

No. 52

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office[4]

Telegram 133.
Confidential. LONDON, *July 15, 1914.*[5]

I have already attempted, as well by repeated conferences with Sir E. Grey, which I have reported, as by cautiously getting into touch with the local press, to prepare the ground for a more favorable opinion concerning such more serious measures as may show themselves necessary to be taken by Austria against Serbia. Sir E. Grey said that everything would depend on the kind of inter-

[1] Exclamation-point by the Emperor in the margin. See Nos. 93, 96 and 108.
[2] From the decodification.
[3] Filed at Fiuggi July 15, 9.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.07 a.m. on the 16th of July; receipt stamp: July 16, a.m. Communicated by telegraph to the Embassy at Vienna by Jagow on the afternoon of the 16th of July.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed at London on the 15th of July at 9.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office on the 16th of July at 1.55 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 16, a.m. See No. 48.

vention that might ensue; in no case ought a diminution of Serbian territory to be considered. He has also, as has been reported, been striving to influence Petersburg in favor of Austria's claims. But if a tremendously excited commotion should arise in Russia as the result of Austria's military measures, he would not in any way be in a position to keep the Russian policy in hand and, in view of the feeling of dislike toward England which is at the moment on top in Russia and of which Count Pourtalès can inform you, he would have to humor Russian sensibilities. In any event, the Minister will, I am convinced, do his utmost upon the outbreak of an Austro-Serbian conflict, to hold Russia back. But I do not believe that he is in a position to speak the decisive word there, as he is in Paris.[1]

As far as concerns public opinion here, however, I regret to have to stand by the arguments I made in my telegram 129,[2] and to have to warn you expressly against deception. In spite of the bombs of the Mazzinists, who were scarcely more tender in feeling in the prosecution of their political aims than the members of the Ochrana, and, as is well known, did not shrink from attempts on the lives of the highest and most exalted individuals, English public opinion took the side of the movement for Italian unity and honored Garibaldi here in the most extravagant manner. At that time Austria was just as unsuccessful in dealing the death blow to the Italian movement as she was in exciting sympathy for herself here, and I doubt if the Serbian race can be induced to renounce its activities in behalf of the realization of its national hopes and ideals outside of its official borders by the bringing up of the question of authority.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 53

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor[3]

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 13, 1914.*[4]

The assassination at Serajevo has, it seems, made a deep impression here also, and condemnation of the shameful crime was expressed far and wide at the earliest moment. But the deep hatred of Austria-Hungary that is felt here very soon began to assert itself, even during this sad event, and the indignation at the revenge exercised against the Serbs in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy superseded within a few days all expressions of sympathy for the aged Emperor Franz Joseph and his realm.

Nevertheless, the mourning ceremonies held here by the representatives of Austria-Hungary were attended in great numbers by the members of official circles. Among the Grand Dukes appeared the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch,

[1] In the margin the remark by Zimmermann: "I am convinced to the contrary."
[2] In the margin the remark by Jagow: "That is unfortunately all true." See No. 43.
[3] From the engrossed copy.
[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office; July 16, a.m. Report submitted to the Emperor; returned by him on the 20th of July; back at the Foreign Office on the 23d of July. In accordance with Imperial instructions on the margin, it was communicated on the 26th of July to the Embassies at Vienna, London and Paris, and on the same day, besides to the Embassy at Rome.

who represented the Czar, and the Grand Duke Boris Vladimirovitch. Almost all of the ministers were there, and the military suite of the Czar was represented almost in full. But apart from this outward participation, evidences of a *sincere sharing* of the grief of the Imperial Austrian House were *scarcely to be seen.* Not only in the press but among social circles one met with *almost nothing but unfriendly criticism of the murdered Archduke, with the suggestion* that in him Russia had *lost a bitter enemy.* Such stories were preferably spread abroad as described the Archduke as having but few friends even in his own home, and with having been on anything but good terms even with the Emperor Franz Joseph.

He always wanted to restore the old three-empire alliance! He was Russia's best friend!

Even Mr. Sazonoff, when I spoke to him about the assassination for the first time, dwelt only briefly upon a condemnation of that crime, while he could not find *enough words with which to criticize the behavior of the Austro-Hungarian authorities* [1] for permitting the excesses against the Serbs. When I pointed out to the Minister that it was perfectly comprehensible that the loyal population throughout the whole Monarchy and especially at Serajevo should be raised to the highest state of excitement by the deed of blood, and that the police, who, as the insufficient measures of safety had already revealed, were not equal to their task, should lose their heads, Mr. Sazonoff was unwilling to take these ameliorating *circumstances into account.* On the other hand, he gave me plainly to understand that, according to his conviction, the authorities had *intentionally relieved the wrath of the people of all restraint.*[1] That Bosnia and Herzegovina contained a *loyal population worth speaking about, the Minister would not concede.*[1] There might be, as he carelessly remarked, a few loyal *Mohammedans and Catholics. Mr. Sazonoff also protested* against the assertion as made by the Austrians that the assassination was to be traced back to a *Greater-Serbian* plot. In any event, up to the present time *absolutely nothing* had been proved in this direction,[2] and it was unjustifiable to the last degree to hold the Serbian Government, which was maintaining the most correct behavior, responsible for the crime, as the Austro-Hungarian press was doing. Russia would many times have had the same right to *call the French Government to account* for assassinations that were planned on French soil and carried out in Russia.

Well! Well!

Why was it not done?

I replied to the Minister that it appeared to me impossible to fail to admit that the anti-Austrian agitations conducted for years by Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and kept stirred up from Serbia itself had at least contributed greatly toward bringing the plan for the horrible crime to fruition. Mr. Sazonoff stuck to his point that the affair concerned *only the act of individual and*

[1] Exclamation-point by the Emperor in the margin.
[2] Two exclamation-points by the Emperor in the margin.

immature young men, whose connection with a widespread political plot had in no way been proved. *Just as Pashitch says.*

I pointed out further that the assassination contained a new and serious warning to the old monarchies to bear in mind their common interests and the common dangers by which they were threatened. Mr. Sazonoff was unable not to agree with this remark, although he did so *with less enthusiasm* [1] than I have been accustomed to find in him when the talk has fallen on monarchical interests. This restraint can only be explained *by the immitigable hatred of the Minister for Austria-Hungary, a hatred which is absolutely clouding more and more all clear and calm judgment here.* *Right.* I believe that we shall have *to reckon for years to come with this phenomenon*, which *necessarily, of course, has its effect on our relations with Russia.* It is all the more remarkable, as in connection with the bitterness against Austria that there is *constantly increasing and over-weening presumption toward the Hapsburg Monarchy.* All expressions of opinion concerning Austria-Hungary heard even in official circles testify to a *boundless contempt for the* conditions *ruling there.* *Naturally, I do already.* *Pride comes before a fall!*

F. Pourtalès.

No. 54

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 8. Fiuggi, *July 16, 1914.* [3]

Have already got in touch with the press within the limits possible to the Embassy. Take the liberty of reserving the right to make application for money later, if necessary. At the moment, owing to the midsummer absence of all intermediaries and confidential agents, use of money made difficult. Task in any case very difficult, as talk is already becoming general to the effect that, in view of Italy's similar history, opposition to Serbian fight for nationality would be impossible.

Flotow.

[1] "less enthusiasm" twice underscored by the Emperor; exclamation-point in the margin.
[2] From the decodification.
[3] Filed at Fiuggi at 10.30 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.44 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 16, a.m. (error for p.m.). See Nos. 44 and 47.

No. 55

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 134. LONDON, *July 16, 1914.*[2]

Today's *Times* has a leading article on Austria and Serbia, and criticizes most sharply the challenging attitude of the Serbian press, [which] is estranging the sympathies of the civilized world from Serbia's cause. The paper expects a ready compliance on the part of the Serbian Government in the matter of the investigation into the crime, and guarantees against further support of the revolutionary movement. At the same time the paper warns the Austrians against the prosecution of such a policy as is demanded by the military periodicals, by which there would be everything to lose and nothing to gain. The southern-Slav question, the most serious of all Austro-Hungarian problems, can never be solved by violence or threats. Any attempt in this direction would be much more likely to endanger the peace of Europe. The Monarchy can learn from its own history to what the policy of the desertion of peaceful self-control can lead.

I repeat my opinion that if military measures are taken against Serbia, public opinion will be united against Austria-Hungary.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 56

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Director-General of the Hapag[3]

Entirely confidential. BERLIN, *July 15, 1914.*[4]

MY DEAR MR. BALLIN:

Pardon me if I interrupt your stay at the baths with these lines, but there is a matter in question which also is a child of your bosom—our relations with England.

You will have read the announcements of the *Berliner Tageblatt* concerning certain naval conventions between England and Russia, which led finally to an interpellation in the Lower House and to the somewhat complicated denial of Grey. I do not know whence this piece of news came flying to the editorial desk of Theodor Wolff, and at first I hardly felt like giving it any too much credit, as it seemed to me to correspond too inaccurately with our apparently improved relations, as well as to stand in opposition to the trend of English policy in connection with agreements of that nature. But I naturally looked into the matter, and—as I must inform you in the strictest confidence—have been able to assure myself, to my most intense regret, from very confidential sources, that the report had, as a matter of fact, some foundation. Lichnowsky has talked to Grey on the *Tageblatt* matter, and Grey, after some hesitation, failed to make a complete denial. Now there is probably behind the affair, as a matter of fact, more than Theodor Wolff knows himself or than the good Lichnowsky is willing to believe.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at London at 11.47 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.05 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 16, a.m. (error for p.m.).
[3] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting. [4] Mailed at 6.45 p.m., July 16.

There is actually in negotiation between London and Petersburg a naval convention, by which—this, again, in the strictest confidence—on the part of Russia a very broad military and naval cooperation is being sought. These negotiations have not yet been brought to a conclusion despite Russia's urgent pressure, partly, perhaps, because Grey has become a little dilatory on account of the indiscretion of the *Tageblatt* and of the open opposition of a portion of the Liberal Party in England. But the Russians appear to be very urgent, and who knows what they may offer as a *quid pro quo*? Grey will probably not oppose the conclusion of the compact in the end, if he does not meet with opposition from his own party or the Cabinet. Like a Pilate, he may be able to persuade himself that the transactions are not really being conducted between the two Cabinets, but between the naval authorities. I will admit that it is open to doubt whether the English will not act with their unique casuistry and conclude the agreement with a mental reservation not to intervene at the critical moment if it should not suit them to do so, as a *casus foederis* is intentionally not provided in the convention. But even if the convention, according to the English conception of it, should hang indecisively in the air, it would nevertheless have the result of materially encouraging Russia's aggressive tendencies.

The significance that the occasion might have for us I do not need further to explain. A closer *rapprochement* to England could in that case scarcely be thought of by us. It appears to me to be very important, therefore, to make a new attempt to cause the plan to miscarry. It is possible that Grey might be scared off from the definite conclusion of the matter if the Liberal Party should once more become alarmed, or if some member of the Cabinet should express a decided scruple. It is my idea that you might, through one of your many intimate connections with Englishmen in positions of authority—have you not some such with Lord Haldane?—issue a warning concerning the Canal. I have thought out some such scheme as this: You write a letter stating that you had learned at Kiel that the announcement in the *Tageblatt* had, as a matter of fact, some foundation. Our naval circles were very much excited about it, and you foresaw that a new, inevitable and intensive naval scare might result—with new and far-reaching naval provisions. Even in the Wilhelmstrasse they were drawing long faces and asking themselves mournfully if the whole weary work of a *rapprochement* to England was now to fall hopelessly into ruins. The feeling that the ring of iron was closing about us more tightly every moment might finally even lead to serious consequences, in connection with the threat of the ever-increasing strength of Russia and the ever more aggressive tendencies of Panslavism.

Whether this plan is a good one, or would be useful, I do not know. Perhaps you can suggest another one to me. What I mean is, that we must leave nothing untried in order to cause the plan to miscarry. I should be very grateful to you if you would give me your views and tell me, if you can, what you think it is possible to do. In any event, it is necessary to make haste in order that the conclusion of the compact be not reached in the meantime—an end toward which Mr. Poincaré is doubtlessly cooperating at Petersburg.

With the best wishes for a complete cure at the baths, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

JAGOW.

Since writing this yesterday evening, I read early this morning a new article from Wolff in the *Berliner Tageblatt*. Apparently his confidential correspondents are beginning to take the matter more seriously.[1]

No. 57

The Foreign Office to the Imperial Chancelor[2]

Telegram 13. BERLIN, *July 16, 1914.*[3]

Vienna notified through dispatch to Tschirschky of necessity for understanding with Italy on Serbia.[4]

Ballin requested by private letter to work against English-Russian naval convention through his English connections.[5]

STUMM.

No. 58

The Imperial Chancelor to the Secretary of State for Alsace-Lorraine[6]

HOHENFINOW, *July 16, 1914.*[7]

DEAR COUNT ROEDERN:

You will already have seen, from your reading of the papers, that the European situation is not at present free from dangers. In the event of an Austro-Serbian conflict it will be of the utmost importance to localize this difference. We have reason for doubting, and sincerely trust that France, burdened at the present time with all sorts of troubles, will do everything she can to prevent Russia from intervening. This task will be made materially easier for the present authorities at Paris if the French nationalists find no cause for agitation of which to make capital during the next few weeks; I have therefore arranged at Berlin that all press polemics with France shall be cut out as far as possible during the next few weeks, and I would ask you to do the same thing at Strassburg. It would also be advisable to postpone for a few weeks any administrative measures which have possibly been arranged for, which might be made use of in France for purposes of agitation. If we are successful not only in keeping France quiet but in having Petersburg admonished to keep the peace, it would have what would be for us a most favorable effect on the Franco-Russian alliance.[8]

With cordial wishes, yours most sincerely,

V. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] "Since writing . . . seriously," postscript by Jagow in the finished copy, added on the 16th of July. See Nos. 57 and 254.

[2] From the original draft in Stumm's handwriting. The Hohenfinow decodification is also in the archives.

[3] Filed at Berlin at 8.30 p.m.; arrived at Hohenfinow at 8.46 p.m.

[4] See No. 46.

[5] See Nos. 56 and 254.

[6] From the original draft. First copy made by Counselor of Legation Dr. Riesler, regular assistant in the Foreign Office.

[7] Sent on the 16th of July.

[8] See No. 232.

No. 59

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 9. FIUGGI FONTE, *July 17, 1914.*[2]

Experienced newspaper heads, with whom I have got in touch concerning the Austrian proceedings, suggest that it would be better now, in the present tolerably indifferent state of the Italian press, not to start any premature polemics by an obtrusive defense of Austria, as there would be no lack of contradiction under the conditions of the present feeling against Austria in Italy. Cautious statements in favor of Austria occasionally distributed were approved. I was confidentially informed that the Austrian Ambassador himself wishes that only the noisy attacks against Austria be replied to.

It seems to me that it would be important to try to influence the press at Milan, which is hard to get at from Rome. I make the suggestion as to how far the initiative and cooperation of the Imperial consul at Milan might be useful.

It might be most important at the present moment to try to influence, if it is possible, the Italian correspondents at Vienna, especially the correspondent of the *Giornale d'Italia*, who writes very unfavorably. It is from there that the only actually unfavorable stories have come, up to the present time.

FLOTOW.

No. 60

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office[3]

Telegram 10. FIUGGI, *July 17, 1914.*[4]

At a purely theoretical discussion of the possible Austro-Serbian conflict—for he has not yet been initiated—Marquis di San Giuliano stated that the overthrow of Serbia or even an annexation by Austria could be tolerated by Roumania as little as by Italy. I do not consider it to be impossible that he plans to bring about a conference at Bucharest on the subject, when occasion offers.

FLOTOW.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Fiuggi Fonte at 11.30 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.20 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 17, p.m. Communicated to the Embassy at Vienna by Jagow on the 18th of July, with the addition of the following remarks (draft in Radowitz's handwriting): "For Your Excellency's information, to be used with Count Berchtold: The Imperial Ambassador at Rome has been instructed, as have also the Imperial representatives at London and Bucharest, in accordance with the wishes expressed here by the Austro-Hungarian Government, to influence the press in favor of Austria. Mr. von Flotow reports on the 17th of the month as follows: (Here follows the above report with the omission of the second paragraph)." Dispatch sent to Vienna at 8 p.m. on the 18th of July.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed at Fiuggi at 2.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.06 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 17, p.m. Communicated to the Embassy at Vienna by telegraph by Jagow on the 18th of July, with the omission of the words "for . . . initiated," and with the following addition: "As San Giuliano has not been informed of our latest *démarche* at Bucharest, I have notified Count Waldburg to try and see that it is kept secret." Telegram (draft in Bergen's handwriting, with alterations by Stumm and Zimmermann) filed at the Central Telegraph Office at 8.15 p.m. In connection with the communication of the Flotow telegram to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest, see No. 63.

No. 61

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna[1]

Confidential. BERLIN, *July 17, 1914.*[2]

As Your Excellency knows from having read the memorandum of Count Hoyos on his conference with the Under-Secretary of State, Count Hoyos stated here that Austria would have to proceed to a complete partition of Serbia.[3]

Count Berchtold and Count Tisza remarked in this connection that this declaration represented only the personal view of Count Hoyos, and that they therefore expressly did NOT identify themselves with it; however, have not apparently disclosed any further their own views as to territorial plans.

For the benefit of the diplomatic handling of this conflict with Serbia, it would not be unimportant to know from the beginning what the ideas of the Austro-Hungarian statesmen concerning the future status of Serbia really are, as this question will have a material influence on the attitude of Italy and on the public opinion and attitude of England.

That the plans of the statesmen of the Danube Monarchy may be influenced and modified by the course of events is, of course, to be looked upon as self-evident; nevertheless, we must assume that the Vienna Cabinet has in mind some sort of a picture of the aims to be sought, even in the matter of territorial acquisition. Will Your Excellency kindly endeavor to get some information on this question in your talks with Count Berchtold, however, avoiding giving any impression, that we are attempting to put any obstructions in the path of Austrian activities or that we are trying to prescribe certain limits or aims. But it would be useful to us to be informed to a certain extent about where the road is likely to lead us.

V. JAGOW.

No. 62

The Ambassador at London to the Imperial Chancellor[4]

LONDON, *July 16, 1914.*[5]

From the point of view of Count Berchtold it is perfectly comprehensible that he should conceive of making use of this comparatively favorable opportunity of restoring the status of the Monarchy, greatly shaken by the peace of Bucharest, and of reestablishing its influence in the Balkans, diminished by the desertion of Roumania, by a passage at arms with Serbia. It is well known that the leading military authorities in Austria have been urging for a long time the establishment of the prestige of the Monarchy by means of a war. Once it was Italy, from which Irredentism was to be driven out, at another time Serbia, which was to be forced to renounce her evil ways and to better manners by feats of arms *à la* Prince Eugene. I comprehend, as I say, this point of view as held by the leaders

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] Sent off on the 17th of July. See No. 18.
[3] In Jagow's draft originally written "crushed", altered by him to "partition".
[4] From the engrossed copy.
[5] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 18, a.m.

of the Austrian nation, and, in their place, might perhaps have made earlier use of the Serbian disturbances to solve the southern-Slav problem according to Hapsburg ideas.

But the primary requisite for any such policy should be a clear program based on the recognition of the fact that the present national and international conditions within the family of Serbo-Croat peoples, which assign one portion of this nation divided by religion but not by race to the Austrian, another portion to the Hungarian State, a third to the Monarchy as a whole, and finally a fourth and a fifth to independent kingdoms, can not be maintained for any length of time. For the endeavor to maintain the sacred *status quo* under all circumstances, purely for reasons of convenience, has often, as recently at the time of the last Balkan crisis, led to the total collapse of the political house of cards erected on a foundation thus composed.

Now, I doubt, first of all, whether there has been drawn up at Vienna a broad plan which alone would offer the basis of a permanent regulation of the southern-Slav problem, I mean a triad with the inclusion of Serbia. From my knowledge of conditions as they exist there, I do not in the least believe that they are in a position to be able to direct any international transformation of the Monarchy of that nature. For such a purpose there would first have to be overcome the opposition of Hungary, which would defend itself to the utmost against being forced to sacrifice Croatia and Fiume. And for the carrying out of such a program, Vienna lacks a powerful personality adapted for such deeds. There, all they try to do most of the time is to satisfy the need of the moment, and they are happy when the political difficulties, which never die, inasmuch as they are the result of the variety in the component factors of the Empire, are so far postponed as to offer them the prospect of being able to go dragging along in the old groove for a few months more.

The military correction of Serbia would therefore never possess the purpose or have the result of a satisfactory solution of the extremely difficult southern-Slav problem—at the best, only the result of having brought afresh upon the stage, in order to afford Austria some moral satisfaction, the eastern question once decided with so much difficulty.

Whether Russia and Roumania would stand idly by and leave Austria a free hand, Your Excellency is in a better position to judge than I am. From the impressions I have gained here, and especially from the confidential talks I have had with Sir Edward Grey, I believe that I was right in the views I recently upheld at Berlin concerning Russia's views regarding us. Sir Edward Grey assures me that no one in Russia has any idea of wanting to go to war with us. My cousin Count Benckendorff tells me much the same thing. A certain anti-German feeling regularly recurs there from time to time—that is part of the Slavic frame of mind. But against this wave there is always in existence a strong pro-German party. Neither the Emperor nor any one of the principal persons in authority is anti-German, and since the Liman question was settled, no serious bad feeling has arisen. On the other hand, Count Benckendorff admitted frankly that a strong feeling against Austria existed in Russia. But no one in Russia had in mind any such thing as wishing to take by conquest any part of Austria, such as, say, Galicia.

Whether it would be possible in view of this feeling to persuade the Russian Government to an attitude of passivity during an Austro-Serbian passage at arms, I am unable to judge. But what I do believe myself able to state with certainty is that in case of war it would not be possible to influence public opinion in this country to the disfavor of Serbia, even by conjuring up the bloody shades of Draga and her paramour, whose removal has long been forgotten by the English public and thus belongs among historic events with which, as far as non-British countries are concerned, people here are in general less familiar than is, perhaps, one of our average third-form boys at home.

Now, I am far from advocating the sacrifice of either our alliance or our ally. I consider the alliance, that has won its way into the sentimental life of both nations, as necessary, and if only with regard to the many Germans living in Austria as the natural form of their attachment to us. The question that troubles me is whether it is advisable for us to support our ally in a policy, or, in other words, to stand as guarantors of a policy which I regard as mere adventure, inasmuch as it will lead neither to a radical solution of the problem nor to the annihilation of the Greater-Serbia movement. If the Imperial and Royal police and the Bosnian territorial authorities let the heir to the throne drive through an "avenue of bomb-throwers," I can see in that no sufficient reason for us to risk the famous Pomeranian Grenadier in promoting Austria's Pandour [1] policy, merely for the purpose of strengthening Austrian self-assertion, which, in such a case, as the era of Ährenthal showed, considers its supreme task to be its speediest liberation from the guardianship of Berlin.

If, however, it is proposed to decide our policy by the consideration that as soon as the Greater-Serbian movement has received its death-blow, happy Austria, relieved of this anxiety, will be grateful to us for the assistance we have rendered, I cannot suppress the question whether the national movement in Hungary was stamped out when the revolt was overthrown by the help of the Czar Nicholas and by the constant requisition of the gallows after the Hungarian subjugation at Világos under direction of the Imperial General Haynau, and whether the rescue of Austria by the Czar really laid the foundation of cordiality and confidence between the two Empires.

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] [Austrian infantryman (fig., marauder).]

No. 63

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest [1]

Telegram 38.
Confidential.
For your personal information. BERLIN, *July 18, 1914.*[2]

The Imperial Ambassador at Rome telegraphs: "At a purely theoretical . . . offers." [3]

Marquis San Giuliano has not been informed either of the letter of the Emperor Franz Joseph to our Most Gracious Lord or of our *démarche* at Bucharest. Therefore kindly take care that the confidential communication from His Majesty the Emperor and King transmitted by Your Highness to King Carol be kept STRICTLY SECRET and is not brought to the knowledge of the local Italian representative.

JAGOW.

No. 64

The Ambassador at Rome to the Imperial Chancelor [4]

FIUGGI, *July 16, 1914.*[5]

I would like to add to my previous report relating to the framing of an international legal opinion by Minister Fusinato [6] concerning the Austro-Serbian quarrel and the attitude assumed by the Marquis di San Giuliano in connection with it, that the Minister very decisively took the point of view that Austria could not make accusations against Belgrade on account of the Greater-Serbia propaganda, as long as this propaganda did not result in action in Austria itself. The assassination of the heir to the throne could not be regarded as such an act, as it was not committed by a subject of Serbia. If Austria had the design of suppressing the Serbian struggle for nationalism by violence, it would be quite impossible for any Italian Government to accompany her along this path; all the traditions of the nationalistic idea and of the principles of liberalism compelled Italy to keep off this road.

Any one who is acquainted with the subjection of the Latin peoples to the power of phrases can not fail to realize that, in fact, it would not be an easy matter for an Italian Government to take any other position. Talk is already becoming general to the effect that in view of the similar historical Italian fight for nationality, opposition to the nationalistic strivings of Serbia would be impossible. The platform of the Austrian procedure is therefore in great disfavor with local public opinion. Though I contested the Minister's point of view with considerable animation, it was less because I failed to understand this point of view than because I wished to bring him indirectly to the announcement of some

[1] From the original draft. Drafted in Bergen's handwriting with alterations by Jagow.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.30 p.m.
[3] Here the telegram from Flotow of the 17th of July (No. 60) is inserted, with the omission of the words "for he has not yet been initiated." The words "informed either . . . Bucharest" added by Jagow instead of the original "informed of our latest *démarche* there" in Bergen's draft.
[4] From the engrossed copy.
[5] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 18, p.m. Copy sent on the 19th to the Embassy at Vienna "for confidential information and for appropriate use with Count Berchtold."
[6] See No. 42.

hint as to whether he, too, would refuse aid to his ally in the event of serious European complications. The Minister could not go as far as a definite declaration to that effect for the reason that the Austrian demands have not yet been formulated. But I got the impression that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to persuade Italy to follow along with us into this field. Not only does the present acute problem play a part under existing circumstances, but also the dominating feeling here against Austria and even the peculiar psychological disposition of the Marquis di San Giuliano himself. Even a year ago things looked otherwise. But since the well-known Trieste decrees of Prince Hohenlohe, the historical dislike of Austria, which was scarcely latent, has gradually been becoming more and more aroused, and it is, in fact, difficult practically to conceive at the present moment of any extensive Austro-Italian cooperation. The Marquis di San Giuliano, who has regarded the cultivation of relations with Austria as a sort of political program of his ministry, is disappointed, and feels himself to be no longer supported by public opinion. He told me only yesterday that he saw so many dark clouds on the horizon of Austro-Italian relations that he almost despaired of the result of any further labor.

I told him that for many reasons I was still convinced today that an alliance with Austria was the best policy for Italy. Temporary disturbances, like the present one, must be overcome. The Minister stated that as long as he was still in office, he, too, would strive for this same end. But he was striving without any great hope.

FLOTOW.

No. 65

The Counselor of Embassy at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

Confidential. VIENNA, *July 17, 1914.*[2]

As Count Berchtold told me, the note containing the demands to be made on Serbia is to be presented at Belgrade on Thursday, the twenty-third, in the afternoon.[3] With the hope of hastening the occurrence as much as possible, the date has been advanced by a few days, and the day of Mr. Poincaré's departure from St. Petersburg has been set for it. They are counting on the fact that the President will already be aboard ship when the *démarche* at Belgrade becomes known at St. Petersburg.

The verbal text of the note, the Minister tells me, has not yet been definitely established, and conferences with Count Tisza are still taking place; on Wednesday, the twenty-second, it is to be laid before His Majesty the Emperor Franz Joseph for his final sanction.

Count Berchtold appeared to hope that Serbia would not agree to the Austro-Hungarian demands, as a mere diplomatic victory would put the country here again into a stagnant mood for which they would have absolutely no use.

W. PRINCE STOLBERG.

[1] From the engrossed copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 18, p.m. Corrected copy was sent to the Emperor on the 18th of July, was returned by him on the 20th of July, and on the 23d was back in Berlin. Copy sent to the Imperial Chancelor by the Foreign Office on the 18th of July.

[3] See Nos. 67 and 69.

No. 66

The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

Confidential. SINAIA, *July 14, 1914.*[2]

Count Czernin had, as His Majesty the King told me on Friday,[3] an audience with His Majesty the day before. What information if any the Austrian Minister had to give him is not within my knowledge. His Majesty showed neither surprise nor disquiet at my arguments.

I got the impression that the King, quite apart from His Majesty's idea that Bulgaria was not to be brought into an alliance just now, also thought that the immediate present did not appear to be the proper time for entering upon such binding agreements as the Emperor Franz Joseph was proposing. His Majesty seemed rather to favor the view that the changes in the Balkans had not yet come to an end, and that the nations there were at the present moment in a stage of transition that was not advantageous for that kind of agreements, which required quieter times.

His Majesty did not express himself spontaneously, either as to whether he could draw away from Serbia or could take active measures against the Roumanian agitations directed against the Danube Monarchy. Fearing that the audience might come to an end before I should receive an answer to the request of our Most Gracious Master, I found myself forced to take occasion to ask His Majesty the question what attitude he took toward the Imperial requests. From the reply I received I gathered that the Monarch is willing to draw away from Serbia as well as to try to repress the agitation against Austria-Hungary which dominates the country. However, to the granting of this last request is attached the expectation that the authorities in Hungary will endeavor to lighten the King's labors in this direction by showing the Roumanians there a certain reciprocity. There is no doubt that with the aggravation that the anti-Austrian feeling in this country has undergone of late, it will require an evidence of the good-will of the neighboring Monarchy in order gradually to bring about an alleviation of the popular dislike. This would be all the more advisable for the reason that we must certainly be prepared to see France and Russia do everything in their power to stir up the anti-Austrian agitation, with a view to separating Roumania from Austria and in that way from the Triple Alliance. His Majesty thought that the agitation might quiet down during the summer, but might flare up again when winter came. Count Tisza had made a start toward finding a solution in the question of the Hungarian Roumanians that was full of promise, but unfortunately that was all there was to it. In the meantime an agitation against the Roumanians had commenced on the Hungarian side, especially in the press, which made an understanding all the more difficult to arrive at.

As a matter of fact, there now existed on both sides of the Carpathians an exacerbated feeling that found expression in the press on every occasion. It was certainly a mistake on the part of the Austro-Hungarian papers to announce

[1] From the engrossed copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 18, p.m. Communicated to the Embassy at Vienna on the 21st of July.
[3] Friday, July 10; see No. 41.

Count Tisza's action with such emphasis. By so doing, they only increased the expectations attached to that action. Thus the disappointment was twice as great, inasmuch as the desired result never came to pass, or appeared, at least, unsatisfactory. If the Hungarian Government should be able to shut the mouths of the leaders of the agitation, perhaps by skilful assignments in the service of the State, much would be gained, according to the views of leading authorities here.

His Majesty told me that he wished to inform Mr. Bratianu also of the communications I had made to His Majesty.

WALDBURG.

No. 67

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister in the Imperial Suite [1]

Telegram 82.
Confidential; private. BERLIN, *July 18, 1914.*[2]

Request exact particulars of the route of *H. M. S. Hohenzollern* from the twenty-third on. On that day, as we know, the Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade is to occur[3]—a forty-eight hour ultimatum appears to be planned—and it would depend on the development of events whether or when His Majesty's presence here might prove desirable. Kindly take Admiral von Müller into your confidence, if called for, but do not cause His Majesty any premature uneasiness.

As we wish to localize prospective conflict between Austria and Serbia, we cannot afford to alarm the world by the premature return of His Majesty, but on the other hand His Majesty must be within reach in case unforeseen circumstances should make important decisions (mobilization) necessary for us also. Perhaps cruising about in the Baltic for the last few days of trip might be considered.[4]

JAGOW.

No. 68

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [5]

BERLIN, *July 18, 1914.*[6]

Count Szögyeny carried out today the instructions specified in the enclosed note.[7]

In the first place, the newspaper reports, already denied, concerning the gathering of troops at Bari, appear to dispense with the actual facts. It seems also just as improbable to me that Italy should take action against Valona, if at all, at any rate without previous arrangement with Vienna.

The Imperial Chargé d'Affaires at Athens has been instructed to take the step there which is desired by Count Berchtold, and the Imperial Ambassador at

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting. [2] Sent at 5.05 p.m.
[3] See No. 65. [4] See No. 79.
[5] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting. [6] Sent on the 18th of July.
[7] This is a communication of the Imperial and Royal Embassy at Berlin regarding the possible occupation of Valona by Italy.

Rome has been informed of the matter for the purpose of passing it on to Marquis San Giuliano. As far as concerns the proposal for an international naval demonstration and the occupation of Valona by the detachments of several Powers, however, the following reasons oppose it, in my opinion. In case Valona should be captured by the insurgents, a simple naval demonstration would hardly suffice to bring about the evacuation of the city, and it would be necessary, as Count Berchtold evidently has in mind, to proceed to the landing of detachments and in the end to a fight with the insurgents. But the Powers would scarcely be prepared to employ more troops in Albania. Sir Edward Grey's declarations permit this to be assumed with certainty, and the participation of France or Russia in such activities could be counted on just as little. We ourselves do not want to employ our troops in fighting in Albania. Thus, I regret that it is impossible to suggest to Italy to take an initiative where we ourselves would not be able to follow.

Finally, I would like to suggest for Count Berchtold's consideration, whether, if Italy were engrossed with Valona, it would not materially lighten the burden of Austria's action against Serbia. They can have no illusions in Vienna—as I have already explained elsewhere—as to the fact that an Austrian attack on Serbia would not only meet with a very unfavorable reception in Italy, but would presumably encounter direct opposition. For that reason I consider an early agreement on this subject between the Cabinets of Vienna and Rome to be urgently necessary, and I think that this could be materially simplified, if Italy were engaged in Albania with Austria's consent.

Your Excellency will discuss this matter with Count Berchtold most seriously.

v. JAGOW.

No. 69

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister in the Imperial Suite[1]

Telegram 84. BERLIN, *July 18, 1914.*[2]

According to information from Vienna Embassy, Austro-Hungarian *démarche* will take place at Belgrade on the twenty-third instant.

JAGOW.

[1] From the original draft. Copy in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 7.30 p.m. See Nos. 65 and 80.

No. 70

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 122. BERLIN, *July 18, 1914.*[2]

Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung publishes tomorrow remarks on Austro-Serbian conflict which are intentionally written in a mild tone with an eye to European diplomacy. This markedly official paper was not to give alarm prematurely. Please take care that this is not wrongly interpreted there as German deprecation of Vienna determination.

JAGOW.

No. 71

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 349.
Confidential. CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 18, 1914.*[4]

People are already talking here about the Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade, announced, but again and again postponed, as if it were an affair not to be taken seriously. Especially in Triple Entente circles, they are becoming firmly convinced that Serbia will accept the paper demands of Austria and that then everything will remain just as it has been. Margrave Pallavicini is, it is true, fully aware of the significance of the motive for the future of the Triple Alliance, but seems himself to be in doubt as to whether they will actually come to any firm determination at Vienna. He hopes for the rescue of Austria less as the result of any energetic action on the part of his Government than as that of the arrangement of new alliances, and would like therefore to attach Turkey to Austria through Bulgaria. I oppose this idea most actively. Turkey is today without any question still worthless as an ally.[5] She would only be a burden to her associates, without being able to offer them the slightest advantage. The association of Turkey to Bulgaria would be absolutely certain to provoke a counterblow from Russia in Armenia. It should be the policy of the Triple Alliance to . . . Turkey with her . . .[6] and to arrange its relations with her so that in case Turkey should actually become a factor of power when years have gone by, the threads should not be severed. But to begin with, Turkey can only be

[1] From the original draft. Copy in the handwriting of the regular assistant at the Foreign Office, Counselor of Legation Esternaux, with some alterations in the handwriting of the reporting counselor at the Foreign Office, Acting Privy Counselor of Legation Dr. Hammann.

[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.10 p.m.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed at Constantinople on the 18th of July at 11 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office on the 19th of July at 2.30 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 19, a.m. Communicated on the 19th of July by Jagow to the Ambassador at Vienna as a dispatch, with: "For your information. The Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople, who had not been informed of the Pallavicini-Berchtold suggestion to associate Turkey with our group of Powers, writes in a report: 'Margrave Pallavicini hopes for the rescue of Austria as the result of the arrangement of new alliances, and would like . . . Armenian border.'"

[5] See No. 117.

[6] Several cipher groups are lacking here; the words "to . . . Turkey . . . with her . . ." Jagow struck out in writing to the Embassy at Vienna.

advised to keep away from every political adventure and to maintain friendly relations with all nations. Even a neutral Turkey would detain several Russian corps on the Armenian border.

WANGENHEIM.

No. 72

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [1]

Private letter. BERLIN, *July 18, 1914.*

DEAR LICHNOWSKY:

Your opinion on our policy as contained in your Serbian report [2] is always appreciated by me, and I am sure that the Imperial Chancelor feels the same way about it. Nor do I hesitate to admit that many of your remarks are justified. But after all, we are allied to Austria; *hic Rhodus, hic salta.* There may also be different opinions as to whether we get all our money's worth from an alliance with that ever increasingly disintegrating composition of nations beside the Danube, but there I say with the poet—Busch, I think it was—"If no longer you like your company, look for another, if any there be." And, unfortunately, we have not yet been able to arrive at a relationship with England that promises complete satisfaction, nor could we, after all that has passed, arrive at it, if, indeed, we shall ever be able to arrive at it.

Austria, which has forfeited more and more prestige as the result of her lack of vigor, hardly counts any longer as a really Great Power. The Balkan crisis weakened her position still further. Our alliance federation has also been weakened by this retrogression of Austria's position as a Power.

Austria no longer intends to tolerate the sapping activities of the Serbians, and just as little does she intend to tolerate longer the continuously provocative attitude of her small neighbor at Belgrade—see the talk in the Serbian press—and that of Mr. Pashitch. She fully realizes that she has neglected many opportunities, and that she is still able to act, though in a few years she may no longer be able to do so. Austria is now going to come to an understanding with Serbia, and has told us so. During the whole Balkan crisis we mediated successfully in the interest of peace, without forcing Austria to passivity at any of the critical moments. The fact that notwithstanding that we have often, with injustice, been accused of trimming and shuffling, makes no difference to me. Nor have we at the present time forced Austria to her decision. But we neither could nor should attempt to stay her hand. If we should do that, Austria would have the right to reproach us (and we ourselves) with having deprived her of her last chance of political rehabilitation. And then the process of her wasting away and of her internal decay would be still further accelerated. Her standing in the Balkans would be gone forever. You will undoubtedly agree with me that the absolute establishment of the Russian hegemony in the Balkans is, indirectly, not permissible, even for us. The maintenance of Austria, and, in fact, of the most powerful Austria possible, is a necessity for us both for internal and external

[1] From a typewritten copy placed at our disposal by Prince Lichnowsky.
[2] See No. 62.

reasons. That she can not be maintained forever, I will willingly admit. But in the meantime we may perhaps be able to arrange other combinations.

We must attempt to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia. Whether we shall succeed in this will depend first on Russia, and secondly on the moderating influence of Russia's Allies. The more determined Austria shows herself, the more energetically we support her, so much the more quiet will Russia remain. To be sure, there will be some agitation in Petersburg, but, on the whole, Russia is not ready to strike at present. Nor will France or England be anxious for war at the present time. According to all competent observation, Russia will be prepared to fight in a few years. Then she will crush us by the number of her soldiers; then she will have built her Baltic Sea fleet and her strategic railroads. Our group, in the meantime, will have become weaker right along. In Russia this is well known, and they are therefore determined to have peace for a few years yet. I readily believe your cousin Benckendorff when he says that Russia wants no war with us at present. Sazonoff assures us of the same thing, but the Government of Russia, which is still attached to peace and half-way friendly to Germany today, is constantly growing weaker, while the feeling of the Slavic element is becoming more and more hostile to Germany. Russia's fundamental treatment of us was clearly indicated last fall. During the Balkan crisis she could not thank us enough for our peaceful influence. But no sooner had the crisis passed, than her unfriendly behavior recommenced—on account of Liman, etc. If we can not attain localization (of the conflict) and Russia attacks Austria, a *casus foederis* will then arise; we could not throw Austria over then. We stand in the midst of an isolation that can scarcely be called "proud." I desire no preventive war, but if war should come, we cannot hide behind the fence.

I still hope and believe, even today, that the conflict can be localized. In this matter the attitude of England will prove of great significance. I am fully convinced that local opinion in that country will not be enthusiastic over Austria's procedure, and I admit that all your arguments in this line are correct. But we must do all that is possible to prevent her becoming too enthusiastic in the Serbian cause, for it is a long road from either sympathy or antipathy to the fanning of the flames of a world-conflagration. Sir Grey is always talking of the balance of power represented by the two groups of Powers. It should, therefore, be perfectly obvious to him that this balance of power would be utterly destroyed if we should desert Austria and she should be demolished by Russia, and also that the balance of power would be made to totter considerably by a world-conflagration. Therefore, if he is honorable and logical, he must stand by us in attempting to localize the conflict. But now, *satis superque*; it is one o'clock in the morning. If these arguments in favor of our policy are, perhaps, not sufficient to convince you, I know, nevertheless, that you will stand behind them.[1]

With the warmest greetings, sincerely yours,

JAGOW.

July 19.

I have just received your letter of the seventeenth. In the main, it is answered by the above. First of all, leave of absence as a *cura posterior*; I will reply very soon as to the colonial agreement.

J.

[1] See No. 161.

No. 73

The Ambassador at Rome to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

FIUGGI, *July 16, 1914.*[2]

The Marquis di San Giuliano views very skeptically the action against Serbia planned by Austria. In the opinion of the Minister, the action can in no way lead to the expected result. Even if Serbia should comply with the Austrian requirements, that is, if she should forbid and dissolve the Greater-Serbia associations, etc., the agitations would simply change from a public to a secret character. That would even be the case if Austria should occupy Belgrade. National aspirations of such strength can no longer be repressed by force in these days. To believe in the supreme power and efficiency of police measures in such national questions is Austria's old mistake. Italian history of the last century offers an example of it. The analogy of the two cases is so striking that, for this reason alone, no one should dare to expect any Italian sympathy for the Austrian procedure. If the Serbian problem can be solved at all within the present status of the Austrian Empire, it will only be possible by providing the Austrian Serbs with an interest in remaining a part of Austria and standing by Austria.

FLOTOW.

No. 74

The First Chief Quartermaster General of the Grand General Staff to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [3]

Private letter.[4]
Entirely confidential.

IVENACK, *July 27, 1914.*[5]

DEAR JAGOW:

My adjutant has just brought me a letter written to me by Kageneck, in which he gives me such information as he can in reply to my questions concerning the military intentions of Vienna.

As General Conrad was on a journey, Kageneck laid my questions before his representative, General Höfer, whom I know to be a sensible man. According to the latter, they intend to move six army corps against Serbia, and, for the time being, to undertake nothing in Galicia. Should Russia intervene, they would leave Serbia alone and turn everything against their principal opponent.

Those are sensible plans. But I should like on this occasion to express as my personal opinion that we should do well not to count upon a speedy carrying out of Austrian army plans, as:

1. Partial mobilization always has its difficulties.

2. Breaking away from any opponent always takes a certain amount of time, and

3. In Vienna they still have no idea where the Serbs will finally take a stand;

[1] From the engrossed copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 19, a.m.
[3] From the corrected copy in the handwriting of Count Waldersee.
[4] Filed by Jagow in the archives.
[5] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 29, a.m.

should this occur, as is very likely, in southern Serbia, perhaps at Nish, the decision will be longer delayed, and the later movements will take longer.

General Moltke[1] expects to return to Berlin on the twenty-fifth instant. I shall remain here ready to jump;[2] we are all prepared, here at the General Staff; in the meantime there is nothing for us to do.

Best of greetings. As always,

Yours,

WALDERSEE.

No. 75

The Ambassador at Rome to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs[3]

FIUGGI, *July 16, 1914.*[4]

Many thanks for your letter. I am glad that you have no illusions about the difficulty of the situation here; I consider it to be hopeless, unless Austria compels herself to recognize plainly, in view of the danger, that in case she intends to take anything in the territorial line, she will have to compensate Italy. That is so serious a question for us, that we should consider whether we should not come to some distinct agreement with Vienna.

S.[an] G.[iuliano]'s attitude you can judge from my reports, etc. It all depends on him more than ever, as Salandra is not supporting him as is Giolitti. Sal.-[andra] makes no concealment of his anti-Austrian feelings, and Mérey has not handled him cleverly. S.[an] G.[iuliano], however, is pessimistic, dispirited, and very ill.

[FLOTOW].[5]

No. 76

The Ambassador at London to the Imperial Chancelor[6]

LONDON, *July 17, 1914.*[7]

Today's *Westminster Gazette* publishes the accompanying leading article on the European situation, which distinguishes itself by its quiet and matter-of-fact discussion of the Austro-Serbian quarrel. In view of the friendly relations between the publisher, Mr. Spender, and Sir Edward Grey, it is easy to assume that the views of the Minister were not uninfluential in the matter, and that my repeated conferences with him have contributed to *taking into consideration the right of Austria* to *claim satisfaction*. But even this friend of the administration expresses the decided expectation that the *ultima ratio* will be avoided.

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] General in Chief von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, on leave at Karlsbad since the 28th of June.

[2] Waldersee was granted leave on the 7th of July and went away on the evening of July 8.

[3] From a copy of a private letter of Flotow's to Jagow filed by Jagow in the archives.

[4] Copy bears the receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 22, p. m., but may have reached Jagow somewhere about the 19th of July.

[5] Signature, as well as address, lacking in the copy.

[6] From the corrected copy.

[7] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 19, a.m. Report submitted to the Emperor, returned by him on the 27th of July.

No. 77

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 124. BERLIN, *July 19, 1914.*[2]

Your Excellency will request immediate communication from Count Berchtold of text of proposed note to Belgrade, as well as any other announcements, as soon as they are finally formulated, to be laid before the Emperor Franz Joseph, in order that we can prepare in proper time for our *démarches* toward the other Powers. Previous information on material points of the proposed procedure desired.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 78

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 11. FIUGGI FONTE, *July 19, 1914.*[5]

I learn from the *entourage* of the Marquis di San Giuliano that recently very pessimistic reports on Serbia have been received from the Duke d'Avarna. I learn from a conversation with Mr. Luzzatti that the Marquis di San Giuliano now considers the situation to be serious. Apparently he is himself at the present time avoiding any extended conversations with me on this subject. The gentlemen of the ministry are disposed to believe that Austria is going to put herself in the wrong by too far-reaching demands, and will then be unable to count on support.

FLOTOW.

No. 79

The Minister in the Imperial Suite to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 116. BALHOLM, *July 19, 1914.*[7]

According to present plans *H. M. S. Hohenzollern* is to remain at Balholm until about the thirtieth instant, then stop at Bergen for a day to coal, then return to Swinemünde. Will inform you of any variation.

WEDEL.

[1] From the draft. Copy in Stumm's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.25 p.m.
[3] See Nos. 83, 88 and 103.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed at Fiuggi Fonte at 2.15 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 20, a.m. Communicated as on the 19th of July by Jagow to the Ambassador at Vienna, after the effecting of minor alterations in style; delivered at the Central Telegraph Office at 12.10 a.m. on the 20th of July.
[6] From the decodification. The draft in Count Wedel's handwriting is also now among the archives.
[7] Filed at Balholm at 1.15 p.m.; received at the Foreign Office at 4.35 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 20, a.m. See No. 67.

No. 80

The Minister in the Imperial Suite to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 117. BALHOLM (*Hohenzollern*), *July 19, 1914.*[2]

His Majesty requests Your Excellency to consider whether the Directors General of the Hapag and the North German Lloyd should not be informed now, secretly and in strict confidence, by the Minister at Hamburg, that the Austrian ultimatum is to be expected on the twenty-third.[3] In view of results so far unforeseen, but which may come very suddenly, it appears desirable to His Majesty that the two great lines should be notified in time to make proper dispositions and to be able to issue orders to steamers now in foreign countries.[4]

WEDEL.

No. 81

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office[5]

Telegram 352. THERAPIA, *July 19, 1914.*[6]

Talaat Bey told me that the Turco-Greek negotiations were progressing nicely. The idea of erecting a suzerain principality under a Greek prince had been given up. A sort of autonomy under a governor general to be named jointly by Turkey and Greece is planned instead. Even the right of military occupation is to be exercised jointly after the model of the former administration in the Sanjac. He would guarantee that the Porte would accept the offer of alliance. He had previously favored making a connection with Bulgaria, but had become convinced in Roumania and by myself that the *alliance* with Greece was to be preferred.

[1] From the decodification. The draft in Count Wedel's handwriting is also now in the archives.

[2] Filed at Balholm at 1.10 p.m.; received at the Foreign Office at 4.35 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 20, a.m.

[3] See No. 69.

[4] With the consent of the Imperial Chancelor, Jagow followed out this suggestion. In a telegram to the Imperial Chancelor, dated July 19 and delivered to the Central Telegraph Office at 12.10 a.m. on the 20th of July, he communicated the contents of the telegram from Balholm, and added: "I will see Ballin tomorrow and will inform him in strict confidence, provided Your Excellency does not order otherwise. The Director General of the Lloyd would have to be informed by the Minister at Hamburg, or else summoned here." This telegram, arriving at Hohenfinow at 6.40 a.m. was replied to by a dispatch giving consent ("agreed"), sent at 11.25 a.m. Jagow telegraphed on the afternoon of the 20th of July to Director von Plettenberg of the North German Lloyd: "Should be grateful if you could pay me a visit tomorrow on a very important matter. Secretary of State von Jagow." Telegram filed at Central Telegraph Office at 7.20 p. m. See further No. 90.

[5] From the decodification.

[6] Filed at Therapia July 19 at 7.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.17 p.m.; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 20, a. m. Communicated by telegraph to the Emperor by Jagow on the 20th of July, after several alterations and transpositions had been effected, and with the omission of the sentence: "Prince Saïd . . . mediation of Mr. Dillon." Filed at Berlin at 5.05 p.m.; arrived at the Court office at 11 p.m.; decodification by the Court office returned by the Emperor on the 21st of July, reached Berlin on the 23d of July. The Emperor ordered, through instructions in the margin, its communication to the representative at Athens. The excerpts "Talaat Bey told me . . . offer of alliance" (with a slight alteration), and "The Grand Vizier told me . . . without an alliance," had already, however, been previously, on the 20th of July, communicated through a dispatch to the Chargé d'Affaires at Athens "for his personal information."

The Grand Vizier was to meet Venizelos at Brussels very soon to *conclude* the compact.

In the event that Turkey forms an alliance with Greece and in the meantime Bulgaria should have made a compact with Austria, that is to say, the Triple Alliance, it might happen that Bulgaria would attack Serbia at the same time with Austria, in which case Greece would have to give assistance to Serbia, and then a *casus foederis* would be offered to Turkey, who, for her part, would have to take the field against Bulgaria's ally, Austria, consequently, also against us. But she would only decide to do that if the Turco-Greek Alliance should previously have been taken under the protection of Russia, that is to say, the Triple Entente.

I urged the Grand Vizier today, with a cautious reference to the possibility of a turn for the worse in the relations between Austria and Serbia, not to conclude an alliance [1] *of any kind* before the situation had cleared itself up.[2] *Right.*

The Grand Vizier told me that he, and not Talaat Bey, had the final word to say in the matter of alliances. He did intend to meet with Venizelos very soon, but was *not* considering *entering upon an alliance with the Greeks*. The Island question would presumably be solved without an alliance. *No unity*

Prince Saïd Halim finally remarked that the negotiations between Talaat Bey and Venizelos had recently been carried on through the mediation of Mr. Dillon.

WANGENHEIM.

No. 82

The Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [3]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *July 20, 1914.*

The Emperor has had the following order sent direct by telegraph to the fleet:

BALESTRAND (*Hohenzollern*), *July 19, 1914.*[4]

The Emperor orders the Fleet to be kept together until the 25th of July in such a manner that it can carry out quickly an order to break off the cruise. Entrance into Norwegian harbors only to occur after first getting special permission direct from the Emperor. Confirm. End. Notify Foreign Office from there. Confirm.[5] von Mueller.

[1] "alliance" underscored by Jagow in his telegram to the Emperor.

[2] Sentence "I urged the Grand Vizier . . . cleared itself up" read in Jagow's telegram to the Emperor: "It would probably be better, in view of the possibility of a turn for the worse in the Austro-Serbian relations, if no alliances of any kind were entered into before the situation had cleared itself up." The Emperor's marginal note applied to that.

[3] From the copy forwarded by the Admiralty Staff.

[4] Telegram sent from Balestrand July 19, at 11.15 p.m.; copy to the Foreign Office on the 20th of July; receipt stamp: July 20, p.m.

[5] See 101.

Original very respectfully sent to the Secretary of State of the Foreign Office for his information.

For the Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy, on leave.

PAUL BEHNCKE.

No. 83

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Confidential. BERLIN, *July 20, 1914.*[2]

I assume that simultaneously with the prospective *démarche* at Belgrade an official announcement will be issued at Vienna, concerning the contents of the note, the result of the inquiry, etc.

In order to facilitate the handling of our publicity, it would be of the greatest advantage to us to be exactly informed not only as to the contents, but also as to the day and hour of the publication. I request Your Excellency to report by wire in such an event.[3]

v. JAGOW.

No. 84

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor [4]

Telegram (unnumbered). HOHENFINOW, *July 20, 1914.*[5]

I am compelled most respectfully to report to Your Majesty that His Imperial Highness, the Crown Prince, against the advice given him by Your Majesty and accepted by him, has begun to court publicity again of late with announcements by telegraph. Thus His Imperial Highness has during the past week sent telegrams of very warm approval to Lieutenant Colonel Frobenius (retired), on his recently published brochure "The Empire's Hour of Destiny," and to Professor Buchholz of Posen on one of the latter's lectures on Bismarck put out in the form of a brochure. Frobenius refers convincingly to the difficult situation of Germany, but at the same time indulges his taste for Pan-German excesses and incitement to war. Buchholz utilizes a homage to the great Chancelor, based on a glowing patriotism, for the purpose of violently attacking the men whom Your Majesty has placed in responsible offices. Both telegrams have been published in the press. The one to Frobenius is especially regarded by the English, Russian and French press as indicating that the Crown Prince is placing himself in opposition to Your Majesty's policies, and that he is urging war. I know also from reliable sources that these demonstrations on the part of the Crown Prince are attracting serious consideration among the governmental circles of the Triple Entente as of grave significance.

[1] From the draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] Sent on the 20th of July.
[3] See Nos. 77, 88 and 103.
[4] From the original draft. Written by the Imperial Chancelor personally.
[5] Filed at 12.15 p.m., July 20. In addition the marginal note by the Imperial Chancelor: "See letter of Count Wedel of July 21, with telegram of His Majesty to the Crown Prince of July 21. See telegram of His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince of July 23, 1914. (Nos. 105, 132, 133.)

I permitted myself to beg His Imperial Highness in a lengthy letter to desist from this sort of public announcement, which, indited without knowledge of the political situation at the moment or of diplomatic relations, is only capable of compromising and reacting against Your Majesty's policies. In so doing I expressly made reference to the strained situation of the moment. I have no assurance that His Imperial Highness will comply with my request, but am, on the contrary, very much more afraid that His Highness may, as soon as the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia is made public, come out with statements which, in the light of all that has passed, will be regarded by our opponents as wilful war-baiting, whereas it is our task, according to Your Majesty's admonitions, to localize the conflict. The accomplishment of this task is in itself so difficult, that even minor incidents may determine its fate. On this account I must venture to most humbly request that Your Majesty graciously forbid His Imperial Highness by an immediate telegraphic order to refrain from any sort of political self-assertion.

Most humbly,

v. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 85

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 138. LONDON, *July 20, 1914.*[2]

Count Benckendorff, with whom I spent the week-end yesterday at Lord Lansdowne's, told me that he could assure me that the views he had recently communicated to me concerning our relations with Russia corresponded entirely with the ideas of Mr. Sazonoff. It was even felt to be an inconvenience that the visit of Mr. Poincaré should take place just at this time, but they could not suggest to him to stay away. Nobody in Russia was thinking of war; the armaments were purely the result of all the surplus and improved finances. Therefore it was much to be regretted that ill-feeling, which was wholly unjustified and was based only on scandal and false reports, could arise. Frank talk would probably lead quickest to the object desired. Belgrade was being pacified just as much as possible.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 86

The Serbian Legation at Berlin to the Foreign Office [3]

BERLIN, *July 20, 1914.*[4]

Immediately after the execrable assassination at Serajevo, the Austro-Hungarian press began to ascribe the guilt of the crime to Serbia and to the Greater-Serbia idea. The Royal Government as well as public opinion condemned the crime most severely, and gave plain expression to their abhorrence. All celebrations were called off on the day of the assassination. Nevertheless, the Austro-

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at London at 12.51 p.m.; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 20, p.m.
[3] Unsigned memorandum from the Serbian Legation at Berlin.
[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 20, p.m.

Hungarian press did not cease to raise loud complaint and accusation against Serbia and the Greater-Serbia idea, and to disseminate throughout the world news of the most prejudiced kind, thus offering a challenge to the Serbian press. The Royal Government attempted, by advising the Serbian press, to persuade it to maintain a quiet behavior and to reply only when necessity compelled to the prejudiced reports. Some of the Serbian papers of no importance failed to follow this advice, as, by the spreading of the most incredible reports and by the tendency of the Austro-Hungarian papers to use the crime as a political weapon against Serbia and the Serbian people, they increased their means of subsistence. The polemics which developed between the Serbian and the Austro-Hungarian press became more bitter through the fact that the Austro-Hungarian press made certain selections from quite insignificant Serbian newspapers and, putting a further edge on them, republished them, with the result of alarming public opinion in Europe. The Royal Government possessed no means of silencing the Serbian press polemics which were called forth by the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian press, as in Serbia the freedom of the press is guaranteed by the constitution.

The Royal Government immediately announced its willingness to proceed judicially against any Serbian subject of whose participation in the guilt of the crime at Serajevo evidence was produced.

Up to the present day the Austro-Hungarian Government has presented no demands with reference to the investigation of or judicial procedure against any person whatsoever. The only demands made have been demands relating to the whereabouts of certain students expelled from the religious seminary at Paveratz, which demands were without further ado complied with.

Public opinion in Austria-Hungary and in Europe is still being continually exasperated against Serbia, and how serious the excitement is has been made plain by the interpellations of certain Hungarian party leaders in the Hungarian parliament, and by the reply of the Hungarian Premier. It is evident from the discussions that the Monarchy intends to take steps against the Royal Government—of what kind and in what form is not indicated. When the excitement of public opinion, and all that has happened and is still happening, is considered, it is impossible to avoid the fear that a step may be in preparation which would have an evil effect on the neighborly relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. This fear is only strengthened by the discussions in the Hungarian parliament. The Royal Government has proved both by its attitude and by its activities that it is doing everything possible to conduce to the quieting of public feeling, besides everything conducive to the interests of peace and to a good relationship between neighbors.

It has been the especial care of the Royal Government to improve and render more cordial its relations with the neighboring Monarchy, which, as a result of the recent war, had become strained. The Royal Government is firmly convinced that it is a matter of vital interest for Serbia that peace and quiet in the Balkans be maintained better and longer; and it is guided only by such a desire and such a policy. The Royal Government fears lest the excited public feeling in Austria-Hungary may offer an occasion to the Austro-Hungarian Government for taking a step designed to bring about the humiliation of Serbia, which could not be tolerated on the part of Serbia.

The Royal Government therefore implores the Imperial Government to take notice of Serbia's good-will and desire to maintain friendly relations with the neighboring Monarchy and to repress energetically every attempt made on Serbian territory, the object of which is the disturbance of peace and security in the neighboring Monarchy. The Royal Government is likewise inclined to comply with such demands as shall be imposed by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the Royal Government with regard to the judicial prosecution of the accomplices in the crime, if any there may be.

The Royal Government would be unable to comply only with such demands as any other nation, mindful of its dignity and independence, would find itself unable to comply with.

As the Royal Government is honestly striving to improve the situation and to assure and establish good and neighborly relations with the neighboring Monarchy, it begs the amicably inclined Imperial Government to be good enough to take note of these declarations, and, should the occasion offer, to be kind enough to use its influence with a view to reconciliation.[1]

No. 87

The Counselor of Embassy at Vienna to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs[2]

Private letter. VIENNA, *July 18, 1914.*[3]

THE MOST HONORABLE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Yesterday I saw Berchtold, who told me that the note in question is to be handed over at Belgrade on the twenty-third instant. As I reported yesterday, Berchtold hopes that the Austrian demands, about which he did not go into particulars, will not be accepted by Serbia. He is not, however, quite sure, and I gathered the impression from his statements as well as from those of Hoyos, that Serbia *can* accept the demands. To my question what would happen then, should the matter come to nothing in this fashion, Berchtold said that then they could exercise considerable latitude in the practical execution of the separate postulates. If they really want a final settlement of the relations with Serbia here, as Count Tisza claimed in a recent speech to be a peremptory necessity, it is certainly incomprehensible why they should not have preferred such demands as would make a breach unavoidable. If this action dies out like the shooting at Hornberg and remains nothing but a so-called diplomatic victory, then the view already taken here to the effect that the Monarchy is no longer capable of any exercise of vigor, will be well confirmed. The results of such an action, both at home and abroad, are obvious.

I also asked Berchtold whether he intended to get in touch with Italy before finally acting against Serbia, to which he replied that so far he had not uttered a single word, and that his intention was to place the Italian Government before a

[1] See Nos. 91 and 95.

[2] From the corrected copy in Stolberg's handwriting.

[3] The letter was sent to von Jagow personally, who answered it as early as the afternoon of July 20 (see No. 89), and only at that time was it entered on the records of the Foreign Office, so that it bears a receipt stamp of July 21, p.m.

fait accompli, as it appeared to him not very reliable in the quality of secrecy, and as it might easily, in view of its Serbophile attitude, let something drop at Belgrade. Even at Berlin they had agreed that Hoyos, with whom the matter was discussed, was right on this point. This was stated to me by Hoyos himself. At that, I explained at length to the Minister, according to the tenor of the secret dispatch of the fifteenth instant (No. 911),[1] of what tremendous importance it appeared to us to be that the people here in Vienna should come to an understanding with Rome regarding the aims to be sought in case of war, and attempt to keep Italy on their side. Berchtold disclosed great optimism, and seemed to think that Italy could not possibly be so despicable an ally as to turn against the Monarchy. I said in reply that in case of a prospective conflict with Serbia only, the alliance would not come into question, and that Italy could very easily take a stand by the side of Serbia, if only morally; but even this might presage evil for the stability of the Triple Alliance, and it would unquestionably inflame Russia's lust for war. This struck the Minister as very evident, yet he would not of his own accord mention the question of compensation; even when Hoyos, who had been drawn into the conference, expressed the conviction that the Italians would have to be given something. As the Ambassador is to return early tomorrow morning, I thought it better for me (not)[2] to go any more deeply into the details of this question, which will in any case necessitate a series of lengthy conferences.

On the other hand, I had a long conversation with Hoyos immediately afterward, during which he mentioned the subject of the Trentino of his own accord, and asked me whether this was the compensation that we had in mind, to which I replied in the affirmative. He did not by any means seem unfavorable to this, nor did he show himself in any way deaf to the argument that in this manner Irredentism could be done away with. I told him also that, if the occasion arose, it would be a question only of the comparatively small territory of the diocese of Trent. He listened to everything in very friendly fashion, and then mentioned as a possible compensation for Italy the ceding of the Dodecanese to her.[3] He furthermore, however, advanced the point of view that, as a matter of fact, Italy had no right to claim compensation on the strength of the agreement, as it referred only to Turkey. But I argued in reply that in this case the question could only be a political and not an equitable one, and that Austria would have to do everything possible, in consideration of the relation of alliance, to keep Italy in the traces. Finally, I advised him, in the event of the outbreak of any conflict with Serbia, to give Rome the assurance that they had no intention of making any territorial acquisitions but that, in case events should necessitate any such, they would compensate Italy in the most thorough manner.

I have just seen Berchtold again. He told me that tomorrow the note is finally to be put into shape with the aid of Tisza, and that it still might be modified according to the happenings of the day (interview with Pashitch, article in the *Samouprawa*, etc.). Hoyos has just told me that the demands were really of such a nature that no nation that still possessed self-respect and dignity could possibly accept them.

I can state further that the question of the Trentino has frequently been

[1] See No. 46.
[2] "not" is lacking in the corrected copy.
[3] See No. 89.

touched on before between the Ambassador and various local politicians such as Körber, Bacquehem, etc., who have all shown great common sense about it. The thing has been mentioned at least once in a conversation with Berchtold.

With sincere respect,

Your Excellency's most obedient

W. Stolberg.

No. 88

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 90. Vienna, *July 20, 1914.*[2]

Count Berchtold, who had not planned to go to Ischl before tomorrow, intends to go there this evening instead and submit to the Emperor the note which was written today. In order to make possible its very earliest communication to Berlin, he will advise the Ministry at Vienna by telegraph immediately after the audience to deliver the note to me, so that it can go to Berlin as early as tomorrow evening.

Tschirschky.

No. 89

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [3]

Telegram 126.
Confidential. Berlin, *July 20, 1914.*[4]

About the private letter from Prince Stolberg.[5] England would always be opposed to the complete surrender of the Dodecanese. This difficulty is also recognized in Rome. There Austria's consent to cede the Islands *alone* would hardly be considered as satisfactory compensation.

Jagow.

No. 90

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister in the Imperial Suite [6]

Telegram 85. Berlin, *July 20, 1914.*[7]

Have today confidentially informed Ballin, who was here on a casual visit, and have requested Director of North German Lloyd to call on me tomorrow.

Jagow.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Vienna at 1.15 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 20, p.m. See Nos. 77, 83 and 103.
[3] From the draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 8.15 p.m.
[5] See No. 87.
[6] From the draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[7] Filed at Berlin at 9.33 p.m.; arrived at Balholm at 11.59 p.m.; on the 21st of July, Count Wedel made the report to the Emperor. See No. 80.

No. 91

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 127. BERLIN, *July 20, 1914.*[2]

The Serbian Chargé d'Affaires visited me today [3] to tell me that the Serbian Government would do everything it could to improve and solidify the relations with Austria-Hungary; that it would energetically oppose every effort made in Serbian territory with the object of disturbing the peace and security of the neighboring Monarchy, and would agree to the demands of the Imperial and Royal Government relating to the prosecution of the accomplices of the Serajevo criminals, if any such should be discovered. It would only be unable to comply with such demands as were inconsistent with the dignity and independence of the Serbian nation. The Serbian Government requested us to use our influence at Vienna with a view to reconciliation.

I confined myself to replying that I would bring the *démarche* of the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires to the attention of Vienna. I further called the attention of the Chargé d'Affaires to the fact that up to the present time the Serbian Government, despite the patience and the conciliatory and peaceful attitude of Austria-Hungary during the Balkan crisis, and despite our continued counsel in the matter, had done nothing to improve its relations with the neighboring Monarchy, and that I could well understand it, if at Vienna they were now going to take more energetic measures. I was not acquainted, I said, with the demands which Austria-Hungary intended to make.

The action of the Chargé d'Affaires is evidently the result of a circular dispatch from his Government.

JAGOW.

No. 92

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 143. LONDON, *July 20, 1914.*[5]

I judged from Sir E. Grey's statements on my visit today that he was still viewing the Austro-Serbian quarrel optimistically, and believed that a peaceful solution would be reached. He said that he had received no information that would indicate anything to the contrary. I repeated on this occasion that I was convinced that Count Berchtold, after a scrupulous examination of the proceedings and of the convincing material now at hand, would find himself obliged to demand satisfaction from Serbia as well as a guaranty for the future, and that I hoped that the exercise of Russian and English influence would prove successful

[1] From the draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.35 p.m.
[3] See Nos. 86 and 95.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed at London on July 20 at 8.08 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.50 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 21, a.m. Communicated by telegraph to the Emperor on the 21st of July; telegram filed at Berlin at 12.26 p.m.; arrived at Balholm at 7.15 p.m.; decodification returned by the Emperor the same day. Contents communicated by dispatch to the Ambassadors at Vienna and Rome also on the afternoon of the 21st of July.

in persuading Serbia to agree to these justifiable demands. He replied that everything would depend on the form of satisfaction demanded, and whether moderation would be exercised, but especially on whether the accusations raised against Serbia could be made on convincing grounds. In this manner he hoped that the quarrel might be settled and localized, for the idea of a war between the great Powers of Europe must be repelled under all circumstances.

The Minister has had the announcement made in Vienna, however, that the recent article in the *Westminster Gazette*, about which I made a report, was not inspired by him, as he had learned that they were taking it there as an encouragement to go ahead and fight.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 93

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Petersburg [1]

Telegram 116.
Confidential. BERLIN, *July 21, 1914.*[2]

At what hour on Thursday is the departure of the President from Cronstadt expected? Wire answer.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 94

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor [4]

Confidential. VIENNA, *July 20, 1914.*[5]

In an exhaustive and confidential conference with Count Berchtold, I utilized all the material relative to Italy's attitude toward the Austro-Serbian conflict with which I have been supplied, and I called to his attention with particular emphasis the importance of coming to an understanding with regard to possible Italian claims for compensation. In doing this, I also laid stress on the fact that up to the present we had told Rome nothing at all about our negotiations with Vienna, and therefore naturally had not discussed the compensation question there, a statement of which Count Berchtold took note with thanks.

I further explained that it would be of conclusive significance in connection with the future attitude of Italy and with Italian public opinion, as well as with the attitude of England, to know what the ideas of the Austro-Hungarian statesmen concerning the future status of Serbia really were. As a partner in the enterprise, we were naturally most urgently interested in being informed on this matter. Count Berchtold fully agreed to this, and said that according to his view, as matters now stood, the question of compensation was at present not a real question at all. It had been determined at yesterday's conference to refrain from any permanent incorporation of foreign territory, more especially at the

[1] Draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.15 p.m.
[3] See Nos. 50, 96 and 108.
[4] From the engrossed copy.
[5] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 21, p.m. Communicated to the Ambassador at Rome by dispatch on the 21st of July for his "strictly confidential information."

insistence of Count Tisza, who had asserted that neither he nor any other Hungarian Government could be suspected of wishing to enlarge the Slavic element within the Monarchy by the annexation of portions of the Serbian domain. Thus every valid ground on which Italy could lay claim to compensation was taken away. To my suggestion that even the overthrow of Serbia and the resulting extension of the influence of the Monarchy in the Balkans might be regarded on the part of Italy as an injury to her status and possibly lead to complaints, the Minister stated that this point of view was inconsistent with the repeated declarations of the Marquis di San Giuliano, to the effect that Italy needed a powerful Austria, if only as a protecting wall against the Slavic flood. Furthermore, the keynote of the move against Serbia was not that Austria wanted any expansion in the Balkans, but that she wanted solely to bar the Slavic advance toward the west and into the territories of the Monarchy. It should be perfectly easy to make this plain to the Italians, all the more so, as Italy could not possibly find in this state of affairs any reason for assuming a hostile attitude toward Austria. When Marquis di San Giuliano said that Italy could not support Austria's complaints against Serbia because they were inconsistent with the principles of nationality and of liberal government, it simply meant that even a liberal form of government in the Austrian provinces inhabited by Serbs, to which had been granted under Austrian rule every privilege of a free and constitutional state, would be rendered impossible by the Greater-Serbia propaganda. Furthermore, it was perfectly plain from the occupation of Libya, which was in direct opposition to the principle of nationality and was purely a case of the subjection of a foreign nation by the power of might, that Italy did not live up to that principle herself, but only required that it be lived up to by others. If, however, Rome was unable at present to figure on a practical and extensive Austro-Italian cooperation, why, there was absolutely no occasion for such a cooperation; Austria demanded neither cooperation nor support, but simply abstention from any hostile procedure against an ally.

Of course, he would do everything he could to spare Italian sensibilities as far as possible, and he had already considered doing something to pacify the Italians within the Monarchy. I approved of this last idea most heartily, and advised the Minister to go ahead with his plans.

Count Berchtold told me, furthermore, that Mr. von Mérey—who had carefully avoided discussing the Serbian matter with Marquis di San Giuliano, because he was certain that every hint, even the smallest, would immediately be passed on to Russia by the Italians and would be used as a foundation for counteraction and for compensation claims—also cherished no illusions as to the anti-Austrian and pro-Serbian feelings of San Giuliano and the Italians, but was firmly convinced that Italy could hardly even think of actively intervening, both for military reasons and for those connected with the internal political situation. Mr. von Mérey believed—and he, the Minister, held this belief to be well founded—that it was San Giuliano's main object to bluff Austria and in this way protect himself against Italian public opinion. He had evidence that San Giuliano was even attempting to make use of his Russian connections for this purpose.

Mr. von Mérey had proposed, out of consideration for Italy, in order that the Italians might not learn first of the note through the newspapers, that it be

brought through him to the knowledge of the Marquis di San Giuliano on the same day it was given to Belgrade; he, the Minister, intended to follow this advice. And in view of the importance of making it possible for Italy to take her stand by the side of Austria and of excluding the possibility of any misunderstanding right at the beginning, he would have a statement made at Rome at the time of handing over the note, to the effect that Austria-Hungary had in view for herself no territorial aggrandizement of any sort in connection with her action against Serbia.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 95

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 91. VIENNA, *July 21, 1914.*[2]

Count Forgach, who represents the Minister today, begs me to convey to Your Excellency the thanks of the Imperial and Royal Government for the friendly information and particularly for the manner of the speech with which Your Excellency addressed the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 96

The Admiralty Staff of the Navy to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs[3]

BERLIN, *July 21, 1914.*[4]

I have the honor of forwarding to Your Excellency with reference to yesterday's conversation the itinerary of President Poincaré on board the liner *France.*[5]

ITINERARY

On the fifteenth of July the President embarked on board the *France* at Cherbourg.

ARRIVAL	PORT	DEPARTURE
	Cherbourg	July 15, 7.00 p. m.
July 20, 2.00 p. m.	Cronstadt	July 23, 10.00 p. m.
July 25, 10.30 a. m.	Stockholm	July 25, evening
July 27, 1.00 p. m.	Copenhagen	July 28, afternoon
July 29, 10.30 a. m.	Christiania	July 29, night
July 31, 4.00 p. m.	Dunkerque	

Correcting the information I gave you by word of mouth yesterday, I would state that His Majesty's yacht *Hohenzollern*, by cutting as short as possible the stop at Bergen for purposes of coaling, can reach Wilhelmshaven or Cuxhaven from Balholm in from one and a half to two days, Kiel in approximately two days, according to circumstances.

For the Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy, on leave.

PAUL BEHNCKE.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Vienna at 4 p.m.; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 21, p.m. See Nos. 86 and 91.
[3] From the engrossed copy.
[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 21.
[5] See Nos. 50, 93 and 108.

No. 97

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 129. BERLIN, *July 21, 1914.*[2]

I request Your Excellency to urge the local government to seek to influence the Italian press with money. You will further point out that it would be advisable, after the press move has been made, to spare the national feelings of the Serbian subjects of Austria herself, in order to win them over to the Austrian side of the Serbian question.

JAGOW.

No. 98

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 356.
Absolutely confidential. CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 21, 1914.*[4]

My Austrian colleague has already received secret instructions as to what his attitude toward Turkey is to be upon the outbreak of a war.

WANGENHEIM.

No. 99

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 354. THERAPIA, *July 21, 1914.*[6]

Grand Vizier, Talaat Bey and Enver all agreed in telling my Austrian colleague yesterday that Austria had now arrived at the last moment at which she could make good the losses suffered in the Balkan war and restore her prestige as a Great Power in the eyes of the Balkan nations and of Turkey. Not only Bulgaria, but Roumania and Turkey also, would *take an unconditional stand by the side of the Triple Alliance,*[7] if Austria should give Serbia a proper lesson. Turkey had been on the point of concluding an alliance with Greece at the desire of Germany and Roumania, against her own better judgment. This alliance

Well? Heaven permit it. We will remind the gentlemen of this at the proper time.

[1] From the original draft. Copy in Stumm's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.20 p.m. See No. 128.
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Filed at Constantinople at 5 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 21, p.m. Communicated to the Ambassador at Vienna in a dispatch of July 22.
[5] From the decodification.
[6] Filed at Therapia at 4.30 p.m.; received at the Foreign Office at 7.03 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 21, p.m. On the 22d of July the section "Grand Vizier . . . a proper lesson" was communicated over the wire to the Emperor, to whom the decodification was submitted on the same day. The Emperor ordered by marginal instructions that it be communicated to the Embassy at Vienna. Section "Grand Vizier . . . proper lesson" was communicated to the Ambassador at Rome by wire on the 22d. Telegram at the Central Telegraph Office at 10.25 p.m. The same section was also communicated by wire to the Ambassador at Vienna on July 22d.
[7] Question-mark by the Emperor in the margin. The marginal note "we will . . . proper time" is written over the words "unconditional stand."

would not take place if Austria should link Bulgaria to herself by acting resolutely.

Margrave Pallavicini has gained the impression from his talks with the Turkish ministers that the Triple Entente, especially Russia, is now working in favor of the Turco-Greek alliance.

WANGENHEIM.

No. 100

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassadors at Petersburg, Paris and London[1]

BERLIN, *July 21, 1914.*[2]

The public statements of the Austro-Hungarian Government relating to the circumstances under which the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne and of his wife took place, fully disclose the aims which the Greater-Serbia propaganda had set for itself, and the means of which it availed itself toward the realization of these aims. The facts that have been made public must also do away with the last doubt that the center of the activities that were to result in the separation of the southern-Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and in their union with the Kingdom of Serbia, is to be found at Belgrade, and were developed there at least with the connivance of members of the Government and of the army.

The Serbian mischief-making goes back over a long term of years. The Greater-Serbia chauvinism appeared in particularly marked form during the Bosnian crisis. Only the extreme moderation and self-command of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intervention of the Great Powers can be credited with the fact that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary was at that time exposed by Serbia did not lead to war. The Serbian Government has not made good the assurances of future good conduct which she gave at that time. The Greater-Serbia propaganda has since been continually increasing in extent and intensity under the very eyes of official Serbia, and, at least, with its tacit consent. It is to the account of that propaganda that the latest outrage, the trail of which leads to Belgrade, can be charged. It has become unmistakably evident that it would no longer comport either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to regard inactively any longer the mischief-making on the other side of the border—mischief-making by which the security and integrity of its dominions are lastingly menaced. In such a state of affairs, neither the procedure nor the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be regarded as otherwise than moderate and proper. Nevertheless, the attitude adopted of late by public opinion as well as by the Govern-

[1] Circular dispatch from the Imperial Chancelor, signed by von Jagow, to the Ambassadors at Paris, London and Petersburg. From the original draft. First paraphrased by Stumm from a typewritten draft submitted to him, with formal emendations from the hand of Acting Counselor of Legation Baron Langwerth von Simmern, reporting councilor at the Foreign Office, and alterations by the Imperial Chancelor. The section "Your Excellency will furthermore . . . blind to this fact" went only to the Ambassador at Petersburg. This paragraph is also lacking in the reprint of the circular dispatch in the German White Book of May, 1915, p. 24, where the dispatch is dated July 23.

[2] Sent to Petersburg on the 21st of July, to Paris and London on the 22d of July.

ment in Serbia does not exclude the fear[1] that the Serbian Government may refuse to satisfy these demands, and that it is allowing itself to be driven into a provocatory attitude toward Austria-Hungary. In such a case there would remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless it wishes to dispense forever with its standing as a Great Power, no other course than to enforce its demands upon the Serbian Government by strong pressure, and, if necessary, to take military measures—a situation in which the choice of means must be left to itself.

I have the honor of requesting Your Excellency to express the tenor of the foregoing argument to Mr. Sazonoff,[2] and in so doing to emphasize particularly the view that the problem under discussion is one which it is solely for Austria-Hungary and Serbia to solve, and one which it should be the earnest endeavor of the Powers to confine to the two immediate participants. We urgently desire the localization of the conflict, as the intervention of any other Power would, as a result of the various alliance obligations, bring about inestimable consequences.

Your Excellency will furthermore call Mr. Sazonoff's attention to the serious consequences which might ensue for the monarchical idea, if, in the case suggested above, the monarchical Powers should not stand solidly by the side of Austria-Hungary, setting aside for the moment any possible national prejudices or political points of view, inasmuch as it is a question of dealing the death-blow to a political radicalism, now reigning in Serbia, which does not hesitate at making even members of its own rulers' families the victims of its criminal tendencies. Russia is fully as interested in such a task as is Germany. I venture to hope that Mr. Sazonoff will not be blind to this fact.

I shall await with interest a telegraphic report of your conference at your earliest convenience.[3]

v. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 101

The Imperial Chancelor to the Foreign Office[4]

Telegram (unnumbered). HOHENFINOW, *July 21, 1914.*[5]

His Majesty's order to the Fleet to keep together[6] makes me fear that as soon as the ultimatum is refused, conspicuous Fleet movements might be prematurely ordered from Balholm. On the other hand, in case of a crisis, a mistakenly chosen rendezvous for the Fleet might be disastrous. As I am not competent to judge of the question from a military point of view, a conference with the Admiralty Staff might be advisable, so that as a result we should be able through Count Wedel to make the necessary report to His Majesty with proper regard for the military as well as the political requirements.

Request answer by wire as to view of Admiralty Staff.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] "does not exclude the fear" was an alteration by the Chancelor from "permits it . . . to be feared" in the draft.

[2] In the dispatch to Lichnowsky: "Sir E. Grey"; in the dispatch to Schoen: "to the temporary representative of Mr. Viviani."

[3] See Nos. 154, 157 and 160.

[4] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Chancelor.

[5] Filed at Hohenfinow at 6.50 p.m. on the 21st of July; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.55 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 22, a.m.

[6] See Nos. 82, 111 and 115.

No. 102

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 355.
Confidential.

THERAPIA, *July 21, 1914.*[2]

Grand Vizier summoned the Bulgarian Minister, to inform him confidentially that he was very soon to hold a meeting with Venizelos, at which, among other things, an alliance would be discussed. He was determined not to enter upon any alliance, but would nevertheless like to know before his departure what Bulgaria's attitude would be in case of the outbreak of an Austro-Serbian war.

WANGENHEIM.

No. 103

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 92.
Confidential.

VIENNA, *July 21, 1914.*[4]

Note to be sent to Serbia together with brief compilation of the results of the inquiry at Serajevo goes to Berlin this evening. Note will be delivered at Belgrade Thursday afternoon, and will be published in the morning papers here Friday.

The Austro-Hungarian representatives to the signatory Powers will deliver to the respective Governments on Friday morning a note which will contain the text of the note sent to Serbia, and a commentary. This note, together with the commentary directed to the Powers, will be published Friday afternoon or Saturday morning.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 104

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 93.
Confidential.

VIENNA, *July 21, 1914.*[6]

Yesterday afternoon, after my conference with Count Berchtold, Mr. von Mérey was authorized, in order to show the greatest complaisance toward Italy, to give the Marquis di San Giuliano immediately a general outline of Austria's

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Therapia July 21 at 5 p. m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.55 p. m.; receipt stamp: July 22, a.m. See No. 147.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed at Vienna the 21st of July at 7.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 22, a. m. See Nos. 77, 83 and 88.

[5] From the decodification.

[6] Filed at Vienna the 21st of July, at 7.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 22, a.m. Communicated to the Emperor by Jagow over the wire on July 22 at 1.38 p.m., with the omission of the words "after my . . . Berchtold," and with the following supplement: "Mr. von Tschirschky formally reports further that Count Berchtold told him that Austria-Hungary aspires to no Serbian territory whatever, as Count Tisza had decisively stated that Hungary could not stand the acquisition of any more Serbian population," (from the original draft in Jagow's hand). The decodification of this telegram, which arrived at the Court Office at 7.30 p.m., was submitted to the Emperor on the 22d of July. Tschirschky's telegram was also communicated by wire, with the omission of the words "after my . . . Berchtold" to the Ambassador at Rome—filed at the telegraph office at 10.20 a.m. on the 22d of July.

plans in connection with Serbia, and particularly to indicate that the Monarchy is aspiring to no territorial acquisitions of any sort for itself.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 105

The Emperor to the Crown Prince [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). BALHOLM, *July 21, 1914.*

I have just received from the Imperial Chancelor the following telegram: [2]

I am compelled to venture . . . political self-assertion.

Most humbly,

VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG.

I appeal to Your understanding to realize how extraordinarily painful and grievous it must be to Me that You, in spite of the promises You had made Me, have again by Your behavior given the Chancelor cause to prefer such a request to Me. I appeal furthermore to Your feeling of duty and honor as a Prussian officer, who has to keep a given promise unconditionally, and expect with confidence that You will once and for all refrain, not only particularly during this present strained situation, but henceforth entirely, from any sort of political comment toward third parties, which can only serve to disturb My policies and those of My responsible advisers.

PAPA WILHELM.

No. 106

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor [3]

Confidential. VIENNA, *July 21, 1914.*[4]

I have the honor of submitting to Your Excellency herewith a copy of the note intended for the signatory Powers by the Imperial and Royal Government.[5] The note contains the text of the Austro-Hungarian note to be delivered Thursday afternoon at Belgrade, together with a commentary. At the same time the Imperial and Royal Government holds at the disposal of the Governments referred to a brief compilation of the results of the inquiry at Serajevo.

In transmitting the accompanying documents, Count Forgach expressly requests that they be considered as intended only for the strictly confidential personal information of Your Excellency, as the Imperial sanction has not yet been received, although, as a matter of fact, there is no doubt of its issuance.[6]

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] Sent by Wedel with an accompanying short letter to the Imperial Chancelor. Time of arrival in Imperial Chancelry: July 25.
[2] Identical with No. 84. See Nos. 132 and 135.
[3] From the corrected copy.
[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 22, p.m.
[5] For the translation of the transmitted note, see Supp. 1.
[6] See No. 113.

No. 107

Draft of an unsent order from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Hamburg [1]

Absolutely confidential. BERLIN, *July 22, 1914.*

In view of the outbreak of an Austro-Serbian crisis, it is earnestly to be desired that the German press should punctually assume the attitude adapted to our interests. The first aim of German policy should be, as the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* indicated on Sunday morning, that of localizing the struggle. This may be expected if Serbia gives in at once to the expected demands of Austria-Hungary. Otherwise an intensification of the crisis is in prospect. If it comes to that point, our press must avoid two things. The impression must not arise that we are inciting war—wherefore all articles unfriendly to the Dual Alliance nations must be avoided as far as possible—nor any impression that, in case of complications, we should leave Austria-Hungary in the lurch. Our great economic interests which are so dependent on the maintenance of peace are not being left out of consideration here. But there is no better way of avoiding war than by taking our place quietly and firmly by the side of Austria-Hungary from the beginning. If public opinion in Russia and in France discovers itself to be under the necessity, in the present unfavorable circumstances, of taking up the fight with the German Empire, it will then be made very difficult for the governments at St. Petersburg and Paris to join in an Austro-Serbian conflict to the disadvantage of Austria-Hungary and the Triple Alliance.

I respectfully request Your Excellency next Friday morning, in carrying out this duty, to talk over the situation confidentially but impressively on the lines indicated above with the editors in chief of the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, the *Korrespondent* and the *Fremdenblatt.*

v. JAGOW.

No. 108

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 144. PETERSBURG, *July 22, 1914.*[3]

Departure of Mr. Poincaré from Cronstadt is arranged for Thursday evening at eleven o'clock.

POURTALÈS.

[1] From the original draft. Copy in the handwriting of Counselor of Legation Esternaux, regular assistant at the Foreign Office; dated July 20, with alterations and additions by Hammann and von Jagow. The dispatch was, however, quashed and was not forwarded. The draft bears a note by Langwerth von Simmern of the 22d of July. "Settled. Stop. Will be settled by me by word of mouth according to instructions."

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed at Petersburg at 12.05 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.31 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 22, p.m. See Nos. 93, 96 and 112.

No. 109

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 16. FIUGGI, *July 22, 1914.*[2]

Marquis di San Giuliano telephones me from Rome, where he went to hold a conference with Premier Salandra, that according to news he has received, he considers the situation to be extremely serious. Therefore he will arrive here again tomorrow evening with Mr. Salandra to discuss the situation with me. Should any new considerations have arisen that are worth making a point of in discussion, I venture to suggest their being communicated, as the opportunity for further conferences with the Ministers during the next few days is uncertain, owing to their traveling arrangements.

FLOTOW.

No. 110

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 94.
Confidential. VIENNA, *July 22, 1914.*[4]

In view of the departure of Mr. Pashitch from Belgrade, Baron Giesl has been instructed to announce there that he will have an important announcement to make on Thursday afternoon. If, in spite of that, Pashitch should not have returned to Belgrade, Baron Giesl has been instructed to hand the note to the next senior minister. Baron Giesl has been further instructed, in case the reply should not be satisfactory or should not be given in time, to leave Belgrade at once with his whole personnel. Local Serbian representative would likewise be invited to leave Vienna.[5]

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 111

The Acting Chief of the Admiralty Staff to the Foreign Office [6]

BERLIN, *July 22, 1914.*[7]

If the possibility of an imminently prospective declaration of war on the part of England must be reckoned with, then, from a military standpoint, a sudden attack on our Fleet by the English fleet must also certainly be reckoned with.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Fiuggi at 2 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.15 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 22, p.m.
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Filed at Vienna at 1.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.52 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 22. p.m.
[5] See No. 114.
[6] From the corrected copy in Behncke's handwriting.
[7] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 22, p.m. Communicated by wire on the 22d of July to the Imperial Chancelor (see No. 115), and on the 23d of July sent by wire also to the Minister in the Imperial Suite (see No. 125). See also Nos. 82 and 101.

In view of its great numerical inferiority, our Fleet must in no case be exposed to this possibility.

Therefore, just as soon as the possibility of the outbreak of a war with England within, say, six days, has to be reckoned with, the Fleet must be recalled.

BEHNCKE,
Rear Admiral.

No. 112

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 130.
For immediate attention. BERLIN, *July 22, 1914.*[2]

Have asked Count Pourtalès about the program of Poincaré's visit. He reports that President leaves from Cronstadt Thursday evening at eleven o'clock. This would be nine-thirty by Central European time. If *démarche* in Belgrade is made tomorrow afternoon at five o'clock, it would thus become known while Poincaré is still in Petersburg.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 113

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 95.
Confidential. VIENNA, *July 22, 1914.*[5]

The note to be delivered to Serbia has received the sanction of His Majesty the Emperor Franz Joseph without alteration.[6]

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 114

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Belgrade [7]

Telegram 26.
Confidential. BERLIN, *July 22, 1914.*[8]

If the Austrian Minister leaves Belgrade, Your Excellency will take over the affairs and the protection of the subjects of Austria-Hungary.

JAGOW.

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.05 p.m.
[3] See Nos. 50, 93, 96, 108 and 127.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed at Vienna at 3.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.35 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 22, p.m.
[6] See No. 106.
[7] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[8] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.55 p.m. See No. 110.

No. 115

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

Telegram 18. BERLIN, *July 22, 1914.*[2]

The Admiralty Staff is of the following opinion: "If the possibility . . . must be recalled." [3]

That England would come to the decision of making an immediate surprise attack on us and, anyway, that the question of a European war would be so promptly determined, is very unlikely. According to a communication from the Admiralty Staff, the English fleet is to separate and go into its home ports on the twenty-seventh instant. In case our Fleet should be prematurely recalled, England would keep hers together.

JAGOW.

No. 116

The Imperial Chancelor to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 3. HOHENFINOW, *July 22, 1914.*[5]

I assent to Your Excellency's estimate of the general situation, which probably also takes into consideration the terms of the Austrian note, with which I am as yet unacquainted. Therefore I should regard a premature recall of our Fleet as a serious mistake, and should view a report to His Majesty through Count Wedel to this effect as advisable. If you do not disagree, I beg you to send the latter a telegram in conformity with this view in my name. In any case, however, our Fleet must not undertake any movements that would call attention to it before the twenty-seventh, the date of the dispersal of the English fleet, unless in the meantime unexpected events occur.[6]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 117

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 362. CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 22, 1914.*[8]

Enver Pasha told me that I had showed the Grand Vizier [9] *She can't! Rot!* that Turkey should not *permit herself to enter upon an alliance of any kind* before the completion of her military and administrative reorganization. In theory my view was entirely correct. Prac-

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] Filed at Berlin at 7.03 p.m.; arrived at Hohenfinow at 8.20 p.m. See No. 101.
[3] Here the communication from Behncke of the 22d of July (No. 111) is inserted word for word.
[4] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor now to be found in the archives.
[5] Filed at Hohenfinow on the 22d of July at 11.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office on the 23d of July at 1.25 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 23, a.m. See No. 115.
[6] See No. 125.
[7] From the decodification.
[8] Filed at Constantinople on the 22d of July at 5.55 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office on the 23d of July at 1.25 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 23, a.m. Communicated by wire on the afternoon of the 23d of July to the Imperial Court Office by Jagow, after several alterations had been effected and

tically, however, Turkey faced the difficulty of being enabled to carry out internal reforms peacefully and with thoroughness only if she were secured against attacks from without. For that reason she *needed the support* of one of the groups of Great Powers. A small minority of the committee stood for an alliance with France and Russia, because such an alliance would guarantee security to Turkey so far as the nations of the Triple Alliance were the weaker in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the majority of the committee, with the Grand Vizier and Talaat Bey, Halil and himself at its head, did not wish to become the *vassals of Russia,* and were convinced that the Triple Alliance was stronger militarily than the Entente, and would prove the victor in case of a world war. He could state, in consequence, that the present Turkish Government *earnestly desired* to connect itself with the *Triple Alliance,* and would with heavy hearts decide on a pact with the Triple Entente only if they should be turned away by us. Now the Cabinet understood very well that Turkey, in comparison with the Great Powers, was worthless as an ally. Consequently it only demanded the protection of the group of Great Powers concerned for the alliance which she would herself conclude with one of the smaller nations. At the present time there were two possibilities of secondary alliances open to Turkey: an alliance with Greece, which would tend toward the Triple Entente, and an alliance with Bulgaria, which would lead toward the Triple Alliance. The Cabinet was inclined, therefore, to close with Bulgaria on the condition that the *alliance should be under the patronage of the Triple Alliance, or, at least, of that of one of the Triple Alliance Powers.* An alliance with Bulgaria had *already previously been agreed upon* in all its details, and had not been signed for the sole reason that Bulgaria *could not* persuade herself to do it *without the patronage of the Triple Alliance.* But now, as a result of the Austro-Serbian tension, the situation had become critical. The Grand Vizier was going to discuss an alliance with Venizelos. It would make it easier for him to refuse the Greek offer if Turkey and Bulgaria were offered the prospect of becoming part of the Triple Alliance bloc in a relation similar to (that) [1] once occupied by Roumania with regard to Austria. The Porte was unable to wait until the outbreak of a war in the Balkans. The *joint military preparations must be commenced at once.*

Right.

And of France.

Well, thus we were on the right scent!

I told Enver in reply that he had not convinced me of the necessity of an alliance for Turkey. Even the economic recuperation

[1] After "similar to" the deciphering of the word "that" was omitted.

with the omission of the sentences "so far as the nations . . . in the Mediterranean," and "The Grand Vizier was going . . . Roumania with regard to Austria." Arrived there at 11.06 p.m. Decodification of the Court Office with the marginal notes of the Emperor arrived at Berlin on the 27th of July. See No. 71.

[9] "I had showed the Grand Vizier" altered by Jagow in the telegram to the Emperor to "the Grand Vizier inclined toward the view".

Theoretically correct, but at the present moment wrong! The thing to do now is to get hold of every gun in readiness in the Balkans to shoot against the Slavs for Austria, and so a Turkish-Bulgarian alliance connected with Austria may well be accepted! That is opportunist politics, and must be pursued in this case.

of Turkey would be put at stake by an alliance. Would Russia and France sign the contracts if Turkey joined the Triple Alliance? The political considerations were serious. As a member of the Triple Alliance, Turkey would have to reckon on the open enmity of Russia. In that case the eastern border of Turkey would become the weakest point in the strategic disposition of the Triple Alliance, and Russia's natural point of attack. The Triple Alliance Governments would presumably be reluctant to burden themselves with obligations in return for which Turkey *today was able to offer no satisfactory equivalent.* Even Turkey and Bulgaria together as a bloc could scarcely be considered effective as allies by contrast with the Triple Alliance. It would be somewhat different if Roumania should become part of this bloc, a possibility, however, of which there seemed at present to be little prospect.

Enver Pasha listened attentively, but insisted again and again that if the Triple Alliance prevented a Turco-Bulgarian alliance, the friends of the Triple Entente on the committee would gain the upper hand.

Faute de mieux to be taken in, if they are prepared to fight on the side of Austria.

The critical feeling at the present moment rendered it very improbable that an alliance would be concluded at Brussels.[1] Turkey might next attempt to persuade Bulgaria to an alliance even without the sanction of the Triple Alliance. Should Bulgaria be drawn into the Austro-Serbian conflict, it was almost certain that Turkey would not remain neutral, but would attempt to force her way toward Greece through western Thrace.[2]

WANGENHEIM.

Agreed. If it does not happen otherwise, and Stamboul absolutely wants to form an alliance "under the patronage of the Triple Alliance or of one of its Powers" let it then try quietly to get Roumania and Bulgaria together and place itself at the disposal of Austria. I am not opposed to it. That is better in any case than driving Turkey into the arms of the Triple Entente by theoretical scruples.

No. 118

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office[3]

Telegram 145. LONDON, *July 22, 1914.*[4]

Sir Edward Grey, as I am confidentially informed, is going to state to Count Mensdorff tomorrow that the British Government will exert itself[5] to influence the Serbian Government to accept the Austro-Hungarian demands, in case they

[1] For the meeting of the Grand Vizier and Venizelos at Brussels see Wangenheim's telegram 352 of July 19, No. 81.

[2] See Nos. 141 and 144.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed at London July 22d at 9.17 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.25 a.m. on the 23d of July; receipt stamp, July 23, a.m. Lichnowsky's telegram was communicated by wire to the Ambassador at Vienna by Jagow with the addition: "Prince Lichnowsky is being instructed, as a guide . . . attempt to influence" (see final sentence of the telegram to the Emperor, No. 121). To the Central Telegraph Office on the 23d of July at 1.05 p.m.

[5] The words "will exert itself" are lacking in the decodification. They are supplied above from the archives of the German Embassy at London.

are moderate and are found to be consistent with the independence of the Serbian nation. . . . to talk with Sir Maurice de Bunsen on the Serbian question along the same lines.[1]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 119

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 17. FIUGGI, *July 23, 1914.*[3]

According to a statement of San Giuliano, the Austrian Ambassador has informed him in a general way of Austria's intention to proceed against Serbia. The note will be communicated here immediately after its terms have been definitely settled on. Austria has at the present time no intention of acquiring any territory or of occupying Lowtschen. Minister does not consider this declaration to be a permanent obligation, and is therefore not entirely satisfied on this point. He apparently avoided any further discussion with the remark that Premier Salandra wished to discuss with me on Friday, the twenty-fourth instant, the situation that had arisen, in his—the Marquis di San Giuliano's—presence. The seriousness of the situation for Germany and for Italy called for such a discussion. San Giuliano could not conceal his dread of excessive demands on the part of Austria, which would arouse the public opinion of all Europe and also of Italy against Austria. He considers, now as before, the whole proceeding to be futile, as Serbia's nationalistic strivings cannot be suppressed.

FLOTOW.

No. 120

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor [4]

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 21, 1914.*[5]

Mr. Sazonoff, who spent several days last week at his country estate in the Government of Grodno, has been quite anxious since his return from there on account of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. He told me that he had received very alarming reports from London, Paris and Rome, and that Austria-Hungary's attitude was inspiring an increasing worry everywhere. Mr. Schebeko, too, who was in general a calm observer, reported that the feeling in Vienna against Serbia was constantly growing more bitter.

[1] See the full text of the Lichnowsky telegram under No. 121. See Nos. 126 and 140.

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed at Fiuggi at 7.20 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.50 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 23, a.m. Communicated by Jagow by wire on the 23d of July to the Ambassador at Vienna. Telegram given to the Central Telegraph Office at 2.30 p.m.; arrived at the German Embassy in Vienna at 8 p.m.

[4] From the corrected copy.

[5] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 23, a.m. Report submitted to the Emperor, returned by him on the 27th of July. In accordance with Imperial instructions in the margin, it was communicated on the 30th of July as a dispatch to the Embassies at Vienna, Rome, London and Paris.

The Minister took the opportunity of giving his wrath at the Austro-Hungarian policy free rein, as usual. That the Emperor Franz Joseph and even Count Berchtold were friends of peace, Mr. Sazonoff was, it is true, willing to admit, but he said that there were very powerful and dangerous influences at work, which were constantly gaining ground in both halves of the Empire, and which did not hesitate at the idea of plunging Austria into a war, even at the risk of starting a general world conflagration. One anxiously asked oneself the question whether the aged Monarch and his weak Foreign Minister would always be able to successfully oppose these influences.

The picture fits Petersburg much better!

Previously the belligerent elements, among which clerical intrigues also played an especially important rôle, had set their hopes on the dead Archduke, Franz Ferdinand. The death of the Archduke had in no way discouraged them; on the other hand, they were the very ones who were inspiring [1] the dangerous policy which Austria-Hungary was pursuing at the present moment. The actual leaders in this policy were two men, particularly, whose increasing influence appeared to the highest degree dubious—namely, Count Forgach, who is "an intriguer of the basest sort," and Count Tisza, who "is half a fool."

Fool yourself, Mr. Sazonoff!

I replied to Mr. Sazonoff that his unmeasured reproaches against Austro-Hungarian policy appeared to me to be strongly influenced by his too great sympathy for the Serbs, and to be utterly unjustified. No sensible man could refuse to recognize the complete restraint observed by the Vienna Cabinet since the assassination at Serajevo. It seemed to me that to decide just how far Austria-Hungary was justified in holding the Serbian Government responsible for the Greater-Serbia agitations, as early as this, before the result of the inquiry concerning the assassination was known, was absolutely premature. But according to everything that was already known, one could scarcely doubt *that the Greater-Serbia agitation was stirred up under the very eyes of the Serbian Government, and that even the shameless assassination itself had been planned in Serbia.* No great nation, however, could possibly tolerate permanently the existence along its borders of a propaganda which directly threatened its own security. Should, therefore, as appearances now seemed to indicate, traces be discovered at the inquiry into the origin of the crime which pointed back to Serbia, and should it be proved that the Serbian Government had regrettably connived at the intrigues directed against Austria, then the Austro-Hungarian Government would unquestionably be justified in using strong language at Belgrade. I could not conceive that in such a case the representations of the Vienna Cabinet to the Serbian Government could meet with the objection of any Power whatsoever.

Yes.

Right.

Yes.

Good.

[1] Exclamation-point by the Emperor in the margin.

The Minister met these arguments with the assertion that the support of the Greater-Serbia propaganda in Austria-Hungary by Serbia or by the Serbian Government in any way, *had in nowise been proved.*[1] A whole country *could not be held responsible* for *the acts of individuals.* Furthermore, the murderer of the Archduke was not even a Serbian subject. There *certainly* was a Greater-Serbia propaganda *in Austria*, but it was the result of the *bad* methods of government by which Austria had distinguished herself for ages back. Just as there was a Greater-Serbia propaganda, one heard talk also of the Italian Irredenta and of the Free-from-Rome movement. The Vienna Cabinet had not the slightest reason for complaining of the *attitude of the Serbian Government*, which, on the contrary, *was behaving itself with entire propriety.*

Genuinely Russian.

Damnation!

I interjected here that it did not suffice for members of the Serbian Government themselves to refrain from participation in the anti-Austrian propaganda. Austria-Hungary had far more reason to require that the Serbian authorities should proceed actively against the anti-Austrian propaganda, for it was impossible that the Government should refuse responsibility for everything that was going on in the country.

Right.

According to that principle, returned Mr. Sazonoff, Russia ought to hold the Swedish Government responsible for the *anti-Russian agitation* that has been *going on in Sweden* for about a year and a half.

And Russia for her spies that are being apprehended everywhere!

I pointed out that in Sweden the matter merely concerned a political agitation, and not, as in Serbia, a propaganda of action.

Mr. Sazonoff remarked in reply that those people in Austria who were advocating proceeding against Serbia would apparently not content themselves with making representations at Belgrade, but that their object was the annihilation of Serbia. I answered that I had never heard of any object but one, namely, the "clarification" of Austria-Hungary's relations with Serbia.

And the best thing, too.

The Minister continued excitedly, saying that in any case, Austria-Hungary, if she was absolutely determined to disturb the peace, ought not to forget that in that event she would *have to reckon with Europe.* Russia could not look indifferently on at a move at Belgrade which aimed at the humiliation (of)[2] Serbia. I remarked that I was able [to][3] *see no humiliation* in serious representations by which Serbia was reminded of her international obligations. Mr. Sazonoff answered that it would all depend on how the move was carried out; that in no case *should there be any talk of an ultimatum.*[4]

No! with Russia, yes! as the perpetrator and advocate of regicide!!!

Right.

It's already there!

The Minister repeatedly called attention in the course of the

[1] Two exclamation-points by the Emperor in the margin.
[2] Copy in error: "of" omitted.
[3] "to" is omitted by error in the corrected copy.
[4] "any talk of an ultimatum" twice underscored by the Emperor.

conversation to the fact that, according to information he had received, the situation was being very seriously regarded in Paris and London also, and he was visibly attempting to give me the impression that even in England Austria's attitude was strongly disapproved.

He is wrong!

At the conclusion of our conversation I asked Mr. Sazonoff what there was, in his opinion, to the alleged plan for the union of Serbia and Montenegro, lately so much discussed in the papers. The Minister remarked that such a union was desired only by Montenegro, which would of course benefit most by it. Such a union was not being considered at all in Serbia, as the late Mr. Hartwig had specifically emphasized in one of his last reports. At the most, all that was wanted was a closer economic relation with Montenegro, but a personal union was not in any way desired.

Mr. Sazonoff has also expressed to my Italian colleague his anxiety about the Austro-Serbian tension, and remarked at the time that Russia would *not be able to permit* Austria-Hungary to *make any threats against Serbia* or to *take any military measures.* "*La politique de la Russie,*" said Mr. Sazonoff, "*est pacifique, mais pas passive.*" [1]

Qui vivra verra!

F. Pourtalès.

No. 121

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Emperor [2]

Telegram 116. Berlin, *July 23, 1914.*[3]

Your Majesty's Ambassador in London telegraphs:

Sir Edward Grey, as I am confidentially informed, is going to state to Count Mensdorff tomorrow that the British Government will exert itself to influence the Serbian Government to accept the Austro-Hungarian demands, in case they are *modified* and are *made reconcilable with the independence of the Serbian nation.* He also believes that Sazonoff will use his influence at Belgrade toward the same end. But the condition precedent to this attitude would be that Vienna should bring no unprovable accusations *à la* Friedjung, and that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be in a position to demonstrate indubitably the connection between the murder at Serajevo and the political circles in Belgrade. Everything will depend on the manner in which the note is drawn at Vienna and on the results of the inquiry up to date. But it will be *impossible,* however, to make representations *at Belgrade* on the strength of *frivolous* assertions. I am in

It's not for him to decide as to this; that is the business of His Majesty the Emperor Franz Joseph!

That's their business!

What does he mean, frivolous?

[1] [The policy of Russia is pacific, but not passive.]

[2] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting and the Court Office decodification.

[3] Filed at Berlin at 1.40 p.m.; arrived at the Court office at 8.30 p.m. Decodification of the Court Office reached the Foreign Office on the 27th of July. The same telegram was sent to Vienna at 1.40 p.m.; arrived there at 4 p.m. (according to the archives of the German Embassy at Vienna).

the meantime endeavoring to influence matters here so that, in view of Austria's justifiable desire for satisfaction and for the final termination of the long disturbances, they may advocate the unconditional acceptance of the Austrian demands, even if the latter should not fully respect *Serbia's national dignity*. In so doing I meet with the expectation that our influence at Vienna has been successful in suppressing demands that cannot be met. They are counting with certainty on the fact that we shall not identify ourselves with demands that are plainly intended to bring on war, and that we will not support any policy which makes use of the murder at Serajevo merely as an excuse for carrying out Austrian desires in the Balkans, and for the annulment of the peace of Bucharest. Furthermore, Sir Edward Grey let me know again today that he was trying to use his influence at Petersburg in behalf of the Austrian point of view. But the fact that Count Berchtold has so far very noticeably avoided discussing the Serbian question with Sir Maurice de Bunsen has not created a pleasant impression here.

How can Grey use such a word about that old and honored sovereign? There isn't any such thing! Why should I do any such thing? None of my business! What does "cannot be met" mean? The rascals have added murder to agitation and must be humbled. That is a tremendous piece of British insolence. I am not called upon to prescribe à la Grey to His Majesty the Emperor how to preserve his honor! Right! Grey must be told this plainly and seriously! So that he will see that I am not fooling. Grey is committing the error of setting Serbia on the same plane with Austria and other Great Powers! That is unheard of! Serbia is nothing but a band of robbers that must be seized for its crimes! I will meddle in nothing of which the Emperor is alone competent to judge! I expected this dispatch, and am not surprised by it! Real British reasoning and condescending way of giving orders, which I insist on having rebuffed![3] *Wilhelm I. R.*

Your Majesty's Ambassador at London is in receipt of instructions, for the benefit of his conferences, to the effect that we do not know what the Austrian demands are, *but that we regarded*[1] *them as part of Austria-Hungary's internal affairs, which it would not become us to attempt to influence.*[2]

Most humbly,

JAGOW.

No. 122

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Athens[4]

Telegram 99.
Confidential.
To be used in strict confidence.

BERLIN, *July 23, 1914.*[5]

Tension between Austria and Serbia does not preclude military conflict. In that event Bulgaria would hardly neglect opportunity for attack on Serbia. How long Turkey would then remain quiet is questionable. Our standpoint must necessarily be that of our ally Austria. Timely alienation of Greece from Serbia advisable, in order that Greece be not drawn into the conflict. Under circum-

[1] Decodification of the Court Office: "regard." [2] See Nos. 118 and 140.

[3] The marginal annotations of the Emperor "Why should I do any such thing . . . preserve his honor," and "Right! Grey must . . . on having rebuffed," were communicated by wire to the Foreign Office by Wedel as early as the 23d of July; telegrams filed at Balholm at 12.30 a.m. on July 24; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.55 a.m.; receipt stamps: July 24, a.m.

[4] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.

[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 7.40 p.m.

stances named the conclusion of an alliance between Turkey and Greece appears very dubious at the present time. Arrangement on another basis, perhaps an agreement on neutrality, is therefore to be recommended now.[1]

JAGOW.

No. 123

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Stockholm [2]

Telegram 15.
Confidential. BERLIN, *July 23, 1914.*[3]

To guide your conferences. According to all appearances Austria-Hungary, who feels her existence to be threatened by the Greater-Serbia agitations, is going [4] to make very serious demands on Belgrade. These demands are not known to us; we regard them as part of Austria-Hungary's internal affairs, which it would not become us to attempt to influence. In case Serbia should refuse to accept the demands, an Austro-Serbian conflict might impend. We earnestly desire that such a conflict should remain localized. This will depend chiefly on Russia. Russian intervention, i. e., an attack on Austria by Russia, would, it is recognized, prove a *casus foederis* for us. If things should come to a general conflagration, despite our efforts at localization, we hope that Sweden would clearly comprehend how important even for her fate the hour would be.

JAGOW.

No. 124

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 146. BERLIN, *July 23, 1914.*[6]

My Italian colleague told me in the course of a lengthy and confidential conference that it would be extremely difficult for any Italian Government to advocate, in opposition to the country, the taking part in a war the object of which was perhaps the conquest or Austrianization of Serbia. Italy was maintaining active trade relations with Serbia, and would be anything but interested to see these ruined by Austria. Thus the war would run directly contrary to Italian interests, and could only be undertaken if Austria should offer the prospect of adequate advantages in return.

I venture to request that you treat this communication as strictly confidential.

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] See No. 189.
[2] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[3] To the Central Telegraph Office at 2.40 p.m.
[4] The corrected draft, also to be found among the archives, reads incorrectly "is going" instead of "will" as originally written by Jagow.
[5] From the decodification.
[6] Filed at London at 1.21 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 23, p.m. Sent by Jagow as a dispatch to the Ambassador at Vienna on the 24th of July at 8 p.m.

No. 125

The Imperial Chancelor to the Minister in the Imperial Suite[1]

Telegram 89. BERLIN, *July 23, 1914.*[2]

Austro-Hungarian note is to be delivered at Belgrade this afternoon or evening, and to be published early tomorrow morning in Vienna. Thus the ultimatum would expire on the evening of the twenty-fifth. Our attitude for the present will be that the matter concerns a difference which affects Austria and Serbia only. Only the intervention of another Power would draw us into the conflict. It is not to be assumed that this will occur at once, namely, that England will decide to intervene immediately. The very fact that President Poincaré, leaving Cronstadt this evening, will visit Stockholm on the twenty-fifth, Copenhagen on the twenty-seventh and Christiania on the twenty-ninth, arriving on the thirty-first at Dunkerque, would probably delay the making of any decision.[3]

English fleet, according to information of the Admiralty Staff, is supposed to break up on the twenty-seventh and go into home ports. Any premature recall of our Fleet might cause general uneasiness and be regarded as suspicious, especially in England.

After consulting with Admiral von Müller, kindly talk at an audience with His Majesty along these lines. State in addition that the Admiralty Staff gives its expert advice as follows:

> If the possibility of an imminently prospective declaration of war on the part of England must be reckoned with, then, from a military standpoint, a sudden attack on our Fleet by the English fleet must also certainly be reckoned with. In view of its [4] numerical inferiority, our Fleet must in no case be exposed to this possibility. Therefore, just as soon as the possibility of the outbreak of a war with England within, say, six days, has to be reckoned with, the Fleet must be recalled.
>
> BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the original draft written and signed by Jagow. Telegram was sent by Jagow in the name of the Chancelor.

[2] Filed at Berlin at 3.40 p.m.; arrived at Balholm at 9.30 p.m. The decodification of the Court Office, now to be found in the archives, bears the annotation in Wedel's handwriting: "Audience referred to held with His Majesty, Balholm, 7. 23. 14." Text of the telegram to Wedel was communicated by wire to the Chancelor at Hohenfinow by Jagow. Telegram to the Central Telegraph Office at 3 p.m. on the 23d of July. See Nos. 111, 115 and 116.

[3] See Nos. 50, 93, 96, 108 and 112.

[4] The word "great" which follows "its" in Behncke's report is here omitted by Jagow. See No. 111.

No. 126

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [1]

Telegram 167. BERLIN, *July 23, 1914.*[2]

We are not acquainted with the Austrian demands.[3]

We regard the settlement of the Austro-Serbian dispute as an internal matter,[4] to be arranged exclusively between both participants, and as one on which we should exercise no influence; and we have, therefore, exercised no influence on the decision of the Vienna Cabinet.

Your Serene Highness will therefore undertake only to carry out the directions sent to London yesterday evening,[5] after the wording of the Austrian note to the Serbian Government has been made public through the press. In any other event, the impression might arise there that we had been acquainted with it in advance.

JAGOW.

No. 127

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 96. VIENNA, *July 23, 1914.*[7]

Imperial and Royal Government sends warmest thanks for the information. Baron Giesl is instructed to postpone delivery for one hour.[8]

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 128

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor [9]

Confidential. VIENNA, *July 22, 1914.*[10]

This evening discussed at length with Count Forgach the necessity of influencing the foreign press. So far as Italy is concerned, Mr. von Mérey has authority to spend any amount which may seem necessary to him. Ambassador has hitherto taken the stand that it would be extremely dangerous to start suddenly to approach the Italian press with large sums. This would, he believes, awaken distrust in Italy, and might possibly have an adverse effect. He has been directed

[1] From the original draft. Copy in Stumm's handwriting with alterations by Jagow. The telegram, shortened by the first sentence, "We . . . demands," was sent at the same time to the Ambassador at Paris.

[2] Sent, as was the telegram to the Ambassador at Paris, to the Central Telegraph Office at 4 p.m. See No. 118.

[3] Sentence "We . . . demands" added by Jagow to the Stumm draft.

[4] "internal" added by Jagow to the Stumm draft.

[5] See No. 100.

[6] From the decodification.

[7] Filed at Vienna at 1.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 23, p.m.

[8] See No. 112.

[9] From the decodification.

[10] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 23, p.m. Paragraph 1, "discussed the . . . desired here" communicated to the Ambassador at Rome by a dispatch on the afternoon of the 25th of July. See No. 97.

again, however, to make attempts to affect the local press and, in any case, after the step has been taken at Belgrade, to do everything and to use every means to influence the leading newspapers not to make impossible for the Italian Government the neutral attitude so desired here.

Count Czernin at Bucharest has also unlimited sums at his disposal. He is especially to make an attempt to buy the *Adeverul*.

Count Szapary, too, has the same authority. But he is in but slight touch with the Russian press, and they would welcome it here with real gratitude if Count von Pourtalès could put him in a position to find intermediaries.[1]

Nothing can be done with money in England; there the attempt to get results must be made by means of discussions of fact. Count Mensdorff has already been in touch with Mr. Steed (*sic*) of the *Times*, who unfortunately, however, after moments of clearer insight, seems to have fallen once more into his Austrophobia. Very soon, however, there will appear in the English newspapers articles by Professor Lammasch, Professor Redlich and Count von Lützow.

They think here that there is no chance of being able to affect the French press with money.

I particularly recommended to Count Forgach the exercise of influence on the local press here, in order to spare the nationalistic feelings of the local Serbs after the action at Belgrade. He will do everything that is possible in this direction, and is sure of the active cooperation of Count Tisza along this line.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 129

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram 147. LONDON, *July 23, 1914.*[3]

The former Roumanian Minister, Take Jonescu, who is temporarily stopping here and with whom I have been acquainted since my term at Bucharest, tells me that Mr. Sazonoff on his recent visit gave King Karl[4] the most solemn assurances of Russia's desire for peace. The Russian Minister also refrained from any suggestion of a closer understanding with Roumania. Mr. Sazonoff did, however, state decisively that Russia could not tolerate an attack on Serbia by Austria. Mr. Take Jonescu thinks that Russia would feel herself obliged to intervene with force even at the risk of defeat, in case Austria should invade Serbian territory. The Roumanian statesman claims to have gathered from statements of the Ambassador, the Margrave Pallavicini, who was recently at Bucharest—in fact, just before the assassination at Serajevo—that Austria had desired war even before the murder, and had been awaiting a convenient opportunity to restore her status in the Balkans which had been sacrificed through the policy of Count Berchtold. He, too, regards the situation as extremely grave, and gave me to understand that Roumania could not remain disinterested in case of a new Balkan war, and would want to be sure that the peace of Bucharest would be maintained.

[1] See No. 143.

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed at London at 1.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 23, p.m.

[4] Decodification reads first "Karl," then "Carol."

The relations with Austria, Mr. Take Jonescu described as bad, and said that therefore the Russian visit had been very inconvenient for King Carol,[1] but that he had not been able to prevent it.

As much as two weeks ago Roumania had been ready to send a large body of troops to Albania, if each of the Great Powers would send even one hundred men there. Whether this willingness still existed, he could not tell me. He did not believe that the revolutionary movement in Albania was being nurtured either from Serbian or from Greek sources, but rather that it had emanated from the Young Turk element, which hoped that in case of new complications something might fall into their laps. Serbia knew perfectly well that she would not be allowed to go into northern Albania, and she preferred Prince William to an Austro-Italian occupation.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 130

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram 146. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 23, 1914.*[3]

The cool reception that President Poincaré met with on his visit here attracted general attention. The great apathy of the general public can probably be attributed in part to the workingmen's strikes, which have undergone great extensions in the last few days. More than half the workmen here have stopped their work. A number of papers were prevented from appearing during Poincaré's visit on account of the printers' strike. These resulted in serious riots, in which the police and the Cossacks had to take a hand. Last night a serious collision occurred in the Wyborg quarter, where the workmen had erected barricades, and in which, it is officially reported, five were killed and eight wounded.

Bravo!

It is intended, I hear, to proceed more severely against the workmen immediately after Poincaré's departure.

Strikes are taking place at present in other large cities of Russia besides Petersburg. They deserve serious attention as a symptom of the embittered feeling swaying the Russian laboring element, even if they can not at present be credited with great importance otherwise. However, in *case of external complications they might cause the Government serious embarrassment.*

Yes.

POURTALÈS.

[1] Decodification reads first "Karl," then "Carol."

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed at Petersburg at 2.55 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 23, p.m. Communicated to the Emperor by telegraph on the 23d of July by Jagow, filed in Berlin at 11.21 p.m., on the 23d of July; received at the Court Office on the 24th of July at 7 a.m. Decodification of the Court Office returned by the Emperor on the 24th of July, reached the Foreign Office again on the 27th of July.

No. 131

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 97. VIENNA, *July 23, 1914.*[2]

Count Szapary reports that President Poincaré impressively pointed out to him at a recent diplomatic reception that Serbia had friends who would not leave her in the lurch. This statement, I am told here, is not in consonance with the attitude of Mr. Sazonoff, who has expressed himself very quietly and reservedly on the Serbian affair.

Mr. Dumaine visited the ministry yesterday. He painted the danger of a war with Serbia in the darkest colors as a war which would become a guerrilla warfare of incalculable duration. In connection with this the French Ambassador insisted that Russia would as a matter of course lend Serbia her MORAL support.

Mr. Schebeko has gone away on leave. He did not touch on the Serbian matter at his farewell visit to Count Berchtold.

A telegraphically dispatched article from the *Westminster Gazette* in the morning papers, which speaks of the arousing of Slav sentiment in Russia and of the "attack upon an orthodox Slav nation" has had a disagreeable effect here.

They are firmly determined here not to let themselves be turned aside by any attempts at intimidation.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 132

The Crown Prince to the Imperial Chancelor [3]

Telegram (unnumbered). ZOPPOT, *July 23, 1914.*[4]

The contents of the telegram which Your Excellency sent to His Majesty in the matter we know of interested me greatly.

WILHELM.

No. 133

The Minister in the Imperial Suite to the Imperial Chancelor [5]

BALHOLM, *July 23, 1914.*[6]

I have the honor of reporting to Your Excellency in addition to my prescribed report of the twenty-first instant that His Majesty the Emperor and King has just received the following telegram: "Orders will be obeyed. Wilhelm, Crown Prince."

Count G. WEDEL.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Vienna at 1.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.50 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 23, p.m. Communicated by telegraph to the Ambassador at Rome by Jagow on the 24th of July; telegram sent to the Central Telegraph Office at 6.45 p.m.

[3] From a corrected copy in the Imperial Chancelry.

[4] Sent from Zoppot on the 23d of July. Hour of sending from Zoppot and time of arrival at Hohenfinow not known. See Nos. 84, 105 and 133.

[5] From a duplicate of a corrected copy to be found in the archives of the Imperial Chancelry.

[6] Sent from Balholm on the 23d of July. Time of arrival at Hohenfinow not known. See Nos. 84, 105 and 132.

No. 134

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 147. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 23, 1914.*[2]

Count Szapary tells me that at the reception given by the diplomatic corps to the President of the French Republic, Mr. Poincaré addressed him on the subject of the Austro-Serb tension. President used language which, in consideration of the fact that he was addressing himself to a diplomat in a country in which he himself was a guest, could not but cause astonishment. Count Szapary, therefore, observed an attitude of cold reserve toward the observations of the President. Under cover of great confidence, Poincaré argued to the Ambassador that it was not permissible to hold a government responsible for the crimes of individuals. President further remarked that while he did not wish to insinuate that Austria-Hungary was seeking an excuse to fall upon Serbia, he hoped that Austria would not proceed too harshly against this neighbor, who "also had friends." Poincaré also made tactless references to the negative results of the Prohaska case, which led Count Szapary to reply that the President did not seem to be familiar with the proceedings in question. My Austro-Hungarian colleague believes that Mr. Poincaré is urging them on here to a conflict with the Triple Alliance; I assume rather that the President's statements were instigated by Mr. Sazonoff, who is trying out a policy of bluff. In any event, Mr. Poincaré made use of exactly the same arguments to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador that Mr. Sazonoff used toward me in our recent conferences.

POURTALÈS.

No. 135

The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office[3]

Telegram 41.
Confidential. BUCHAREST, *July 23, 1914.*[4]

I learn confidentially from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with whom I traveled here from Sinaia, that the Italian Minister has an audience today with His Majesty the King. Italy's idea, according to Baron Fasciotti, is that Austria will submit unacceptable demands to Serbia in order to resort to war as soon as they have been refused. Italian Government desires that Roumania act as petitioner at Vienna for the purpose of getting Austria to make the demands on Serbia possible of acceptance. Roumanian Government, as Mr. Porumbaro told me, has already used persuasion at Belgrade and has most urgently advised submission to Austria-Hungary.

WALDBURG.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Petersburg July 23d at 5.03 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 24, a.m. Communicated to the Ambassadors at Vienna, Rome and Paris at 4 p.m. on the 24th of July by Jagow, after the effecting of certain alterations in form.
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Filed at Bucharest at 7.20 p.m. on the 23d of July; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.35 a.m. July 24; receipt stamp: July 24, a.m. Wired by Jagow on the 24th of July in the afternoon, after slight alterations had been effected, to the Ambassador at Rome.

No. 136

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 19. FIUGGI FONTE, *July 24, 1914.*[2]

The Counselor of Embassy announced here today in behalf of the sick Austrian Ambassador that the note had been delivered at Belgrade and that it contained a condition of a forty-eight-hour delay besides a demand for the suppression of the Pan-Serbian activities. Details were not communicated. Marquis di San Giuliano replied that he could make no statement in answer to so unspecific a communication.[3]

The Minister told me that he feared that the time-limit would cause an unfavorable impression, and he had had all the prefects warned through the Premier even as early as last night to suppress all anti-Austrian demonstrations and to prevent the enlistment of any possible volunteers to fight for Serbia. He considers it to be against the spirit of the Triple Alliance to enter upon such an action without first advising with the other allies.

FLOTOW.

No. 137

The Minister at Belgrade to the Imperial Chancelor [4]

BELGRADE, *July 21, 1914.*[5]

The excitement among the local population continues, as no one yet knows what steps the Austro-Hungarian Government is going to take against Serbia in the matter of the murder. Up to the present the nervous excitement has voiced itself in violent attacks of the Serbian press against Baron von Giesl. The Minister is accused in the most unqualified fashion of having personally evoked the panic that broke out in the local Austro-Hungarian colony on the twelfth instant, in order to compromise Serbia in the mind of Europe. The least that the press demands in the way of satisfaction is immediate recall, as Baron Giesl is even more dangerous to Serbia than the "Jesuitical" Count Forgach. As evidence, they refer to an interview alleged to have been given by Baron Giesl to a correspondent of the Budapest paper *A Nap*, in which he stated that all the preparations for the massacre of the Austro-Hungarian colony had actually been made, and that it was thanks only to his energetic interference that the execution of the satanical plan was prevented.

By its warm support of Austria-Hungary and by its unanimous demand for the granting of guaranties on the part of Serbia against the dangers of the Greater-Serbia agitations, the press of the German Empire has created an extraordinary

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Fiuggi Fonte at 7.30 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.50 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 24, a.m. Communicated by Jagow to the Ambassador at Vienna by telegraph on the 24th, with the additional clause of Jagow's: "According to this, the Vienna Cabinet did not keep the promise it made Your Excellency" (from the draft in Jagow's handwriting). Telegram to Tschirschky at the Central Telegraph Office at 6.45 p.m. See No. 187.

[3] See No. 145.

[4] From the engrossed copy.

[5] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 24, a.m.

impression here. In this regard it would appear that they had expected here from Germany something similar to the Austrian efforts for the revision of the Bucharest compact, and were now unpleasantly undeceived.

In view of the general indignation expressed in the press of all civilized nations, and especially in view of the plain and serious talk contained of late in the English press, Mr. Pashitch will not let it come to a war with the neighboring Monarchy, and will be ready to make any promises. His position is, as a matter of fact, a very difficult one, in view of the coming elections and of the agitation that has arisen throughout the country. Every concession to the neighboring Monarchy will be charged against him by the united opposition as a weakness. In addition to that is the fact that military circles, blinded by their megalomania and chauvinism, are forcing him to bluntness absolutely alien to his otherwise conciliatory nature. In this connection I should like to refer to the interview accorded to the reporter of the *Leipziger Neuester Nachrichten*, which can only be explained on the ground of internal political considerations. It is said to have been stoutly denied in the interim, but did actually take place, as I know from a reliable source.

The longer Austria-Hungary takes to conclude the inquiry into the assassination at Serajevo, the longer she delays approaching Serbia with specific demands, so much the more will the mutual relations of the two countries be envenomed by the tireless mischief-making of the press and by the election agitations in the interior of the country, which will hesitate at nothing; and so much the more difficult will it be for Mr. Pashitch to assert himself.

V. GRIESINGER.

No. 138

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

Confidential. VIENNA, *July 24, 1914.*[2]

Baron Macchio requests me to submit the following to Your Excellency:

According to the Hague Conventions, the Monarchy would be bound eventually to serve Serbia with a formal declaration of war. This declaration of war would follow the completion of mobilization, immediately before the commencement of military operations. Inasmuch as the Imperial and Royal representative in Serbia has received orders to leave Belgrade at once with his entire personnel in case of an unsatisfactory answer to the note, the Monarchy would possess no official organ later, at the time of the declaration of war, through which to bring the declaration to the attention of the Serbian Government in correct and secure fashion. It would also have to be assumed that at that time telegraphic connection between Austria-Hungary and Serbia would be broken off; to send it through the mails would also be unsafe, and the due receipt of the declaration of war might be contested on the part of Serbia. Likewise, the delivery of the declaration of war at Belgrade by an official to be specially sent would hardly be possible, as it is not likely that the Serbs would let such a person cross the border, and as the sending of an officer with a flag of truce BEFORE an actual declaration of war would not be proper according to international law.

[1] From the engrossed copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 24, a.m.

The Imperial and Royal Government therefore inquires of Your Excellency whether the Imperial Government would perhaps be willing to undertake to transmit to the Serbian Government the declaration of war signed by Count Berchtold by way of Berlin through the German minister. Should the Imperial Government, however, have any scruple about undertaking its transmission in this way, some other sure means must be discovered.[1]

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 139

The Minister at Belgrade to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 30. BELGRADE, *July 24, 1914.*[3]

The Austrian Minister delivered the note concerning the assassination at Serajevo yesterday evening at six o'clock to Minister of Finance Patchou, who is taking the place of Premier Pashitch, now absent on a trip in connection with the elections. It stipulates a delay of forty-eight hours. The Minister of Finance accepted the note without reading it, and promised to call the Ministerial Council together today. Today's morning papers describe the note as very harsh, and advise the Government to adopt an attitude of refusal.

GRIESINGER.

No. 140

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [4]

Telegram 168. BERLIN, *July 24, 1914.*[5]

His Majesty the Emperor deigned to remark in relation to "In so doing I meet with the expectation . . . peace of Bucharest," in Your Serene Highness's telegram 145: "Why should I do any such thing! . . . preserve his honor".[6]

To my announcement that Your Serene Highness had received instructions to the effect that we regarded the affair as an internal question of Austria-Hungary with which it did not become us to interfere, His Majesty remarked: "Right! . . . insist on having rebuffed." [7]

Your Serene Highness will be able to call attention further, in your conferences with Sir Edward Grey, to the fact that the continuous disturbances to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years along her eastern border, have created a condition which, if only on account of the enormous financial burden connected

[1] See No. 142.

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed at Belgrade at 12 noon, arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.35 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 24, p.m. Communicated to the Emperor by telegraph on the 24th of July by Jagow, with the omission of the words "concerning . . . Serajevo" and "It . . . hours." Telegram filed at Berlin at 7.20 p.m.; arrived at the Court Office at 10.09 p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor on the same day.

[4] From the original draft. Copy in Stumm's handwriting.

[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.40 p.m. See Nos. 118 and 121.

[6] Here the marginal annotation of the Emperor is inserted (No. 121); only instead of the word "humbled," the word "punished" is used, and instead of the word "Emperor," it reads "the Emperor Franz Joseph."

[7] Here the marginal annotation of the Emperor (No. 121) is inserted with the omission of the sentence "Serbia is nothing . . . for its crimes."

therewith, a Great Power cannot be expected to tolerate permanently when due to a little nation like Serbia. These conditions are the direct result of the encouragement that Serbia has always received from Russia, particularly from Russia's representative who died recently.[1]

JAGOW.

No. 141

The Minister in the Imperial Suite to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 128. BALESTRAND (*Hohenzollern*), *July 24, 1914.*[3]

His Majesty the Emperor and King believes the arguments of Baron von Wangenheim to be right in theory, it is true, but is of the opinion that for reasons of expediency Turkey's inclination at the present moment to make a connection with the Triple Alliance should be taken advantage of.[4]

Therefore if Stamboul absolutely desires to form an alliance "under the patronage of the Triple Alliance or of a Power thereof," it should honestly try to get Roumania and Bulgaria together and place itself at the disposal of Austria. Wangenheim is to work in Constantinople along this line.[4]

WEDEL.

No. 142

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [5]

Telegram 134. BERLIN, *July 24, 1914.*[6]

We consider it desirable to have the declaration of war on Serbia sent directly, and not through our Legation. Our standpoint has to be that the quarrel with Serbia is an Austro-Hungarian internal affair, in which it would no more become us to mix than it would others, and for that reason we are advocating the localization of the conflict. Only if Russia should intervene would we be drawn into the conflict. Declaration of war through our Legation would in general, especially to that portion of the public not acquainted with diplomatic customs, appear as though we had HARRIED Austria-Hungary into the war.[7]

JAGOW.

[1] See No. 163.
[2] From the decodification.
[3] Filed at Balestrand (*Hohenzollern*) at 11.50 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.38 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 24, p.m.
[4] See Nos. 117, 144 and 149, note 2.
[5] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 2.05 p.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 6.15 p.m. See No. 138.
[7] See No. 206.

No. 143

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Petersburg [1]

Telegram 120. BERLIN, *July 24, 1914.*[2]

At the desire of the Austro-Hungarian Government [3] I request that you assist Count Szapary in finding intermediaries for the purpose of financially influencing the local press.

JAGOW.

No. 144

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople [4]

Telegram 268. BERLIN, *July 24, 1914.*[5]

Minister Count Wedel telegraphs that His Majesty, in spite of the existing doubt as to Turkey's capacity as an ally, is of the opinion [6] that at the present moment, for reasons of expediency, Turkey's inclination toward a connection with the Triple Alliance could be taken advantage of.

If, therefore, Stamboul absolutely desires to form an alliance "under the patronage of the Triple Alliance or of a Power thereof," it should honestly try to get Roumania and Bulgaria together and place itself at the disposal of Austria.

Your Excellency is to work in Constantinople along this line. I remark in this connection that for the present it would be a matter of an alliance *ad hoc*, and that, naturally, as Your Excellency has also explained, we could not now undertake any far-reaching obligations.

JAGOW.

No. 145

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome [7]

Telegram 126. BERLIN, *July 24, 1914.*[8]

I suggest that you tell the Marquis di San Giuliano that we are not informed in detail about the Austrian note, nor do we wish to be, as we consider the matter as belonging to Austria-Hungary's internal affairs. Italy, also, failed to inform her allies at the beginning of the Libyan war, but placed them before a *fait accompli.*

JAGOW.

[1] From the original draft. Copy in Stumm's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.35 p.m.
[3] See No. 128.
[4] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.40 p.m.
[6] See Nos. 117 and 141.
[7] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[8] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.45 p.m. See No. 136.

No. 146

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 99. VIENNA, *July 24, 1914.*[2]

The King of Montenegro has been informed from here that Austria's proceedings against Serbia are in no way directed against Montenegro. On the contrary, they are convinced here that Montenegro's political attitude toward the Monarchy is not to be classed with that of Serbia. Montenegro's interests are unquestionably those of the Monarchy, in putting a stop to the intrigues and conspiracies at Belgrade, and they make their appeal to the King's oft-proved wisdom. The King accepted the Austrian announcements with a very good grace, and expressed the hope that a new era of good relations with the Monarchy was beginning to dawn.

They believe here that they will not have to reckon with Montenegro in a military way, in any case.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 147

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 365. PERA, *July 24, 1914.*[4]

Bulgarian Government has replied to the Turkish inquiry that in case of an Austro-Serbian conflict, Bulgaria will not take action without first having come to an agreement with Turkey.

WANGENHEIM.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Vienna at 5.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 24, p.m. Communicated to the Emperor and to the Ambassador at Rome by telegraph on the 25th of July by Jagow, after minor formal alterations had been effected; both telegrams filed at the Central Telegraph Office at 11.40 a.m., July 25. Decodification by the Court Office submitted to the Emperor on the evening of July 25. Tschirschky's telegram was communicated to the Minister at Cetinje in full by a dispatch of July 25.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed at Pera at 2.25 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 24, p.m. Communicated by telegraph to the Emperor on the 25th of July by Jagow, after minor formal alterations. Telegram filed at Berlin at 12.48 p.m.; arrived at the Court Office at 10.20 p.m.; decodification of the Court Office in the Emperor's hands on the evening of the same day. Wangenheim's telegram communicated by telegraph to the representatives at Vienna and Sofia on the 25th, filed at the Central Telegraph Office at 4 p.m. See No. 102.

No. 148

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 148. PETERSBURG, *July 24, 1914.*[2]

Count Szapary found Mr. Sazonoff *comparatively calm* today when he communicated to him the Austrian note delivered yesterday in Belgrade. Minister at first evidently wished to avoid committing the Russian Government in any way at all. Mr. Sazonoff principally called attention to the impression that the note would make, not only here but also in Paris, London, as well as in the rest of Europe. *A mask!*

In discussing the individual points of the note, Minister defended Serbia's standpoint and stated, among other things, that *Serbia would under no circumstances agree to the demand to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana.* The Ambassador's reference to the common monarchical interests of the conservative Powers as well as his appeal to the Minister's monarchical feelings won no response from Mr. Sazonoff. The monarchical principle, said the Minister, has nothing at all to do with the case in hand. *If Russia does not want her to! Otherwise much rather than have a war!*

After the visit of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, the Ministerial Council assembled. Therefore Mr. Sazonoff had me informed that he would be able to see me after the council. As the Ministerial Council is still deliberating now, at five o'clock in the afternoon, it appears to be doubtful whether Mr. Sazonoff will send for me today. *It is to be hoped that Pourtalès will speak plainly, seriously and absolutely firmly.*[3]

POURTALÈS.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Petersburg at 6.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 24, a.m. (this mistakenly for p.m.). Communicated to the Emperor telegraphically by Jagow, with the omission of the sentence "The ambassador's reference . . . case in hand." Jagow's telegram, dated July 24, filed at Berlin at 12.42 a.m., July 25, arrived at the Court Office July 25 at 9.50 a.m. Decodification of the Court Office reached Berlin on the 27th of July. Pourtalès' telegram communicated telegraphically by Jagow to the Ambassador at London, with the omission of the last sentence "After the visit . . . for me today." Jagow's telegram dated on the 24th of July sent at the Central Telegraph Office at the same time with the one to the Emperor, July 24, 11.30 p.m.

[3] This marginal annotation of the Emperor's had already been communicated to the Foreign Office by Wedel on the 25th of July. Wedel's telegram filed at Balestrand (*Hohenzollern*) at 12.15 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.50 p.m.; receipt stamp, July 25, p.m.

No. 149

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 364. THERAPIA, *July 23, 1914.*[2]

Margrave Pallavicini had been commissioned by his Government to warn the Grand Vizier against concluding an alliance with Greece. In view of the imminent change in the relations of Austria to Bulgaria, such an alliance would put Turkey in a false position. The Grand Vizier stated to my Austrian colleague in the most definite manner that he would agree to no alliance with Mr. Venizelos, and that in the event of war Austria could *count on Turkey with the same assurance as on Bulgaria.* Roumania, too, would *turn toward the Triple Alliance once more after the first energetic action.* Finally the Grand Vizier repeated to me the wish expressed yesterday by Enver Pasha, that Turkey might be allowed formally to enter the Triple Alliance. Margrave Pallavicini, who had in the meantime talked the matter over with me, replied that an alliance with Turkey would for the present *lay too great a burden on the Triple Alliance.* The Triple Alliance could not defend Turkey against everybody. Grand Vizier remarked in answer that Turkey required from the Triple Alliance to be defended against Russia only, and not against France and England.

WANGENHEIM.

Nous verrons. I hope so.

Rot. Let him first join them to us, the rest will be taken care of!

She makes a direct offer of herself!!! A refusal or a snub would amount to her going over to Russo-Gallia, and our influence would be gone for once and all! Wangenheim must express himself to the Turks in relation to a connection with the Triple Alliance with unmistakably plain compliance, and receive their desires and report them! Under no circumstances at all can we afford to turn them away. *W.*

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Therapia July 23, at 5.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.20 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 24, a.m. Communicated to the Emperor telegraphically by Jagow on the 24th of July after the effecting of slight alterations in form and with the omission of the sentences "Margrave Pallavicini had . . . in a false position," and "Grand Vizier stated . . . France and England"; filed at Berlin at 2.52 p.m.; arrived at the Court Office at 7 p.m. Decodification of the Court Office with the marginal annotations of the Emperor of July 24 arrived at Berlin on July 27. But Wedel telegraphed the Foreign Office as early as the 24th of July the marginal directions of the Emperor quoted above, "A refusal or a snub . . . turn them away." Telegram filed at Balestrand (*Hohenzollern*) on the 24th of July at 9.35 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.45 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, a.m. Thereupon Jagow communicated to the Ambassador at Constantinople by telegraph the marginal annotations of the Emperor, with the omission of the words "unmistakably plain" and "at all"; telegram sent from the Central Telegraph Office at 1 p.m. The communication of Wangenheim's telegram to the representatives at Vienna, Sofia and Athens, as ordered by the Emperor in marginal instructions, was not done. See Nos. 117, 141 and 144.

No. 150

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 136. BERLIN, *July 24, 1914.*[2]

Italian Ambassador has just informed me of the standpoint of his Government: Italy will maintain toward Austria the most friendly and benevolent attitude possible, and make no difficulties for her, always reserving the right to freedom of action and to her interests as based on Article 7 of the Triple Alliance compact. Italy will conduct a policy uniform with that of her allies in all Balkan questions, but this will only be possible for her after she has received assurances concerning the interpretation of Article 7. Otherwise Italian policy would have to be directed toward the prevention of Austria-Hungary's territorial aggrandizement.

Mr. Bollati told me that Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome had informed them that Austria-Hungary sought no territorial expansion, but could not bind herself in this matter.

For Your Excellency's personal information only: Mr. Bollati told me in the strictest confidence that Italy would demand the Trentino as compensation, in the event of the extension of Austrian territory, and, should Austria take a portion of Albania, Valona. Italy did not desire the latter.

Article 7 speaks of the *régions des Balkans*; Austrian interpretation, therefore, to the effect that only Turkish territory comes into question, does not appear to us to be correct. Furthermore, it seems to me that theoretical disputes about the interpretation of the compact are out of place at present. Politically serviceable decisions are necessary. Request Your Excellency to talk along these lines.

JAGOW.

No. 151

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 100. VIENNA, *July 24, 1914.*[4]

Count Berchtold goes to Ischl tomorrow noon in order to be with His Majesty at the time of the arrival of the Serbian reply.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.

[2] Given to the Central Telegraph Office at 9.15 p.m.; received at the Embassy at Vienna on the 25th of July at 4.03 a.m.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed at Vienna at 7.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.20 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 24 a.m. (this in error for p.m.). Communicated telegraphically to the Emperor by Jagow on the 24th of July; to the Central Telegraph Office at 11 p.m.; arrived at the Court Office July 25, at 8.15 a.m.

No. 152

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 150. LONDON, *July 24, 1914.*[2]

Count Benckendorff came to me and told me in strict confidence that he held it to be scarcely possible to advise the Serbian Government to accept that sort of condition unless she was to sink to the level of a vassal of Austria. He did not believe that Russia would be in a position to give such advice. It simply amounted to delivering the Serbs unconditionally into the hands of Austria. Public opinion in Russia would not tolerate that. Only a Government that wanted war could possibly write such a note; that was not the tone of peace. Sir E. Grey has so far not talked with him.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 153

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at Paris, London and Petersburg [3]

Telegrams 162, 169, 122. BERLIN, *July 24, 1914.*[4]

In local diplomatic circles the opinion seems to be prevalent that we incited Austria-Hungary to direct a sharp note to Serbia and participated in its composition. Report seems to emanate from Cambon. Kindly refute it there, if necessary. We exercised no influence of any kind with regard to the contents of the note and had as little opportunity as any other Power to adopt an attitude in connection with it before its publication. That we are now unable to counsel Vienna to retract, since Austria-Hungary has determined on strong speech of her own initiative, goes without saying. Austria-Hungary's prestige, both internal and external, would be completely lost, in case of retraction.[5]

ZIMMERMANN.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at London July 24 at 6.16 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.20 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, a.m.
[3] From the original draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[4] Telegram to the Central Telegraph Office at 9.45 p.m.
[5] See Nos. 163, 166, 180.

No. 154

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 210. PARIS, *July 24, 1914.*[2]

The Minister of Justice, representing the Premier, to whom I expressed myself along the lines of dispatch 918,[3] was visibly relieved at our idea that Austro-Serbian conflict was one to be settled exclusively by the two participants. French Government sincerely shares the wish that conflict remain localized, and will labor along this line in the interest of the maintenance of European peace. It does not conceal from itself, however, that such a Power as Russia, which has to reckon with the current of Panslavism, would find it difficult to maintain an entirely disinterested attitude, especially should Austria-Hungary insist upon the immediate fulfilment of all demands, even those which are scarcely compatible with Serbian sovereignty, or are impracticable to carry out at once. French Government feels that it goes without saying that Serbia should give satisfaction in a convincing manner, and should be obliged to assure the punishment of criminals and the prevention of conspiracies against Austria-Hungary. Here, too, advice has been given the Serbians to make all the concessions possible. But the view is held here that Austria-Hungary would do well, in case Serbia might not agree to all the demands at once but should wish to discuss individual points, not to refuse such requests without further ado, provided that on the whole Serbia's good-will was not *questionable.*

SCHOEN.

Rot.

Ultimata are accepted or not! But one does not discuss any longer! Thence the name!

It is.[4] *Rubbish clad in stately phrases!*

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Paris July 24 at 8.05 p. m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.35 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, a.m. Communicated telegraphically by Jagow on the 25th of July, with the omission of the sentence "to whom I . . . dispatch 918," to the Emperor as well as to the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Rome and Vienna; telegrams to the Central Telegraph Office at 11.45 a.m. Arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 6 p.m. Telegram to the Emperor reached the Court office July 25 at 11.45 p.m.; decodification returned by the Emperor on the 26th of July, arrived at Berlin on the 27th of July.

[3] See No. 100.

[4] This is on the left-hand side of the page.

No. 155

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 101. VIENNA, *July 24, 1914.*[2]

Absolutely superfluous! Will give the impression of weakness and the impression of an apology, which, in connection with Russia is unconditionally false and must be avoided. Austria has her good reasons, has made a move on the strength of them; now it cannot later be made the subject of a quasi-discussion!

Ass! She must take back the Sanjac, else the Serbians will reach the Adriatic.

That will come entirely of its own accord, and must come. Austria must become preponderant in the Balkans as compared with the little ones, and at Russia's expense; otherwise there will be no peace.
Feeble!

In order to *prove by documentary evidence his good intentions* toward Russia, Count Berchtold requested the Russian Chargé d'Affaires to call on him this morning, in order to make him an exhaustive explanation of Austria-Hungary's position with regard to Serbia. After recapitulating the historical developments of the last few years, he emphasized the fact that the Monarchy was far from wishing to oppose Serbia in the rôle of a conqueror. Austria would not lay the *least claim to any Serbian territory.* In like manner there had been a careful avoidance in the note directed to Serbia of any humiliation of Serbia. Austria strictly insisted that the step was purely a defensive measure with the aim of opposing the Serbian intrigues, but was compelled by necessity to demand guaranties for a subsequent more friendly attitude on the part of Serbia toward the Monarchy. He was far from wishing to upset the balance of power either in the Balkans or in Europe. On the contrary, he regarded the unaffected stability of Russia [3] as a necessary factor of European policy. It [4] should believe that it was in the interest of Europe in general to put an end to the Serbian intrigues that were continually disturbing Europe; and particularly the monarchistically [5] ruled nations of Europe should show a solid front in their united opposition to the Serbian policy conducted with revolver and with bomb.

Prince Koudacheff, who has as yet received no instructions of any kind from Petersburg, took the arguments of the Minister under consideration, with the promise that he would submit them at once to Sazonoff.

I have informed the Duke d'Avarna of the above; he thought this move of Count Berchtold's with regard to Russia excellent, and felt assured that it would have an especially good effect on the Marquis di San Giuliano.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification. See also German White Book of May, 1915, p. 27, No. 3.

[2] Filed at Vienna July 24 at 8.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.23 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, a.m. Communicated on July 25 telegraphically by Jagow, after slight alterations had been effected and with the omission of the sentence "I have informed . . . San Giuliano," to the Emperor as well as to the Ambassadors at Rome, Petersburg, London and Paris. Telegram to the Emperor sent to the Central Telegraph Office at 12.45 p.m., the other telegrams at 11.45 a.m. Telegram to the Emperor arrived at the Court Office July 26 at 12.40 p.m.; decodification returned by the Emperor July 26, reached Berlin on the 27th.

[3] "Russia" annotated by Jagow: "Must this be Russia? If so, better leave out the word." New test showed correctness of deciphering, "Russia." Hence word was left out in further transmission of the telegram. Even in Tschirschky's own personal draft in the archives of the Embassy at Vienna the word is "Russia's."

[4] Should read "he" according to the archives of the Vienna Embassy.

[5] "monarchically" according to the archives of the Vienna Embassy.

No. 156

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 20. FIUGGI, *July 24, 1914.*[2]

During a more or less excited conference lasting several hours with Premier Salandra and Marquis di San Giuliano, the latter argued that the spirit of the Triple Alliance compact demanded that Austria come to an understanding with her allies, before entering upon a move so portentously aggressive. As she had not done so, so far as Italy was concerned, Italy could not consider herself bound in connection with the further consequences of this move.

Furthermore, Article 7 of the Triple Alliance compact (which I have not here with me) required that the contracting parties should come to an agreement previous to any alteration of the *status quo* in the Balkans, and that if either of the contracting parties should bring about a territorial change, the other should be compensated.

To my remark [3] . . . vital interests of Austria that were in question. My task is made very difficult by the fact that Austrian Ambassador sick in bed. Counselor of Embassy incompetent.

Marquis di San Giuliano will probably leave Fiuggi on the afternoon of the twenty-seventh. Request any possible communication for him by morning of the twenty-seventh, as I shall perhaps not be able to see him then for two or three days.

FLOTOW.

No. 157

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 151. LONDON, *July 24, 1914.*[5]

Sir E. Grey asked me to call on him just now. The Minister was evidently greatly affected by the Austrian note, which, according to his view, exceeded anything he had ever [6] seen of this

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Fiuggi, July 24 at 8.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 25 at 12.10 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, a.m. Flotow's telegram communicated by Jagow over the wire to the Ambassador at Vienna on July 25, after the effecting of slight alterations and with the omission of the sentence "Counselor of Embassy . . . two or three days"; to the Central Telegraph Office at 11.05. With relation to the communication of Flotow's telegram to the Emperor, see No. 168.

[3] Here follows the section quoted in Jagow's telegram to the Emperor, No. 168, "To my remark . . . Austria that were in question."

[4] From the decodification. On the 25th of July the English Chargé d'Affaires presented to the Foreign Office a brief *résumé* of the Grey-Lichnowsky conversation, which agreed with the report of the German Ambassador.

[5] Filed at London July 24 at 9.12 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.16 a.m. July 25; receipt stamp: July 25, a.m. Communicated over the wire to the Emperor on July 25 by Jagow, after the making of minor alterations and with the omission of the sentences "such as Your Excellency laid stress . . . talking to Sir E. Grey," and "They also claim . . . who attacked"; sent at the Central Telegraph Office at 2 p.m. on July 25, arrived at the Court Office July 26 at 3.45 p.m. Decodification of the Court Office returned by the Emperor on the 26th of July, was in the Foreign Office on the 27th of July. Likewise sent over the wire on July 25 by Jagow to the Ambassadors at Rome, St. Petersburg and Paris, with the omission of the sentences "such as Your Excellency laid stress . . . talking to Sir Edward Grey", and "I am told from another quarter . . . who attacked." These telegrams to the Central Telegraph Office at 4 p.m. For simultaneous communication to the Ambassador at Vienna see No. 171.

[6] "ever" omitted by Jagow in the telegram to the Emperor.

sort before. He said that he had so far had no news from Petersburg, and consequently did not know what they thought of the matter there. But he very much doubted whether it would be possible for the Russian Government to recommend to the Serbian (Government) [1] the unconditional acceptance of the Austrian demands. Any nation that accepted conditions like that would really cease to count as an independent nation. It was very difficult for him, Sir E. Grey, to offer advice of any sort to Petersburg at the present moment. He could only *hope* that a *mild* [2] and pacific view of the situation would gain ground there. As long as the matter concerned a localized quarrel between Austria (and) [3] Serbia, such as Your Excellency laid stress on in dispatch 1055 [4] which I employed in talking to Sir E. Grey, he, Sir E. Grey, had nothing to do with it; but it would be a different matter should public opinion in Russia force the Government to proceed against Austria.

This would be very desirable. It is not a nation in the European sense, but a band of robbers!

Right.

Right for they aren't!

Right.

To my remark that one could not measure the Balkan peoples by the same standard as the *civilized nations* of Europe, and that therefore one had to use another kind of language with them—that had been proved by their barbaric manner of warfare—than one used, say, toward Britons or Germans, the Minister replied that even if he were (able) [5] to share this opinion, he did not believe that it would be accepted in Russia. The danger of a European war, should Austria *invade Serbian territory*, would become immediate. The results of such a war between *four* nations—he expressly emphasized the *number four*, and meant by it Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and France—would be absolutely [6] incalculable. However the affair might come out, one thing would be certain: that would be total exhaustion and impoverishment; industry and trade would be ruined, and the power of capital destroyed. Revolutionary movements, like those of the year 1848, due to the collapse of industrial activities would be the result.[7] What Sir Edward Grey most deplored, beside the tone of the note, was the brief time-limit, which made war almost unavoidable. He told me that he would be willing to join with us [8] in pleading for a prolongation of the time-limit at Vienna, as in that way *perhaps a way out* [9] might be found. He requested me to transmit this proposal to Your Excellency. He further suggested that in the event of a dangerous tension between Russia and Austria, the four nations not immediately concerned—England, Germany, France and Italy—should under-

Then the Russians are not any better themselves. Which will certainly happen. He forgets Italy.

Useless. This is superfluous, as Austria has already made matters plain to Russia, and Grey has nothing else to propose. I

[1] Cipher-group at fault, filled in by Jagow according to the sense.
[2] Exclamation-point by the Emperor on the margin. [3] See No. 100.
[4] Cipher-group at fault, filled in by Jagow according to the sense.
[5] Cipher-group mutilated, filled in by Jagow according to the sense.
[6] "absolutely" omitted by Jagow in the telegram to the Emperor.
[7] Exclamation-point by the Emperor in the margin.
[8] The words "with us" omitted by Jagow in the telegram to the Emperor.
[9] A question-mark and two exclamation-points by the Emperor in the margin.

take to mediate between Russia and Austria. This proposal, also, he requested me to submit to Your Excellency.

The Minister is evidently endeavoring to do everything to avoid European complications, and could not conceal his great regret at the challenging tone of the Austrian note and at the brief time-limit.

I am told from another quarter in the Foreign Office that there is reason for the assumption that Austria is very much underestimating Serbia's power of self-defense. In any event it will be a long and desperate fight, in which Austria will be excessively weakened and in which she will be *bled white.* They also claim to know that Roumania's attitude is more than uncertain, and that they were saying in Bucharest that they would be against anybody who attacked.

LICHNOWSKY.

will not join in it unless Austria expressly asks me to, which is not likely.[1] *In vital questions and those of honor, one does not consult with others. Nonsense. It may give Persia to England.*

No. 158

The Minister at Belgrade to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 32. BELGRADE, *July 24, 1914.*[3]

Italian Chargé d'Affaires has just told me confidentially that the Crown Prince in greater [4] excitement requested his good offices in the matter of a telegram to the Queen of Italy, in which Her Majesty was asked to lend assistance to the dynasty.

The military categorically demand the rejection of the note and war.

Mobilization is already in full swing.

GRIESINGER.

[1] The sentence: "I will not join . . . likely" had already been communicated to the Foreign Office on July 26 through Count Wedel by wireless by way of Norddeich; telegram sent from on board the *Hohenzollern* at 11.12 p.m., July 26; arrived at the Foreign Office on July 27 at 12.07 a.m.; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office, July 27, a.m.

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed at Belgrade July 24 at 11.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 25 at 1.47 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, a.m. Communicated by Jagow to the Emperor by wire on the 25th of July with telegram 127, filed at Berlin at 11.44 a.m.; arrived at the Court Office at 3.45 p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor on the same day. On the 25th of July the same dispatch was telegraphically communicated to the Ambassadors at Vienna and Rome, the telegrams being filed at the Central Telegraph Office at 1.30 p.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 9.15 p.m. The two last paragraphs "The military . . . in full swing" were also communicated to the General Staff on the 25th of July; communication forwarded by messenger at 8.30 p.m.

[4] Thus in the decodification.

No. 159

The Minister at Belgrade to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 31. BELGRADE, *July 24, 1914.*[2]

Bravo! one would not have believed it of the Viennese!

It looks as if His Majesty had made himself scarce.

The proud Slavs!

The energetic tone and the detailed demands of the Austrian note were *absolutely unexpected by the Serbian Government.* The Ministerial Council has been deliberating since early this morning with the *Crown Prince as Regent in the chair*, but is *unable to arrive at any decision.* It is said to be impossible to carry out the demands set forth within forty-eight hours, especially points 2, 4, 5, and 6, paragraph 2, in which a direct attack upon Serbian sovereignty is seen. In case of the proclamation of the Order of the Day, a *military uprising is feared.*

How hollow the whole so-called Serbian power is proving itself to be; thus it is seen to be with all the Slav nations! Just tread hard on the heels of that rabble!

As I am informed, the removal of the Government to Nish is being considered.

GRIESINGER.

No. 160

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 149. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 25, 1914.*[4]

Good.

Have just had long interview with Sazonoff at which subject of dispatch 592 [5] figured exhaustively. Minister, who was *very much excited* and gave vent to boundless reproaches against Austria-Hungary, stated in the most determined manner that it would be impossible for Russia to admit that the Austro-Serb quarrel could be settled between the two parties concerned. The obligations which Serbia had assumed after the Bosnian crisis and

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Belgrade July 24 at 9.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 25 at 2.33 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, a.m. Communicated by Jagow to the Emperor by wire on July 25, filed at Berlin at 11.44 a.m.; arrived at the Court Office at 2.10 p.m. Court Office decodification returned by the Emperor on July 25, was in Berlin on the 27th of July. Same dispatch sent to the Ambassador at Vienna, telegram at the Central Telegraph Office at 1.40 p.m., arrived at 7.15 in the evening.

[3] From the decodification. See also German White Book of May, 1915, p. 27, No. 4.

[4] Filed at Petersburg at 1.08 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.45 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, a.m. Communicated to the Emperor by wire on the 25th of July by Jagow, after the effecting of slight alterations of style and with the omission of the words "at which subject . . . exhaustively. Minister," and "avoiding everything . . . of a threat"; filed at the Central Telegraph Office at 1.15 p.m., July 25, arrived at the Court Office July 26, at 5.30 p.m. Court Office decodification, returned by the Emperor on the 26th of July, was in Berlin on the 27th of July. Pourtalès' report was likewise communicated by Jagow on the 25th of July to the Ambassadors at Vienna, Rome, Paris and London, after he had effected slight changes in style and with the omission of the words "at which subject . . . exhaustively. Minister," "and to which . . . refers," "in case the facts . . . to be true," and "avoiding everything . . . of a threat." Telegrams filed at the Central Telegraph Office at 2 p.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 8.15 p.m.

[5] See No. 100.

to which the Austrian note refers, were assumed toward Europe, consequently the affair was a European affair, and it was for *Europe* to investigate [1] as to whether Serbia had lived up to these obligations. He therefore proposes that the documents in relation to the inquiry be laid before the Cabinets of the six Powers.[2]

Rot!

That's a question of the point of view!

Austria could not be both accuser and judge in her own case. Sazonoff announced that he could in no way consider as proven the facts alleged by Austria in her note, that the inquiry, on the other hand, inspired him with the greatest (suspicion).[3] He continued by saying that, in case the facts asserted should be proved to be true, Serbia could give Austria satisfaction in the purely legal questions, but not, on the other hand, in the matter of the demands of a political nature. I called attention to the fact that it was impossible to separate the legal from the political side of the matter, as the assassination was inseparably connected with the Greater-Serbia propaganda.

Cannot be separated.

Right. Panslavistic.

Most certainly not!

Bravo! Well said!

I promised to lay his ideas before my Government, but did not believe that we would suggest to our ally to submit the results of an inquiry conducted by her *once more to a European tribunal.* Austria would object to this suggestion just as any Great Power would have to refuse to submit itself to a court of arbitration in a case in which its vital interests were at stake.

Not since her fraternizing with the French socialist republic!

Regicide.

Very good.

My references to the monarchical principle made little impression on the Minister. Russia *knew* what she *owed to the monarchical principle,* with which, however, this case had nothing to do. I requested Sazonoff very seriously, avoiding everything that might have the appearance of a threat, not to let himself be led astray by his hatred of Austria and "*not to defend a bad cause.*" Russia could not possibly constitute herself the advocate *of regicides.*

Well, go to it!

That it wants to do, it seems.

Not correct.

In the course of the conversation Sazonoff exclaimed: "If Austria-Hungary devours Serbia, we will go to war with her." From this it may perhaps be concluded that Russia will only take up arms in the event of Austria's attempting to acquire territory at the expense of Serbia. The expressed desire to Europeanize the question also seems to point to the fact that immediate intervention on the part of Russia is not to be anticipated.

POURTALÈS.

[1] Jagow revises the telegram to the Emperor: "and Europe would have to investigate"; the Emperor underscored the last four words.
[2] Exclamation-point by the Emperor in the margin.
[3] Cipher-group at fault, Jagow supplies the word.

No. 161

The Ambassador at London to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

Private letter. LONDON, *July 23, 1914.*[2]

DEAR JAGOW:

Many thanks for your letter of the eighteenth, which, however, was unfortunately not able to convince me completely.[3]

Surely, we have an alliance with Austria, and I may here repeat again that I consider that alliance to be useful and even necessary, even if it no longer completely fulfils the requirements for which Bismarck concluded it. Bismarck was impressed with the danger of a war of revenge, conducted with the assistance of Russia. This danger no longer exists for us in the same measure as at that time. Russia's territorial interests have been transferred to the East, where new territories are ever becoming accessible to the unfolding of Russian power, and where new questions are continually coming up to demand the attention of Russia. I do not believe in a war with Russia, and, I may say, for this reason: because it is perfectly clear that France will remain the vassal of Russia only so long, and even England will half close her eyes on the Russian advance into Asia only so long as we continue to compel the principal attention of each of them. What interest, as a matter of fact, would Russia have in making war? So far as my recollection goes, that is to say, as long as I have been in touch with diplomacy —and that is now nearly thirty years—I can remember that it has been said that Russia was not prepared, but would be prepared in a few years, and that the General Staff was worried. And Russia was never ready when these few years had passed, and it will always be the same in the future. And in the same way I have frequently heard discussed the question of a preventive war. Even Bismarck became very skeptical in regard to this idea, and said to Waldersee and to other military gentlemen who wanted to make plain to him the necessity of a preventive war, that he could not be convinced without proof, and no one was ever able to offer him proof. Nor do I believe today that we shall have to wage war against Russia if our policy is cleverly conducted; least of all do I believe that we should accomplish anything by a preventive war save, at the most, turning a second neighbor into an implacable enemy.

But I do not wish to be understood to the effect that I am in any way advocating the sacrifice of Austria or of the Austrian alliance for the advantage of a friendship with Russia or even of one with England. Nothing is farther from my mind. The maintenance of Austria is of the greatest importance to us, only in that alliance we must be the LEADING, not the BLEEDING partner. The alliance was naturally conceived as a mutual protection against political storms, but not as a union in a common political partnership. It is true, we have to protect Austria; but it is not to our interest to support her in an active Balkan policy in which we have everything to lose and nothing whatever to gain. What advantages do you promise yourself from the strengthening of Austrian prestige in the Balkans or

[1] From the original draft to be found among the archives. Copy from the dictation of Prince Lichnowsky with alterations in his own handwriting.

[2] Sent on the 23d of July; time of arrival not known.

[3] See No. 72.

elsewhere? Austria's value as an ally depends above all else on her military capabilities, and not on her prestige abroad; and our standing among the Powers is great enough to insure the influence of the Triple Alliance group even despite the diplomatic defeats of Count Berchtold. What would you say if England or Russia encouraged the French to revive their actually very much lowered prestige by the adoption of an active and dangerous foreign policy? It is exactly the comparative weakness of France and her fear of us which are the factors causing her to nestle up to England and Russia and to show herself so obsequious to them. It is much the same with Austria; Austria—I will not say the feeble, but the frightened Austria—is a very convenient ally for us to have; the diminishment of Austrian influence in the Balkans has up to the present time been a factor of considerable advantage to our economic interests in that region. Economically, we and Austria are rivals in the Balkans, and German trade is finding its way more and more into the position everywhere, as a leading Vienna financier complained to me recently, which Austrian trade had earlier all for its own.

Whether or not they accuse us at Vienna of trickery or shiftiness is a matter of entire indifference; we are always being abused there, and, with the famous Nibelungen faith, we are ultimately simply laughed at. But I believe as little in the imminent collapse of Austria as I believe in the possibility of mastering internal troubles by prosecuting an active foreign policy. The nationalistic feeling of the southern Slavs and their craving for union can not be destroyed by a war, and might perhaps be brought even more violently to the surface as a result. And it is by just such active proceedings on the part of Austria that the Balkan nations will be driven even closer into the arms of the Russian hegemony, while otherwise, as both Roumania and Bulgaria have shown by example, they have a tendency to try to stand on their own feet.

Finally, as far as the localization of the struggle is concerned, you will have to admit that such a localization, in the event of a passage at arms with Serbia, belongs in the realm of pious wishes. Consequently, to my mind everything seems to depend on whether the Austrian demands can be so formulated that, with the help of some pressure from Petersburg and London, they can be accepted in Belgrade; not, however, so formulated that they will of necessity lead to a war *ad majorem illustrissimi comitis de Berchtold gloriam.*

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 162

The Minister at Sofia to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 36.
Confidential. SOFIA, *July 25, 1914.*[2]

Hurry it up! Premier stated to me after the loan had been concluded, that Government was now firmly established and could begin to follow a line of conduct of its own, by *seeking to become attached to the Triple Alliance.* I advised him to make a concrete proposition, whereupon he made an immediate report to the King, who *I believe it.* *was overjoyed* and commissioned him to draw up a plan.

MICHAHELLES.

No. 163

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 152. LONDON, *July 25, 1914.*[4]

Will express myself accordingly. Here, too, the idea is abroad that we are at least morally responsible in part, as without our encouragement such a note would have been unthinkable. Count Mensdorff is also able to report corresponding expressions on the part of His Majesty the Emperor and King and of the Imperial Chancelor. General impression here nothing but ruinous; if we do not participate in mediatory action, confidence in us and in our peaceable sentiments will be destroyed for good and all.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 164

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [5]

Telegram 174. BERLIN, *July 25, 1914.*[6]

Have communicated proposal of Sir Edward Grey to Vienna. As ultimatum expires today and Count Berchtold, according to newspaper reports, is at Ischl, I believe that prolongation of time-limit will no longer be possible.

JAGOW.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Sofia at 12 (no further indication), arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.55 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m. Communicated to the Emperor on the 25th of July by Jagow telegraphically; to the Central Telegraph Office at 3 p. m.; arrived at the Court Office at 11.30 p.m. Decodification of the Court Office, returned by the Emperor on July 26, was at the Foreign Office on the 27th of July. See No. 22.
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Filed at London at 10.49 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.48 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m. See Nos. 140 and 153.
[5] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1 p.m.

No. 165

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 153. LONDON, *July 25, 1914.*[2]

Would urgently advise not to refuse Sir E. Grey's proposal concerning extension of time-limit, as otherwise we shall be reproached here with not having tried everything for the maintenance of peace. Attitude of refusal might have a great influence on England's future position.[3]

Today's *Morning Post*, leading conservative paper, already states at the end of an article condemning Austria's proceeding, note is a challenge of the Triple Alliance and is intended to force England to decide whether she will from now on take part in European policy. In spite of quarrels at home which are agitating the British nation, it will stand firmly behind the Government and uphold its course, no matter what it may be.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 166

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 212. PARIS, *July 25, 1914.*[5]

I explained yesterday very plainly to the Government here that we had nothing to do in any way with the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, even though, after it had been made public, we considered the demands to be justified. I also had the opportunity of working on the press along this line, and shall continue my efforts.

SCHOEN.

No. 167

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 21. FIUGGI, *July 25, 1914.*[7]

Although the final result of the conference yesterday with Premier and Marquis di San Giuliano was in the end not so very unfavorable, I showed here a great disappointment and an attitude of reproach, and would like to believe that a similar attitude has been exhibited toward Mr. Bollati. It would render my task easier, which in itself, by reason of the absolute breaking down of the Austrian Embassy, is apart from that, a very difficult one. For the last two weeks the Embassy has been practically without contact with the minister stopping here. Absolutely nothing has been accomplished by it with the press. Day before

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at London at 11.10 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.26 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m.
[3] See No. 157.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Paris at 11.25 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.50 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m. See No. 153.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed in Fiuggi at 12.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.14 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m.

yesterday for the first time, the Ambassador requested and received 300,000 francs from Vienna. Nevertheless, I would request that nothing be said in Vienna about it, as discord with sick Austrian Ambassador at this moment might have disastrous results.

In case it is possible to influence large papers, can I count on from 30,000 to 40,000 marks? [1]

FLOTOW.

No. 168

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Emperor [2]

Telegram 134. BERLIN, *July 25, 1914.*[3]

Your Majesty's Ambassador at Rome telegraphs:

During a more or less excited conference lasting several hours with Premier Salandra and Marquis di San Giuliano, the latter argued that the spirit of the Triple Alliance compact demanded that Austria come to an understanding with her allies, before entering upon a move so portentously aggressive. As she had not done so, so far as Italy was concerned, Italy could not consider herself bound in connection with the further consequences of this move.

Furthermore, Article 7 of the Triple Alliance compact required that the contracting parties should come to an agreement previous to any alteration of the *status quo* in the Balkans, and that if one of them [4] should acquire an increase of territory there, the other should be compensated.

To my remark that, so far as I knew, Austria had stated that she contemplated no territorial acquisitions, the Minister said that such a statement had only been made in very conditional form. Rather, Austria had stated that she contemplated no territorial acquisitions at present, subject to further determinations that might become necessary at a later date. The Minister therefore thought that he could not fairly be reproached if he took precautionary measures in time.

She wanted to go quietly pilfering around in Albania, and Austria smoked her out.

The substance of the Austrian note was worded so [5] aggressively and so ineptly, that the [6] *public opinion* both *of Europe* and of Italy would be against Austria—no Italian Government could contend against it.

Rot!

After Marquis di San Giuliano energetically argued in the matter of the Triple Alliance compact that the compact was an obligation in connection with a defensive war, that Austria

[1] To this question is sent to Flotow on the 25th of July at 8.30 p.m. by telegraph Jagow's assenting reply "To the final sentence: Yes."

[2] From the decodification of Flotow's telegram (No. 156) as altered and amended by Jagow, and from the decodification of the Court Office, which is also now among the archives.

[3] Filed at the Central Telegraph Office on the 25th of July at 3 p.m. Decodification of the Court Office returned on the 27th of July by the Emperor and arrived at the Foreign Office the same day.

[4] "one of them" interpolated according to the sense in the Court Office decodification in place of "the contracting parties" of the Jagow draft, which was lacking at this point.

[5] The "unprecedentedly" following the "so" in Flotow's telegram was omitted in Jagow's telegram to the Emperor.

[6] The "entire" following the "the" in Flotow's telegram was omitted in Jagow's telegram to the Emperor.

was now proceeding aggressively, and that Italy, therefore, even in the event of Russian intervention, would not be [1] actively [2] obligated, I ardently contested this point of view, and after some lengthy discussion explained that, in this matter, as in the earlier arguments of the Marquis di San Giuliano, it was merely a question of *preserving in principle* his standpoint, which did not exclude other determinations on the part of the Italian Government. I argued that at this stage it was of no concern what might *possibly have to occur in the future*, but that it was important to *show the world at the present moment the determination and the agreement* [3] *of the Triple Alliance*, and to avoid everything that might lead Russia and France to count on internal dissension among the allies. Therefore I must earnestly request that influence be exerted on the press along this line. Austria demanded no answer; therefore, in the first place, Italy was relieved of the embarrassment of having to make her one. I finally succeeded in getting their agreement to this.

So it was pride.

Right.

According to my impression, the only chance of holding Italy to her place is by *making her a timely* [4] *promise of compensation*, in case Austria should undertake to possess herself of any territory or to occupy the Lowtschen.

The little thief must always have his swallow, too.

I found Mr. Salandra reasonable to a certain extent. He understood that it was the vital interests of Austria that were in question. My task is made very difficult by the fact [5] that . . .[6]

Mr. Bollati has stated to me on the part of his Government that Italy would preserve as benevolent an attitude toward Austria-Hungary as was possible, and would put no difficulties in her way; but that she should have to reserve her rights on the strength of Article 7 of the Triple Alliance compact with regard to the preservation of her interests (*compensation*) and to her possible freedom of action. In any other event, her policy would have to be directed toward trying to prevent any Austrian extension of territory.

Albania. That is all bosh and it will come out all right in the end of itself, in the course of events.

Your Majesty's most humble servant,

JAGOW.

[1] Exclamation-point by the Emperor in the margin.

[2] "further" in the Flotow telegram and accordingly the same in the Jagow telegram, corrupted into "actively" in the decodification by the Court Office.

[3] The decodification of the Court Office has "agreement" in place of "unity" as it is in the Flotow and consequently in the Jagow telegram.

[4] "timely" written by Jagow in the telegram to the Emperor in place of "at the right time," as in Flotow's.

[5] "by the fact" added by Jagow in the telegram to the Emperor.

[6] After "that" in the Flotow telegram, and accordingly in Jagow's, was the following: "Austrian ambassador sick in bed. Counselor of Embassy incompetent." This is lacking in the Court Office decodification, as the corresponding cipher group was incomprehensible. See No. 156.

No. 169

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 213. PARIS, *July 25, 1914.*[2]

Local press almost unanimously condemns Austrian note and states generally that Austria-Hungary evidently wants war. That it is probably a matter of previous arrangement between Vienna and Berlin. In connection therewith present difficulties of the Triple Entente Powers are mentioned: Ulster crisis, labor troubles in Russia, disclosures in the French Senate concerning armament deficiencies, absence of Poincaré and Viviani.

Our statement relative to localization of the conflict has made a great impression.

SCHOEN.

No. 170

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office[3]

Telegram 214. PARIS, *July 25, 1914.*[4]

Echo de Paris publishes a material portion of my yesterday's announcement to the French Government, in part correctly, in part distorted, inasmuch as it lends a threatening character to my warning against intervention on the part of other Powers.

Quai d'Orsay, to which I protested against the indiscretion and the distortion, gave me assurance that it had no part in either, and will take pains to have things set right.

I had the opportunity of convincing myself that Minister took down my announcement correctly in the main.

Moreover, I have run against the rumor in the press that the Austro-Hungarian *démarche* was arranged between Vienna and Berlin.

SCHOEN.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Paris at 1.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m.
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Filed at Paris at 1.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.50 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m.

No. 171

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 140. BERLIN, *July 25, 1914.*[2]

The Imperial Ambassador at London telegraphs: "Sir E. Grey . . . at the brief time-limit." [3]

Have replied to London that I would communicate Sir E. Grey's proposals to Vienna. But as the ultimatum expired today and Count Berchtold was at Ischl, I did not believe that an extension of the time-limit would be possible.

JAGOW.

No. 172

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [4]

Very confidential. BERLIN, *July 12/25, 1914.*[5]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE:

As the affair which I have to take up with Your Excellency is of an uncommonly urgent nature, I have decided, notwithstanding your courtesy in being willing to receive me at four-fifty o'clock, to submit its tenor to you through the medium of these lines.

The note of Austria-Hungary to the Powers succeeded within half a day the *démarche* at Belgrade. This deprives the Powers of the opportunity of exerting all their efforts toward settling the difficulty. In order that all that is humanly possible may be done to avoid the incalculable consequences which might result from precipitate action, the Imperial Government is of the opinion that the Vienna Government might first of all prolong the term of the respite granted for the Serbian reply. As the Imperial and Royal Government has further declared its willingness to submit to the Powers the grounds on which it bases its accusation, it would seem advisable that the Powers be given the time to take cognizance of these grounds and thus to permit them, once they are convinced of the justice of certain accusations, to impart the necessary advice to Belgrade. The refusal of Austria-Hungary to put the Powers in a position to form a well-grounded opinion as to the foundations of the accusations, would deprive the communication made yesterday to the Powers of every real significance.

The Imperial Government has directed the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to submit to His Excellency Count Berchtold the aforesaid considerations, and instructs me to inform the Imperial German Government of this fact at once, in the hope that the latter will be able to appreciate the motives which have inspired

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.

[2] At 4 p.m. to the Central Telegraph Office.

[3] Here is inserted Lichnowsky's telegram of the 24th of July (No. 157) with the omission of the sentences "such as Your Excellency . . . talking to Sir Edward Grey," and "I am told from . . . anybody who attacked."

[4] From the corrected copy [in French].

[5] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 25, p.m. (Entered in the journal on the 29th of July.)

this step, and will not refuse to give to its representative in Vienna the instructions necessary to bring about an extension of the respite in question.

Accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my high consideration.

A. DE BRONEWSKY.

No. 173

The Minister in the Imperial Suite to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 131. BALESTRAND (HOHENZOLLERN), *July 25, 1914.*[2]

In the event of the situation becoming more acute and of an increasing tension between Russia and ourselves His Majesty the Emperor and King desires that confidential inquiries [3] be made of Denmark and Sweden at once, and requests that the necessary preparations be made therefor.

[G.] WEDEL.

No. 174

Memorandum of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [4]

BERLIN, *July 25, 1914.*

On the strength of a Wolff report, His Majesty issued the following order to the Fleet this morning at 9.30: "Coaling to be hastened, Fleet to be held in readiness to run out."

Victoria Louise and Hansa (School-ship, at present in Norway) have received the following order: "Clear for sea. Steaming signal for journey home. Orders to be kept secret."

Foreign Office to notify von Müller.

Admiralty Staff has made following report to His Majesty: "Confidential agent Portsmouth reports today twelve noon that second and third English fleet reducing crews or discharging from service."

Naval attaché London reports: "Breaking up according to schedule, as far as he knows, no movements out of the ordinary."

Foregoing now being sent, 6.30 p.m., to His Majesty.

ZIMMERMANN.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Balestrand (*Hohenzollern*) at 12.15 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.11 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m.

[3] "confidential inquiries" (thus Wedel's draft) was lacking, as the group was undecipherable, in the decodification of the Foreign Office, but was supplied at the Foreign Office according to the sense.

[4] From Zimmermann's handwriting. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 25, p.m.

No. 175

The Admiralty Staff to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

Absolutely confidential. BERLIN, *July 24, 1914.*[2]

I have the honor of respectfully giving Your Excellency information of the following telegram:

Admiral—Berlin. *Hohenzollern*, Balestrand.

The following order has gone out to the Fleet: "Fleet permitted by His Majesty to enter port" (in Norway). "Shore leave in Norway to be arranged in view of possibility of shortening of stay. End. Notify Foreign Office. von Mueller."

For the Chief of the Admiralty Staff, by order,

VON BÜLOW,
Naval Captain.

No. 176

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor [3]

VIENNA, *July 24, 1914.*[4]

Count Berchtold has read me the telegraphic report which Baron Giesl rendered about his interview with acting Premier Patchou for the purpose of handing over the note. The interview was only granted after some hesitation on the part of Mr. Patchou, who attempted to avoid it in consideration of the absence of Mr. Pashitch. It then took place exactly at six o'clock in the presence of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as Mr. Patchou does not speak French. Baron Giesl did not read the note to them, but confined himself to handing it over and to the observation that the Austrian Government demanded an answer within forty-eight hours and that, if this answer was not one of unconditional agreement, he was instructed to leave Belgrade with the entire personnel of the Legation. Mr. Patchou thought that it would be physically impossible for the Serbian Government to call the Ministerial Council together and to give an answer in so short a time. Baron Giesl would not admit the validity of this pretext in *these days of the telegraph* and the *telephone*, and in view of the *comparatively small extent of the Serbian* Kingdom. Besides, as Baron Giesl knew, the *Ministerial Council had already been assembled in Belgrade at five o'clock.*[5] *Good.*

Count Berchtold tells me also that Mr. Dillon, that political stormy petrel who appears everywhere, wherever political

[1] From the corrected copy. [2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 25, p.m.
[3] From the corrected copy.
[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 25, p.m. Report was submitted to the Emperor, and was returned by him on the 27th of July.
[5] Exclamation-point by the Emperor in the margin.

thunderstorms are closing in, had just called on him. He had also been to see Count Hoyos. He had had the local point of view and the Austrian intentions thoroughly explained to him, and Mr. Dillon appeared to be won over to the side of the latter. He had attempted at first, it is true, to offer himself as mediator between Austria and Serbia. But he, the Minister, had not been willing to agree to this, as he was absolutely determined *not to enter upon any negotiations.*

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 177

The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

SINAIA, *July 20, 1914.*[2]

The Italian Minister talked very excitedly to me about the attitude that Austria was assuming toward Serbia. He thought that it would pay nobody to conjure up a war that might turn into a world war. It was comprehensible that Austria should demand satisfaction from Belgrade as matters stood, but the claim would have to be so constituted that it could be accepted by Serbia. Should war-like complications break out between Austria and Serbia, Russia would not be able to look calmly on; for the official element would be compelled to take an active part in them through the pressure of the Panslavist movement. Italy found herself for the time being in no financial condition to carry on a war. Baron Fasciotti sought again and again to convince me that Austria's move should be made in such a manner that no complications could arise from it.

WALDBURG.

No. 178

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 102. VIENNA, *July 25, 1914.*[4]

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires appeared at Baron Macchio's today to beg him in the name of his Government for an extension of the forty-eight-hour time-limit granted to Serbia. Prince Koudacheff gave as a reason for this request the fact that the note contained various assertions that required a thorough investigation, and especially that the Powers should be given time to examine the prospective dossier. Baron Macchio replied that he would immediately acquaint Count Berchtold with this communication. But he could tell him at once on his own account that an extension of the delay was impossible. This determination had

[1] From the corrected copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 25, p.m. Communicated in a dispatch to the Ambassador at Rome on the 28th of July in obedience to a marginal instruction by Jagow.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed at Vienna at 2.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5 p.m. Receipt stamp: July 25, p.m. Telegraphically communicated to the Emperor by Jagow on the 25th of July, received at the Central Telegraph Office at 8.05 p.m., July 25, arrived at the Court Office July 26 at 7.15 p.m. Decodification of the Court Office returned by the Emperor on the 26th of July.

been arrived at after the most mature consideration and as a result of a thorough knowledge of the tactics of procrastination always observed by Serbia. An extension until an examination of the dossier had been completed would mean an extension *sine die*. Furthermore, it had been far from the intention of the Imperial and Royal Government to submit the subject of the dissension between Austria and Serbia to the determination of a European tribunal. The information given to the other Powers was to be regarded solely as an act of courtesy toward them.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 179

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Private for Secretary of State von Jagow:
Telegram 155. LONDON, *July 25, 1914.*[2]

I would like to call your attention again to the significance of Grey's proposal of a mediation *à quatre* between Austria and Russia.[3] I see in it the only possibility of avoiding a world war, in which for us there would be everything to lose and nothing to gain. If we refuse, Grey will not bestir himself again. As long as we are not mobilized, mediation will still be possible, and such a settlement of the quarrel as would be acceptable to Austria. Our refusal, however, would have a very disagreeable effect here, and I do not believe that, in case France should be drawn in, England would dare to remain disinterested. Once more, I urgently advise the acceptance of the English proposal and that it be announced to Vienna and Petersburg.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 180

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 154. LONDON, *July 25, 1914.*[5]

Have just seen Sir E. Grey and talked as suggested in telegram 169.[6] The Minister accepted my explanations with a full comprehension of our point of view. Without any irritation or ill-feeling, he discussed with me again [7] the general situation, and seemed again to be a little more hopeful than yesterday, as Count Mensdorff had informed him in behalf of his Government that Austria did not ntend to cross the Serbian border at once, if her demands should be refused, but only to mobilize. Sir E. Grey is still without any information concerning the

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in London at 2 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.21 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m.
[3] See No. 157.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in London at 2.02 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.52 p.m.; receipt stamp: Ju y 25, p.m.
[6] See No. 153.
[7] The substance of this conversation is also contained in a *note verbale* handed to the Foreign Office on July 25 by the British Chargé d'Affaires, Sir H. Rumbold, in accordance with a telegram from Sir E. Grey. See also the British Blue Book of 1914, No. 11.

determination adopted at Petersburg, but counts with certainty on the Austrian mobilization being followed by that of Russia. Upon that, according to his opinion, the moment would have arrived at which to begin mediating between Austria and Russia in conjunction with us, France and Italy. Without our cooperation, he thought, all attempt at mediation would be futile, and he alone could not approach Russia and Austria. Whether France would participate with us, he did not yet know. He had talked with Mr. Cambon, but had so far received no reply; he had told him at their talk that he had made the same proposal to me. He counted firmly on the agreement of France, although he did not know how far she was already committed to Russia.

The Minister draws a sharp line of distinction, as he told me again, between an Austro-Serbian and an Austro-Russian quarrel. Into the first he did not wish to mix, as it did not concern him. But an Austro-Russian strife meant, in the circumstances, a world war, such as we had jointly managed to avoid the year before by means of the ambassadorial conferences. Nor were European complications a matter of indifference to Great Britain, although she was IN NO WAY COMMITTED BY ANY SORT OF BINDING AGREEMENTS.

Therefore he wanted to join with us as before, and proceed hand in hand at the present time in the interest of European peace; and he hoped by our mutual mediation, with which he believed both France and Italy would probably associate themselves, to prevent an Austro-Russian war.

As far as concerned the Austrian note, he fully recognized the justice of the Austrian demand for satisfaction, as well as the desire for the punishment of all persons connected with the murder. He did not go into the details of the note, but appeared to hope that by our mediation we might succeed in reaching an agreement on this matter also.

I deem it to be my duty to point out to Your Excellency that, according to my conviction, the British Government will strive to manifest toward us a friendly attitude, as unpartisan as possible, just so long as it believes in our honest desire for peace and in our efforts to cooperate with England, hand in hand, to avert the rising European thunder-storm. To refuse the proposition to mediate between Austria and Russia, however, or a recalcitrant attitude that would justify the supposition that we wished to bring about a war with Russia, would probably have the result of driving England unconditionally over to the side of France and Russia.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 181

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Copenhagen [1]

Telegram 25.
Confidential.

BERLIN, *July 25, 1914.*[2]

In case Poincaré's visit should be called off, I earnestly request wire at once.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 182

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor [4]

Telegram 139. BERLIN, *July 25, 1914.*[5]

Unbelievable assumption!

Unheard-of! [7] *it never entered my mind!!! On the report of my Minister about the mobilization at Belgrade! This may result in mobilization by Russia; will result in mobilization by Austria! In this case I must have my fighting forces by land and sea collected. There is not a single ship in the Baltic!! Besides,*

The Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy informs me that Your Majesty, on the *strength of a Wolff telegram*,[6] has given the Fleet orders for speedy preparation for the return home. Admiral von Pohl may in the meantime [8] have submitted to Your Majesty the reports of Your Majesty's naval attaché in London and of the confidential agent of the Navy at Portsmouth, according to which the British navy is taking *no unusual measures* of any sort, while, on the other hand,[10] the dispersal of the fleet as arranged for earlier, is going on according to schedule.[11]

Doesn't need to! It is already prepared for war, as the maneuvers have just shown, and is mobilized! [9]

As the previous reports from Your Majesty's Ambassador at London make it plain that for the present, at least, Sir E. Grey is not considering direct participation by England in a possible European war,[12] and is trying to work for the localization of the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian

[1] From the original draft in Stumm's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 8 p.m.
[3] See No. 250.
[4] From the draft. Copy in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 8.35 p.m. on the 25th of July, arrived at the Court Office on July 26 at 7 a.m. Decodification returned by the Emperor on July 26, was in Berlin on August 2d.
[6] The words "a" and "telegram" underscored twice by the Emperor.
[7] "Unheard-of!" is an interlinear note over "Wolff telegram." In the margin beside it two exclamation-points by the Emperor.
[8] "in the meantime" lacking in the Court Office decodification.
[9] Written on the left margin.
[10] "on the other hand" lacking in the Court Office decodification.
[11] "dispersal . . . according to schedule" corrupted in the Court Office decodification into "dispersal schedules."
[12] "European" lacking in the Court Office decodification. Instead of "war" it read "proceeding."

I am not accustomed to undertake military measures on the strength of a single Wolff telegram, but on that of the general situation, and that situation the civilian Chancelor does not yet comprehend! *W.*

conflict as far as may be most feasible,[1] I venture most humbly to advise that Your Majesty order[2] no premature[3] return of the Fleet.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

When Russia mobilizes my fleet must be already in the Baltic, so it is going home. *W.*

No. 183

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office[4]

Telegram 368.
Confidential.

THERAPIA, *July 25, 1914.*[5]

Margrave Pallavicini showed me in confidence a telegram from his Government relating to statements made to Count Tarnowsky by the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs from which it might be inferred that for the present Bulgaria offered only the prospect of her neutrality. My Austrian colleague and myself are of the opinion that as long as Bulgaria has not formally bound herself to Austria to join Austria in arms in the case of the intervention of a third Power, any possible Turco-Bulgarian alliance would be absolutely worthless.

WANGENHEIM.

No. 184

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office[6]

Telegram 367.

THERAPIA, *July 25, 1914.*[7]

Mr. von Giers, whom I met in the ante-chamber of the Grand Vizier, said to me that the Austrian demands on Serbia, if not justified, were nevertheless comprehensible, with the exception of such as provided for the active participation of Austrian supervisory officials in Serbian affairs. This demand was equal to an invasion of Serbian sovereignty. Therefore the situation was serious. My colleague's speech was quiet and contained no threats. He had shortly before spoken to the Grand Vizier in a manner which gave the latter the distinct impression that Russia did not intend to intervene.

WANGENHEIM.

[1] "most feasible" lacking in the Court Office decodification.
[2] See No. 221.
[3] "premature" lacking in the Court Office decodification.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Therapia at 6.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.56 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m. Communicated to the Emperor by telegraph by Jagow, filed at the Central Telegraph Office July 26, at 1.40 a.m.; arrived at the Court Office at 7.30 a.m.; July 27. Decodification submitted to the Emperor on the 27th of July. Wangenheim's telegram sent by Jagow on the 26th of July as a dispatch to the Ambassador at Vienna, only for his personal information. Sent through the mails at 4 p.m., with the omission of the sentence "My Austrian . . . absolutely worthless." Communicated likewise by telegraph to the Minister at Sofia, also only for his personal information; from the Central Telegraph Office at 1.40 a.m. on the 26th of July.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed at Therapia at 6.35 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.03 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m. Communicated by telegraph on the 26th of July to the Ambassadors at Petersburg and Vienna by Zimmermann. Telegrams sent from the Central Telegraph Office at 5.05 p.m.

No. 185

The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 42. BUCHAREST, *July 25, 1914.*[2]

Serbian Chargé d'Affaires has asked here in behalf of his Government what Roumania's attitude is going to be in the event of a conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me, he answered him that Roumania considered the quarrel as a matter concerning Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone, and advises Serbia to give in to the Austrian demands.

WALDBURG.

No. 186

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 156. LONDON, *July 25, 1914.*[4]

Have just received the following letter from Sir Edward Grey written in his own hand:

> I enclose a forecast that I have just received of the Serbian reply.[5] It seems to me that it ought to produce a favorable impression at Vienna, but it is difficult for anybody but an ally to suggest to the Austrian Government what view they should take of it.
>
> I hope that if the Serbian reply when received at Vienna corresponds to this forecast, the German Government may feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favorable view of it.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 187

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 103. VIENNA, *July 25, 1914.*[7]

I put the question very seriously to Baron Macchio today, why the promise made to me, that the note should be communicated to Marquis di San Giuliano through Mr. von Mérey BEFORE [8] its delivery at Belgrade, and that the Austrian

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Bucharest at 8.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.03 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m. Communicated by Jagow to the Emperor by telegraph on July 26; filed at Berlin at 1.50 a.m.; arrived at the Court Office July 27 at 4 a.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor on the same day, July 27. Waldburg's telegram likewise wired by Jagow to the Ambassadors at Vienna and Rome, telegrams to the Central Telegraph Office at 1.50 a.m. on July 26.

[3] From the decodification [in English].

[4] Filed in London at 6.09 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m. On the 26th of July, Jagow informed the Ambassador at Vienna by telegraph of the text of the Grey letter; at 1.05 a.m. to the Central Telegraph Office. On the 26th of July, Zimmermann noted on the margin of the decodification: "The English Chargé d'Affaires has been informed that we have transmitted Sir E. Grey's communication to Vienna."

[5] Accompanying the telegram is the text of the telegram of the English representative at Belgrade, Crackanthorpe, to Sir Edward Grey on the 25th of July, No. 21 of the English Blue Book of 1914.

[6] From the decodification.

[7] Filed at Vienna at 6.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m. Communicated to the Ambassador at Rome by Jagow, after minor alterations in style, on the 26th of July. To the Central Telegraph Office at 2.15 a.m.

[8] See No. 136, note 2.

standpoint should at the same time be exhaustively explained, had not been kept.

The Chief of the First Section stated to me in reply that the "unfortunate" issue of this affair—as he had himself to term it—was the result of a misunderstanding on the part of Mr. von Mérey. The latter had been informed that Marquis di San Giuliano was coming to Rome from Fiuggi, and had therefore intended to inform the Minister of the note at Rome. Now the Marquis had, it is true, come to Rome, but he had already left the city again when the Ambassador tried to see him to talk with him. Then Mr. von Mérey became suddenly ill and only on the next day was able to send the Counselor of Legation to Fiuggi. Thus the communication was delayed by a day and was not made by the Ambassador himself, which he, Baron Macchio, deeply regretted.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 188

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 104. VIENNA, *July 25, 1914.*[2]

Baron Macchio tells me over the telephone: As several points in the Serbian reply are unsatisfactory, Baron Giesl has left. General mobilization said to have been going on in Serbia since three o'clock this afternoon.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 189

The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 213.
Absolutely confidential. ATHENS, *July 25, 1914.*[4]

Minister of Foreign Affairs begs me to transmit his sincere thanks for the advice, which is always gladly welcomed here. This advice has been seriously discussed with His Majesty the King, and has been telegraphed to Mr. Venizelos who is stopping at Munich today. His reply, however, has not yet been received.

Mr. Streit tells me that Greece will NOT take part in an Austro-Serbian conflict. He will announce this at Belgrade also, where Greece continues to strive earnestly for peace.

Mr. Streit did not think that he ought to express himself today as to the Greek attitude in the event of a possible intervention either by Bulgaria or by Turkey, as it would depend too much on the circumstances under which such intervention might occur. The maintenance of the peace of Bucharest was a cardinal principle with Greece; therefore she could not expose herself to Serbia in this connection by statements that might cost her the friendship of Serbia.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Vienna at 7.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.50 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m.
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Filed at Athens at 5.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.05 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m. See No. 122.

Greece's principal aim was the maintenance of peace; she would do everything to prevent her being drawn into a conflict. Streit had a talk today with the Turkish Minister also, along the same lines. I have the impression that the people here do not want to approach more closely the matter of the agreement on neutrality that has been suggested, on account of the possibility of the peace of Bucharest being imperiled by Bulgaria.

BASSEWITZ.

No. 190

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 152. PETERSBURG, *July 25, 1914.*[2]

As I learn from my Italian colleague, he has as yet received no instructions to support the demands of the Austrian note to Serbia.

POURTALÈS.

No. 191

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor [3]

Telegram 140. BERLIN, *July 25, 1914.*[4]

According to information from Vienna, the Serbian Government, King Peter and the authorities left Belgrade at two-thirty o'clock this afternoon and retired toward the south. As the reply of the Serbian Government, handed over at six o'clock, did not satisfy the Austrian demands, the minister, Baron Giesl, has left Belgrade.

President Poincaré is in Stockholm today; no alteration of his further visiting plans has so far been announced. Paris and London are working zealously to localize the conflict.

Most humbly,

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Petersburg at 6.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m. Communicated by wire to the Ambassador at Rome by Jagow "in strict confidence." To the Central Telegraph Office at 12.55 a.m., July 26.

[3] From the original document. Draft in Jagow's handwriting. The sentence "Paris and London . . . conflict" was added to the draft in the hand of the Imperial Chancelor.

[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 10.45 p.m., July 25; arrived at the Court Office July 26, at 11.50 p.m.; decodification returned by the Emperor on the 27th of July.

No. 191A

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 157. LONDON, *July 25, 1914.*[2]
Addendum to telegram 156.

Supplement to letter from Sir E. Grey:

Telegram from Mr. Crackanthorpe, Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

Council of Ministers is now drawing up reply to Austrian note. I am informed by Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be drawn up in most conciliatory terms and will, in as large a measure as possible, meet Austrian demands. Under-Secretary gave me a brief summary of projected reply in advance. Consent of Serbian Government is given in it to the publication of declaration in *Official Gazette*, and they accept the ten points with reserves. They consent to the dismissal and prosecuting of those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested officer mentioned in the Austrian note. They agree to suppress *Narodna Odbrana*. They declare themselves ready to agree to mixed commission of inquiry provided that it can be proved that it is in accordance with international usage that such a commission should be appointed.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 192

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [3]

Telegram 176. BERLIN, *July 25, 1914.*[4]

Sir E. Grey's distinction between Austro-Serbian and Austro-Russian conflict entirely appropriate. We wish to mix into the first no more than does England, and hold the view now as before that the matter must be localized by the non-interference of all Powers. Therefore we earnestly hope that Russia, conscious of the seriousness of the situation and of her own responsibility, will refrain from any active intervention. Should an Austro-Russian strife arise, we shall, with the reservation of our known obligations as allies, be ready with the other Great Powers to inaugurate mediation between Austria and Russia.

JAGOW.

[1] From the decodification [in English].
[2] Filed in London at 6.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 25, p.m.
[3] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 30, No. 15.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.05.

No. 193

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at Rome and Vienna [1]

Telegrams 19, 148. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

The Roumanian Minister, who has just returned, told me that King Carol would not make any change in his policy toward the Triple Alliance. It is true, however, that the Minister saw the King before the Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 194

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 153. PETERSBURG, *July 25, 1914* [5]

General von Chelius reports for His Majesty:

> The troop maneuvers at Krasnoje Camp were broken off suddenly today, the regiments are returning at once to their garrisons; maneuvers are called off, military students were commissioned as officers today instead of in the fall. Grand Headquarters are in the throes of great excitment over Austria's procedure. I have the impression that all preparations are being made for mobilization against Austria.

POURTALÈS.

No. 195

The Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 17. CETINJE, *July 25, 1914.*[7]

The Minister of Foreign Affairs tells me that owing to the absence of the Premier, no decision has been arrived at as to the attitude of Montenegro in the event of an Austro-Serbian war. In his private capacity he told me that both King and Government, even if they wished to remain neutral, would probably be compelled by public opinion to take a hand as soon as Austria invaded Serbia. The King is himself reported to have said something similar. City and population quiet.

ZECH.

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 2 a.m.
[3] See Nos. 208–210.
[4] From the decodification. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 28, No. 6.
[5] Dated: Petersburg, July 25, filed there July 26 at 12.30 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.28 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, a.m. Communicated to the Emperor by the Imperial Chancelor by wireless on July 26; to the Central Telegraph Office at Berlin at 12.05, p.m., July 26; arrived at the Court Office July 27 at 4 a.m. Decodification of the Court Office received back from the Emperor by the Foreign Office on July 27.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed in Cetinje at 10.16 p.m., July 25; arrived at the Foreign Office July 26 at 4.08 a.m. Communicated to the Ambassador at Vienna over the wire by Jagow July 26; telegram to the Central Telegraph Office at 3.40 p.m.

No. 196

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 23. FIUGGI FONTE, *July 25, 1914.*[2]

Considering the significance which local public opinion attaches to telegrams from Berlin just at present, it would seem to be advisable, if it is politically possible, to call the attention of the local press by means of announcements from Berlin to the fact that Austria's action is not aimed at territorial acquisitions which might endanger Italian interests on the Adriatic, but is principally intended to clear up the relations with Serbia for reasons of internal policy.[3]

FLOTOW.

No. 197

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor [4]

Telegram 146. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[5]

Except for the report [6] made by General von Chelius no further guaranteed information concerning the Russian attitude is at hand. Should Russia prepare herself for a conflict with Austria, England intends to attempt mediation [7] and hopes for French support in the matter. As long as Russia undertakes no hostile action, I think that our attitude *must be calm* and aimed at *localization*.[8] General von Moltke returned from Karlsbad today and agrees with this view.

Calmness is the first duty of a citizen! Keep calm—only keep calm! But a calm mobilization is something new, indeed.

I most humbly request to be informed where and when Your Majesty *will land*,[9] in order that I may await Your Majesty there for the purpose of making a report.

He is to await me in Berlin; I shall come there, or to Wildpark.

Most humbly,

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Fiuggi Fonte July 25 at 11.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 26 at 4.20 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, a.m.

[3] Marginal annotation by Hammann: "Wolff notified to supply such matter to the *Agenzia Stefani*."

[4] From the original draft in the Imperial Chancelor's handwriting.

[5] Wirelessed by way of Norddeich: To the Central Telegraph Office in Berlin July 26, at 1 p.m.; arrived at the Court Office July 27, at 4 a.m. Decodification returned by the Emperor on July 27; reached the Foreign Office on the same day.

[6] See No. 194.

[7] The words "conflict with Austria . . . in the matter" were mutilated and confused in the decodification by the Court Office: "Austria (followed by a gap) Baron Fredericks intends to attempt England's mediation, and he hopes for French support." The Emperor underscored the word "Fredericks" and wrote in the margin "Who?"

[8] Exclamation-point by the Emperor in the margin.

[9] Two exclamation-points in the margin by the Emperor.

No. 198

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg [1]

Telegram 126. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

Since Count Berchtold has stated to Russia that Austria wishes to make no territorial acquisitions in Serbia, but only to bring about quiet, maintenance of European peace depends upon Russia alone. Confiding in Russia's love of peace and in our long-established friendly relations, we trust that she will take no step that will seriously endanger the peace of Europe.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 199

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [3]

Telegram 178.
Urgent. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[4]

Austria has officialy declared to Russia that she wishes to make no territorial acquisitions in Serbia, and for her part does not wish to encroach upon the integrity of the Kingdom, but only to bring about quiet. According to information which has reached here from trustworthy quarters, although not yet actually corroborated, the calling to the colors of several annual drafts of reserves is imminent in Russia, which would point toward mobilization against us at the same time. If this information should prove to be well-founded, we should be forced against our will to adopt measures for counter-action. We are endeavoring just as much today to localize the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe. We therefore request Sir Edward Grey to use his influence at Petersburg for this purpose.[5]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 200

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris [6]

Telegram 167. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[7]

Austria has officially declared to Russia that she wishes to make no territorial acquisitions in Serbia, and for her part does not wish to encroach upon the integrity of the Kingdom, but only to bring about quiet.[8] The decision as to whether a European war is to take place depends at the present moment upon

[1] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 29, No. 12.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.35 p.m.
[3] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 29, No. 10.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.35 p.m.
[5] See No. 218.
[6] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.
[7] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.35 p.m.
[8] Similar to No. 199.

Russia's action. We trust that France, with whom we know ourselves to be at one in the desire for the maintenance of the peace of Europe, will make use of her influence at Petersburg in the interest of moderation.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 201

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 159. LONDON, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

Prince Henry requests me to report to Your Excellency that His Majesty the King has conveyed to him his intense desire that British-German joint participation, with the assistance of France and Italy, may be successful in mastering in the interest of peace the present extremely serious situation.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 202

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [3]

Telegram 150. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[4]

The Chief of the General Staff, also, deems it to be urgently necessary that Italy be held fast to the Triple Alliance. Hence it is necessary that Vienna and Rome should come to an agreement. Vienna must not evade such an agreement by questionable compact interpretations, but must make up her mind in accordance with the seriousness of the situation.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 203

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor [5]

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 24, 1914.*[6]

After the review at Krasnoje Selo and a dinner on the *France*, the President of the French Republic last evening again took his departure from the roadstead of Cronstadt. The reception accorded Mr. Poincaré here was, as could be

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in London at 11.49 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.56 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26 p.m. Communicated by wire to the Emperor on July 26 by Jagow; filed at Berlin July 26, at 7.56 p.m.; arrived at the Court Office July 27, at 7.30 a.m.; decodification submitted to the Emperor the same day.

[3] From the original draft in the handwriting of Jagow.

[4] Given to the Central Telegraph Office at 3 p.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 7.10 p.m.

[5] From the corrected copy.

[6] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 26, p.m. Corrected copy was directed to the Emperor, who ordered by marginal instructions its communication to the Ambassador at Paris. Came back from the Emperor to the Foreign Office on the 28th of July. Report was forwarded to the Ambassador at Paris on the 30th of July. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915.

expected, a very friendly one. The official arrangements testified to the desire to show to the head of state of the allied Republic quite unusual honorary distinctions, which were also very apparently designed to *flatter his personal vanity*. For instance, on the occasion of the visit to St. Petersburg made by Mr. Poincaré from the Peterhof, it was not only on his trip from the Neva Quay to the Winter Palace, but also on all of his drives that he was escorted by a squadron of Cossacks, who were dressed for this duty in their scarlet uniforms, otherwise not worn in the summertime, even on parade.

Apart from these purely formal testimonials of honor, it can *not* be said that the reception accorded to the French guest here was *a particularly warm one*. Whoever reads nothing but the nationalistic local papers and the extravagant reports of the celebration by the very numerous French journalists who made their appearance here, will gain a quite mistaken impression of the spirit that reigned here during the period of the Presidential visit. Every impartial observer would have to testify to the *striking indifference* exhibited by the great mass of the general public toward the visit. Even on the day on which Mr. Poincaré paid his official visit to the Palace itself, and in spite of the pretentious display called for on the occasion of this visit, there was nothing to be seen of any particularly lively participation on the part of the public, not to speak of any sort of enthusiasm. For the arrival of the President and for his passage along the Neva Quay to the Winter Palace, but a comparatively small proportion of the public had gathered, which *not only failed* to give Mr. Poincaré *an ovation*, but, indeed, *scarcely greeted* him. The streets—decorated by police orders, but in no way particularly thickly beflagged—through which the President with his escort and a numerous suite passed on a drive about the city during the afternoon, were far from being unusually lively, and only at the street corners did a few curious sight-seers gather to await the passing of the *cortège*.[1]

The greatest amount of vivacity was shown on the Nevski Prospect, when the President betook

[1] Beside "*cortège*" an exclamation-point by the Emperor.

himself to the City Duma in the evening after the dinner at the French Embassy.

As I have already mentioned elsewhere, the great indifference of the inhabitants of the capital during the visit of Mr. Poincaré can to no small degree be *laid to the working men's strikes*, which came to serious collisions with the police and the troops during the presence of the French guests. It must be regarded as one of the ironies of fate that at the very time at which the Russian Guards at the camp of Krasnoje Selo were greeting the guest of the Czar with the strains of the "*Marseillaise*,"[1] in the outskirts of Petersburg the *Cossacks were cutting down working men* for singing *that same Marseillaise*.

That results from the union of an absolute monarchy and an absolute, socialistic, sansculotte Republic!

When, on the occasion of one of my conferences with Mr. Sazonoff, the conversation turned on the visit of Mr. Poincaré, the Minister laid stress on the pacific tone of the after-dinner speeches that had been exchanged. I could not help calling Mr. Sazonoff's attention to the fact that it was not the toasts exchanged on the occasion of such visits, but the press comments made in connection with them that supplied the material for uneasiness. Nor were such comments conspicuous by their absence on this occasion, on which even the news of the alleged conclusion of an Anglo-Russian naval convention was spread abroad. Mr. Sazonoff seized on this sentence and said irritably that such a *naval convention existed* only "in the mind of the *Berliner Tageblatt* and in the moon."

According to the present reports of the naval attaché, according to the statement of the Russian naval attaché, it is in process of arrangement!

Today perhaps! but tomorrow!

The *communiqué* of the Russian Government relating to the visit of Mr. Poincaré as published in the press is respectfully appended in connection herewith.

F. Pourtalès.

[1] "*Marseillaise*" twice underscored by the Emperor.

No. 204

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 25, 1914.*[2]

The conversation which I had yesterday evening with Mr. Sazonoff, and concerning which I have already had the honor of making a report,[3] turned at first, after I had developed to the Minister the point of view of the Imperial Government, principally to the subject of the European inquiry into the connivance of the Serbian Government in the mischief-making of the Greater-Serbia propaganda, which is advocated by the Minister. Mr. Sazonoff took the position that the question was a European one, since Serbia had undertaken obligations toward Europe after the Bosnian crisis, and that Europe could not permit Serbia to be sacrificed to the violence of her powerful neighbor.

I attempted to prove to the Minister that it appeared to be absolutely imperative, in the interest of the earnestly desired avoidance of any further complications, to localize the Austro-Serbian conflict. I further pointed out that, according to my conviction, Austria-Hungary would never submit to the suggestion to subject the inquiry against the originators of the assassination at Serajevo to the supervision of the Powers, and that she could not agree to it unless she were willing to dispense with her status as a Great Power.

Finally I called his attention to the point that the whole proposal to bring the matter before a European tribunal appeared to me to be absolutely impracticable, as it could most certainly be expected that the general political views of the several Powers and groups of Powers would constitute the determining factor in their attitude toward the question. Of what practical use would such a "judicial procedure" be, if the "political friends" of Austria-Hungary should range themselves on her side, and her opponents place themselves on the opposite side? Who, in such an event, would pronounce the decision?

But Mr. Sazonoff was not to be dissuaded from his opinion by these arguments, and urgently entreated me to present it to my Government. I replied that it would naturally be my duty to report his point of view to my Government, but that I could not offer him the smallest prospect that Your Excellency would even recognize as worthy of discussion this proposal which, in my opinion, was totally impracticable and even humiliating for Austria. Mr. Sazonoff answered with great irritation that he had already realized for several days that we were prejudiced in the matter, and that we had already taken a firm position in a predetermined direction.

I remarked in reply to this, that our standpoint was throughout a simple and loyal one. It was dictated not alone by our obligations toward our ally, but also by our sense of justice and above all by our firm adherence to the monarchical principle.

The appeal to the monarchical principle was visibly disconcerting to Mr. Sazonoff. He took the stand that in this case the defense of monarchical interests was in no way concerned. Russia, he added angrily, certainly needed to

[1] From the corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 26, p.m. Marginal annotation by the Imperial Chancelor: "Submitted to His Majesty. v. B. H. 27."
[3] See No. 160.

be given no instruction in regard to respect for the sanctity of the monarchical principle. "And yet," I replied, "you should look seriously into the question as to whether you are not taking the wrong side in the case now before us. Russia can not possibly afford to defend a case of regicide."

Mr. Sazonoff, who, at this stage of the conference, was getting more and more nervous and irritated, sought to avoid this subject, and, by referring to previous assassinations to take the stand that governments and nations had never yet been held responsible for the acts of individuals. To which I remarked that there was in recent history scarcely a single example of a nation's tolerating criminal propaganda against a neighbor, as had now been proved to have happened in Serbia.

Mr. Sazonoff then gave me to understand that he was not at all convinced by the "proofs" brought forward by Austria-Hungary; he then broke into the most unmeasured accusations and insinuations against the Austro-Hungarian Government. I could not help expressing to the Minister in response to this most intensely excited outburst my fear that he was wholly under the influence of a blind and implacable hatred of Austria, which unfortunately apparently rendered him insusceptible to all other and reasonable considerations. "Hatred is no part of my character," replied the Minister, "therefore I feel no hatred toward Austria, nothing but contempt."

Mr. Sazonoff then explained that in his opinion Austria was only looking for an excuse to "devour" (*avaler*) Serbia. "In that event, however," added the Minister, "Russia will go to war with Austria." That was the only time that Mr. Sazonoff, who otherwise made use of very little restraint in expressing himself, made any reference to the possibility of an armed intervention on the part of Russia. I should conclude, therefore, despite the great excitement unquestionably predominating in government circles here, that precipitate steps in this direction are not to be looked for at present.

I expressed to the Minister my conviction that even if matters came to extremes, it would only be a matter of a punitive expedition of Austria against Serbia, and that it was far from Austria's intentions to consider making any territorial acquisitions. Mr. Sazonoff shook his head incredulously at these arguments, and spoke of far-reaching plans that Austria had in view. First Serbia was to be eaten up, then it was to be Bulgaria's turn, and then "we shall have them on the Black Sea."

I remarked to this that such fantastic exaggerations did not appear to me to be in the least worthy of any serious discussion.

My general impression is that in spite of the very much excited mood in which Mr. Sazonoff finds himself, he wishes to temporize above all things, and that this desire is chiefly at the bottom of his proposal to bring the matter before the judgment-seat of Europe. A dangerous element of the situation here is, to be sure, the passionately nationalistic and also particularly religious hatred of the Minister for Austria-Hungary.

Local public opinion has thus far shown itself remarkably indifferent in relation to the Austro-Serbian conflict. This, to be sure, as is indicated already by the press at the present time, may undergo a change within the next few days.

F. Pourtalès.

No. 205

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 25, 1914.*[2]

I hear from a reliable source that the question said to have been principally discussed at yesterday's Ministerial Council here was whether Russia's present internal situation was such that the country could look forward to external complications without uneasiness in this direction. The majority of the ministers present are said to have expressed themselves to the effect that Russia did not need to shun complications of that nature on account of the internal situation.

F. POURTALÈS.

No. 206

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor [3]

VIENNA, *July 25, 1914.*[4]

They are going to serve the Serbian Government with notice of the declaration of war by telegraph or through the post, but will inform all the Powers of it at the same time, in order to deprive the Serbian Government of every excuse for saying that it had not received information.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 207

The Naval Attaché at London to the Imperial Naval Office [5]

Telegram (unnumbered).
Absolutely confidential. LONDON, *July 26, 1914.*[6]

England proposes joint action Germany, France, Italy for pacifying Russia, Austria-Hungary. King of Great Britain said to Prince Henry of Prussia, England would maintain neutrality in case war should break out between Continental Powers. Fleet has discharged reservists and given leave to crews according to program.

NAVAL ATTACHÉ.

[1] From the corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 26, p.m. Marginal annotation by the Imperial Chancelor: "Submitted to His Majesty. v. B. H. 27."
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 26, p.m. See No. 142, which arrived at the Embassy at Vienna July 24, at 6.15 p.m.
[5] From a copy handed over to the Foreign Office on the afternoon of July 26 by Captain von Bülow of the Admiralty Staff. Zimmermann annotates it on the same 26th of July: "The Imperial Chancelor has already been directly informed of this by H. v. Bülow."
[6] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 26, p.m.

No. 208

The Roumanian Minister at Berlin to the Foreign Office [1]

Confidential. BERLIN, *July 13/26, 1914.*[2]

The Royal Roumanian Government, which may find itself in the position of having to fulfil its alliance obligations as a result of the events so precipitantly succeeding each other, believes it to be of the utmost importance to receive such timely instructions, in full agreement with the German Empire, that on its part it can undertake the necessary political and military measures, more especially to prepare public opinion in the nation for the decisions to be arrived at, which are of the most far-reaching importance for Roumania.

His Majesty the King as well as Premier Bratianu have both given instructions to the undersigned along this line, although at the time of his departure from Roumania it did not appear that we were so close to the point of having to make this decision.

A. BELDIMAN.

No. 209

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at Vienna and Rome [3]

Confidential. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[4]

The Roumanian Minister, who has just returned here from his home leave and who saw King Carol a few days ago, has told me on the part of the latter that he was not going to alter his policy with relation to the Triple Alliance. It is true that Mr. Beldiman talked with his sovereign BEFORE the Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade, and King Carol told him that he wished to receive timely instructions in advance of the commencement of any critical situation, in order that he might make arrangements accordingly. Mr. Beldiman is of the opinion, however, that in case of a conflagration Roumania will undoubtedly perform all the obligations of her alliance.

In spite of the strong dislike existing in Roumania against Austria-Hungary, he thinks the distrust of Russia is still stronger; many influential compatriots have said as much to him. The project of a Russian marriage is put aside for the present, as Prince Carol is very averse to the idea of entering upon marriage so soon.

As far as concerns any relations with Bulgaria, the Minister said that the hatred of Roumania was too strong in Bulgaria, especially in military circles, to render an improvement of relations, or any sort of union, possible at present. The military border conflicts were practically all due to the hostile feeling against Roumania among the Bulgarian officers' corps.

JAGOW.

[1] From the corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 26, p.m. The communication must, nevertheless, have been received before the transmitting of No. 193. See also Nos. 209 and 210.
[3] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[4] Forwarded on the 26th of July. See Nos. 193, 208 and 210.

No. 210

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 152. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

The Roumanian Minister has expressed here the wish in behalf of King Carol and as the result of an understanding with Bratianu, that the Roumanian Government, for the purpose of being able to fulfil its obligations as an ally, receive timely instructions of such a nature that it can undertake the necessary political and military measures, as well as prepare public opinion in time for the decision that will have to be made.

Bratianu has received information—of which we have no knowledge here—that Bulgaria is calling in the reserves and is concentrating troops on the Roumanian border. The Roumanian Government naturally is intensely interested in receiving a guaranty that there is nothing to be feared on the part of Bulgaria, in order to be able to march against Russia with full force.

Kindly inform Count Berchtold of the foregoing and use your influence to see that Roumania gets the desired guaranty.

JAGOW.

No. 211

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 24. FIUGGI FONTE, *July 26, 1914.*[4]

Marquis di San Giuliano continues to tell me that the procedure of Austria is in the highest degree precarious for Italy, as Austria might start the same sort of a proceeding tomorrow against Italy, on account of the Irredenta. Thus Italy is unable to give her consent to such a step. According to reliable information from Bucharest, His Majesty the King is of the same opinion on account of the Roumanians living in Hungary.[5] I told the Minister that he should not construct arguments on cases that were not under discussion.

The Minister still refuses to lend faith to the Austrian promises not to lay claim to any Serbian territory. He considers it necessary, therefore, to prepare Austria very soon for Italy's claims to compensation. But he will have great difficulty in dealing directly with Vienna on the matter. Neither Baron von Mérey here nor the Duke d'Avarna in Vienna is adapted for the purpose. Above all else, the existing distrust between Vienna and Rome makes such negotiations difficult. The only available road lies through Berlin. I told him that I did not know what my Government thought about the matter. At the moment, it seemed to me to be too early. The Minister again intimated that in default of compensation, Italy would be forced "to stand in the way of Austria."

[1] From the original draft. Copy in Bergen's handwriting with alterations by Stumm and Zimmermann.

[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 4.15 p.m. See Nos. 193, 208 and 209.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed at Fiuggi Fonte at 3.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, p.m. On the decodification is the remark by Jagow, written on the 26th or the 27th of July: "Discussed with Mr. Bollati."

[5] Regarding this, Zimmermann's marginal annotation: "Fasciotti!" See No. 239.

Marquis di San Giuliano handed me a telegram from Mr. Bollati, according to which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had declared himself satisfied with the explanations.

In a confidential talk the Minister said that it appeared to him as if the Imperial Government was encouraging Austria too far. I contested this view, and told him that we were confining ourselves to the fulfilment of our obligations as allies.

All in all, the press is still relatively favorable, with the exception of the Berlin correspondent of the *Messagero*. *Corriere della Sera* has refused to undertake the defense of Austria.

FLOTOW.

No. 212

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 106. VIENNA, *July 26, 1914.* [2]

Duke d'Avarna gave out a statement in the name of his Government here yesterday to the following effect. Italy must reserve her right to compensation in accordance with the terms of Article 7 even in case of the provisional occupation of Serbian territory. For the rest, the Italian Government intends in the event of an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia to maintain toward the Monarchy a friendly attitude in consonance with the obligations of the alliance.

Count Berchtold welcomed this declaration on the part of Italy, stating, however, that warlike operations on Serbian territory could, of course, not be regarded as provisional occupation. I am continuously discussing with Baron Macchio and Count Berchtold the whole range of the question connected with the Italian demands for compensation, and expect to be able to report on the matter very soon. I am striving in the first place to get the authorities here to the point of dropping the futile theoretical discussions concerning the interpretations of Article 7, in which matter General Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf, in whose presence I had again today a lengthy conference with Count Berchtold on the subject, supported me. I emphasized the fact that the thing to do was to discover a practical and feasible method, inasmuch as there could be no doubt that if occasion offered, Italy would certainly come forward with demands for compensation. Count Berchtold did not assume an attitude of refusal, but considers, however, that Italy has already compensation in her hands in advance through the occupation of the Islands, which, with the exception of Rhodes and the islands lying close about it, are situated in the Ægean Sea.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Vienna at 4.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.15 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, p.m. Communicated by wire to the Ambassador at Rome on the 26th of July by Jagow, after the effecting of minor alterations and with the omission of the sentence "inasmuch as there . . . demands for compensation"; at the Central Telegraph Office at 12.50 a.m. on the 27th of July.

No. 213

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 105.
Confidential.

VIENNA, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

Count Berchtold read me a telegram from Count Szögyeny in which the latter reports that the Berlin authorities consider the utmost rapidity in military operations and the immediate declaration of war to be necessary in order to avoid as far as possible the danger of the intervention of a third party. The Minister had already requested Baron von Hötzendorf to come to him in order to discuss this point; he appeared while I was with the Minister. I warmly supported our point of view—which was fully shared by Count Berchtold—to the Chief of the General Staff. Baron von Hötzendorf explained that commencing a campaign with insufficient forces was above all things to be avoided. The Hungarian corps on the northern Serbian border would be ready to march within a short time. The Austrian detachments along the western border of Serbia, however, would take a longer time to prepare, owing to the lack of sufficient communication material; to wait that length of time was absolutely necessary. He was counting on being able to commence the general advance somewhere about the 12th of August. For the rest, a formal declaration of war would probably prove superfluous, because, according to his certain information, hostile uprisings across the Bosnian border would be made by Serbia within the next few days.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 214

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest [3]

Telegram 42.
Confidential.

BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[4]

To be passed on. Austria has informed Russia that she seeks no territorial acquisition in Serbia, but only wants to restore peace there. Responsibility for any future extension of the conflict and for the disturbance of the peace of Europe would thus rest on Russia alone, if the latter should proceed against Austria. We are continually endeavoring, just as is England, to bring about the localization of the conflict. Procedure of Russia against Austria, however, would have for us the known consequences, in which case we are counting on the loyalty of Roumania.

News from Russia is more or less disquieting.

JAGOW.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Vienna at 4.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.20 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, p.m. On a copy of the decodification is a note by the Imperial Chancelor: "Submitted to His Majesty. B. H. 27." Jagow gave orders for the communication of the explanations of Conrad von Hötzendorf reported in Tschirschky's telegram to the General Staff and to the Admiralty Staff; Conrad's remarks were communicated to these offices and to the Ministry of War on the 27th of July, after alterations in style had been effected by Zimmermann. Communications sent by messengers at 9 p.m.

[3] From the original draft in the handwriting of Jagow.

[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.25 p.m.

No. 215

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 159. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

I learn from colleagues that Mr. Paléologue made the statement here today that Germany was forcing a war; that it was no longer a matter of an Austro-Serbian, but of a Russo-German conflict. I have, therefore, after coming to an agreement with my Austrian colleague, had it publicly announced through the local bureau of information that the news, according to which Austria was being urged on by Germany and according to which the German Government had known the contents of the Austrian note, was untrue.

POURTALÈS.

No. 216

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 158. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 26, 1914.*[4]

Military attaché requests me to transmit following report to General Staff:

> Consider it certain that mobilization has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa. Warsaw and Moscow doubtful, but the others probably not yet.

POURTALÈS.

No. 217

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 157. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 26, 1914.*[6]

Found Sazonoff, with whom I have just now had another long conference, much quieter and more conciliatory today. He stated with the utmost fervor that nothing lay farther from Russia's mind than the desire for war; that, on the contrary, she was ready to exhaust every means to avoid it; a way must absolutely be found—and he urgently entreated our assistance in finding it—to satisfy, on the one side, the Austrian demands, the justice of which, so far as they related directly

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Petersburg at 3.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, p.m. Under date of July 26, telegraphically communicated to the Ambassador at Paris by Jagow; filed at the Central Telegraph Office at 1.15 a.m. on the 27th of July.

[3] From the decodification. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 28, No. 7.

[4] Filed at Petersburg at 3.25 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.01 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, p.m. Marginal annotation of the Imperial Chancelor of the 27th of July: "Submitted to His Majesty. B. H. 27." Pourtalès' telegram communicated to the General Staff on the 26th of July at 8.30 p.m.

[5] From the decodification.

[6] Filed at Petersburg at 3.15 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.01 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, p.m. Communicated by Jagow to the Ambassador at Vienna by wire under date of July 26, with the omission of the sentences "I particularly . . . Minister's peace of mind"; telegram filed at the Central Telegraph Office July 27, at 12.05 a.m. On a copy of the decodification the marginal annotation by the Imperial Chancelor on the 27th of July: "Submitted to His Majesty. B. H. 27."

to the prosecution of the authors of the assassination, he recognized.[1] Some of the demands, however,[2] which constituted direct violations of Serbian sovereignty, must be modified, and he requested, in the interest of peace, the cooperation of all the Powers, including Germany, to persuade the Vienna Cabinet to qualify some of the points. It was wrong to believe that Russian policy was guided solely by its "sympathies". For Russia, however, the balance of power in the Balkans was a question of vital interest, and hence it was impossible for her to tolerate the reduction of Serbia to a vassal state of Austria. There was no more talk of proposals for the revision of the Austrian inquiry by Europe. On the other hand, the Minister seems to be taken up with the idea of a mediation in which Germany and Italy could play a part.

I particularly pointed out to Sazonoff that if Austria was really seeking a pretext for falling on Serbia, as he seemed to believe, we should already have heard [3] of the commencement of some action on the part of Austria.

This suggestion seemed to contribute to the Minister's peace of mind.

POURTALÈS.

No. 218

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 160. LONDON, *July 26, 1914.*[5]

Today, Sunday, no one at Foreign Office to talk with, so can not carry out instructions [6] before tomorrow. Doubt if Sir E. Grey is in a position to use influence in Russia as suggested, as since appearance of Austrian demands nobody here believes in possibility of localizing conflict. No one here has doubted that from that sort of procedure on part of Austria world war must result. Consider moment to have arrived to start mediation along lines suggested by Sir E. Grey, to which, of course, Austria's willingness to waive her claim to further laurels would be a prerequisite.

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] In a special telegram of July 26, filed at Petersburg July 26, at 5.25 p.m.; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 27, a.m., Pourtalès requests that in the above telegram, after the words "he recognized," the words "and on the other hand, to render their acceptance really possible by Serbia," be inserted.

[2] In his correcting telegram of July 26 (see preceding note), Pourtalès asks to have the word "however" crossed out. Pourtalès' alterations had not yet been attended to when the telegram was sent to Vienna or when the copy of the decodification was laid before the Imperial Chancelor (see note 6, p. 220).

[3] Thus in the decodification.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in London at 4.25 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.01 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, p.m.

[6] See No. 199.

No. 219

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg [1]

Telegram 128.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

As already indicated in telegram 126,[3] preparatory military measures on the part of Russia aimed in any way at us would compel us to take measures for our own protection, which would have to consist in the mobilization of the army. Mobilization, however, would mean war, which, furthermore, would have to be waged at the same time against Russia and France, as, of course, we are acquainted with France's obligations to Russia. We can not assume that Russia is willing to unchain such a European war. In view of Austria's territorial disinterestedness, we are much more of the opinion that Russia will be able to take an expectant stand toward the quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. We shall be all the better able to support Russia's desire not to have the integrity of the Serbian Kingdom placed in question, as Austria-Hungary has made the statement that she does not wish to put it in question. In this manner it would seem possible to arrive at a common basis of agreement even at a further stage of the affair.[4]

I request Your Excellency to confer with Mr. Sazonoff along the lines suggested.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 220

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 26.

FIUGGI FONTE, *July 26, 1914.*[6]

Crown Prince of Serbia has written to His Majesty the King of Italy, but received only a polite reply saying nothing.

FLOTOW.

[1] From the original draft in the Imperial Chancelor's handwriting. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 5.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 7.15 p.m.
[3] See No. 198.
[4] Here in the Chancelor's draft was originally the following: "and furthermore to contribute toward putting an end to a tension which is opposed to the real interests of Germany and Russia, which require friendly relations." This was later eliminated by him.
[5] From the decodification.
[6] Filed at Fiuggi Fonte at 4.05 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.58 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, p.m. Marginal annotation of the Imperial Chancelor on the 27th of July: "Submitted to His Majesty. B. H. 27." Flotow's telegram communicated by wire to the Ambassador at Vienna by Jagow on the 27th of July at 7.40 p.m.

No. 221

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor[1]

Telegram 150. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

As Your Majesty has just been informed by the Admiralty Staff, the naval attaché at London reports that the *English* fleet is discharging its reservists, and giving crews leave according to schedule.[3] In agreement with this fact, I venture most humbly to suggest to Your Majesty to order the High Seas Fleet to remain in Norway for the present,[4] as this would materially lighten the burden of England's proposed mediation action at Petersburg, which is *evidently beginning to get shaky.*[5]

Your Majesty's most humble servant,
BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

There is a Russian fleet! In the Baltic there are now five Russian torpedo boat flotillas engaged in practice cruises, which as a whole or in part can be at the Belts within sixteen hours and close them. Port Arthur should be a lesson! My Fleet has orders to sail for Kiel, and to Kiel it is going to sail!

Where does he get that idea? Not from the material submitted to me.[6]

W.

No. 222

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[7]

Telegram 107. VIENNA, *July 26, 1914.*[8]

From the reports of Count Szapary, they have received the impression here that Mr. Sazonoff,[9] in discussing the Austro-Hungarian procedure against Serbia, has timidly avoided the question as to the attitude of Russia, referring, on the contrary, only to the effect on England, France and Europe. Even Sazonoff's exclamation: "If Austria-Hungary devours Serbia, Russia will go to war with her," is taken to indicate that Russia will not go beyond diplomatic action.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor. Note from the Chancelor to Zimmermann: "Kindly send this telegram off, in case you and His Excellency Jagow have no scruple about it. Otherwise I beg that you submit another draft. B. H. 26." Zimmermann in answer: "No scruples. The telegram to be sent immediately. Z. July 26."

[2] Dispatched by wireless over Norddeich, filed at Berlin July 26, at 7.59 p.m.; arrived at the Court Office July 27, at 7 a.m.

[3] See No. 182.

[4] In the margin exclamation-point by the Emperor.

[5] "get shaky" twice underscored by the Emperor. Annotation in the margin.

[6] Written in the original on the left-hand side.

[7] From the decodification.

[8] Filed in Vienna at 6.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, p.m.

[9] "Mr. Sazonoff," corrected at the Foreign Office from the original decodification's erroneous "Count Szapary."

No. 223

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 108. VIENNA, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

Count Szécsen reports concerning an interview with Mr. Pichon the following among other matters:

Mr. Pichon asked me whether a very belligerent feeling prevailed in Berlin; if the people in Berlin did not want war, peace would be maintained. Russia did not want war. Count Szécsen laid stress on the assertion that Germany regarded the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia as a matter that concerned these two nations alone, and would keep out of the quarrel as long as no third party mixed into it.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 224

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 109. VIENNA, *July 26, 1914.*[4]

Count Czernin reports that the King of Roumania, in talking over the Serbian note with him, criticized several points. The remark made twice, and with emphasis, in the course of the conversation by Count Czernin, to the effect that the Triple Alliance was, nevertheless, stronger with Roumania than were its opponents, was received by the King both times without any contradiction.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 225

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 25. FIUGGI FONTE, *July 26, 1914.*[6]

Marquis di San Giuliano told me in reference to Sir E. Grey's proposal for mediation in case of the danger of a clash between Russia and Austria, that care must be taken not to reject any possible proposals of Sir E. Grey too abruptly. With his characteristics, such action would discourage him and drive him toward the other side, while his cooperation at the present time was worth much.

FLOTOW.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Vienna at 6.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, p.m.
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Filed in Vienna at 6.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, p.m.
[5] From the decodification.
[6] Filed in Fiuggi Fonte at 4.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, p.m.

No. 226

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 156. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

For the purpose of advantageous use in London it would be desirable that we should be informed in what material points the Serbian answer to the Vienna note is found unsatisfactory.

ZIMMERMANN.

No. 227

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome [3]

Telegram 20. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[4]

As is known to Your Excellency, Roumania is going to fulfil her obligations. As the Roumanian Minister told me confidentially, Mr. Bratianu is being continually made to waver by the talk of the Italian Minister, who tells him that Italy can not take part in the conflict, and could not go to war now, anyway. It would be desirable that Marquis di San Giuliano should send the Minister instructions for his proper behavior. The Roumanian Minister at Rome must also be given a clear understanding regarding Italy's impartial attitude.

JAGOW.

No. 228

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [5]

Telegram 157. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[6]

I should like to know how far transactions between Vienna and Sofia concerning drawing Bulgaria into the Triple Alliance have been carried, and whether there are in existence any agreements as to Bulgaria's eventual intervention, in the event of the extension of the conflict. Wire answer.[7]

JAGOW.

[1] From the original draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.40 p.m.; forwarded from there at 12 midnight, arrived at the Embassy at Vienna July 27, at 3.30 a.m. Reply from the Embassy at Vienna, "Information follows," filed at Vienna July 27, at 3.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.32 p.m.
[3] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.40 p.m.
[5] From the original draft. Copy in Bergen's handwriting.
[6] Given to the Central Telegraph Office at 10 p.m.; forwarded from there at midnight; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna July 27 at 3 a.m.
[7] See No. 259.

No. 229

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 162. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 26, 1914.* [2]

Lieutenant General von Chelius informs me that it is the belief in the circles of peacefully disposed and monarchically inclined higher officers in the *entourage* of the Czar, that a telegram from His Majesty the Emperor and King to the Emperor Nicholas [3] would prove the surest means of maintaining peace. Such a telegram should appeal to the monarchical feelings of the Czar and refer to the heavy blow suffered by the monarchical idea through the murder at Serajevo, as well as to the dangers which would threaten all monarchies, in the event of a general European conflagration.

POURTALÈS.

No. 230

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 164. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 26, 1914* [5]

Spoke to Mr. Sazonoff about the current rumor among the circle of the military attachés to the effect that it is alleged that an order for mobilization had been issued to several Russian army corps on the western border. In doing so, I pointed out the great danger of such measures, in that they might easily call forth counter-measures. Minister replied that he could assure me that no mobilization orders of any sort had been issued; that, to the contrary, it had been decided at the Ministry of War to hold back such orders until Austria-Hungary adopted a hostile attitude toward Russia. That "certain military preparations had already been made in order not to be taken by surprise" was admitted by Mr. Sazonoff.

POURTALÈS.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Petersburg at 8.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.05 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, p.m.

[3] See the draft of such a telegram, No. 233. As a matter of fact, it was not sent. Marginal annotation by the Imperial Chancelor on July 27 on Pourtalès' telegram: "His Majesty will for the present send *no* dispatch to the Czar. B. H. 27."

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in Petersburg at 9.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.05 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 26, p.m. Marginal annotation made by the Imperial Chancelor on July 27: "Submitted to His Majesty. B. H. 27." von Jagow ordered its communication to the General Staff. Pourtalès' telegram, after undergoing alterations in style, was communicated to the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff under date of July 27; forwarded by messengers at 11.30 a.m. on the 28th of July.

No. 231

The Emperor to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 134. ON BOARD THE HOHENZOLLERN, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

I did not give the order to the Fleet to prepare for speedy preparation for the homeward trip [3] on the strength of a Wolff telegram, but in consideration of the general situation and of possible eventualities. I was compelled to take this action more particularly inasmuch as no general situation report from the Foreign Office was in my hands, and as I even had to learn the contents of the Austrian ultimatum through the Norddeich news service instead of through official channels.

Apart from the fact that the English navy has no need of making any further preparation at all, because, as the maneuvers have just shown, it is now lying fully prepared for war, in its home harbors, we have to reckon with the Russian fleet which, in case Russia should mobilize against Austria, could appear before our Baltic Sea ports in a very short time with those vessels now in service alone.

In order to avoid the danger that my Fleet might be surprised by war while widely scattered in Norwegian harbors and far from its base, I gave orders yesterday noon, after learning from telegram 127 [4] that the Serbian mobilization was already in full swing, that the Fleet, after completing the necessary coaling, should concentrate and begin the journey home.[5]

WILHELM I. R.

No. 232

The Secretary of State for Alsace-Lorraine to the Imperial Chancelor [6]

STRASSBURG, *July 24, 1914.*[7]

According to the instructions of the sixteenth instant,[8] the *Strassburger Post* has been given to understand that for a little while to come it is not to carry on any polemics against France. There is scarcely any need for a warning of that sort to any other newspapers.

The Hansi and Knüpfler affairs had already been settled, and the decree concerning recruits, the proscription of French colors, and the warning to French officers through the *Strassburger Post* concerning the recent frequent frontier-crossings, which was requested by the Foreign Office, had already been attended to before the arrival of Your Excellency's communication. I assume therefrom that for some time to come, no administrative measures which are likely to cause any great interest across the border are wished for. If anything new turns up, the tempo will be slowed up as desired in the prosecution of such matters.

Count ROEDERN.

[1] From the decodification of the Foreign Office and from the draft written down by Wedel and personally signed by the Emperor, which arrived at the Foreign Office on the 2d of August, and which is now in the archives.

[2] Filed at Neumünster at 7.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.23 p.m.

[3] See Nos. 182 and 221.

[4] See No. 158, note 3.

[5] "the necessary . . . journey home" distorted in the decodification of the Foreign Office to "the coaling soon commence journey home."

[6] From the corrected copy.

[7] Arrived at the Imperial Chancelry on the 26th of July.

[8] See No. 58.

No. 233

Draft of an unsent telegram from the Emperor to the Czar [1]

I am confident you will agree with me that the Austro-Serbian conflict concerns only Austria and Serbia and that they should be left alone to settle it between themselves. The unscrupulous agitation that has been going on in Serbia for years, has resulted in the outrageous crime to which Franz Ferdinand fell a victim. It is a common interest of me and you and in fact of all monarchs that this crime and all that are morally responsible for it, should receive the punishment it deserves. Austria must be allowed a free hand to take the evil by the root and to wipe out the revolutionary movement in Serbia which may, by spreading over other countries, one day threaten your throne as well as mine. The spirit of the people that murdered their own king and his wife still governs the country. It would be folly and suicidal on our part to do anything to spare them the penalty they have incurred.[2]

No. 234

Draft of an unsent telegram from the Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassadors at Paris, London and Petersburg [3]

BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*

Some individual Russians consider it to be the self-evident right and the duty of Russia, actively to take the part of Serbia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The *Nowoje Wremja* even believes itself authorized to venture to allege Germany's responsibility for the European conflagration which would result from the taking of such a step by Russia, because she did not influence Austria-Hungary to yield. In this, the Russian press is distorting facts to suit itself. It was not Austria-Hungary that evoked the conflict with Serbia, but it was Serbia, which by unscrupulously favoring the Greater-Serbia aspirations, even in portions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, endangered the very existence of the latter and brought about conditions which ultimately found their expression in the criminal deed of Serajevo. If Austria-Hungary resists this sort of thing, it is simply in the justifiable way of self-protection. If Russia believes herself compelled to enter the conflict in behalf of Serbia, she certainly has a right to do so. But she must fully understand that by so doing she is making the Serbian efforts to undermine the conditions of the existence of the Austro-

[1] Title in Stumm's handwriting for the document above, which is typewritten: "Draft [in English] of a possible dispatch to the Czar." The draft bore no date; it was, of course, written during the late evening hours of the 26th or early on the 27th of July, after the arrival of Pourtalès' telegram (No. 229). The dispatch was not sent; see No. 229, note 3.

[2] Cf. with this No. 335.

[3] Draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor. On the copy of the telegram, which was not sent, is the note in Stumm's handwriting: "Stop." This draft was followed by the draft of a telegram, likewise in the handwriting of the Chancelor, which was to inform the Ambassadors at Vienna, Rome and Constantinople of the foregoing telegraphic circular dispatch in case it was sent out. Furthermore, there follows a written but unsigned draft by Stumm for a telegraphic dispatch to London; "It is to be hoped that the English Government can have no doubt as to the meaning of the victory of Russia, in the event of such a conflict, and the general Slavic advance, not only to the balance of power in Europe but also to the political, economic and civilized interests of all western Europe."

Hungarian Monarchy her own, and that she alone will be responsible, if a European war should arise out of the Austro-Serbian affair, which all the other Great Powers desire to localize. This Russian responsibility is as plain as day, and is all the heavier inasmuch as Count Berchtold has officially announced to Russia that it (*sic*, for Austria-Hungary) neither wishes to acquire any Serbian territory or to encroach upon the status of the Kingdom of Serbia, but is solely anxious to put an end to the Serbian intrigues which are endangering its existence.

Germany's position in this crisis is clearly outlined. We regard the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia as a matter which concerns these two nations alone, and which, therefore, must remain localized.[1] As Austria-Hungary is defending vital interests by her proceeding, any interference by her ally Germany is impossible. Should an acute antagonism between Austria-Hungary and Russia develop, we should support by act and deed the efforts of other Great Powers to arbitrate this antagonism, true to the principles of that policy which, for over forty-four years, we have followed with success in the interest of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. It will only be when compelled by force, that we shall take to the sword, but when we do so it will be with the clear consciousness that we are in no way guilty of the unspeakable misery with which war would overwhelm the nations of Europe.

I respectfully request Your Excellency to stand firmly by the considerations discussed above in your conferences with the statesmen of the country where you are.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 235

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram 220. PARIS, *July 26, 1914.*[3]

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has assured me that our appeal for a united effort for the maintenance of peace had a very beneficial effect here and will receive befitting attention. Speaking for himself, he would gladly be willing to have pacifying influences set to work at Petersburg, after it had been established in advance through Austrian assurances that no annexation was contemplated. Of course, he could not yet give me a formal explanation in the name of the French Government as to the method of influence, as he would first have to get in touch with the absent Premier.

The Minister interjected as an idea of his own, whether the exercise of pacifying influences at Vienna might not also be considered, since Serbia had apparently

[1] "We regard the conflict . . . must remain localized" is an alteration by the Chancelor of what was originally set down by him: "Just because we are making every effort to localize the conflict, we are refraining from any interference in the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which concern these two nations alone."

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed at Paris July 26 at 7.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.07 a.m., July 27; receipt stamp: July 27, a.m. In the copy used by the Imperial Chancelor for his report to the Emperor the paragraph "Mr. Bienvenu-Martin . . . Quai d'Orsay" is omitted. Marginal annotation of the Imperial Chancelor on this copy; on the 27th of July: "Submitted to His Majesty. B. H. 27." Schoen's telegram communicated by Jagow on the 27th of July by telegraph to the Ambassadors at Vienna and Rome; to the Central Telegraph Office at 8 p.m.

conceded most of the points and thereby opened up the opportunity for negotiation. I replied that any possible general representations of the Powers at Vienna would not appear to be conformable to our view that Austria-Hungary and Serbia ought to be let alone. The place where influence ought to be exercised was Petersburg.

Mr. Bienvenu-Martin confidentially admitted, in the course of the conversation, that Sazonoff's idea that only the Powers as a body were competent to pronounce judgment on Serbia's conduct, would be difficult to uphold legally. Minister expressed regret that my first *démarche* here was so generally misinterpreted by the press, and assured me that the indiscretion did not originate at the Quai d'Orsay.

SCHOEN.

No. 236

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 161. LONDON, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

Have just talked with Sir A. Nicolson and Sir W. Tyrrell. According to reports at hand here, a general calling to the colors of the Russian reservists is not projected, but only a partial mobilization far from our frontiers. Both gentlemen see in Sir E. Grey's proposal to hold a conference *à quatre* here, the only possibility of avoiding a general war, and hope that in this way it would be possible to get full satisfaction for Austria, as Serbia would be more apt to give in to the pressure of the Powers and to submit to their united will than to the threats of Austria. But the absolute prerequisite to the bringing about of the conference and the maintenance of peace would be the cessation of all military activities. Once the Serbian border was crossed, everything would be at an end, as no Russian Government would be able to tolerate this, and would be forced to move to the attack on Austria unless she wanted to see her status among the Balkan nations lost forever. Sir W. Tyrrell, who saw Sir E. Grey last evening and is fully cognizant of his views, pointed out to me repeatedly and with emphasis the immense importance of Serbia's territory remaining unviolated until the question of the conference had been settled, as otherwise every effort would have been in vain and the world war would be inevitable. The localization of the conflict as hoped for in Berlin was wholly impossible, and must be dropped from the calculations of practical politics. If we two should succeed—that is, His Majesty the Emperor or his Government and representatives in conjunction with Sir E. Grey—in preserving the peace of Europe, German-English relations would be placed on a firm foundation for time everlasting. If we did not succeed, everything would be doubtful.

I would like to offer an urgent warning against believing any further in the

[1] From the decodification. See No. 248.

[2] Filed in London July 26 at 8.25 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.07, July 27th. Receipt stamp: July 27, a.m. In the decodification used by the Imperial Chancelor for his report to the Emperor, the sentences "and to submit to . . . threats of Austria," "as no Russian Government . . . nations lost forever," and "I would like to offer . . . everything to lose," are eliminated. Marginal annotation of the Chancelor on the 27th of July: "Submitted to His Majesty. His Majesty disapproved of Lichnowsky's point of view. B. H. 27."

possibility of localization, and to express the humble wish that our policy be guided solely and alone by the need of sparing the German nation a struggle in which it has nothing to gain and everything to lose.

Sir E. Grey returns this evening.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 237

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 162. LONDON, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

As I am told confidentially at the Foreign Office, according to the information they have received there, the feeling in Italy against any participation in a war is such that the Government would not dare to intervene actively. The news spread abroad from Vienna to the effect that Italy has given her consent and has made promises in the spirit of the alliance, is said not to correspond with the facts.[3]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 238

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 163. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 26, 1914.*[5]

Count Szapary had a lengthy conference with Sazonoff this afternoon. Both participants, with whom I talked afterward, emerged from it with the same pleasant impression. The assurances of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary was contemplating no plan of conquest, and was simply anxious to have the peace kept along its borders, visibly eased the Minister's mind. The Austrian note was quietly discussed by Sazonoff and Count Szapary. It developed from the discussion that Sazonoff had no objection to a number of the points. Concerning some of the other points, the Minister told me, they might be able to come to an agreement as a result of alterations in their form. Perhaps it was only a matter

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in London July 26 at 8.48 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 27 at 12.45 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, a.m. Regarding communication of Lichnowsky's telegram to Rome see No. 273.

[3] To this the marginal annotation by Zimmermann: "What business of the Ambassador's is Italy!"

[4] From the decodification. Cf. German White Book May, 1915, p. 27, No. 5.

[5] Filed in Petersburg July 26 at 10.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 27 at 12.45 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, a.m. In the copy used by the Imperial Chancelor for his report to the Emperor, apart from minor alterations in style, the sentence "Should an agreement . . . of some third Power," and the words "along the lines of my proposal" are omitted. Marginal annotation of the Chancelor on the 27th of July: "Submitted to His Majesty. v. B. H. 27." Pourtalès' telegram sent by Jagow by telegraph on the 27th of July to the Ambassador at London, after minor alterations in style and with the omission of the words "along the lines of my proposal" and of the sentences "Should an agreement . . . of some third Power" and "Minister earnestly . . . same thing here"; it was likewise communicated by telegraph to the Ambassador at Vienna after the effecting of minor alterations in style and the omission of the sentences "Should an agreement . . . of some third Power," and "I have the impression . . . same thing here." Telegram 180 to London at 12.10 p.m.; telegram 161 to Vienna at 4.35 p.m. from the Central Telegraph Office.

of words. Austria, he said, made some demands which the Serbian Government could not, as a matter of fact, carry out, without altering the Serbian constitution, which at the present moment was impossible. But perhaps a method for satisfying Austria might be found without literal compliance with the demands. Sazonoff also touched upon the idea of mediation in his talk with my Austrian colleague, and suggested mediation by the Kings of Italy and England. The Minister also asked me with urgence whether I, too, might not be able to make some proposition. While insisting that I was not empowered to make any proposition and could therefore only suggest my own personal ideas, I replied that the following method might perhaps be feasible. In case the Vienna Cabinet might be found willing to modify to a certain extent the form of certain of the demands, which, from the statements of Count Szapary, did not seem to be entirely excluded as a possibility, it might be possible to get into immediate touch with Austria-Hungary on this matter. Should an agreement be the result, then Serbia . . .[1] be advised by Russia to accept the demands on the basis agreed upon between Austria and Russia, and to permit Austria to be notified of this through the medium of some third Power. Sazonoff, to whom I again emphatically insisted that I was not speaking in the name of my Government, said that he would immediately telegraph to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna along the lines of my proposal.

I have the impression that Sazonoff, perhaps as the result of information from Paris and London, has lost some of his nerve and is now looking for a way out. Minister earnestly requested of me that the German press be quieted down as much as possible. He promised to see to the same thing here.

POURTALÈS.

No. 239

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome[2]

Telegram 22. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[3]

Opinion about Roumania, incorrect; evidently founded on prejudiced report of the Italian Minister there.

Italy will have to negotiate the compensation matter with Vienna direct.

JAGOW.

[1] Cipher group lacking here.
[2] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[3] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.35 a.m., July 27. See No. 211.

No. 240

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 222. PARIS, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

Quai d'Orsay seems to suspect, from the fact that Vienna Cabinet is not satisfied with the Serbian reply, although its compliance is very great, that we are urging Austria on and want war.

I emphatically opposed this opinion.

SCHOEN.

No. 241

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office[3]

Telegram 221. PARIS, *July 26, 1914.*[4]

From a confidential conversation with the deputy political chief, I have gained the distinct impression that Viviani's answer will be that he will be willing to exert a pacifying influence at St. Petersburg if we are willing to counsel Vienna to moderation, since Serbia has agreed to almost all the demands.

SCHOEN.

No. 242

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office[5]

Telegram 165. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 27, 1914.*[6]

Military attaché reports concerning conversation with Minister of War:

Sazonoff asked latter to give me full information as to the military situation. The Minister of War gave me his word of honor that as yet no mobilization orders of any kind had been issued. For the present nothing but preparatory measures were being undertaken, not a horse was being conscripted, not a reservist called to the colors. Should Austria invade Serbian territory, the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan, facing Austria, would be mobilized. Under no circumstances Warsaw, Vilna, Petersburg on the German front. Peace with Germany was earnestly desired. To my question what the reason was for mobilization against Austria, a shrug of the shoulders and a reference to the diplomats.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Paris at 9.50 p.m., July 26; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.55 a.m., July 27; receipt stamp: July 27, a.m. Marginal annotation by the Imperial Chancelor July 27: "Submitted to His Majesty. B. H. 27."

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in Paris July 26 at 9.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.55 a.m., July 27; receipt stamp: July 27, a.m. Communicated by wire to the Ambassador at Vienna on July 27 by Zimmermann; to the Central Telegraph Office at 7.50 p.m.

[5] From the decodification. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 30, No. 13.

[6] Filed in Petersburg at 1 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.35 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, a.m. Marginal annotation by the Imperial Chancelor on the 27th of July: "Submitted to His Majesty. v. B. H. 27." Pourtalès' telegram communicated by telegraph to the Ambassador at Vienna by Jagow on July 27, to the Central Telegraph Office at 9.05 p.m. Communicated also to the General Staff, the Minister of War and the Admiralty Staff on the 28th of July; sent by messengers at 11.30 a.m.

Told the Minister that we gave credit for friendly intentions, but would have to consider mobilization even against Austria alone as very threatening. Minister emphasized strongly and repeatedly urgent need of and desire for peace. Received an impression of great nervousness and worry. Believe desire for peace to be sincere, military information so far correct that complete mobilization may not yet have been ordered, but preparatory measures are very far-reaching. They are evidently striving to gain time for further transactions and for completion of their armament. Internal situation is also plainly a cause of deep worry. Chief feature of their frame of mind, hope in Germany and in the meditation of His Majesty.

POURTALÈS.

No. 243

The King of Greece to the Emperor [1]

Telegram 218. ATHENS, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

His Majesty handed me the following telegram intended for His Majesty the Emperor and King with the request to see that it was delivered to His Majesty:

> I am grateful for the telegram of Your Majesty, which gives me the opportunity of denying the false accusations which were raised against my country, *ergo* also against myself. Our pacifism is not mere appearance, and I believe that we have recently given evidence of this fact, especially with regard to Turkey. The war provisions which we are said to be accumulating in our ports are the provisions that we should need in case of mobilization, and which are supposed to be always on hand. Owing to the deficiency resulting from the wars and owing to the tripling of my army, the requirements have been materially increased. The General Staff, since working out its schemes for mobilization, has insisted since October of last year on the necessary replenishments. The Ministry neglected this until up to three months ago, but then the orders were all sent out, to be filled, if possible, by October. Aside from that, there have been coming since February, the guns for the completion of the field and mountain batteries, together with ammunition and rifles; and lately fortress guns for the fortresses of Salonika, Kavalla and the frontiers have been ordered from Krupp. That we have been recalling the army nurses is a fanciful fabrication. If fiery patriots write letters to Ottoman Greeks and promise them their freedom, I can not be held responsible for it, nor do I know anything about it. We have never considered an attack on the Dardanelles or anywhere else. Both myself and my Government are very far from considering any adventurous policy. The Government has recently given evidence of its community of feeling with European interests, and is only thinking of maintaining an honorable peace, of which the country is in need. We wish to preserve and develop what we have won. We desire no war, and we proved this during the last difficult crisis in spite of the frightful maltreatment of hundreds of thousands of our conationals in Asia Minor. We want nothing from Turkey. Turkey feels that she is opposed to us on account of the Island question. We had

[1] From the decodification. Forwarded by the Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office.

[2] Filed in Athens at 1.10 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.32 a.m.; receipt stamp, July 27, a.m. In the margin an annotation by the Imperial Chancelor: "Submitted to His Majesty. His Majesty desires to have the matter looked into to see whether an immediate reply is necessary. v. B. H. 27." Regarding communication of King Constantine's telegram to the Ambassador at Constantinople, see No. 354.

almost arrived at an understanding, when nearly everything was ruined by her underhand work. Venizelos is to have a meeting at Brussels within a few days with the Grand Vizier, to discuss the proposal I telegraphed Your Majesty about a few days ago, and of which Your Majesty knows through my personal communications to Count Quadt. But we can concede no more than that. I again repeat to Your Majesty my request for support in this matter. If this problem can be solved, nothing more can come between ourselves and Turkey, if the latter means to deal honorably. We have advised Serbia to modify her methods.

I can not perceive how Turkey can help Austria without associating herself with Bulgaria. If Bulgaria mixes into it, however, then it will result in an accretion of power to another Slav nation in the Balkans, which would be particularly dangerous to Turkey and to the non-Slavic nations, and which would upset the peace of Bucharest and the balance of power in the Balkans. I think that this would be a great menace to our interests, and that it would also be contrary to the German interests in the Orient; and in this case I would not take the side of Austria against the Slavs, as it is said in Your Majesty's telegram.

In conclusion I beg Your Majesty to believe in my complete loyalty as a ruler, as a colleague and as a man, and that I have always told the plain, unvarnished truth and shall continue to do so. But the others must treat me just as honorably as I treat them, particularly Turkey. Constantine.[1]

BASSEWITZ.

No. 244

The Ambassador at Rome to the Imperial Chancelor [2]

FIUGGI, *July 25, 1914.*[3]

In yesterday's discussion with Mr. Salandra and Marquis di San Giuliano, when sharp collisions repeatedly occurred between the Marquis di San Giuliano and myself,[4] three points seemed to stand out on the Italian side. First, the fear of public opinion in Italy, secondly, the consciousness of military weakness, and thirdly, the desire to make use of this occasion to get something for Italy, if possible, the Trentino.

Marquis di San Giuliano did not directly give expression to the possibility that Italy might eventually turn against Austria, but it could be heard in gentle hints. I took no notice of these hints, as I thought it best not to admit such a possibility in any way. I am under the impression that even the occupation of actual Serbian territory by Austria would not at once bring about Italian procedure of that nature. But it would consolidate the relations between Italy and Russia, which are of themselves not above suspicion. On the other hand, I should consider it to be extraordinarily desirable that Austria should avoid occupying the Lowtschen, at least for the present. If that is not possible, then Austria should make preliminary offers of compensation here. For the occupation of the Lowtschen would

[1] See No. 466.

[2] From the corrected copy.

[3] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 27, a.m. Marginal annotation by the Imperial Chancelor on the 27th of July: "Submitted to His Majesty. B. H. 27." Beneath it is a note of the Chancelor made on the same day: "His Majesty considers it to be absolutely necessary that Austria come to an understanding with Italy on the compensation question *in time.* This must be communicated to Mr. von Tschirschky to be passed on to Count Berchtold as expressly coming from His Majesty. B. H. 27." See No. 267.

[4] See No. 156.

as a matter of fact, alarm the whole of Italy, and, under the circumstances, force the Government to go further than it wants to go. It must be remembered in connection with all these matters that the Cabinet is far less powerful, and thus far less capable of resistance, than the Giolitti Cabinet.

His Majesty the King, in the present state of parliamentary and democratic relations here, will not be in a position to exercise a controlling influence.

As I have already reported, Marquis di San Giuliano, basing his argument on the structure of the Austrian note, forcefully contended that Austria's procedure against Serbia was aggressive, and that for that reason any possible intervention on the part of Russia or of France would not make the war a defensive war, and thus that a *casus foederis* would not obtain. I objected strenuously to this point of view especially for tactical reasons. Presumably, however, Italy will continue to hold fast to this excuse for evading her obligations.

The upshot of the whole matter is this: The active assistance of Italy in any European conflict that may possibly arise can scarcely be counted on. The assumption of a directly hostile attitude to Austria by Italy might, as far as can be foreseen today, be avoided by clever handling of the situation on the part of Austria.

FLOTOW.

No. 245

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor [1]

Telegram 151. BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

Austria does not appear to be able to enter upon military activities before the 12th of August, and Serbia appears to intend to confine herself exclusively to the defensive. Serbia's answer to the ultimatum, the text of which we have not yet been able to get hold of, is said to agree to nearly all the points, even the punishment of all officers, outside of a general order; cooperation only with certain reservations. The diplomatic situation is not entirely cleared up. England and France desire peace, Italy likewise, as the question at issue is unpopular and is alleged to be disadvantageous to Italian interests. According to the latest reports, Russia does not seem to be mobilizing as yet, and seems to be willing to open negotiations with Vienna concerning reasonable modification [3] of the demands not yet satisfactorily agreed to by Serbia. Vienna's attitude as to this so far unknown. I have had all cabinets informed that we regarded the Austro-Serbian conflict as a matter that concerned these two nations alone, and have called Russia's attention, with all the emphasis possible, to the consequences of such military measures of preparation in any way directed against ourselves. The most recently arrived dispatches I will forward to Your Majesty at the Wildpark station.

Your most humble servant,

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.

[2] Marginal annotation by the Chancelor: "Might be best to present it to His Majesty as he passes through Wittenberge, in case the Court train stops there. Otherwise at any station where it does stop." Telegram filed in Berlin at 11.20 a.m.; arrived at the Court Office at 1.20 p.m. Decodification returned by the Emperor on July 27.

[3] In the decodification of the Court Office "reasonable modifications" corrupted into "reasonableness, modifications."

No. 246

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 160. BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

Please telegraph text of the Serbian reply immediately.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 247

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris [4]

Telegram 170. BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[5]

We must hold fast to the contention that Austro-Serbian conflict concerns these two nations alone. Therefore we cannot mediate in the conflict between Austria and Serbia, but possibly later between Austria and Russia.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 248

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [6]

Telegram 179. BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[7]

Had no knowledge here up to the present of Sir E. Grey's proposal to hold a conference *à quatre* there.[8] We could not take part in such a conference, as we would not be able to summon Austria before a European court of justice in her case with Serbia. Sir Edward Grey makes a sharp distinction, as Your Excellency has expressly reported, between Austro-Serbian and Austro-Russian conflict,[9] and is concerned about the former just as little as we ourselves. Our mediation activities must be confined to a possible Austro-Russian clash.[10] In regard to the Austro-Serbian conflict, the method of a direct understanding between Petersburg and Vienna as suggested by telegram (163)[11] from Petersburg appears to me to be feasible. I therefore request you most urgently to advocate in London the necessity and the possibility of localization.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.30 a.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 4 p.m.
[3] See No. 280.
[4] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.30 a.m.
[6] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 30, No. 14.
[7] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1 p.m.
[8] See No. 236.
[9] See No. 180, par. 2.
[10] After "clash" the Chancelor originally wrote: "Your Excellency's assumption that localization is impossible, is not yet evident," but eliminated it later.
[11] See No. 238.

No. 249

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 29. FIUGGI FONTE, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

Marquis di San Giuliano expresses some hope that it may yet be possible to prevent the conflict. According to his information —he does not go any further into detail—Serbia would be willing to agree to the Austrian demands if they were presented by Europe. On the other hand, Russia would only intervene if Austria should occupy Serbian territory permanently. Sir Edward Grey wants to unite the Ambassadors of Germany, France, Italy and Russia in some action for the preservation of peace. Embarrassment and worry here are great, hence the ceaseless efforts in behalf of peace.

Rotl

I will not go into anything.

FLOTOW.

No. 250

The Minister at Copenhagen to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 32. COPENHAGEN, *July 27, 1914.*[4]

Poincaré's visit just officially called off, two hours before arrival was expected.

RANTZAU.

No. 251

The Minister at Sofia to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 37. SOFIA, *July 27, 1914.*[6]

Premier has confirmed to me his reply to the Turkish inquiry as reported from Constantinople, and is telling everybody that for the present Bulgaria will remain strictly neutral.

All possible reports concerning troop movements in Bulgaria or any other measures preparatory to mobilization are false,[7] and, if they come from Bucharest, prejudiced, as Roumanian colleague is instigating his Government against Bulgaria.

MICHAHELLES.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Fiuggi Fonte at 11.05 a.m.; received at the Foreign Office at 1.28 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, returned by him July 28.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in Copenhagen at 12.14 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.28 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, returned by him on July 28. See No. 181.

[5] From the decodification.

[6] Filed in Sofia at 11.10 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, p.m. Submitted to the Emperor, who ordered through marginal instructions its communication to the representatives at Vienna, Bucharest, Constantinople and Athens. Decodification returned by the Emperor on July 28. Michahelles' telegram communicated by Zimmermann to the Ambassador at Vienna on the 29th of July, and the paragraph "Premier . . . neutral" to the Ambassador at Constantinople and the Minister at Athens; telegram to Vienna to the Central Telegraph Office at 1.45 p.m., and telegrams to Constantinople and Athens at 7.50 p.m.

[7] Regarding communication to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest, see No. 321.

No. 252

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 223. PARIS, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

Tone of local press and business world a little more hopeful today, chiefly as a result of a discreet official bulletin concerning my conference yesterday about means of maintaining European peace. Press, however, still distrustful of us, but does not openly continue to accuse us of trying to bring on a war. Says the decision as to war or peace is now chiefly dependent *on Berlin.* If Germany could influence Vienna to moderation, and Paris, Petersburg, peace could be maintained. *No! on Petersburg alone!*

SCHOEN.

No. 253

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor [3]

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 22, 1914.*[4]

In a confidential conversation with my Italian colleague, who has from the commencement of his activities here shown himself very frank toward me, I recently mentioned to Marquis Carlotti the immense increase in Russia's armed forces, and asked him if he had considered it advisable to express any anxiety to his Government with regard to the aims pursued by Russia in connection with her armament.

The Ambassador said in answer to this, that he had sent no detailed report relating to the question of the increase in the Russian army to his Government, but had confined himself to reporting by telegraph the figures that had recently been made known regarding the increases undertaken in the army and in the navy, as well as the amounts granted by the Duma for these purposes. In so doing, he had also, in the light of the same figures, pointed out what the strength of the Russian army with the colors would amount to in three years, if all of the plans now in contemplation should be carried out by that time. He had not accompanied these reports with any more detailed commentary.

The information given to the Imperial Minister at Athens by his Italian colleague concerning the alarmist reports of the Marquis Carlotti may be traced, according to my humble opinion, to the reports of the Ambassador which I have referred to above. Perhaps the figures given by Marquis Carlotti were not previously known to the Italian representative at Athens, and he was struck by their size. Nor should anything extraordinary be deduced from the fact that Marquis Carlotti sent telegraphic reports concerning these matters, as my Italian

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Paris at 1.05 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, p.m. In accordance with marginal instructions by Jagow, a copy, omitting the words: "chiefly . . . European peace," was submitted to the Emperor, and came back from him to the Foreign Office July 28.

[3] From the corrected copy.

[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 27.

colleague, as he informs me himself, and as is, so far as I know, the custom in the Italian diplomatic service, sends most of his reports by telegraph, and only reports by letter under exceptional circumstances.

Relative to his views as to the Russian armament, Marquis Carlotti told me that he did not believe that Russia had any plans in view that were connected with any intention of entering upon an offensive war within three years at least. On the other hand, in his opinion, the conviction that the process of Turkey's dissolution, which it was no longer possible to check, would very soon bring on another eastern crisis, was gaining ground here more and more. Russia wanted to be thoroughly equipped for such an eventuality, in order to be able to throw a greater weight into the scale than before at the approaching settlement of the questions that would arise at such a crisis.

This view of my Italian colleague agrees thoroughly with my own. I should only like to add that I must, nevertheless, perceive in the connection of the unquestionably significant increase of the armed forces of Russia with the Russo-Austrian controversy which is continually growing more acute, a growing menace to the peace of Europe which must not be underestimated.

F. Pourtalès.

No. 254

The Director General of the Hapag to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

Confidential. London (Ritz Hotel), *July 24, 1914.*[2]

Most Honorable Excellency:

I dined last evening at Haldane's with Sir Edward Grey, and took occasion after dinner to say to the gentlemen that the reports in the press that had reached me concerning Anglo-Russian naval transactions had affected me disturbingly, inasmuch as I was forced to fear that the corroboration, or even the continued dissemination of such news might again cast a cloud over the friendly relations between Germany and England, as Germany might perhaps find herself compelled to prepare for the new situation in the shape of increased naval construction. I was naturally intensely interested in the question of whether the friendly relations, which I had been able to take a small part in bringing about, were to be overcast, and no less naturally, I was tempted to ask Grey the indiscreet question whether or to what extent the news as to these Anglo-Russian transactions accorded with the facts. He was talking only with a private individual and therefore did not need to seek diplomatic protection against such a question. But he could leave the question unanswered if it did not suit him.

The result of my conversation with Grey and Haldane I may combine in the following notes:

1. Grey stated that the friendly relations, which might be considered to be the result of the Haldane mission of some little time ago, had not only remained unclouded throughout their whole extent, but had even become strengthened through the cooperation of Germany and England during the

[1] From the corrected copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 27, p.m. Entered in the journal, July 29. See Nos. 56 and 57.

Balkan difficulties and by other transactions that had taken place since that period.

2. The political situation had, in the course of the past decade, so developed that England, also, had come to associate herself with a group of Powers, and it was natural that between the members of such a group questions came up for discussion the consideration of which could not be refused without further ado. As it happened to England in this connection with France and Russia, it probably happened to Germany within her group of Powers, with regard to Austria and Italy.

3. But he was glad to state to me, however, that no such naval convention existed, and that it was not England's intention to agree to any such convention.

Haldane, who wished to be heartily remembered to His Excellency the Imperial Chancelor, very strongly corroborated Grey's statements while I was sitting with him for some time after Grey had left, and hinted to me that our vivacious French friends very often brought up into public notice for internal reasons questions which were not worthy of serious discussion. Grey believed that the balance of power as it resulted from the two groupings of the Powers, constituted the most fortunate assurance of the maintenance of the peace of the world, or at least for that of peace among the Great Powers. It was very evident that Germany's powerful equipment incited the other Powers also to great expense and effort in the way of armament. That was, of course, regrettable to the highest degree, and was unquestionably a heavy burden on the shoulders of a peaceful cooperation.

The Austrian note to Serbia is being very mildly criticized here. This is in part due to the present situation, for the Ulster problem is the ruling question of the hour. The gentlemen were extraordinarily pessimistically inclined last evening.

I dine this evening with Winston Churchill, and intend to travel to Cologne Monday, where conferences of the North Atlantic Marine Companies are to take place on the twenty-ninth and thirtieth of July.

I remain, Your Excellency, with the heartiest greetings,

Most sincerely yours,

BALLIN.

No. 255

The Admiralty Staff to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

Absolutely confidential. BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

1. According to reliable sources in Hull and the Medway district, no preparations are being undertaken there which would point to preparations for war.

2. An agent whose reliability has, it is true, not yet been tested, but who has made a very good impression (a German), reports:

> I have learned the following from assistant at the Petersburg District Headquarters:
>
> Russia is quietly mobilizing in order to support Serbia, if occasion should arise.

[1] From the corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 27, p.m.

At Petersburg about ten days ago there were ready at the District Headquarters calls to the colors for about 300,000 men and 20,000 officers.

The inclination in military circles is not for a war with Germany, but absolutely for a war with Austria.

By order,
ISENDAHL.

No. 256

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 371.
Confidential.

THERAPIA, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

Private: For the Secretary of State.

Turkish offer of alliance was realized as the result of my dropping the scruples which I had hitherto expressed to the Grand Vizier against it, in accordance with the peremptory order I received. Up to the present, Bulgaria has only approached Turkey with ceremonious phrases, without making any definite proposals. Russia and France have not yet recovered from the shock. But it is to be expected that both will very soon commence energetic attempts to intimidate the Turkish Government and to refer it to an association with Greece under the protection of the Triple Entente. If Turkey is granted no positive protection against Russia, Turkey will not even then absolutely be lost to the Triple Entente, although the temptation to place herself under the protection of Russia would naturally appeal very strongly to Turkey under those circumstances. I believe, however, that after our refusal Bulgaria and Turkey will manage to get together, in order to settle accounts with Greece in view of Serbia's preoccupation elsewhere. Then the general upheaval would commence. It is to our interest to retain Bulgaria and the Young Turks as long as the Austro-Serbian conflict remains localized.

I should naturally have to correct my estimate of Turkey's value as an ally if the Turkish army were actually commanded by German officers. Its military worth would thereby be increased threefold. General Liman told me today he . . .[3] himself strong as the leader . . . of the Fifth Turkish Army Corps which was to be put into the . . .[4] at once under any circumstances, . . .[5] to defeat. German command of the army would have the inestimable advantage that Turkey, in the event of war, would have to fulfil the obligations she undertook.

WANGENHEIM.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Therapia at 1.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.15 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, p.m.
[3] Cipher group at fault; filled in at the Foreign Office according to sense with: was making.
[4] Cipher group at fault; filled in at the Foreign Office according to sense with: field.
[5] Cipher group incomprehensible.

No. 257

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 113. VIENNA, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

They have decided here to send out the declaration of war tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow at the latest, chiefly to frustrate any attempt at intervention.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 258

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 164. LONDON, *July 27, 1914.*[4]

Sir E. Grey had me call on him just now and requested me to inform Your Excellency as follows:

The Serbian Chargé d'Affaires had just transmitted to him the text of the Serbian reply to the Austrian note.[5] It appeared from the reply that Serbia had agreed to the Austrian demands to an extent such as he would never have believed possible; except in one point, the participation of Austrian officials in the judicial investigation, Serbia had actually agreed to everything that had been demanded of her. It was plain that this compliance of Serbia's *was to be attributed solely to the pressure exerted from Petersburg.*[6]

Should Austria fail to be satisfied with this reply, in other words, should this reply not be accepted at Vienna as a foundation for peaceful negotiations, or should Austria proceed even to the occupation of Belgrade, which lay quite defenseless before her, it would then be absolutely evident that Austria was only seeking an excuse for crushing Serbia. And thus that Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans were to be struck at through Serbia. It was plain that Russia could not regard such action with equanimity, and would have to accept it as a direct challenge. The result would be the most frightful war that Europe had ever seen, and no one could tell to what such a war might lead.

We had repeatedly, and even yesterday,[7] stated the Minister, turned to him with the request that he *make a plea for moderation at Petersburg. He had always gladly complied with this request* and during the last crisis had subjected himself to reproaches from Russia to the effect that he was placing himself too much on our side and too little on theirs. Now he was turning to us with the request that we should make use of our influence at Vienna either to get them to accept the reply

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Vienna at 3.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.37 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, p.m. A copy of the decodification was sent to the Emperor on the 27th of July. Tschirschky's telegram was also communicated on the 28th of July to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office; sent by messengers at 11.45 a.m.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in London at 1.31 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.37 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, p.m. *Re* communication of Lichnowsky's telegram to the Emperor and to the Ambassador at Vienna, see Nos. 283 and 277.

[5] Printed in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book I, No. 25. For [translation of] French text see No. 271.

[6] Question-mark by the Emperor in the margin of the copy submitted to the Emperor.

[7] See Nos. 199 and 218.

from Belgrade as satisfactory or as the basis for conferences. He was convinced that it lay in our hands to bring the matter to a settlement by means of the proper representations, and he would regard it as a good augury for the future *if we two should once again succeed in assuring the peace of Europe by means of our mutual influence on our allies.*

I found the Minister irritated for the first time. He spoke with great seriousness and seemed absolutely to expect that we should successfully make use of our influence to settle the matter. He is also going to make a statement in the House of Commons today in which he is to express his point of view. In any event, I am convinced that in case it should come to war after all, we should no longer be able to count on British sympathy or British support, as every evidence of ill-will would be seen in Austria's procedure. Also, everybody here is convinced, and I hear it in the mouths of all my colleagues, that the key to the situation is to be found in Berlin, and that, if peace is seriously desired there, Austria can be restrained from prosecuting, as Sir E. Grey expresses it, a foolhardy policy.[1]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 259

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram 114. VIENNA, *July 27, 1914.*[3]

Bulgaria has let it be known here that she would undertake nothing without *having first come to an understanding with Austria-Hungary.* It has been strongly hinted to Bulgaria from here that she is to remain strictly neutral and to undertake no action against Roumania or in Macedonia. Roumanian information, according to which Bulgaria is concentrating troops on Roumanian border, is believed here to be false. It originates apparently from the *Roumanian representative* at *Sofia*, *Derussi*, who is known to be a bad sort. They will continue to keep Bulgaria . . .[4] as peaceful as may be possible, in order not to irritate Roumania.

Mr. Bratianu has also been making an attempt here to influence Bulgaria to remain quiet, in which he has been promised energetic cooperation.

Count Berchtold has had Mr. Bratianu informed that in case anyone should attack Roumania, Austria-Hungary would at once announce that she stood behind Roumania as her ally.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] See Nos. 265, 277 and 278.

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed at Vienna at 4 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.23 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, p.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on July 28, who by marginal instructions ordered it communicated to Bucharest and Sofia; came back from the Emperor to the Foreign Office on July 28. On July 28 Tschirschky's telegram was telegraphically communicated by Jagow to the representatives at Sofia, Bucharest and Constantinople "for their confidential information." Telegrams to the Central Telegraph Office at 10.20 a.m. See Nos. 210 and 228.

[4] Cipher Bureau noted here: "Group lacking." According to the records of the German Embassy at Vienna nothing is lacking, however; instead, "peace" should read "peaceful."

No. 260

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 31. FIUGGI FONTE, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

Have so far given no information or hint here to the effect that we support or are preparing to support Italy's claims for compensation at Vienna.[3] As soon as permissible, should like to ask instructions, as it would be of tactical value here in holding on to Italy.

FLOTOW.

No. 261

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 30. FIUGGI FONTE, *July 27, 1914.*[5]

Marquis di San Giuliano has instructed the Minister at Bucharest: (1) to request the Roumanian Government to urge compliance at Belgrade; (2) to discuss with the Roumanian Government the proposition that it is to the interest both of Italy and of Roumania that Serbia should not be entirely crushed. If the Minister has stated beyond that, that "Italy could not take any part in the war," he has exceeded his instructions, and he would set him right.

I called the Minister's attention to the fact that to me point 2 appeared to be a delicate subject for discussion at Bucharest at the present moment, and one which had better be omitted. Minister insisted that the stability of Serbia was an unconditional requisite for Italy. This barrier against Austria could not be allowed to disappear. I warned the Minister once more in a general way against permitting any doubts as to the solidity of the Triple Alliance to arise as the result of his speech; his object of preserving peace would only be thwarted thereby. I venture to suggest that Bollati receive the same warning.

FLOTOW.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Fiuggi Fonte at 5.35 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.45 p.m. (*sic*); receipt stamp: July 27, p.m.
[3] See Nos. 211, 267 and 287.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Fiuggi Fonte at 2.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.06 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, p.m. Communicated over the wire to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest by Zimmermann on the 29th of July, with the omission of the sentence "I venture . . . warning."

No. 262

The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 43. BUCHAREST, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

Minister of Foreign Affairs has just told me that Roumania, in case the peace of Bucharest were violated by Austro-Serbian conflict, would join with Greece in filing a protest. Furthermore, Roumania could not permit any sort of disturbance of the peace on the part of Bulgaria.

Just don't talk so big!

WALDBURG.

No. 263

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 373. CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 27, 1914.*[4]

Greek Minister has just informed the Grand Vizier that Venizelos had been compelled by the seriousness of the situation to return at once to Athens, but hoped soon to be able to set a new date for the meeting. Prince Saïd Halim replied that he would be at the disposition of Mr. Venizelos at any time.

WANGENHEIM.

No. 264

The Administrator of the Consulate at Kovno to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 3. EYDTKUHNEN, *July 27, 1914.*[6]

Kovno put in a state of war. Report follows.

BÜLOW.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Bucharest July 26 at 9.10 (a.m. or p.m. is not noted); arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.20 p.m., July 27; receipt stamp, July 27, p.m. Decodification sent on the 28th of July to the Emperor, who by marginal instructions ordered its communication to the representatives at Vienna and Sofia; it arrived back at the Foreign Office on the same day. Jagow put through its communication to Vienna on July 28; to the Central Telegraph Office at 9.40 a.m. Its communication to Sofia remained unattended to.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed at Constantinople at 4.09 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.20 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, p.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 28th of July, who by marginal instructions ordered it to be communicated to the Legation at Athens; came back from him to the Foreign Office July 28. Wangenheim's telegram was communicated to the Chargé d'Affaires at Athens in postal cipher on July 28, forwarded at 9 p.m.

[5] From the decodification.

[6] Filed at Eydtkuhnen July 27 at 5.35 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 27 at 7.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, p.m. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 28, No. 8.

No. 265

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 166. LONDON, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

In addition to my telegram 164[3] of today, I would like to point out that our entire future relations with England depend on the success of this move of Sir Edward Grey. Should the Minister succeed at this significant moment, in which, despite all internal divisions, the entire British nation stands behind him, in preventing, with our cooperation, the situation from becoming more acute, I will guarantee that our relations with Great Britain will remain, for an incalculable time to come, of the same intimate and confidential character that has distinguished them for the last year and a half. The British Government, whether liberal or conservative, sees, in the maintenance of the peace of Europe on the basis of the balance of power by groups, its most vital interest,[4] and the conviction that it depends absolutely on us whether Austria shall endanger European peace by a stubborn prestige-policy, carries with it the assurance that any attitude of compliance on the part of Austria will be interpreted as proof of our honest desire to prevent, in conjunction with Great Britain, a European war, to the benefit of our friendship with England and of our love of peace.

Should we, on the other hand, conceive our sympathies for Austria and the exact fulfilment of our alliance obligations to be of so much importance that every other point of view were overshadowed by them, and even the most important item of our foreign policy—our relations with England—subordinated to the special interests of our ally, I believe that it would never again be possible to restore those ties which have of late bound us together.

The impression is constantly gaining force here—and I noticed it plainly at my interview with Sir Edward Grey—that the whole Serbian question has devolved into a test of strength between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. Therefore, should Austria's intention of using the present opportunity to overthrow Serbia ("to crush Serbia," as Sir E. Grey expressed it) become more and more apparent, England, I am certain, would place herself unconditionally by the side of France and of Russia, in order to show that she is not willing to permit a moral, or perhaps a military, defeat of her group. If it comes to war under these circumstances, we shall have England against us. For the realization that, in view of the far-reaching compliance of the Serbian Government, the war might have been avoided, will be of controlling significance in determining the attitude of the British Government.

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in London July 27 at 5.08 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, a.m.
[3] See No. 258.
[4] On the margin of the decodification the annotation by Zimmermann: "Where will the balance of power be, if Austria gives in!"

No. 266

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 165. LONDON, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

It is true that the Minister draws a sharp line of distinction between the Austro-Serbian and the Austro-Russian conflicts,[3] that is to say, he did not want to mix into the Austro-Serbian as long as it did not develop into an Austro-Russian conflict. As long as it remained an Austro-Serbian conflict he held himself in the background. But now he finds himself compelled to take a hand in it, as it threatens to develop into an Austro-Russian and thus into a European conflict. In this way the Austro-Russian conflict cannot be separated from the Austro-Serbian, as the former is based on the latter, and the Minister has been talking to me from this point of view. An understanding between Austria and Russia depends on the settlement of the Austro-Serbian quarrel. Without such a settlement, every attempt at mediation appears entirely hopeless from the English point of view. How can I argue for localization of the conflict, when nobody here has any doubt that by Austria's procedure important Russian interests are in jeopardy, and that Russia will find herself compelled to intervene even against her own desire, in case no pressure on Vienna is exercised by us? I should be greeted by nothing but a cynical shrug of the shoulders.

If an understanding between Vienna and Petersburg on the basis of the Austrian note as suggested in telegram 180 [4] could be arrived at, together with the abstention from all military measures against Serbia, then everything that Sir E. Grey is striving for would be attained. What he wishes to avoid is Austria's armed attack on Serbia, because he fears the disturbance of the peace of Europe would be its result.

He confirmed to me again today the fact that no calling in of the Russian reservists has taken place.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 267

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [5]

Telegram 168. BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[6]

His Majesty the Emperor considers it to be absolutely necessary that Austria should come to an understanding with Italy about Article 7 and the compensation question IN TIME. His Majesty has given his express command to give Your Excellency information of this for communication to Count Berchtold.[7]

JAGOW.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at London at 6.17 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 27, p.m.
[3] See No. 248.
[4] See No. 238, note 5.
[5] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9 p.m.
[7] See Nos. 168 and 244, note 3.

No. 268

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the Foreign Office [1]

MEMORANDUM

BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

The Royal Serbian Government has refused to agree to the demands which we were forced to make for the lasting assurance of those of our vital interests threatened by that Government, and has thus given evidence that it is not willing to desist from its destructive efforts directed toward the constant disturbance of some of our border territories and their eventual separation from the control of the Monarchy. We are therefore compelled, to our regret and much against our will, to force Serbia by the sharpest means to a fundamental alteration of her hitherto hostile attitude. That in so doing, aggressive intentions are far from our thoughts, and that it is merely in self-defense that we have finally determined, after years of patience, to oppose the Greater-Serbia intrigues with the sword, is well known to the Imperial German Government.

It is a cause of honest satisfaction to us that we find both in the Imperial German Government and in the entire German people a complete comprehension of the fact that our patience was of necessity exhausted after the assassination at Serajevo, which, according to the results of the inquiry, was planned at Belgrade and carried out by emissaries from that city; and that we are now forced to the task of securing ourselves by every means against the continuation of the present intolerable conditions on our southeastern border.

We confidently hope that our prospective difference with Serbia will be the cause of no further complications; but in the event that such should nevertheless occur, we are gratefully certain that Germany, with a fidelity long proven, will bear in mind the obligations of her alliance and lend us her support in any fight forced upon us by another opponent.

No. 269

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [3]

Telegram 167. BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[4]

Marquis San Giuliano much worried because Count Berchtold expressed his satisfaction with reference to Italy's friendly attitude assured by declaration of Duke d'Avarna, but said nothing about Article 7 and compensation.[5] Italian Ambassador acquainted me with the contents of a dispatch, according to which Marquis San Giuliano makes the discussion of Article 7 and compensation (at least in principle) a prerequisite to the Italian attitude. Latter might otherwise become directly anti-Austrian. Therefore I consider an immediate conference between Count Berchtold and Duke d'Avarna to be urgently necessary.

I learn confidentially that Italy also fears the occupation of the Lowtschen.

JAGOW.

[1] From the corrected copy, not signed.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 27. Returned by the Imperial Chancelor July 28.
[3] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.30 p.m. [5] See Nos. 168 and 267.

No. 270

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Emperor [1]

BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

I hasten most humbly to submit to Your Imperial and Royal Majesty in the accompanying document a copy of the reply of the Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum,[3] which has just been handed to me by the local Serbian Chargé d'Affaires.

JAGOW.

No. 271

Note of the Serbian Government in reply to the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum [4]

The Royal Serbian Government has received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the tenth instant, and is convinced that its reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Serbian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighboring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draws attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government has made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has several

[1] From the original draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.

[2] Sent off by messenger at 9.30 a.m. On the completed copy, signed by Jagow, which is also in the archives, the annotation in the hand of the Emperor: "July 28, 1914."

[3] The telegram transmitting the note and received by the Serbian Legation in Berlin—Belgrade, July 25, 7.40 (to be filled out p.m.) very urgent, arrived at the Berlin Central Telegraph Office July 26 at 8.58 p.m.—is also among the archives of the Foreign Office. The hardly legible telegram was handed over by the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires with a brief accompanying letter during the course of the 27th of July—the exact hour has not been determined—and was multigraphed at the Foreign Office. A copy was submitted to the Emperor; see No. 271. Regarding transmission of the Serbian note in reply by Tschirschky, see No. 347.

[4] From the corrected telegram (see No. 270) handed in in the original [French] to the Foreign Office, with a brief accompanying letter by Dr. M. Yovanovitch, the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires (receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 27, p.m.) and the copy sent to the Emperor, which is likewise at present among the archives. The text of the Serbian Blue Book was drawn on for comparison. A number of minor discrepancies were, however, not taken note of. The telegram, dated July 25, and directed to the Serbian Legation at Berlin, was received July 26 at 8.58 p.m. at the Berlin Central Telegraph Office. On the copy above the marginal annotation by the Emperor: "read New Palace July 28, 1914. W."

times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule escape official control. The Royal Government is all the less responsible in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighboring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government has been pained and surprised at the statements according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and it was ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of its attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to it. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, it is prepared to hand over for trial any Serbian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the *Journal Officiel*, on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:

The Royal Government of Serbia condemns all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and it sincerely deplores the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regrets that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Serbian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good-neighborly relations to which the Royal Serbian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 18th (31st) March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and it considers it a duty formally to warn the officers, officials and entire population of the Kingdom that henceforth it will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such

acts, to prevent and to repress which it will use its utmost endeavor.

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertakes:

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engages at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possesses no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish it with any, that the *Narodna Odbrana* and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissolve the *Narodna Odbrana* society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Serbian Government undertakes to remove without delay from its public educational establishments in Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnishes them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agrees to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and it expects the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to it at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that it does not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon its territory, but it declares that it will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good-neighborly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government considers it its duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th (28th) June, and who happen to be within the territory of the Kingdom. As regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

The legation can be vested with control.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankositch. As regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th (28th) June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the inquiry of Serajevo, for the purposes of the latter inquiry.

8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that it will immediately order an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznica line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by its officials, whether in Serbia or abroad, in interviews after the crime, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government has communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government is not satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by

referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

A brilliant performance for a time-limit of only forty-eight hours. This is more than one could have expected! A great moral victory for Vienna; but with it every reason for war drops away, and Giesl might have remained quietly in Belgrade! On the strength of this I should never have ordered mobilization! *W.*[1]

No. 272

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [2]

Telegram 182. BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[3]

Italian Government has promised attitude of a friendly ally at Vienna and made a like communication here.

JAGOW.

No. 273

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome [4]

Telegram 24. BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[5]

Prince Lichnowsky telegraphs: "As I am told confidentially . . . correspond with the facts." [6]

Kindly keep on pointing out there that it is just in the solid front exhibited outwardly by the Triple Alliance that there lies the surest guaranty for a solution of the crisis corresponding to its interests.

JAGOW.

No. 274

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 169. PETERSBURG, *July 27, 1914.*[8]

Military attaché reports: Swedish consul Riga reports: Dünamünde is barred by mines. In the Riga district all cars are being unloaded and placed at the disposal of the military authorities.

POURTALÈS.

[1] See personal letter of the Emperor of July 28, 10 a.m. (No. 293).
[2] From the original draft. Copy in Bergen's handwriting.
[3] To the Central Telegraph Office at 10 p.m.
[4] From the original draft. Copy in Bergen's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 10 p.m.
[6] Here Lichnowsky's telegram of July 26 (No. 237) is inserted.
[7] From the decodification.
[8] Filed at Petersburg July 27 at 7.17 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, a.m. Communicated on the 28th of July to the General Staff, the Admiralty Staff, the Imperial Naval Office and the Ministry of War; sent by messengers at 11.45 a.m.

No. 275

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 170. PETERSBURG, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

Consul Kiev reports: Tonight artillery marched off in a westerly direction, Commander 11th Cavalry Division left for garrison town of Dubno. Stock exchange much upset, otherwise public feeling not particularly aroused; the press moderate, strike agitations in progress, consular guard strengthened.

POURTALÈS.

No. 276

The Consul General at Warsaw to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 13. WARSAW, *July 27, 1914.*[4]

All the troops have been recalled from the maneuvers; much infantry, also Uhlans, at the Brest station, alleged to be entraining for Lublin and Kovel; hundreds of military automobiles passing all night on the Brest-Litovsk highway; so far, no reservists called to the colors; yesterday the ammunition magazine at the citadel blew up.

BRÜCK.

No. 277

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [5]

Telegram 169. BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[6]

Prince Lichnowsky has just telegraphed: [7]

> Sir E. Grey had me call on him just now and requested me to inform Your Excellency as follows:
>
> The Serbian Chargé d'Affaires had just transmitted to him the text of the Serbian reply to the Austrian note.[8] It appeared from the reply that Serbia had agreed to the Austrian demands to an extent such as he would never have believed possible; except in one point, the participation of Austrian officials in the judicial investigation, Serbia had actually agreed to everything that had been demanded of her. It was plain that this compliance of Serbia's *was to be attributed solely to the pressure exerted from Petersburg.*[9]

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Petersburg July 27 at 7.43 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, a.m. Communicated on the 28th of July to the General Staff, Admiralty Staff, Imperial Naval Office and Ministry of War. Sent by messengers at 11.45 a.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on July 28.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed at Warsaw July 27 at 3.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, a.m. In accordance with marginal instructions by Zimmermann, communicated on the 28th of July to the General Staff, the Admiralty Staff, the Imperial Naval Office and the Ministry of War; sent by messengers at 11.45 a.m.

[5] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.

[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.50 p.m.; forwarded from there July 28 at 12.45 a.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 5.30 a.m.

[7] See No. 258 and note 4 thereof.

[8] Printed in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book I, No. 25. For [translation of] French text see also No. 271.

[9] In the copy submitted to the Emperor, a question-mark by the Emperor in the margin.

Should Austria fail to be satisfied with this reply, in other words, should this reply not be accepted at Vienna as a foundation for peaceful negotiations, or should Austria even proceed to the occupation of Belgrade, which lay quite defenseless before her, it would then be absolutely evident that Austria was only seeking an excuse for crushing Serbia. And thus, that Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans were to be struck at through Serbia. It was plain that Russia could not regard such action with equanimity, and would have to accept it as a direct challenge. The result would be the most frightful war that Europe had ever seen, and no one could tell to what such a war might lead.

We had repeatedly, and even yesterday,[1] stated the Minister, turned to him with the request that he *make a plea for moderation at Petersburg. He had always gladly complied with this request* and during the last crisis had subjected himself to reproaches from Russia to the effect that he was placing himself too much on our side and too little on theirs. Now he was turning to us with the request that we should make use of our influence at Vienna either to get them to accept the reply from Belgrade as satisfactory or as the basis for conferences. He was convinced that it lay in our hands to bring the matter to a settlement by means of the proper representations, and he would regard it as a good augury for the future *if we two should once again succeed in assuring the peace of Europe by means of our mutual influence on our allies.*[2]

I found the Minister irritated for the first time. He spoke with great seriousness and seemed absolutely to expect that we should successfully make use of our influence to settle the matter. He is also going to make a statement in the House of Commons today in which he is to express his point of view. In any event, I am convinced that in case it should come to war after all, we should no longer be able to count on British sympathy or British support, as every evidence of ill-will would be seen in Austria's procedure.

Since we have already refused one English proposal for a conference, it is impossible for us to waive *a limine* this English suggestion also. By refusing every proposition for mediation, we should be held responsible for the conflagration by the whole world, and be set forth as the original instigators of the war. That would also make our position impossible in our own country, where we must appear as having been forced into the war. Our situation is all the more difficult, inasmuch as Serbia has apparently yielded to a very great degree. Therefore we cannot refuse the mediator's rôle, and must submit the English proposal to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet, especially as London and Paris continue to make their influence felt in Petersburg. I request Count Berchtold's opinion on the English suggestion, as likewise his views on Mr. Sazonoff's desire to negotiate directly with Vienna.[3]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] See Nos. 199 and 218.
[2] See Nos. 265 and 278.
[3] See No. 400.

No. 278

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [1]

Telegram 183. BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

We have at once inaugurated a move for mediation at Vienna along the lines desired by Sir Edward Grey. Apart from this English suggestion we have furthermore submitted to Count Berchtold Sazonoff's desire for a direct discussion with Vienna.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor. cf. German WhiteBook of May, 1915, p. 31, No. 15.

[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.50 p.m. See Nos. 258 and 277.

PART II

FROM THE ARRIVAL OF THE SERBIAN NOTE OF REPLY AT BERLIN TO THE TIME OF THE PUBLICATION OF THE RUSSIAN GENERAL MOBILIZATION

No. 279

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [1]

Telegram 184. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

Sir Edward Grey has expressly and repeatedly stated that the Austro-SERBIAN conflict did not concern him, but that on the other hand he stood ready to mediate in case of an Austro-RUSSIAN conflict, and counted on our assistance in doing so. We had declared ourselves to be in complete agreement with this point of view. Now, Sir Edward has deserted this ground and asks us to mediate to persuade Austria to accept the Serbian reply as satisfactory, or at least to look upon it as a basis for further conferences.[3]

The first petition cannot be acceded to. It is impossible [4] for us to counsel Vienna to give a belated sanction to the Serbian reply, which they had immediately refused as unsatisfactory, even before it had come to our knowledge. We made great concessions to England when we undertook to inaugurate mediation in connection with the second petition.[5] I feel sure that England will value this friendly advance of ours as it deserves. Whether the Serbian reply goes to the limit of what is possible, I am not yet able to judge, as it has just reached my hands. The fact that Serbia mobilized before handing over her reply, however, is a suspicious circumstance. That permits one to suspect a bad conscience. Sir Edward's assumption that Austria's object is the overthrow of Serbia seems to me to be all the less reasonable, inasmuch as she has expressly declared to Russia that she is looking for no territorial acquisition and that she would not infringe upon the right to existence of the Serbian Kingdom, a declaration that did not fail to make an impression on Russia. Austria intends—and it is not only her right but her duty—to secure herself against the continuation of the undermining of her own existence through the Greater-Serbia propaganda, which finally resulted in the crime of Serajevo. That has absolutely nothing at all to do with a policy of prestige or with playing off the Triple Alliance against the Triple Entente.[6]

Deeply as we are engaged in all directions in attempting to maintain the peace of Europe, in full agreement with England, and, it is to be hoped, in continued cooperation with her, we can not for that reason acknowledge the right of Russia or even of the Triple Entente to take the part of the Serbian intrigues against Austria.

I respectfully request that you regulate your arguments by these considerations.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor. Originally dated by the Chancelor the 27th of July, later altered to the 28th.

[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 2 a.m. July 28.

[3] See No. 258.

[4] "impossible" an alteration by the Chancelor from "not".

[5] "when we undertook . . . the second petition" an alteration by the Chancelor from "when, adapting ourselves to Sir Edward's altered point of view, we undertook to submit to Vienna for consideration the English desire that the Serbian reply be regarded as a foundation for a conference," as originally written by him.

[6] The sentence which originally followed here, "We are unable to recognize the right of Russia, or even of the Triple Entente, to take the part of the Serbian intrigues against Austria," was crossed out again by the Chancelor.

No. 280

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 116. VIENNA, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

Have urgently requested the text of the Serbian note at once.[3] Baron Macchio informed me in reply to my request that the Bureau was so overburdened that it would not be possible to make a copy of the note so quickly. Nevertheless, everything possible would be done in order to provide me with the note this very evening.

At this moment—half past eleven at night—I have received the note in printed form with explanatory remarks of the Austro-Hungarian Government. As the note with the annotations is being given to the press tonight, I thought it best, in view of the length of the document—nearly six printed sheets—to dispense with sending it by telegraph.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 281

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 115. VIENNA, *July 27, 1914.*[5]

Count Berchtold called on me late this evening to give me the following information:

A telegram from Count Szapary has arrived here based on the report of the military attaché to the effect that reports are coming in thick to the effect that the military districts of Kiev, Warsaw, Odessa and Moscow have received mobilization orders, together with the simultaneous calling of the reservists to the colors. The districts of Petersburg and Vilna, and probably also Kasan, are said to have received orders to prepare to mobilize, though without the reservists.

Chief of the General Staff is of the opinion that the moment has come, in case Berlin is in possession of corroboration concerning the Russian military preparations, to inform Petersburg, with a view to clearing up the military situation, that this mobilization so threatens the southern and western borders of Russia that corresponding counter-measures would have to be taken.

Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf is furthermore of the opinion that Roumania should at once be informed of the proposed declaration at Petersburg and, in case of need, be invited to join in making it. Perhaps it would also be the proper time to make public the compact of alliance with Roumania, since Mr. Beldiman has mentioned to Count von Szapary that the authorities in Roumania in view of recent occurrences, are considering ways and means for the publication of the treaty.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Telegram, dated July 27, filed at Vienna July 28 at 1.45 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, a.m.

[3] See No. 246.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Telegram, dated July 27, filed at Vienna July 28, at 1.45 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 28, at 4 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, a.m.

No. 282

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 167. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

Have just informed Sazonoff of the contents of telegrams 126 and 128.[3] Minister requested me to thank Your Excellency for both communications, which made a very good impression on him, and to assure you in addition that the appeal to our long-preserved friendly relations was warmly echoed by him and stirred him deeply. Your Excellency might remain assured that Russia would not abuse the confidence in her love for peace. He was ready to go to the limit in accommodating Austria, and to exhaust all means to bring the crisis to a peaceful solution.

Since Austria had declared her territorial disinterestedness and had as yet taken no hostile steps against Serbia, the moment had come, in his opinion, to seek the means by an exchange of views among the Powers "to build a golden bridge for Austria." What means should be proposed for the attainment of this end were immaterial to him. The desire to humiliate Austria lay far from his mind. But he urgently requested consideration of the fact that if those Austrian demands which infringed on the rights of Serbian sovereignty should be accepted, there would come into power a revolutionary régime which would be even worse than the present one. I replied that in any event, Serbia would have to swallow several bitter pills. Austria would probably not let herself be put off with lame excuses; whether some of the points might be formally modified, I was unable to judge. In any case, the Serbian provocations, which had now brought Europe to the verge of war for the third time within five years, must once and for all be put to end an, as present conditions had become simply intolerable for Europe. For this reason Europe ought not to try to stay Austria's arm in her present quarrel with Serbia. Sazonoff did not wish to give up the hope that a moderation of some of the points of the demands put to Serbia might possibly be accomplished. He earnestly requested our cooperation along this line. There must be a way of giving Serbia her deserved lesson [4] while sparing her sovereign rights. I said in reply, that guaranties must also be acquired for the future, in order that Serbia should not once again back out of the obligations she had assumed. If Serbia wished to be treated as a member of the European family of nations with equal rights, she would also have to behave herself as a civilized nation. The Minister's objections to this sort of criticism of Serbia were much more feeble than a day or two ago; his speech was just as conciliatory as it was yesterday. In connection with the first part of telegram 128, Sazonoff referred to yesterday's conversation of Major Eggeling with the Minister of War.[5]

POURTALÈS.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Petersburg July 27, at 8.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 28, at 4.36 a.m.; receipt stamp, July 28, a.m. Marginal annotation by the Imperial Chancelor on the 28th of July: "Submitted to His Majesty. v. B. H. July 28." On a sheet attached to the decodification, the Chancelor remarks with reference to Pourtalès' telegram: "I have my doubts as to whether we ought to communicate the Sazonoff telegram to Lichnowsky *in extenso*. He tells everything to Sir Edward in such an awkward fashion, and the latter might become even more obsequious to Russia if he should see so plainly that the wire between Berlin and Petersburg is far from having been torn down. At least, this result might be possible. So it will depend very much on the manner in which Lichnowsky is instructed and in which he talks with Sir Edward."

[3] See Nos. 198 and 219. [4] See No. 323. [5] See No. 242; see also No. 300.

No. 283

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor [1]

BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

Herewith I most humbly submit to Your Majesty a telegram which has just arrived from Prince Lichnowsky.[3] In accordance with Your Majesty's orders I have submitted Sir Edward Grey's suggestion to Count Berchtold.[4] It will be Austria's business to determine what to do about it. If we were to bar the door to every suggestion to play the rôle of mediator, especially as London and Paris are continually trying to influence Petersburg, we should be regarded by England and by the whole world as responsible for the conflagration, and as the actual originators and instigators of the war. That would not only make it impossible to maintain the present favorable feeling in our own country, but would also force England to drop her neutrality.

Your Majesty's most humble servant,

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 284

The Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 18. CETINJE, *July 28, 1914.*[6]
Urgent.

Austrian authorities at Cattaro today expelled all the Montenegrins in the place. Local ministerial council has determined as a counter-measure to send away all Austrians living in Montenegro. Heavy concentrations of troops are reported from Austrian coast towns. Government fears an Austrian *coup* against Lowtschen. King has *told* the Austrian military attaché *that he*[7] *will do everything possible to avoid war with Austria.* Excitement at Cetinje growing. Postal and telegraphic connection with Cattaro broken for the time being. Austrian Minister asks that Vienna be notified that Cetinje-Cattaro telegraphic connection interrupted, and, in fact, apparently by Austrian authorities. As Montenegro prevents him from sending messengers to the post-office at Cattaro, he cannot get into any connection with Vienna.

He can't! Let the devil believe him!

ZECH.

[1] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.
[2] Marginal annotation of the Chancelor: "Early tomorrow morning to the New Palace by messenger." Sent by messenger July 28 at 5 a.m.
[3] See No. 258. Jagow had asked in a note directed to the Chancelor: "Shall this telegram be submitted to His Majesty? It ought hardly to be kept from His Majesty?"
[4] See No. 277. [5] From the decodification.
[6] Filed at Cetinje July 27 at 11.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 28, 7.05 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, a.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, who by marginal instructions ordered its communication to the Ambassador at Vienna; returned by him July 28. Zech's telegram sent by Jagow on July 28 to the Ambassador at Vienna; to the Central Telegraph Office at 10.10 a.m.
[7] "he" twice underscored by the Emperor.

No. 285

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 370.
Absolutely confidential. CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

Grand Vizier just had me sent for and requested me to submit to His Majesty the petition of his sovereign that Germany shortly enter upon a secret offensive and defensive alliance with Turkey against Russia, and thereby render Turkey's entrance into the Triple Alliance possible. *Casus* to occur whenever Russia should attack either Turkey or Germany or else Austria, or if either Germany or the Triple Alliance should make an attack on Russia. Turkey requires no protection against any other countries than Russia. In connection with all other international questions, like those concerning agreements, debts, etc., everything should remain as it had been. Turkish condition would be that in case of war the Emperor should leave the military mission in Turkey. Turkey, on the other hand, would bind herself to find some method by which the supreme command of the Turkish Army and the actual field command of one-fourth of the Army should be given over to the military mission upon the outbreak of war.

The negotiations should be conducted with absolute secrecy, even as far as the Turkish ministers are concerned. Grand Vizier requests me not to mention the matter to any of my colleagues at present, and terms it "indispensable" that even Mahmud Pasha should not be initiated into the secret.

WANGENHEIM.

No. 286

The Minister at Christiania to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 17. CHRISTIANIA, *July 27, 1914.*[4]

Visit French President Christiania called off today.

OBERNDORFF.

No. 287

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome [5]

Telegram 25. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[6]

Please say that we are supporting Italian wishes concerning compensation to the extent that we have already called to the attention of Vienna the necessity of coming to an agreement with Italy and are doing so again.[7]

JAGOW.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Constantinople July 28 at 1.45 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.20 a.m.; receipt stamp, July 28, a.m.
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Filed at Christiania July 27 at 11.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 28 at 8.30 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, a.m. Telegram submitted to the Emperor; returned by him July 29.
[5] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.30 a.m. [7] See Nos. 260 and 267.

No. 288

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

All the local papers go into lengthy disquisitions concerning the gravity of the situation created by the rejection of the Austrian ultimatum by Serbia.

Today's *Nowoje Wremja* devotes three articles to the present situation. The first, the "Austrian Dispatch," as its title reads, seeks to discredit the allusions in the Austrian note to the criminal activities of Serbian officers and officials, and compares them with the Friedjung case. Austria's procedure is said to prove only one thing; namely, the intention of destroying Serbia. Further on it says that Austria would *never have decided to commit a fresh and open violation of international law without the consent of Germany;* that the German Emperor only *needed to say a word or two*, and *Austria would withdraw her note*;[3] that the Emperor *knew that Russia would back Serbia up with her whole military forces*, and that an attack on *Serbia meant war with Russia* as well as that Germany and France would be drawn into the war. The moral responsibility for the threatened destruction of European civilization would rest on Germany and her exalted ruler.

Thanks!

No, I did not know that! I could not assume that the Czar would place himself on the side of bandits and regicides, even at the peril of unchaining a European war. Germans are incapable of such a conception; it is Slavic or Latin.

"Peace or War" is the title of the second article. In it Austria's procedure is characterized as a marauding expedition, on which the sword is being raised against Russia over Serbia's head; Russia knows, it goes on, that the challenge is aimed at her; Russia did not call forth the storm of war, but she would fight for her honor with all her strength and ability. There was yet time for Austria to reconsider, yet time for her to escape the sentence of death. Might God punish that nation that began the war!

The third article is called "The Present Situation." The answer to the question, it says, whether or not we are on the brink of a European war, must be sought at Berlin. If Germany has determined that it is to her disadvantage to wait for further increases in the strength of the Dual Alliance, especially on the part of Russia, and considers it desirable to commence the war forthwith, every effort of the Powers would be of no use. In that event it could not be doubted that the unbelievable Austrian note had been concocted with the cooperation of Germany; that this move to provoke war and to involve Russia and France in it had proceeded from Germany. The reports in diplomatic circles in this connection, however, were uncertain. In any event, if it

[1] From the corrected copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 28, a.m. Report submitted to the Emperor; returned by him on the 30th of July.

[3] Exclamation-point by the Emperor in the margin.

had been an attempt at bluffing, it had not succeeded. The article goes on to say: "A peaceful outcome is possible only if Germany is not standing at Austria's back, determined to go to war. In that case everything would be in vain, and the hour of a European war could not be prevented from striking."

Russia faced events with calmness, confident in her strength and in her indestructible alliance with France. Russia's love for peace was well known, but Russia recognized her historic task and was prepared to take even the most decisive steps that events should require.

The *Semschtschina* takes a stand opposed to the *Nowoje Wremja*. It criticizes the ultimatum, but then says that it is far from wishing to spur Serbia on. The Russian Government is obligated to hold Serbia in check in SO FAR AS IS POSSIBLE, at the same time attempting to influence Austria. It was apparent that the Government was actively at work along these lines. If Austria was bent upon war, measures should be taken to prevent it, without at the same time involving Europe in a war. Attempts should be made to influence Austria through Germany or Italy.

In the event of a "general slaughter," Russia would find herself involved in a war against Germany which neither Russia nor the Germans wanted. "Up to the present the relations between us have remained friendly; why should that fact not be used for the maintenance of peace?" Everybody should rejoice at Suchomlinoff's assurance that every preparation was made, but for that very reason Germany might be the more willing to listen to our request to influence Austria.

The report of Austria's attitude of rejection toward the Serbian reply did not yet mean that Austria would be impervious to German influence.

The *Rjetsch* regards the situation from a similar point of view. "It appears," says that paper, "that despite the provocations of the *Nowoje Wremja*, Germany has not yet considered taking the final steps. We may conclude that the hope for a peaceful solution, or, if matters go to extremes, for the localization of the conflict, has not yet been given up, from the information received here from certain London business circles, relative to the attitude to be assumed by England. England is proposing to offer a form of mediation, the purpose of which is to separate the Austrian note into two parts, to wit: first, a political part, which is to be the subject of negotiations by the Powers, and another dealing with the Serajevo affair, which is to be negotiated between Austria and Serbia. In such an event, it would not be a matter concerning Serbia's offenses—it would be a 'preventive war' that would impend—and not to perceive this would be not to see the forest for the trees."

"It is time to bring the matter to an end," says the *Peters-*

burgski Kurjer. It is of vital interest for Russia that the Slav nations which provide her with a lateral protection against the "urge toward the East" on her road to the Dardanelles, should not come under foreign influence. A war against Austria and Germany would be popular even among the Russian intellectuals, which viewed Germany as the embodiment of reaction and the cradle of militarism.

The *Swjet* demands the "immediate mobilization of the Russian army."

The *Birshewija-Wjedomsti* asserts that Russia's reply to the "screaming threat" of the Austrian note has gained the unanimous support of the entire Russian press. The attitude of the Russian Government has shown that both diplomacy and public opinion consider an assault by Austria on the territory and the independence of Serbia as absolutely non-permissible.

F. POURTALÈS.

No. 289

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

The *Wetschernoje Wremja*, which issued a Sunday extra today, published the article of which a translation is hereto respectfully appended. According to statements made by Mr. Paléologue and reported to me by a friendly colleague, there can be no doubt that by the "highly authoritative personage," the local French Ambassador is intended.

F. POURTALÈS.

No. 290

Supplement to Report of the Ambassador at Petersburg on July 26, 1914

"WETSCHERNOJE WREMJA" OF JULY 13/26, 1914

We had the opportunity today of conferring with a highly authoritative personage.

What's that? How's that? Then the Czar would not have needed to appeal to me!

Everything had been done on the part of Russia, he said, in order that *the conflict between Serbia and Austria might not be extended to great limits*, but the Vienna Government had not thought it necessary to heed the voice of justice and had apparently and absolutely determined to make a war out of the matter.

Russia's diplomatic advances toward Austria can be *regarded as concluded*, as the Vienna Cabinet made a negative reply to the

[1] From the corrected copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 28, a.m. Report and supplement (No. 290) were submitted to the Emperor, who by marginal instructions ordered their communication to the Ambassador at Paris, which, however, was left undone. Returned from the Emperor to the Foreign Office July 30.

note handed yesterday by Prince Koudacheff to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In such a state of affairs, the chances of a war are, in my opinion, greatly increased, and we stand on the eve of great events.

Austrian troops may cross the Serbian border at any hour, and then *Russia's rôle*, in the sense of *affording the necessary military assistance*, will appear *absolutely definite and decided.* — *To the regicides.*

Upon the order of Minister of War Suchomlinoff, *the necessary preparatory measures for the prevention of any kind of catastrophe were taken.* In any event, *our enemies will not be able to surprise us.* — *Mobilization. Unfortunately not, if they go on as they have been going.*

So far as concerns our ally France and our friend England, it has been proved by a recent exchange of opinions that we are acting with complete unanimity, and that we shall proceed hand in hand toward the accomplishment of a single task. It is possible that the situation can be saved at the last moment by the intervention of the King of Italy, but for this there is but a slight hope. Nor must it be forgotten that *Germany stands* behind the wings on the *stage of the events that are being enacted;* she apparently considers the present moment to be particularly adapted for squaring accounts with France. Leading circles in Berlin are openly stating that they sympathize completely with Austria's *outrageous behavior.* Without such sympathy, the Vienna Government would never dare to proceed to such action, which does not appear to be *justified by facts of any sort.* — *Swine! So regicide is a bagatelle.*

No. 291

The Military Plenipotentiary at the Russian Court to the Emperor [1]

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 13/26, 1914.*[2]

In addition to my telegram of last night [3] I most humbly submit the following:

Yesterday the Emperor with his whole suite made inspections at Krasnoje from morning to evening. The contents of the Austrian note had just become known through the newspapers, and had aroused great indignation by its bitter tone and its too detailed substance. It had been determined at the Ministerial Council the day before to request of Vienna an extension of the time-limit. Berchtold's answer declining the request arrived at Krasnoje during the morning. Up to that time the feeling at Headquarters had been serious and uneasy. After breakfast it was altered into the deepest resentment against Austria. The Minister of War, the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Chief of the General Staff, etc., were summoned to the Emperor, and there arose at the camp an excitement that pointed to decisions of great importance. At the afternoon inspection it was

[1] The Chief of the Military Cabinet forwarded the original of the Chelius report to the Foreign Office; at the instructions of the Imperial Chancelor on the 28th of July; the report was sent back to the Chief of the Military Cabinet on July 31.

[2] From a copy of the report which is among the archives.

[3] See No. 194.

made known that the camp exercises would come to an end that evening, that the maneuvers were called off and that all the troops were to return to their cantonments. General Adlerberg, the Governor of St. Petersburg, put his foot in it by saying "to be mobilized." Baron Grünwald, the Imperial Equerry, a gentleman very amicably disposed to Germany, sat next to me at dinner, and told me, "the situation is very serious; I can not tell you what was determined at noon today, but you will probably learn it very soon; you can take it from me, however, that the situation is very serious." He clinked glasses with me again with the words: "Let us hope that we see each other again in better times." After dinner three gentlemen of the suite came to me, one after the other, to learn, apparently in behalf of higher authority, whether they had perhaps known beforehand in Berlin of the Austrian note and had approved it before it was handed over at Belgrade. I could only reply that there had scarcely been time for that. I remained away from the performance at the theater in the evening, which was perhaps just as well, as the Emperor was greeted with a long and demonstrative ovation which had been prepared in advance by the Grand Duke Nicholas. Otherwise, the Emperor was unusually calm and showed no trace of excitement. His Majesty twice shook my hand in greeting with unusual friendliness, but without saying a word. Before dinner, His Majesty made the address hereto attached[1] to the students at the war school and promoted them to officers, which must be regarded as an exceptional measure, inasmuch as the promotion, as every year, was to have taken place later.

A rumor of the mobilization of the military districts of Kiev and Odessa, which are near the Austrian border, was spread through the camp. Even if this rumor is uncorroborated, and it will probably not be learned as a fact for several days owing to the strict censorship which is being applied to all military measures, one received the distinct impression that mobilization had been ordered. This has probably been caused by the following circumstances:

First, the tone of the note. Russia feels herself to be greatly injured by it; never before, they say, has any nation used such language toward a weaker nation; Russia would have to stand by her racial companion, and could not tolerate having Serbia crushed. "What will come of it is entirely immaterial to us; we should be breaking faith with our history, if we did nothing but look indifferently on. Austria should have given notice to Russia of such a note; as it is, it constitutes an insult to a Great Power which is friendly to Serbia and which can not allow the latter to be sacrificed to Austrian high-handedness." This is the view of the Minister of War.

Secondly, the refusal to extend the time-limit. "Russia showed her good

[1] Text of the Czar's address (from the copy in the archives):

"I wished to see you, and gave orders that you be assembled in order to say a few words to you before you go to the work that awaits you. Remember my command: Believe in God, and in the greatness and the glory of our fatherland as well. Aspire to serve it and me with all your power, and to do your duty in whatever situation you may be or in whatever position you may be placed. Treat your superiors with respect and be comrades to one another no matter in what branch of the army you may belong, mindful of the fact that each one of you as a part of our great army serves one fatherland and its ruler. Be firm, yet just, to the soldiers under your command, and endeavor to set them an example in everything, as well inside as outside of the service. I wish you from my heart success in everything, and I am convinced that every one of you will under all circumstances behave as a worthy descendant of our forefathers, besides honorably serving me and Russia. I congratulate you on your promotion to the rank of officer."

intentions by trying to intervene even before the termination of the time-limit; the refusal is an unbelievable affront on the part of Austria, who treated us as if we did not exist. Making full allowance for all the excitement and indignation in Austria at the assassination in Serajevo, she had no right to act in a manner that is contrary to all diplomatic precedent. A war between Austria and Serbia is a war with Russia." This is the opinion of the *entourage* of the Czar. Every argument or explanation failed, as this was the watchword that had been passed.

Thirdly, the belief that they had known of and approved the note at Berlin. This has already been denied, but its acceptance has given birth to the impression that after the visit of Poincaré, which had brought about a firmer bond between Russia and France, it was intended by the Triple Alliance to deliver a blow in the face of the Russian Monarchy, and that unhappy Serbia had been selected for the purpose, to be trodden under foot while the Entente Powers were being truculently confronted.

These three considerations have fanned excitement to an enormous blaze. On the other hand, the older men, like General Fredericks, who has great influence with the Emperor, are hoping for the mediation of England, whose disinterested attitude as set forth by the *Westminster Gazette*, although not over-welcome to them, does appear practical at this time.

The difficulty of conducting a war while the mass of the labor element is flaring into rebellion all over Russia outweighs in many minds any interest in Serbia, for they fear that the demonstrations of several hundreds of thousands of working men, which, particularly in Petersburg, are almost of a revolutionary character, will prove prejudicial to the mobilization by forcing them to leave strong contingents of troops behind in all the large cities.

Yesterday evening at six o'clock the respite named in the note expired at Belgrade. A general of the suite, with whom I was at the moment conversing at Krasnoje, glanced at the clock and said: "The guns along the Danube have probably already commenced their fire, for one only sends a note like that one after the cannon have been loaded."

Nevertheless, that has not happened, and Austria seems to be holding back. So the crisis is probably over, and the door to mediation is opened. Sazonoff is pleased, as the labors of the diplomats, which had almost come to an end, can now begin again. Had Austria occupied Belgrade by yesterday evening, the world would have been placed before a *fait accompli*. One drop of Serbian blood could have been looked upon as atonement. Austria would have had it in her power to prevent the shedding of further blood and to enter upon mediation proposals. Russia's opinion that "Austria barks but does not bite" will now be invested with a new vitality.

With regard to the visit of Poincaré I venture most humbly to state that so far as I could observe the Emperor treated him very coldly and haughtily; this also struck the entire *entourage*. Those under the old gentleman at Headquarters are very little interested in the Entente with France, anyway, and are much more inclined to a monarchical alliance with Germany. The Emperor himself, so Baron Grünwald told me, is unsympathetic to the whole question of the friendship with France, and His Majesty is said often to have expressed himself to that effect. The death of old Prince Meshtchersky, the publisher of the *Grashdanin*,

which His Majesty reads daily, greatly prejudiced our cause, and the pro-German press lost in him one of its few supporters. His word at the present crisis would have had a powerful effect.

VON CHELIUS,
Lieutenant General and General of the Suite.

No. 292

The Ambassador at Paris to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

PARIS, *July 24, 1914.*[2]

At my conference with Minister of Justice, Mr. Bienvenu-Martin, representing the Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the Austro-Serbian conflict, I particularly emphasized the fact that the Imperial Government viewed the quarrel as a matter solely to be decided by the two participants, and that it fostered the hope that, like itself, the governments of the other Powers would strive most earnestly for the localization of the conflict.

The attitude here following the first sensations is already known to Your Excellency—a desire on their own part not to interfere. This desire, however, as is always the case in questions relating to the Balkans, is influenced by Russian considerations. Here it is understood clearly enough that the Vienna Cabinet found itself forced by the Serbian machinations to take energetic action, but its form is considered unnecessarily severe, and the demands in some instances to go so far that their acceptance does not appear compatible with the sovereignty and dignity of an independent nation. In the excessive character of the demands there lies an unfavorable significance, for it can not be expected that Russia could remain indifferent to such a humiliation of a Slav nation.

I stated as my purely personal opinion that I found it quite comprehensible that Austria, after her years of unpleasant experiences with Serbia, of late become worse than ever, should fail to measure the dignity of that nation by the standard she would apply to others. In my opinion, Austria-Hungary, far from desiring to set fire to Europe, was really doing a service toward the maintenance of peace, when she now took steps, after so many fruitless appeals to the obligations and the decency of her Serbian neighbor, to extinguish with a firm hand a brand so dangerous, not only to her own integrity but to the general peace. Beyond that I could only assert that the Vienna Cabinet had asked us for no advice, and that even less had we inspired it to make the rigorous move taken at Belgrade. But after its demands had been made public, we could but consider them absolutely justified.

Mr. Bienvenu-Martin, who is little acquainted with foreign affairs, had the Deputy Political Director Berthelot take part in the discussion. Both of them sought to learn from me whether the Austro-Hungarian *démarche* at Belgrade was to be considered merely as a warning, or, on the other hand, as an ultimatum, and, if so, whether there still remained an opportunity for negotiations on certain of the demands that Serbia could scarcely accept.

[1] From the corrected copy. [2] Sent July 26; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 28, a.m.

I avoided giving even a personal opinion on this point, and only called attention again to the fact that it was very important that the other Powers should refrain from interfering, as any stepping outside the fold of neutrality would necessarily have incalculable consequences, in view of the "*jeu des alliances.*"

v. SCHOEN.

No. 293

The Emperor to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

NEW PALACE, *July 28, 1914, 10 a.m.*[2]

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

After reading over the Serbian reply, which I received this morning, I am convinced that on the whole the wishes of the Danube Monarchy have been acceded to. The few reservations that Serbia makes in regard to individual points could, according to my opinion, be settled by negotiation. But it contains the announcement *orbi et urbi* of a capitulation of the most humiliating kind, and as a result, *every cause for war* falls to the ground.

Nevertheless, the piece of paper, like its contents, can be considered as of little value so long as it is not translated into *deeds*. The Serbs are Orientals, therefore liars, tricksters, and masters of evasion. In order that these beautiful promises may be turned to truth and facts, a *douce violence* must be exercised. This should be so arranged that Austria would receive a HOSTAGE (Belgrade), as a guaranty for the enforcement and carrying out of the promises, and should occupy it until the *petita* had ACTUALLY been complied with. This is also necessary in order to give the army, now UNNECESSARILY mobilized for the third time, the external *satisfaction d'honneur* of an ostensible success in the eyes of the world, and to make it possible for it to feel that it had at least stood on foreign soil. Unless this were done, the abandonment of the campaign might be the cause of a wave of bad feeling against the Monarchy, which would be dangerous in the highest degree. In case Your Excellency shares my views, I propose that we say to Austria: Serbia has been forced to retreat in a very humiliating manner, and we offer our congratulations. Naturally, as a result, EVERY CAUSE FOR WAR HAS VANISHED. But a GUARANTY that the promises WILL BE CARRIED OUT is unquestionably necessary. That could be secured by means of the TEMPORARY military occupation of a portion of Serbia, similar to the way we kept troops stationed in France in 1871 until the billions were paid. ON THIS BASIS, I am ready to MEDIATE FOR PEACE with Austria. Any proposals or protests to the contrary by other nations I should refuse regardless, especially as all of them have made more or less open appeals to me to assist in maintaining peace. This I will do in my own way, and as sparingly of Austria's NATIONALISTIC FEELING, and of the HONOR OF HER ARMS as possible. For the latter has already been appealed to on the part of the highest War Lord, and is about to respond to the appeal. Consequently it is absolutely necessary that it receive a visible *satisfaction d'honneur;* this is the *prerequisite* of my mediation. Therefore Your Excel-

[1] From the original letter in the handwriting of the Emperor which is in the archives. Cf. therewith the marginal annotation on the Serbian note of reply, No. 271.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 29, p.m.

lency will submit a proposal to me along the lines sketched out; which shall be communicated to Vienna.[1] I have had Plessen write along the lines indicated above to the Chief of the General Staff, who is entirely in accord with my views.

WILHELM I. R.

No. 294

The Consulate at Riga to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram 2. RIGA, *July 28, 1914.*[3]

Entrance to the harbor yesterday was barred until afternoon during the laying of contact mines. Later the Stettin steamer *Regina* was allowed to come in. The lights are extinguished, the railroad bridges occupied by troops, the soldiers have moved out of the camp at Kurtenhoff, the ice-breakers, *Peter the Great* and *Czar Michael*, have been ordered to Petersburg. Freight-cars are being refused to private individuals.

CONSULATE.

No. 295

The Administrator of the General Consulate at Moscow to the Foreign Office[4]

Telegram 4.
Urgent. MOSCOW, *July 27, 1914.*[5]

Mobilization alleged to be in process late this evening. Said to be at Kiev, Warsaw, Vilna. Officers of all branches of the service are constantly leaving from the Alexander (Moscow-Brest) station. The reservists of the First Hussars were called to the colors here last night. The Tver Dragoons here have received orders to join their outfit at once; if it should be gone, to follow it. It is said that three regiments in all have been mobilized here. Presumably the local Cossacks in addition. Seventh Grenadiers still here. Popular feeling very calm, not in the least hostile. Secret commission of higher officers from Petersburg has learned that working men are strongly opposed to mobilization and are determined to obstruct it wherever possible. This discovery is said to have made a very deep impression. Peasants interested exclusively in the harvest; mercantile element not anxious for war. Police here is not counted on as wholly reliable against possible labor disturbances. Troops kept strictly apart from working classes. Embassy informed.

HAUSCHILD.

[1] See Nos. 308 and 323.
[2] From the decodification.
[3] Filed at Riga July 28; arrived at the Foreign Office July 28 at 11.55 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, p.m. Communicated on the 28th of July to the General Staff, the Admiralty Staff, the Imperial Naval Office and the Ministry of War; sent by messengers at 5 p.m.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Dated July 27, filed at Moscow July 28 at 12.36 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, p.m. On the 28th of July communicated, in accordance with Zimmermann's instructions on the margin, to the General Staff, the Admiralty Staff, the Imperial Naval Office and the Ministry of War; sent out by messengers at 5 p.m.

No. 296

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 172. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

Odessa reports on the twenty-seventh instant: Many reserve officers being called to the colors, and alleged assembling of large quantities of artillery at the camp.

POURTALÈS.

No. 297

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 173. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 28, 1914.*[4]

The manner in which my Italian colleague talks to me shows me that Rome is far from satisfied with regard to Austria's intentions, and is, to the contrary, very suspicious that Austria really is considering territorial acquisitions. Marquis Carlotti asserts that the Vienna Cabinet has so far evaded any bold [5] declaration calculated to dissipate Italy's anxiety. Am earnestly attempting to quench the distrust of my Italian colleague, which is presumably being nourished here.

POURTALÈS.

No. 298

The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 44. SINAIA, *July 27, 1914.*[7]

His Majesty the King let Count Hutten-Czapski read two telegrams from Petersburg and Paris. According to the Roumanian Minister at Petersburg the impression prevails there that a war-spirit rules at Berlin. Sazonoff is said to want peace. The Emperor has supported him up to the present, but influential Panslavic and Serbophile party is so strong it is feared the Monarch may become undecided.

Paris Minister telegraphs he is under the impression that the Government does not want war at the present time.

King further told the Count that Russian Minister had three times expressly

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at St. Petersburg at 12.14 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.04 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, p.m. On the 28th of July communicated to the General Staff, the Admiralty Staff, the Imperial Naval Office and the Ministry of War; sent out by messengers at 5 p.m.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in Petersburg at 1.21 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, p.m. Communicated by Jagow on the 28th of July by telegram to the Ambassadors at Rome (No. 136) and Vienna (No. 177), after the effecting of minor alterations; telegrams to the Central Telegraph Office at 9 p.m.; sent out from there at 11.35 p.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna July 29 at 6 a.m.

[5] "bold", of the Jagow decodification altered to "no" in the telegrams to Rome and Vienna; decoded at Vienna as "allied."

[6] From the decodification.

[7] Filed at Sinaia July 27, arrived at the Foreign Office July 28, at 3.16 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, p.m.

stated to the King that Russian mobilization was only taking place along the Austrian, not the German, border. King assumes that Poklewski will ask him officially one of these days what Roumania will do if Russia attacks Austria. King will put the counter-question, is Russia going to attack Austria?

WALDBURG.

No. 299

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 173.
Confidential. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

Military reports concerning Russia so far known here only as rumors and not as yet confirmed.

Even according to General Moltke's view, categorical declaration at Petersburg might appear premature today. But perhaps Count Szapary, while avoiding any semblance of a threat, might mention the rumors to the Government there, and hint at the consequences.

Mr. Beldiman said on his return from Roumania that to make public the secret compact, without first preparing the nation for it, appeared to be impossible.

Roumania, too, must refrain from any provocation of Russia as long as the die is not cast.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 300

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg [3]

Telegram 130. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[4]

Agree absolutely with Your Excellency's speech.[5]

Please tell Mr. Sazonoff that I am grateful for his communication and for its conciliatory spirit, and further hope that Austria's declaration of disinterestedness will satisfy Russia and serve as a basis for further agreement.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 301

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 171. LONDON, *July 28, 1914.*[7]

The members of the local Austrian Embassy, including Count Mensdorff, have, in their talks with members of this Embassy and with me, never attempted the least concealment of the fact that Austria was solely concerned with the

[1] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.20 p.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 6 p.m.
[3] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.35 p.m.
[5] See No. 282.
[6] From the decodification. See No. 361.
[7] Filed in London at 12.58 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.45 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, p.m.

destruction of Serbia, and that the note was intentionally so constructed that it would have to be rejected. When the news that Serbia had submitted was published Saturday night by the *Central News*, these gentlemen were actually stunned. Count Mensdorff told me only yesterday in confidence that in Vienna they were absolutely set on war, as Serbia was to be "beaten to the earth." The same gentlemen have also stated that it was the intention to make a present of portions of Serbia to Bulgaria (and presumably also to Albania).[1] But I must earnestly request that you make no reference to these expressions at Vienna, as I do not want to hazard my friendly relations with Count Mensdorff. Whether these gentlemen have also expressed themselves to other persons in a smiliar fashion I do not know, but the assumption would not be unjustifiable that in this case it ought not to be merely a question of such harmless, pedagogical admonitions as those to which the lack of vigilance of the Polish gossiper Bilinski once gave cause.

I have been constantly and energetically standing up for the Austrian point of view here, and have explained to Sir E. Grey and Sir W. Tyrrell that the instinct of self-preservation alone was enough to cause Count Berchtold to take energetic measures, as he and Austria would otherwise have found themselves in an impossible situation. They, too, recognized that fact, and I believe that the unprejudiced attitude maintained up to the present by the local Government is based not least of all upon our confidential relations.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 302

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor[2]

VIENNA, *July 27, 1914.*[3]

Yesterday evening lively demonstrations in favor of Italy took place before the Italian Embassy here. At demonstrations that followed at a later hour of the night in front of the Rathaus, the crowd sang, together with Austrian and German patriotic songs, the Italian hymn *Marcia Reale.* Count Stürgkh informs me in confidence that these demonstrations in favor of Italy were instigated by him.

I took occasion to ask the Premier whether he had more closely considered the idea of showing any friendship to Italy in Austrian internal policy. Count Stürgkh told me that he was in the act of looking into the means by which the Italian university plan could be realized at the earliest possible time.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] It bears this marginal annotation by the Imperial Chancelor dated the 28th of July: "This duplicity of Austria's is intolerable. They refuse to give us information as to their program, state expressly that Count Hoyos' statements which discussed a partition of Serbia were a purely personal expression; at Petersburg they are lambs with not a wicked thought in their hearts, and in London their Embassy talks of giving away portions of Serbian territory to Bulgaria and Albania."

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 28, p.m. Communicated to the Ambassador at Rome on July 31, after minor alterations had been effected.

No. 303

The Prussian Minister at Karlsruhe to the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Imperial Chancelor) [1]

KARLSRUHE, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

In view of the threatening political situation, I announced my renunciation for the present of my leave at Cowes.

Should Your Excellency, however, consider my presence in England to be desirable, as I might be able to be useful in working through many influential friends, I should be ready to make the journey at any time.

Whether the war is to remain localized or not, depends undoubtedly, at present, principally upon the attitude of England. If Petersburg and Paris should receive a determined warning from London, they would hardly plunge themselves into the adventure of a great war.

We are paying bitterly for the fact that our policy in the past was not to preserve our good relations with the British Empire, and that since the peace of Shimonoseki it has often actually challenged the distrust of England. That could absolutely have been avoided, and our responsible statesmen of earlier days bear a heavy responsibility in this connection. In my opinion, it lay in our hands to prevent the Entente with the Dual Alliance Powers, and to preserve for ourselves and the Triple Alliance the friendship, or, at least, the benevolent neutrality, of the Britons.

Street demonstrations of a provocatory nature have so far not taken place here. A few rowdy persons have sung the "*Wacht am Rhein*" and "*Deutschland über Alles*" in front of some newspaper offices and cafés, but the Minister of the Interior knows nothing about the hostile demonstration in front of the Russian consulate at Mannheim, which was rumored from there. The Grand Ducal Government will prevent all such inflammatory demonstrations with the utmost energy.

Almost the entire press and public opinion take the stand that under the circumstances we are obliged to render our assistance to Austria, but according to my observations, there is no real enthusiasm for a war in support of our nearly half-Slav ally.

Nobody here is seriously counting on Italy's energetic support.

V. EISENDECHER.

No. 304

The English Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [3]

BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[4]

AIDE MÉMOIRE

Sir Edward Goschen has been instructed by Sir Edward Grey to ask His Excellency Mr. von Jagow whether he would be disposed to instruct the German representative in London to join with the representatives of Italy and France and Sir Edward Grey in a conference to be held in London at once, in order to endeavor

[1] From the corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 28, p.m.
[3] From the corrected copy [in English.]
[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 28, p.m.

to find an issue to the present complications. With this view, the representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburg and Belgrade should, in Sir Edward Grey's opinion, be authorized, in informing the Government to which they are accredited of the above suggestion, to request that, pending the results of the conference, all active military operations be suspended.

No. 305

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office [1]

BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

Count Berchtold has received the most binding assurances from the Bulgarian Government that Bulgaria will maintain an attitude of unconditional neutrality. In spite of the fact that Count Berchtold has informed King Carol and the Roumanian Government of this fact, His Majesty, like Mr. Bratianu, keeps repeating to Count Czernin that, according to the news they are receiving, Bulgaria is showing aggressive tendencies, which fact is quite out of the question.

Since Count Berchtold is convinced that the German Minister at Sofia is also in a position to report to his Government that the Bulgarian Government will remain peaceable, Count Berchtold requests me to suggest to the Secretary of State that it might be possible for him likewise to use his influence to pacify His Majesty King Carol and Mr. Bratianu in this matter.[3]

No. 306

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office [4]

BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[5]

Count Berchtold has received from Sofia the information that the Bulgarian Premier told our Minister that the Bulgarian Minister at Belgrade had telegraphed that the Montenegrin representative had stated to him that Montenegro would cooperate with Serbia.

In accordance with instructions, the Imperial and Royal Embassy has the honor of again requesting the Imperial German Government to do its best to influence King Nicholas and the Montenegrin Government to observe neutrality.

We should be grateful if during this attempt the German representative should indicate our inclination and readiness to give evidence of our friendly disposition toward the King's desires with regard to the consolidation of his dynasty and the welfare of his country.[6]

[1] From the corrected copy, not signed.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 21, p.m.
[3] See No. 316.
[4] From the corrected copy, not signed.
[5] Handed to the Foreign Office on July 28 by Baron Haymerle. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 28, p.m.
[6] See No. 322.

No. 307

The Imperial Chancelor to the Prussian Ministers accredited to the Federated German Governments [1]

Confidential BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

Your Excellency, p. p., will kindly make the following communication to the Government to which you are accredited:

In view of the facts which the Austro-Hungarian Government made public in its note to the Serbian Government, the last doubt that the bloody deed to which the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne and his wife fell victims was at least planned in connivance with members of the Serbian Government and army, must vanish. It was the result of the Greater-Serbia agitations, which for a number of years past have been a lasting disturbance both to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and to all Europe.

The Greater-Serbian chauvinism stood out in particularly striking form during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-control and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intervention of the Great Powers can be credited the fact that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary was at that time subjected on the part of Serbia, did not lead to war. The Serbian Government did not live up to the assurance of future good behavior which it gave at that period. Within the sight, at least with the tacit consent of official Serbia, the Greater-Serbia propaganda has continued to increase both in extent and intensity. It would be consistent neither with its dignity nor with its right to self-protection, for the Austro-Hungarian Government any longer to regard inactively the machinations on the other side of its border by which the security and the integrity of its territory are constantly threatened. In this state of affairs both the procedure as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government must be regarded as justified.

The reply of the Serbian Government to the demands which the Austro-Hungarian Government made on it on the twenty-third instant, through its representative at Belgrade, goes to show, in the meanwhile, that the ruling authorities in Serbia are not inclined to cease from their previous policy or their trouble-making activities. Thus there will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian Government to do, unless it is willing to make the final sacrifice of its position as a Great Power, but to enforce its demands by the use of heavy pressure, or, if need be, by resort to military measures.

A number of noisy individuals in Russia consider it to be the self-evident right and the duty of Russia actively to take the part of Serbia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The *Nowoje Wremja* even considers itself authorized to allege Germany's responsibility for the European conflagration which would result from the taking of such a step by Russia, because she did not influence Austria-Hungary to yield. In this, the Russian press is distorting facts to suit itself. It was not Austria-Hungary that evoked the conflict with Serbia;

[1] From the original typewritten draft with alterations in Jagow's handwriting. See the German White Book of May, 1915, p. 25, No. 2.

[2] Sent on the 28th of July by various methods to the Legations at Darmstadt, Karlsruhe, Munich, Stuttgart, Dresden, Weimar, Oldenburg and Hamburg. Also, on the 30th of July, to the foreign missions—with the exceptions of Paris, Petersburg and London—"for their guidance in conference," with the omission of the first and last sentences.

but it was Serbia, which, by unscrupulously favoring the Greater-Serbian aspirations, even in portions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, endangered the very existence of the latter and brought about conditions which ultimately found their expression in the crime at Serajevo. If Russia believes herself compelled to enter the conflict on behalf of Serbia, she certainly has a right to do so. But she must fully understand that by so doing she is making the Serbian efforts to undermine the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy her own, and that she alone will be responsible should a European war arise out of the Austro-Serbian affair, which all the other Great Powers desire to localize. This Russian responsibility is as plain as day, and is all the heavier inasmuch as Count Berchtold has officially announced to Russia that it (*sic*, for Austria-Hungary) wishes neither to acquire any Serbian territory or to encroach upon the status of the Kingdom of Serbia, but is solely anxious to put an end to the Serbian intrigues which endanger its existence.

The attitude of the Imperial Government in this matter is clearly indicated. The final object of the Panslavic agitations carried on against Austria-Hungary is, through the destruction of the Danube Monarchy, the breaking-up or the weakening of the Triple Alliance and, as a consequent result, the complete isolation of the German Empire. Accordingly, our most vital interests summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty of preserving Europe from a general war, if that is in any way possible, commands us at the same time to support those efforts which have as their object the localization of the conflict, faithful to the principles of that policy which we have now for more than forty-four years prosecuted in the interest of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In case, however, in contradiction to our hopes, the fire-brand should spread further, on account of Russia's interference, then, true to the obligations of our alliance, we should have to come to the assistance of the neighbor-Monarchy with all the power of the Empire. We should take to the sword only under compulsion, but should do so then with the calm conviction that we were in no way guilty of the misery that a war would necessarily bring to the nations of Europe.

v. Bethmann-Hollweg.

No. 308

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor [1]

Berlin, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

To Your Majesty:

I most humbly beg to report that I was compelled to make the *démarche* [3] commanded at Vienna by telegraph, as there is no longer any regular railroad connection with Vienna.

According to my most respectful opinion, it would be in suitable agreement with this move if Your Majesty would have the goodness to send a telegram to the Czar. Such a telegram, should a

[1] From the corrected copy in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.

[2] On the upper margin the annotation of the Emperor of the same day: "*Agreed. 10.15 p.m., July 28, 1914. W.*"

[3] See Nos. 293 and 323, the latter of which evidently was drafted before No. 308.

war prove to be inevitable, would throw the clearest light on Russia's responsibility. I most humbly take the liberty of appending a draft of such a telegram.[1] Count Pourtalès has been instructed to tell Mr. Sazonoff that Your Majesty is endeavoring to persuade Vienna to hold a frank conference with Petersburg for the purpose of explaining unambiguously and, it
Good. is to be hoped, in a manner satisfactory to Russia, the object and extent of Austria's procedure against Serbia. The declaration of war that has occurred in the meantime need make no difference.[2]

Your Majesty's most humble servant,

v. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 309

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [3]

Telegram 172. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[4]

Count Pourtalès was instructed to call Mr. Sazonoff's attention to the inevitable consequences of hostile Russian measures against us, but, on the other hand, to point out to him that the declaration relative to territorial disinterestedness made by Count Berchtold to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires should satisfy Russia and keep her from interfering. We believed that in that way a basis for an understanding had been found, and hoped, in view of our traditional relations, that war might be avoided. Pourtalès has answered to this: "Have just informed Sazonoff . . . conciliatory as it was yesterday." [5]

v. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 310

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 227. PARIS, *July 28, 1914.*[7]

I informed Under-Secretary of State Ferry yesterday that we could only mediate between Vienna and Petersburg. Ferry introduced the idea of mediation by the four Powers not immediately concerned. I stated, as purely my own personal opinion, that in mediating, every semblance of pressure on Vienna as well as any formal conference was to be avoided.

Today a conversation with Deputy Minister, who told me France had agreed to Sir Edward Grey's proposal, that Your Excellency had accepted in principle,

[1] See No. 335. [2] See No. 315.
[3] From the original draft. Copy in Jagow's handwriting.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 4.10 p.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 7.15 p.m.
[5] Here is inserted Pourtalès' telegram of the 27th of July (No. 282), with the omission of the sentence "In connection with . . . Minister of War."
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed in Paris at 2.04 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, p.m. Communicated on the 29th of July over the wire by Zimmermann to the Ambassadors at London, Petersburg, Vienna and Rome; telegrams (187, 138, 182, 140) to the Central Telegraph Office at 8.35 p.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna July 29 (*sic*) at 6 a.m.

but with regard to the form had made reservations of a nature similar to those I myself expressed yesterday. Minister thought that it would be easy to dispose of these questions as to form. Principal thing was the agreeably general goodwill and hurried handling of the matter. Here they think that the first stage of the mediation action should be to counsel Austria to moderation in her military operations, and to offer a guaranty by the Powers for Serbian atonement and good behavior. I again recommended, on my own responsibility, the required consideration for Austria's just necessities and sensibilities.

SCHOEN.

No. 311

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 118. VIENNA, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

Declaration of war sent by telegraph today at eleven o'clock to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 312

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 119. VIENNA, *July 28, 1914.*[4]

Count Berchtold requests me to give to Your Excellency once more his emphatic assurance, with reference to the final sentence in telegram 167 [5] that Austria-Hungary has not the slightest intention of occupying Lowtschen, in case Montenegro does not violate her neutrality toward the Monarchy.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 313

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 120.
Confidential. VIENNA, *July 28, 1914.*[7]

Count Berchtold thanks Your Excellency most kindly for the communication of the English mediation proposal and will very soon forward a reply to the Imperial Government. The Minister states now, however, that since the opening of hostilities on the part of Serbia and the ensuing declaration of war, he thinks that England's move was made too late.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Vienna at 4.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.39 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, p.m. A copy of the decodification was sent to the Emperor on the 28th of July.
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Filed at Vienna at 4.55 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, p.m.
[5] See No. 269.
[6] From the decodification. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 31, No. 18.
[7] Filed at Vienna at 4.55 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, p.m. Telegram submitted to the Emperor, returned by him July 29. Communication to the Ambassador at London as ordered by Imperial instructions on the margin was not made. See No. 277.

No. 314

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [1]

Telegram 185. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

If the British Government perceives its own chief interest to be the maintenance of the peace of Europe on the basis of the balance of power of the two groups, it can hardly expect us to go so far in our mediation activities as directly to attempt to compel [3] Austria to give in to Serbia. By so doing we should contribute to the undermining of the position of Austria-Hungary as one of the Great Powers, and to the alteration of the European balance of power to the disadvantage of the Triple Alliance. We are far removed, however, from perceiving in the Austro-Serbian conflict a test of strength between the two European groups. We consider the Austro-Hungarian procedure as nothing but a means of putting a final end to the Serbian provocations, which have at last become intolerable and which, for the third time within five years, again seriously endanger the peace of Europe. According to our view, all Europe has an equal interest in this.[4]

Furthermore, we are continuing to press our mediation activities at Petersburg, and hope to obtain results. I have confidence in Your Serene Highness being able to get Sir Edward Grey to see our point of view.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 315

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg [5]

Telegram 131. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[6]

We are constantly striving to persuade Vienna to have a frank discussion with Petersburg, with the object of making plain to Russia, in an unobjectionable and, it is to be hoped, satisfactory manner, the purpose and extent of the Austrian procedure in Serbia. The declaration of war that has occurred in the meantime need make no difference.[7]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the original draft. Zimmermann's copy with an alteration by Jagow.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 8.40 p.m.
[3] "compel" an alteration by Jagow from Zimmermann's original "persuade."
[4] After "in this" was originally written by Zimmermann: "As for the rest, Austria-Hungary has absolutely no intention of subjecting Serbia. She does not intend to infringe upon her status, but only desires to give Serbia a well-deserved lesson and to acquire assurances for her own peace in the future." This was later eliminated by Zimmermann himself.
[5] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 31, No. 16. See Nos. 343, 345 and 357.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9 p.m. The Chancelor communicated the text of his telegram to Pourtalès, to the Ambassadors at Vienna (176), London (186) and Paris (171) in telegrams sent off at the same hour. Arrived at the Embassy at Vienna July 29 at 6 a.m.
[7] Additional sentence later appended here by the Chancelor: "Abstention from Russian mobilization would materially lighten our labors." Afterward eliminated by him.

No. 316

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest [1]

Telegram 45. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

Mr. Beldiman has here expressed the fear of the Roumanian Government that Roumania might be prevented from the complete fulfilment of the obligations of her alliance by aggressive procedure on the part of Bulgaria.

Kindly inform King Carol and Mr. Bratianu that the Bulgarian Government has given Count Berchtold the most binding assurances [3] that it will remain strictly neutral. Neither, according to the reports of the Imperial Minister at Sofia, are there any plans in existence in Bulgaria directed against Roumania. Thus, in this matter, there should be no occasion for worry.

JAGOW.

No. 317

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest [4]

Telegram 44. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[5]

Kindly report continuously, if need be, by telegraph, on the attitude of the press there toward the conflict, and particularly observe whether any breaking away from Russia is noticeable.

JAGOW.

No. 318

The Minister at Sofia to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 39. SOFIA, *July 28, 1914.*[7]

Government here has given out absolutely no declaration of neutrality in writing. The Premier has told my Serbian colleague as well as myself verbally, that Bulgaria would remain neutral.

Yesterday the Russian Minister proposed to the Premier that all the Balkan nations should conclude a new Balkan alliance for the purpose of supporting Serbia. The Premier gave him a *curt*

[1] From the original. Draft in the handwriting of Bergen.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9 p.m.
[3] See No. 305.
[4] From the original; draft in Bergen's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9 p.m.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed at Sofia at 5 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.15 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 28, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, who, by marginal instructions, ordered its communication to the representatives at Vienna, Athens and Constantinople. The copy of the decodification submitted to the Emperor arrived back at the Foreign Office on the 29th of July. Michahelles' report had already been telegraphically communicated to the representatives at Vienna, Constantinople and Bucharest on the 28th of July (telegrams 178, 276, 47); to the Central Telegraph Office at 11.40 p.m. On the 29th of July it was also sent to the Ambassador at Rome (139); to the Central Telegraph Office at 8 p.m.

Good. *refusal*, and stated that *Bulgaria would not lift a finger for the benefit of Serbia.*

Greek colleague stated to the Premier that his country needed *Good.* peace, therefore *could not help Serbia*, and did not consider itself under any obligation to do so, in spite of the compact of alliance.

MICHAHELLES.

No. 319

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Stockholm [1]

Telegram 18.
Confidential. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

Swedish declaration of neutrality would probably render the possible future alteration of Sweden's attitude more difficult.

JAGOW.

No. 320

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Constantinople [3]

Telegram 275.
Confidential. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[4]

His Majesty has agreed to the proposal of the Grand Vizier. The compact should be concluded on the following basis:

1. Both Powers bind themselves to observe strict neutrality in the present conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

2. Should Russia enter upon active military intervention in the war and a *casus foederis* with respect to Austria-Hungary be thus forced on Germany, a *casus foederis* shall also exist for Turkey.

3. Germany will leave the military mission in Turkey in the event of war. Turkey is to assure the actual exercise of the supreme command by the military mission.[5]

4. Germany guarantees to Turkey as against Russia the possession of her present territories.

5. The treaty shall be in force for the purpose of the present Austro-Hungarian–Serbian conflict and for that of any possible international complications arising therefrom. In case no war should take place between Germany and Russia as a result of this conflict, the treaty automatically becomes inoperative.

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.15 p.m.
[3] From the original draft. Copy in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.30 p.m.
[5] In a draft in Zimmermann's handwriting of an Imperial report (of the Chancelor) to the Emperor, which was not sent, but which contains the articles of the proposed treaty very much as they are printed above, article 3 reads: "The German military mission will take over the supreme command of the Turkish army for the duration of the war." On the margin of this draft the Imperial Chancelor remarks, under date of July 28: "His Majesty has agreed to the basis herewith drafted. It is matter of some doubt to *me* whether number 3, so positively laid down, can be accepted by Turkey. Perhaps a formula which would assure the *actual* exercise of the supreme army command by the military mission would suffice." Zimmermann thereupon altered the article for the draft of the dispatch to Wangenheim to the form in which it is printed above.

I authorize Your Excellency to inaugurate the necessary transactions with the Grand Vizier. Margrave Pallavicini has made thorough reports to Vienna concerning your previous conferences with the Grand Vizier. In order to make sure of the strictest discretion in the future, I request that you say nothing for the present, even to your Austro-Hungarian colleague, concerning your transactions with the Grand Vizier.[1]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 321

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest[2]

Telegram 46.
For use. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[3]

Mr. Beldiman had told me of the information received by Mr. Bratianu, according to which Bulgaria was calling in her reservists and concentrating troops on the Roumanian border.

Mr. Michahelles telegraphs on this subject: "All possible reports . . . false and prejudiced."[4]

The Imperial Ambassador at Vienna reports the same thing.

JAGOW.

No. 322

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje[5]

Telegram 15. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[6]

According to statements of the Montenegrin representative at Belgrade, Montenegro is supposed to be considering cooperation with Serbia.[7]

Kindly urgently advise the King and Government there, in view of this rumor, while keeping the source of the report a secret, to support our efforts toward the localization of the conflict, as well as to remain neutral. Your Excellency will add that Austria-Hungary is prepared to respond to the King's desires with regard to the consolidation of his dynasty and the welfare of his country.

Austria-Hungary has declared to the Powers that she is seeking no territorial acquisitions in Serbia.[8]

JAGOW.

[1] See Nos. 411 and 508.
[2] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting.
[3] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.30 p.m.
[4] Here is inserted the second paragraph of Michahelles' telegram of July 27 (No. 251) up to the word "false", the words "and prejudiced" following.
[5] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.30 p.m.
[7] See No. 306.
[8] See Nos. 198, 199, 200 and 476.

No. 323

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 174.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

The Austro-Hungarian Government has distinctly informed Russia that it is not considering any territorial acquisitions in Serbia.[3] This agrees with Your Excellency's report to the effect that neither the Austrian nor the Hungarian statesmen consider the increase of the Slavic element in the Monarchy to be desirable. On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government has left us in the dark concerning its intentions, despite repeated interrogations. The reply of the Serbian Government to the Austrian ultimatum, which has now been received, makes it clear that Serbia has agreed to the Austrian demands to so great an extent that, in case of a completely uncompromising attitude on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government, it will become necessary to reckon upon the gradual defection from its cause of public opinion throughout all Europe.

According to the statements of the Austrian General Staff, an active military movement against Serbia will not be possible before the 12th of August. As a result, the Imperial Government is placed in the extraordinarily difficult position of being exposed in the meantime to the mediation and conference proposals of the other Cabinets, and if it continues to maintain its previous aloofness in the face of such proposals, it will incur the odium of having been responsible for a world war, even, finally, among the German people themselves. A successful war on three fronts cannot be commenced and carried on on any such basis. It is imperative that the responsibility for the eventual extension of the war among those nations not originally immediately concerned should, under all circumstances, fall on Russia. At Mr. Sazonoff's last conversation with Count Pourtalès the Minister already conceded that Serbia would have to receive her "deserved lesson." [4] At any rate the Minister was no longer so unconditionally opposed to the Austrian point of view as he had been earlier. From this fact it is not difficult to draw the conclusion that the Russian Government might even realize that, once the mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Army had begun, the very honor of its arms demanded an invasion of Serbia. But it will be all the better able to compromise with this idea if the Vienna Cabinet repeats at Petersburg its distinct declaration that she [5] is far from wishing to make any territorial acquisitions in Serbia, and that her military preparations are solely for the purpose of a temporary occupation of Belgrade and certain other localities on Serbian territory in order to force the Serbian Government to the complete fulfilment of her demands, and for the creation of guaranties of future good behavior—to which Austria-Hungary has an unquestionable claim after the experiences she has had with Serbia. An occupation like the German occupation of French territory after the Peace of Frankfort, for the purpose of securing compliance with the demands for war indemnity, is suggested. As soon as the Austrian demands should be

[1] From the original. Draft dictated by Stumm and corrected in his own handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 10.15 p.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 4.30 a.m. on the 29th of July. See Nos. 293 and 308.
[3] See Nos. 198 and 200.
[4] See No. 282.
[5] Thus in the original for "it."

complied with, evacuation would follow. Should the Russian Government fail to recognize the justice of this point of view, it would have against it the public opinion of all Europe, which is now in the process of turning away from Austria. As a further result, the general diplomatic, and probably the military, situation would undergo material alteration in favor of Austria-Hungary and her allies.

Your Excellency will kindly discuss the matter along these lines thoroughly and impressively with Count Berchtold, and instigate an appropriate move at St. Petersburg. You will have to avoid very carefully giving rise to the impression that we wish to hold Austria back. The case is solely one of finding a way to realize Austria's desired aim, that of cutting the vital cord of the Greater-Serbia propaganda, without at the same time bringing on a world war, and, if the latter cannot be avoided in the end, of improving the conditions under which we shall have to wage it, in so far as is possible.

Wire report.[1]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 324

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram 121. VIENNA, *July 28, 1914.*[3]

Count Berchtold begs me to bring the following matter to the knowledge of Your Excellency:

> Since, in accordance with the wish expressed by His Majesty our Most Gracious Master, Count Szögyeny is to be left at his post at Berlin until the 18th of August, and as Count Szögyeny himself has requested leave from the 19th of August on, his successor, Prince Hohenlohe, will arrive at Berlin on the 20th of August to take over the post. The Minister begs that His Majesty the Emperor and King be informed hereof and that he be asked whether this arrangement will be agreeable to His Majesty. *Yes.*
>
> TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 325

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome[4]

Telegram 137. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[5]

The Imperial Ambassador telegraphs: "Count Berchtold . . . toward the Monarchy."[6]

We are attempting to work for neutrality in Montenegro, and Vienna, too, has urgently requested us to do so.

JAGOW.

[1] See Nos. 377 and 388.
[2] From the decodification.
[3] From Vienna at 6.45 p.m.; to the Foreign Office at 10.30 p.m., July 28. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, returned by him to the Foreign Office on the 29th. The Under-Secretary of State telegraphed to Vienna July 30: "To telegram 121. Arrangement agreeable to His Majesty. Zimmermann." (Berlin, telegram 199.)
[4] From the original draft in the handwriting of Jagow.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.35 p.m.
[6] Here is inserted Tschirschky's telegram of July 28 (No. 312).

No. 326

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

Private letter.
Confidential.

VIENNA, *July 26, 1914.*[2]

DEAR MR. VON JAGOW:

My best thanks for your friendly letter of yesterday concerning the Italian compensation question. I can assure you that no one is more convinced than I of the necessity of holding Italy firmly to the Triple Alliance, and that with the utmost perseverance and resolution I am doing everything that is possible to persuade the people here, and to turn them from their useless contention with Italy about the interpretation of Article 7 and toward some practical decision. But the Austrians will always remain Austrians. Pride and folly together are not easily or speedily overcome! I know them too well. You will have received my telegram of today [3] announcing that Avarna has declared here that the Italian Government intends, in the event of an armed conflict between the Monarchy and Serbia, to maintain a friendly attitude in consonance with the obligations of the alliance.[4] Avarna himself confirmed this to me today, and assured me that Italy had no idea of breaking away from the Triple Alliance. I have repeatedly and exhaustively discussed this subject—also that of compensation—confidentially with my good friend Avarna. Indeed, he is kept *au courant* by San Giuliano with regard to all the discussions with Flotow. I can not divest myself of the impression—and I have reason to believe that Avarna shares it with me—that San Giuliano is attempting, by means of the arguments he is conducting with Flotow and with Berlin, to set there the highest possible value on his neutral attitude during an Austro-Serbian conflict. What Avarna gets from Rome always sounds much calmer than what is said to us, and this last declaration of the Roman Cabinet, referred to above, is a new evidence of this fact. It is in this way that Berlin's surprise at Italy's favorable [4] attitude can be explained.

All this should not in any way prevent us from working with every means, particularly in our own interest, to arrive finally at a practical and feasible way out of the compensation difficulty. Yesterday, as a result of telegram 136,[5] I first went to work on Baron Macchio, in order to be able to influence Berchtold through him. I argued to him that San Giuliano was not to be blamed for being dissatisfied with the Austrian declaration that no acquisition of territory was intended, as this declaration had not been made in any binding form. Austria ought at last to drop the theoretical contention over the interpretation of Article 7. More than that, I would suggest for his consideration that Germany did not share the Austrian view on the subject. They must come to some practical decision, for they could not have any doubt that, if occasion offered, Italy would surely step forward with demands for compensation, no matter if their reasonable foundation were denied in theory here. Baron Macchio did give in so far as to admit that the discussions over the interpretation of Article 7 were leading no-

[1] From the corrected copy in Tschirschky's handwriting.
[2] Time of arrival at Berlin not known; first reached the Central Bureau of the Foreign Office on the 9th of February, 1915.
[3] See No. 212.
[4] Question-mark by Jagow in the margin.
[5] See No. 150.

where. It was also evident to him that Austria would have to grant Italy compensation if Austria were to increase her own territory. "But the Italians cannot ask that we cut the compensation out of our own flesh," he added. The old Emperor, and likewise military element, would never surrender the Trentino. I can only figure that as a POSSIBILITY after a great and victorious war, in case Austria were to receive absolute *carte blanche* in the Balkans. If the Italians hope to get the Trentino in exchange for a minor territorial extension of Austria in the Balkans—and perhaps, even Valona which, as a matter of fact, I do not believe they honestly want—they are deceiving themselves, and it seems to me that we should destroy these illusions at Rome. Stolberg, whom I also sent to Hoyos as an advance agent in the compensation matter, as Hoyos has for the time being the greatest influence with Berchtold, has gained exactly the same impression from his conferences.

I have also discussed this question today with Berchtold and General von Conrad, as you will have seen from my telegram of today,[1] and my very decided statement that they did not have Germany on their side here in the question of interpretation, made a serious impression, particularly on Conrad. The worst of it is that the Vienna interpretation of Article 7 is an heirloom from the so-called "great" Ährenthal, who had whole volumes of international legal opinions[2] published as a foundation for it, and Berchtold shies at sacrificing this "legacy" of his renowned predecessor. Conrad, who has no such scruples, realizes that the Italians will have to be given something, and he remarked quite confidingly that he should make no objection if the Italians should be invited to occupy Montenegro. I made no reference to this remark in my official telegram, as it escaped him lightly in the course of the conversation, and he probably would not like to be nailed down to it.

As a purely personal suggestion, I proposed to Macchio, as well as to Berchtold and Conrad, that they should state to Italy—and do so without referring to Article 7, in order not to have to give up their theoretical standpoint—that Austria recognizes Italy's right to compensation in the event of the Monarchy extending its territory in the Balkans. Avarna, also, approved of this as a way out. More than that Italy can not demand, for to my knowledge there is nothing in the Triple Alliance compact defining where these compensations shall lie or how large they shall be. That would have to be determined by the negotiations. Besides, Avarna *now* has instructions to discuss the compensation question directly with Berchtold. I should consider it very advantageous if Austria should begin by making the above declaration, as at Rome, too, they hesitate at the idea of direct transactions, for the reason that they consider agreement on the subject of the interpretation of Article 7 an impossibility, and simply expect an increase of friction.

July 28. Yesterday again I had a conference of an hour and a half with Count Berchtold and Count Forgach on the question, at which I talked as peremptorily as you can possibly imagine. In the end Count Berchtold exclaimed: "I see just what the situation is. I am Shylock, who insists on his pledge, and yet effects nothing." At this conference I think I met with success in so far as they will now take the initiative here for a conference with Italy.

[1] See No. 212.

[2] Exclamation-point by Jagow in the margin.

After I reached home, Avarna called on me. Appealing to our personal friendship and with an URGENT PLEA NOT TO BETRAY HIM, he gave me the following information. He had received instructions at first to discuss the compensation question here, but received word that day not to do so, as in Rome they expected nothing but resulting friction, which they wished to avoid. At the same time he had received from San Giuliano news of a telegram to Bollati in which the latter was instructed to urge at Berlin that the compensation question be pushed by us at Vienna. I told Avarna that at the order of my Government I was striving here in every way possible for a solution of the question from the Italian point of view.

This morning Count Berchtold and Count Forgach had breakfast with me. The latter told me that it had been decided, after my conference with Count Berchtold and with himself yesterday, to accept our views.[1] In the meantime a conference between Your Excellency and Count Szögyeny had taken place, at which Your Excellency had made a proposal of practically the same sort concerning a declaration to be made by Austria as I had recently made.[2] This proposal has now been accepted. This afternoon Count Forgach read me the dispatch he is sending to Count Szögyeny on the subject, which goes exhaustively into the whole story of the transactions. Count Szögyeny will read this dispatch to you. It is to be hoped that the Italians will now be satisfied by the Austrian declaration! As Count Forgach told me, Mr. von Mérey protested up to the last moment against any agreement to the Italian demands,[3] which he characterizes as chantage. The principal thing is that the matter is settled for the present—it is to be hoped so, at least—by our bridging over the chasm between Vienna and Rome, and that the Triple Alliance remains intact.

You must excuse the length of this letter. It was not intended to be of such an extent; it has grown into "historical" length.

With very best wishes,

Your always truly devoted

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

Count Berchtold is in very good spirits, and is proud of the countless telegrams of congratulation that are coming to him from every portion of *Germany*!

No. 327

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[4]

Telegram 123. VIENNA, *July 28, 1914.*[5]

Austrian Consul General Odessa reports: Mobilization order for military districts Odessa, Kiev, Warsaw issued but not published.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] See No. 328.
[2] Marginal annotation by Jagow: "Nonsense!"
[3] Jagow, in the margin: "Well, yes!"
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Vienna July 28, 9.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 29, 12.02 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, a.m. In accordance with marginal instructions by Zimmermann, communicated on the 29th of July to the General Staff, Admiralty Staff, Imperial Naval Office and Ministry of War; sent by messengers at 10.15 a.m.

No. 328

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 122. VIENNA, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

Brought His Majesty's commission [3] to the attention of Count Berchtold at once.

As a result of my very serious conference of an hour and a half yesterday with Count Berchtold and Count Forgach, and of the urgent representations made, both are convinced that our views must be accepted. Count Szögyeny will receive today an exhaustive dispatch in which the following instructions to Mr. von Mérey are repeated for the benefit of Your Excellency:

> As had already been stated to the Duke d'Avarna, we have absolutely no intention of acquiring any territory.
>
> Should we, however, find ourselves forced, against our expectations, to undertake an occupation of Serbian territory that could not be described as temporary, we should be ready, in THIS CASE, to enter upon an EXCHANGE OF VIEWS with Italy. *They should do it at once!*
>
> On the other hand, we expect from Italy that that Kingdom will not only not hinder the allies in the moves necessary to attain their objects, but will, on the contrary, continue to maintain with regard to us the friendly attitude of an ally, as promised.

Count Forgach read the whole dispatch to me, which Count Szögyeny is likewise to bring to the attention of Your Excellency in its entirety.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

Admiral Haus, Austrian Naval Commander in Chief, informed my naval attaché as absolutely secret, that he had been informed from Vienna that an agreement with Italy had been arrived at according to which Austria was to be given a free hand in Serbia and Italy was to be given a free hand in Albania in return. *W.*

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Vienna at 9.10 p.m., July 28; arrived at the Foreign Office July 29 at 12.02 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, a.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor on July 29; returned by him to the Foreign Office the same day. Annotation by the Imperial Chancelor on the 30th of July after seeing the Emperor's marginal annotations: "Very remarkable statement in the marginal annotation of His Majesty. v. B. H." Section "As a result of my . . . an ally, as promised," of Tschirschky's telegram was telegraphically communicated by Jagow on the 29th of July to the Ambassador at Rome, after the effecting of minor alterations; to the Central Telegraph Office at 11 a.m.

[3] See No. 267.

No. 329

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 125. VIENNA, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

Count Szécsen reports English Ambassador, Sir Francis Bertie, told him:

Active interference by Russia would bring about participation by Germany and France.

England would look on, but, if France were threatened with *destruction*, would have to join in.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 330

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 124. VIENNA, *July 28, 1914.*[4]

Austrian Consul General Kiev reports on the twenty-seventh: State of extraordinary defense announced for the southeastern railroads, and cessation of freight traffic arranged for from tomorrow on, but not yet ordered. Kiev military camp entirely deserted. Troops moved in part to winter quarters, in part held in readiness at the station.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 331

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 126. VIENNA, *July 28, 1914.*[6]

Austro-Hungarian military attaché Petersburg reports on the twenty-seventh: Preparatory mobilization measures in European Russia much as Minister of War stated to German colleague, though without any special exception in favor of the German border.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Vienna July 28 at 10.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.50 a.m., July 29; receipt stamp: July 29, a.m. A copy of the decodification was sent to the Emperor July 29.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed at Vienna July 28 at 9.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.50 a.m., July 29; receipt stamp, July 29, a.m. In accordance with marginal instructions by Zimmermann, communicated on July 29 to the General Staff, Admiralty Staff, Imperial Naval Office and Ministry of War; sent by messengers at 10.15 a.m.

[5] From the decodification.

[6] Filed at Vienna July 28 at 10.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.50 a.m., July 29; receipt stamp: July 29, a.m. In accordance with marginal instructions by Zimmermann, communicated on July 29 to the General Staff, Admiralty Staff, Imperial Naval Office and the Ministry of War; sent by messengers at 10.15 a.m.

No. 332

The Czar to the Emperor [1]

PETERHOF PALACE, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Telegram (unnumbered).

HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR, NEW PALACE.

Am glad you are back. In this most serious moment I appeal to you to help me. An *ignoble* [3] war has been declared to a *weak* country. The *indignation* in Russia, *shared fully by me*, is *enormous*.[4] I foresee that very soon I shall be *overwhelmed* by the *pressure* brought upon me, and be *forced* to take extreme measures which will *lead to war*. To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war, I beg you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to *stop* your *allies* [5] from *going too far*. NICKY.[6]

In what does that consist? *Ally!*

A confession of his own weakness, and an attempt to put the responsibility on my shoulders. The telegram contains a concealed threat and an order-like summons to tie the hands of our ally. In case Your Excellency sent off my telegram yesterday evening, it must have crossed this one. We shall see now, what effect mine has. The expression "ignoble war" does not indicate any sense of monarchical unity in the Czar, but rather a Panslavic conception; i. e., worry over a capitis diminutio in the Balkans in case of an Austrian victory. This might well first be waited for in its collective result. There will always be time later for negotiation and eventually for mobilization, for which now Russia has no reason at all. Instead of summoning us to check our allies, His Majesty should turn to the Emperor Franz Joseph and deal with him in order to learn His Majesty's intentions. Should not copies of both the telegrams be sent to His Majesty the King at London for his information? The Socialists are making anti-military demonstrations in the streets; that must not be tolerated, in any event, not now; in case they are repeated I shall proclaim a state of martial law and have the leaders one and all tutti quanti locked up. Instruct Loebell and Jagow about this. We can tolerate no Socialist propaganda now! WILHELM.

[1] From the Telegraph Office copy [in English]. This crossed No. 335.

[2] Filed at Peterhof Palace, July 29, at 1 a.m.; arrived at the Telegraph Office at the New Palace at 1.10 a.m. July 29. On the telegram the Emperor's annotation: "New Palace, July 29, 1914, 7.30 a.m."

[3] "ignoble" twice underscored by the Emperor, after it an exclamation-point by the Emperor.

[4] "enormous" twice underscored by the Emperor.

[5] "allies" thrice underscored by the Emperor.

[6] Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 34, No. 22, II. For reply see No. 359.

No. 333

The Administrator of the General Consulate at Moscow to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 5. PETERSBURG (*sic*), *July 28, 1914.*[2]

Mobilization moving forward this afternoon.

Men reported being called to the colors from all sides. Two sources report troop transports from the Volga, especially Kasan. Volga shipping very busy with it. According to rumors, troops are also being moved to the west from the Caucasus. Freight traffic westward of Moscow officially reduced to one half. Yaroslavl [3] Regiment transferred here, aviators being mobilized here. 1500 men and 352 horses (artillery?) are expected in the next few days. Embassy informed. Confirmation of receipt would be useful.[4]

HAUSCHILD.

No. 334

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg [5]

Telegram 132. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[6]

Kindly transmit the following telegram from His Majesty the Emperor to the Czar in the quickest manner.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

(Here follows enclosure.[7])

No. 335

The Emperor to the Czar [8]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*[9]

It is with the gravest concern that I hear of the impression which the action[10] of Austria against Serbia is creating[11] in your country. The unscrupulous agitation that has been going on in Serbia for years has resulted in the outrageous crime to which Archduke[12] Franz Ferdinand fell a victim. The spirit that led Serbians

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed at Petersburg July 28, at 7.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 29 at 1.15 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, a.m. Communicated at Bergen's order to the General Staff, Admiralty Staff, Imperial Naval Office and Ministry of War on the 30th of July; sent by messengers at 8 a.m.

[3] In the decodification wrongly "Yaroslovl."

[4] Telegraphic confirmation of receipt sent to the Consulate General at Moscow; to the Central Telegraph Office at 8 p.m., July 29.

[5] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.

[6] To the Central Telegraph Office July 29, at 1.45 a.m.

[7] See No. 335.

[8] From the original. Draft [in English] in Stumm's handwriting; on it a note by the Imperial Chancelor: "Request immediate copy sent me (for His Majesty). v. B. H. 28." This copy of the Stumm draft, also among the archives, underwent numerous alterations in the Emperor's handwriting. It bears on the upper margin the note by the Emperor: "July 28, 10.45 p.m." Crossed with No. 332. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 33, No. 22, I. Cf. further, No. 233.

[9] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.45 a.m. July 29, see No. 334, note 6.

[10] "action" an alteration by the Emperor from "proceedings" in the draft of Stumm.

[11] Emperor: "is creating" instead of Stumm's: "are producing."

[12] "archduke" added by the Emperor.

to murder [1] their own king and his wife still dominates [2] the country. You will doubtless agree with me that we both, you and me, have a common interest, as well as all Sovereigns, to insist that all the persons morally responsible for the dastardly murder should receive their deserved punishment. In this politics play no part at all.

On the other hand I fully understand how difficult it is for you and your Government to face the drift of your public opinion. Therefore, with regard to the hearty and tender friendship which binds us both from long ago with firm ties, I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive to a satisfactory understanding with you.[3] I confidently hope you will help me in my efforts to smoothe [4] over difficulties that may still arise.

Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin

WILLY.[5]

No. 335A

The Consul General at Warsaw to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 14. WARSAW, *July 28, 1914.*[7]

Imperial Bank removes gold supply, accepts exchange on Polish localities only provisionally. Railroads placed under military control, transportation of troops continues. Commissariat removing supplies.

BRÜCK.

No. 336

The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office [8]

Telegram 220. ATHENS, *July 28, 1914.*[9]

Learn that Bulgarian Minister has stated to Mr. Streit that Bulgaria would remain neutral in the Austro-Serbian conflict.[10]

BASSEWITZ.

[1] "that . . . murder" an alteration by the Emperor from Stumm's "of the people that murdered."

[2] Emperor: "dominates" instead of Stumm's "rules."

[3] "You will doubtless . . . understanding with you" by the Emperor altered from Stumm's "I have no doubt you will agree with me that it is a common interest of you and me and, in fact, of all monarchs, that all that are morally responsible for the outrage should receive the deserved punishment. Politics ought to be left out entirely in this case. But I quite understand the difficulty of your position and your Government in the face of your public opinion and considering the ties of heartiest and tenderest friendship that bind us together, I am doing my utmost to get Austria to come to a straight and plain understanding with you."

[4] Emperor: "to smoothe" instead of Stumm's "by smoothing."

[5] "Willy" added by the Emperor.

[6] From the decodification.

[7] Filed at Warsaw July 28 at 6.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 29 at 2 a.m. Communicated on July 29 at 1.45 p.m. to the General Staff, Admiralty Staff, Imperial Naval Office and Ministry of War.

[8] From the decodification.

[9] Filed in Athens July 28 at 9 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.45 a.m. July 29; receipt stamp: July 29, a.m. Telegraphically communicated by Jagow, July 29, to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest; to the Central Telegraph Office at 10.40 a.m.

[10] See No. 381.

No. 337

The Military Plenipotentiary at the Russian Court to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 174. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

For His Majesty.

Prince Troubetzkoi of the *entourage* of the Czar expressed himself to me today as follows: Now that the Serbian reply has been made public, one is compelled to *recognize the satisfactory intention of Serbia* to comply wholly and completely with the desires of Austria, otherwise Serbia would not have replied in so friendly a fashion to Austria's unbelievably sharp note, but would simply have . . .[3] it. Serbia simply can not accept both the contested points without running the risk of a revolution, but will submit them to *arbitration.*[4] This is absolutely fair, and *Austria* would be assuming a *heavy responsibility* in giving rise to a European conflict by not recognizing *Serbia's attitude.* When I answered that the responsibility would rest on Russia,[5] which certainly had nothing to do with the conflict, Prince Troubetzkoi said: We do not love the Serbs in the least, but they are our *Slavic*[6] brothers, and we cannot leave *our brethren*[7] in the lurch. Austria could *annihilate them*, and that we can not permit. I replied that Austria did not want to acquire a single tract of land, but only to be let alone. He answered that war is war, and Austria's superiority might crush them; and what might come afterward could not be foreseen. We certainly hope, he said, that it will not come to the frightful collision of the Great Powers, which would automatically follow, and in which oceans of blood would be shed, and we believe *that the German Emperor will give his ally Austria the good advice not to over-draw the bow,* to recognize Serbia's good intentions from the promises she has given, and to submit the contested points to the decision of the Powers or

That was to be expected.

Austria can not agree to this. That is what worried me after reading the Serbian reply.

Right.

Murderers of kings and princes!

Won't.

These are phrases to throw the responsibility on me. I refuse it!

[1] From the copy of the decodification prepared for the Emperor and returned by him to the Foreign Office on the 29th of July.
[2] Filed at Petersburg July 28, arrived at the Foreign Office July 29 at 3.42 a.m.
[3] Cipher-group incomprehensible.
[4] In the margin question-mark and exclamation-point by the Emperor.
[5] "right" on the right-hand margin in the original.
[6] "Slavic" thrice underscored by the Emperor.
[7] "brethren" twice underscored by the Emperor.

the *Hague Court of Arbitration.*[1] The political authorities at Vienna need counsel, for the Emperor is too old to be able to judge clearly in a matter of such importance, the heir to the throne too inexperienced; and here at Petersburg they had learned all they wanted of Count Berchtold's weakness. He added: The best service friendship can do is often to give the advice not to do a thing. The return of your Emperor has made us all feel easier, for we trust in His Majesty and want no war, nor does the Emperor Nicholas. It would be of advantage if the two Monarchs would try to *come to an understanding by telegraph.*

That is the opinion of one of the most influential men at Headquarters, and probably the opinion of the entire *entourage.*

CHELIUS.

Has been done! As to whether an understanding will follow, I have my doubts.

No. 338

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram 177. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 28, 1914.*[3]

Sazonoff tried today to convince me that Serbia's note in reply contained practically everything that Austria could demand from Serbia. So, if Austria declared the note to be unsatisfactory, it was a proof that she wanted war under all circumstances. I declined in friendly but determined fashion to discuss the note, by referring to the familiar German point of view that the affair was exclusively an affair of Austria's and Serbia's. Minister then made another appeal for my cooperation in trying to induce the Imperial Government to participate in action for mediation. I replied that I had already transmitted to Your Excellency all the matter which could be of value in aiding my Government to come to any decision in this direction, and had especially informed you about Sazonoff's desire to find some way of satisfying Austria's just demands, sparing in so far as possible the rights of Serbian sovereignty, and that I could do no more. Whether my Government would accept Sir Edward Grey's proposition for a conference *à quatre,* I did not know, but I was sure that the worst method of persuading Germany to take part in a move for mediation was that adopted by the Russian press in trying to make bad blood between Germany and Austria. Every stupid attempt to sow the seeds of distrust between us and Austria was destined to failure in advance, and could only harm the cause of peace. Minister would therefore do well to repress such proceedings. I furthermore pointed out to the Minister that we had received reliable information which left no doubt that military preparations were extending far beyond the limits announced to our military attaché by

[1] "Hague Court of Arbitration" twice underscored by the Emperor.
[2] From the decodification.
[3] Filed in Petersburg July 28 at 8.12 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 29 at 6.15 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, a.m.

the Minister of War. This I could only explain to myself by the assumption that the chiefs of the military districts were perhaps carrying the preparations for which they were responsible further than was intended here at Petersburg. In any event, I found myself obliged again to point out, and as seriously as possible, the great danger that might arise at the present critical moment from the fact that far-reaching military preparations were being undertaken. At my request, my Italian and English colleagues have declared themselves to be willing likewise to call Sazonoff's attention to this danger.

POURTALÈS.

No. 339

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

At the urgent desire of the military attaché, Major von Eggeling, who is anxious to have full reports concerning the military situation reach Berlin as soon as possible, I am this evening sending the Imperial messenger to the frontier, with instructions to return here immediately.

As I have but a short time free before he departs on his mission, I shall have to confine myself to making a brief report to Your Excellency on the local situation and feeling.

Since yesterday a very striking change has taken place in Mr. Sazonoff's attitude, which fact has also been confirmed by my colleagues. The declaration that Austria had no intention of making any territorial acquisitions, and our energetic refutation of the insinuation that we had prodded Austria on with the idea of fomenting a conflict, has *plainly had a quieting effect* here.

Then the mobilization must be stopped.

They are also breathing easier because of the fact that almost forty-eight hours have already passed since the unsatisfactory reply from Serbia was received by Austria-Hungary, without any news of an Austrian advance into Serbia. They had evidently firmly counted here on the assumption that the refusal of Serbia to accede to the demands of Austria would immediately result in the outbreak of hostilities.

Mr. Sazonoff is now evidently striving to find a way out. Lately he has even recognized the *justice of* the Austrian procedure against Serbia *in principle*, but still continues to feel hopeful that Austria-Hungary might be willing to *moderate* the form of her demands *to a certain extent.* I have told the Minister that I could *offer him no prospect* of this *at all*, and could only advise him, in

No!

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Sent July 27; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 29. Sent to the Emperor July 30, who, through marginal instructions, ordered its communication to Vienna, London and Paris, which, nevertheless, was not attended to; came back from the Emperor to the Foreign Office July 31.

case he believed he had reason to hope, as a result of his conversations with Count Szapary, *to address himself to Vienna direct.* *Yes.*

Since the Minister's conference yesterday with my Austro-Hungarian colleague, the local Government has evidently been attempting to consider the situation as improved, and to use its influence toward quieting matters down. The press has apparently received a *mot d'ordre* to discuss our *declaration to the effect that we had not been egging Austria on, as a reassuring sign.* *That goes without saying.*

I learn from banking circles that the distinct improvement in the tone of the exchange today is to be traced to the influence of the Government. The Imperial Bank and the Ministry of Finance intervened with the exchange to this purpose. *How childish!*

The conference to which the Minister of War invited the military attaché, Major Eggeling, last evening, was likewise evidently intended to serve the purpose of pacification.

In general, there is *little war enthusiasm to be remarked here, and it might be difficult* [1] *for the Government at the present moment to prove an assertion* that it was being *carried away* [2] *by public opinion.*

The march through the streets of the troops recalled from the camp at Krasnoje Selo is, as I have taken the trouble to convince myself, viewed by the people *with the greatest indifference*, without anybody's even *thinking* of giving *the soldiers an ovation.*

Late last night, it is true, they say that there were a few nationalistic manifestations on the Nevski Prospect. In general, however, one gets the impression that the public is in a *dejected mood.* *Good.*

Last night there was apparently another *collision with the working people.* It is difficult to learn anything definite about this, as no news on this subject is allowed any longer to be published. But one could plainly hear shooting going on for some time in a quarter removed from the center of the city.

F. Pourtalès.

No. 340

The Imperial Chancelor to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [3]

Berlin, *July 29, 1914.*

Is it not necessary to send another telegram to Vienna, stating pointedly that we regard the manner in which Vienna is handling the compensation question with Rome as absolutely unsatisfactory, and that we rest the responsibility for the attitude that Italy may assume in the event of war directly on Vienna's shoulders? If Vienna threatens in this fashion to blow up the Triple Alliance on the eve of a possible European conflagration, the whole alliance will begin to totter. Vienna's

[1] "difficult" twice underscored by the Emperor.
[2] "carried away" twice underscored by the Emperor.
[3] Memorandum in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor, now in the archives.

declaration that in case of the permanent occupation of parts of Serbian territory, she will come to an arrangement with Italy is, furthermore, in direct opposition to the assurances of her territorial disinterestedness given at Petersburg. The statements made to Rome are certainly known at Petersburg. As her ally we cannot support any double-faced policy.

I consider this to be necessary. Otherwise we cannot mediate any longer at Petersburg, and shall find ourselves completely entangled in Vienna's tow-rope. I do not want that, nor do I want to put myself in danger of being accused of double-dealing.

In case you have no objections to offer, I would request that an appropriate telegram be submitted to me as soon as possible.[1]

v. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 341

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris [2]

Telegram 172.
Urgent. BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[3]

Reports of French preparations for war are becoming more frequent.[4] Kindly take up the matter with the French Government and call its attention to the fact that such activities would force us to take measures for self-protection. We should have to proclaim a state of "risk of war," which, although it would not yet mean mobilization or the calling in of any reserves to the colors, would nevertheless increase the tension. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 342

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg [5]

Telegram 134. BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[6]

Kindly call Mr. Sazonoff's serious attention to the fact that further continuation of Russian mobilization measures would force us to mobilize, and in that case a European war could scarcely be prevented.[7]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] See No. 361.
[2] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 32, No. 19.
[3] To the Central Telegraph Office at 12.50 p.m.
[4] Of the reports of the situation which the Grand General Staff provided daily from July 27 until August 1, 1914, those of the 27th and 28th of July are not among the records of the Foreign Office. Cf. herewith the German White Book of June, 1919, Supp. II, small edition, pp. 73 and 74, large edition, p. 52; for report of situation on July 29, see No. 372. Moreover, a telegraphic report from the Minister at Berne arrived on the 27th of July (from Berne July 27, 1.40 p.m., Berlin Foreign Office at 3.27 p.m.) to the effect "that French 14th Corps has broken off maneuvers and returned to garrison. Romberg." Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 28, No. 9.
[5] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 12.50 p.m.
[7] See Nos. 378 and 401.

No. 343

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 183.
Urgent.

St. Petersburg, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Argued subjects of telegrams 130 and 131 [3] just now with Sazonoff. They made a visibly good impression. Minister remarked, however, that up to the present there were unfortunately no existing evidences that Vienna was preparing to enter upon the road of direct conferences with St. Petersburg.[4] Mr. Schebeko, who had received instructions in regard to this matter, had so far made no report concerning any conversation with persons in authority, and Count Szapary, too, stated that he had received no instructions. Consequently Austria's good faith was questionable.

Moreover, Austria had mobilized eight corps, and this measure must be regarded as in part directed against Russia. As a result Russia found herself compelled to mobilize the military districts on the Austrian frontier. The order for this was to be given today. When I made most earnest protest against these measures, Minister sought to convince me that in Russia mobilization was far from meaning war, as it did among the western European nations; that the Russian army would doubtless be able to remain under arms for weeks to come without crossing the frontier. Russia wanted to avoid war, if it were in any way possible. I replied that these statements were not sufficient to satisfy me. The danger of every preparatory military measure lay in the counter-measures of the other side. It was obvious that the general staffs of the possible opponents of Russia would not be willing to sacrifice the advantage of getting a start over Russia in the matter of mobilization, and would press for counter-measures. I earnestly begged him to consider this peril. Mr. Sazonoff assured me most solemnly once again that not the least thing was to happen to us. I replied with emphasis that, while the idea of a threat was far from my mind, he was acquainted with the obligations of our alliance with Austria.

Pourtalès.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Petersburg July 29 at 1.58 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 29 at 2.52 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m. Regarding communication to the Emperor, see No. 399. Pourtalès' telegram is wrongly dated July 28 in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of February 26, 1916.
[3] See Nos. 300 and 315.
[4] See in reference to this and to what follows, No. 385.

No. 344

The Military Plenipotentiary at the Russian Court to the Foreign Office [1]

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Telegram 184.

FOR HIS MAJESTY.

Up to yesterday, all in the *entourage* of the Emperor, were filled with the hope of a peaceful outcome; today, since the declaration of war, they consider a *general* war almost *inevitable.* Before the publication of Serbia's note of reply, the opinion was expressed that Austria was justified in demanding satisfaction of Serbia; now, since the note, which, according to the *view held here, was very compliant,* has been *declined,* they are convinced that Austria has been acting in *bad faith, wants war* and is determined to have it.

This interpretation was to be feared.

All this has turned opinion *very much in Serbia's favor,* which country Russia *considers it her duty* to *protect* against *the harsh and unjust procedure* of Austria, without regard to the serious consequences which will result. *They do not want any war* [3] and *would like to be able to avoid it,* and regret that *no Power* was successful in *restraining* Austria from taking the dangerous step.

That means us![5]

How is that possible, if they are determined to protect Serbia against Austria! [4]

CHELIUS.

No. 345

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 228.

PARIS, *July 29, 1914.*[7]

The acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I confidentially informed of our efforts to extract a statement from Vienna which could be utilized for the pacification of Petersburg,[8] perceived in them a pleasing evidence of our good faith in trying to prevent any extension of the conflict. He thought that it would be advantageous, in view of the irritating effect on Russia, if all bloodshed in Serbia

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Petersburg at 2.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.15 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, came back to the Foreign Office from him July 30.

[3] "They do not want any war" twice underscored by the Emperor.

[4] On the left-hand side in the original.

[5] "that means us!" twice underscored by the Emperor.

[6] From the decodification.

[7] Filed at Paris at 1.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.33 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m.

[8] See No. 315, note 6.

could be avoided. It was for this very reason that Russia had advised Serbia to evacuate Belgrade. I replied that we could not stay Austria's hand. To the Minister's question whether it was possible that at a later date we might consider Sir Edward Grey's idea, I made an evasive answer.

Minister said he would be glad to be kept currently informed of the success of our efforts, in order eventually to participate in the pacification of St. Petersburg.

SCHOEN.

No. 346

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 127. VIENNA, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Count Berchtold had a lengthy and very friendly conversation with Mr. de Bunsen today. The latter said particularly that England's chief interest lay in the maintenance of European peace, and that she naturally was making every effort to preserve it. England had no interest of any sort in Serbia, and no sympathy for the Serbians.

Count Berchtold explained in detail to the British Ambassador that it was Serbia herself who endangered the lasting peace of Europe with her irresponsible policy, and that it was to Europe's exclusive interest that that disturber of the peace, Serbia, should for once be thoroughly called to order. He, the Ambassador, had not been here long, it was true, but he should nevertheless have been able to get a sufficient view of Austrian conditions to be able to perceive that the Monarchy stood in a state of defense against the Serbian machinations, and that the mainsprings of the Austrian action lay far deeper than in any one or other of the demands contained in the note. He, the Minister, begged him to explain this as plainly as possible to his Government.

De Bunsen made no definite propositions of any sort. The conversation was of a very general nature, and the Ambassador listened with evident comprehension to the Minister's explanations.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 347

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Imperial Chancelor [3]

VIENNA, *July 29, 1914.*[4]

I have the honor of submitting herewith to Your Excellency, with reference to previous communications, the text of the Serbian note of reply,[5] together with annotations, for your favorable consideration.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Vienna at 1.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.36 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m.

[3] From the corrected copy. [4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 29, p.m.

[5] The translation of the note with the Viennese Government's commentaries is among the archives; it has been repeatedly published: *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of July 29, 1914, German White Books of August, 1914, and May, 1915, pp. 14–21. For [translation of the] French text without commentary, see No. 271.

No. 348

The Austro-Hungarian Consul General at Warsaw to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Vienna [1]

Telegram. SZCZAKOWA, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

On account of the uncertainty of the telegraph service I am forwarding herewith by a trustworthy person a duplicate of my telegram 6 of day before yesterday.

During the course of the day, yesterday, the breaking-up of the maneuvers and the concentration of all the troops were completed in this city, and there was a great military conference in which all the generals took part. During the evening a large artillery contingent, said to be a brigade, was entrained at the station. From the same station seven trains went out during the night, mostly carrying sappers for the protection of the bridges, etc. So far as I have been able to confirm by haphazard evidence, the local reservists have not been called to the colors —a measure that took place later, as a matter of fact, during the Russo-Japanese war.

Last night there were explosions of one or more powder-magazines at the citadel. Fire lasted for over five hours, and there were several persons killed. Damage very considerable, but, to judge from the destruction in the neighborhood, the original story that the explosion was of all the powder magazines is improbable. A stroke of lightning is officially said to have been the cause.

I have just received the news that there has been a bomb exploded at the Central Post-Office. Several wounded, perpetrator unknown.

Just learn that Lithuanian and Volhynian Regiment was entrained this morning at the station.

BARON ANDRIAN.

No. 349

The Grand General Staff to the Imperial Chancelor [3]

BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[4]

SUMMARY OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION

It goes without saying that no nation of Europe would regard the conflict between Austria and Serbia with any interest except that of humanity, if there did not lie within it the danger of general political complications that today already threaten to unchain a world war. For more than five years Serbia has been the cause of a European tension which has been pressing with simply intolerable weight on the political and economic existence of nations. With a patience approaching weakness, Austria has up to the present borne the continuous provocations and the political machinations aimed at the disruption of her own national

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Placed at the disposal of the German Ambassador at Vienna by the Austrian Government and forwarded by him on the 28th of July with the dispatch-box. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 29, p.m. The telegram was sent from Szczakowa July 27, at 10.50 p.m.; arrived at Vienna July 28, at 9 a.m.

[3] Marginal annotation of the Imperial Chancelor: " Received from the General Staff. v. B. H. 29."

[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 29.

stability by a people which proceeded from regicide at home to the murder of princes in a neighboring land. It was only after the last despicable crime that she took to extreme measures, in order to burn out with a glowing iron a cancer that has constantly threatened to poison the body of Europe. One would think that all Europe would be grateful to her. All Europe would have drawn a breath of relief if this mischief-maker could have been properly chastised, and peace and order thereby have been restored to the Balkans; but Russia placed herself at the side of this criminal nation. It was only then that the Austro-Serbian affair became the thunder-cloud which may at any moment break over Europe.

Austria has declared to the European cabinets that she intends neither to make any territorial acquisitions at Serbia's expense nor to infringe upon her status as a nation; that she only wants to force her unruly neighbor to accept the conditions that she considers necessary if they are to continue to exist side by side, and which Serbia, as experience has proved, would never live up to, despite solemn assurances, unless compelled by force. The Austro-Serbian affair is a purely private quarrel in which, as has been said, nobody in Europe would have a profound interest and which would in no way threaten the peace of Europe but, on the contrary, would establish it more firmly, if Russia had not injected herself into it. This was what first gave the matter its menacing aspect.

Austria has only mobilized a portion of her armed forces, eight army corps, against Serbia—just enough with which to be able to put through her punitive expedition. As against this, Russia has made all preparations to enable her to mobilize the army corps of the military districts of Kiev, Odessa and Moscow, twelve army corps in all, within the briefest period, and is providing for similar preparatory measures in the north also, along the German border and the Baltic Sea. She announces that she intends to mobilize when Austria advances into Serbia, as she cannot permit the destruction of Serbia by Austria, though Austria has explained that she intends nothing of the sort.

What must and will the further consequences be? If Austria advances into Serbia she will have to face not only the Serbian army but also the vastly superior strength of Russia; thus she can not enter upon a war with Serbia without securing herself against an attack by Russia. That means that she will be forced to mobilize the other half of her Army, for she can not possibly surrender at discretion to a Russia all prepared for war. At the moment, however, in which Austria mobilizes her whole Army, the collision between herself and Russia will become inevitable. But that, for Germany, is the *casus foederis*. If Germany is not to be false to her word and permit her ally to suffer annihilation at the hands of Russian superiority, she, too, must mobilize. And that would bring about the mobilization of the rest of Russia's military districts as a result. But then Russia will be able to say: I am being attacked by Germany. She will then assure herself of the support of France, which, according to the compact of alliance, is obliged to take part in the war, should her ally, Russia, be attacked. Thus the Franco-Russian alliance, so often held up to praise as a purely defensive compact, created only in order to meet the aggressive plans of Germany, will become active, and the mutual butchery of the civilized nations of Europe will begin.

It cannot be denied that the affair has been cunningly contrived by Russia. While giving continuous assurances that she was not yet "mobilizing", but only

making preparations "for an eventuality," that "up to the present" she had called no reserves to the colors, she has been getting herself so ready for war that, when she actually issues her mobilization orders, she will be prepared to move her armies forward in a very few days. Thus she puts Austria in a desperate position and shifts the responsibility to her, inasmuch as she is forcing Austria to secure herself against a surprise by Russia. She will say: You, Austria, are mobilizing against us, so you want war with us. Russia assures Germany that she wishes to undertake nothing against her; but she knows perfectly well that Germany could not remain inactive in the event of a belligerent collision between her ally and Russia. So Germany, too, will be forced to mobilize, and again Russia will be enabled to say to the world: I did not want war, but Germany brought it about. After this fashion things must and will develop, unless, one might say, a miracle happens to prevent at the last moment a war which will annihilate for decades the civilization of almost all Europe.

Germany does not want to bring about this frightful war. But the German Government knows that it would be violating in ominous fashion the deep-rooted feelings of fidelity which are among the most beautiful traits of German character and would be setting itself against all the sentiments of the nation, if it did not come to the assistance of its ally at a moment which was to be decisive of the latter's existence.

According to the information at hand, France, also, appears to be taking measures preparatory to an eventual mobilization. It is apparent that Russia and France are moving hand in hand as far as regards their preparations.

Thus, when the collision between Austria and Russia becomes inevitable, Germany, also, will mobilize, and will be prepared to take up the fight on two fronts.

With relation to the military preparations we have in view, should the case arise, it is of the greatest importance to ascertain as soon as possible whether Russia and France intend to let it come to a war with Germany. The further the preparations of our neighbors are carried, the quicker they will be able to complete their mobilization. Thus the military situation is becoming from day to day more unfavorable for us, and can, if our prospective opponents prepare themselves further, unmolested, lead to fateful consequences for us.

No. 350

The Ambassador at Paris to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

PARIS, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

In the course of a conversation with the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, I casually made the remark that it was astonishing that the idea that we were urging Austria on and should therefore be responsible, if a general conflict grew out of the Austro-Serbian quarrel, not only found expression in the French press, but even seemed to haunt the minds of highly-placed personages who ought to know better, and, coming from whose mouths, such insinuations might have an

[1] From the corrected copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 29, p.m.

unfortunate effect. I did not want to be more definite, but I believe that Mr. Bienvenu-Martin understood me. He said that the press was not accusing us of driving Austria directly onward, but only of not restraining our ally. It was very hard to believe that Austria would have proceeded as she had, had she not been certain of our support; not that he wished to suggest, naturally, that our assurance that we had had no previous knowledge of the Austrian note was not entitled to absolute credence. But the fact was that we had said from the beginning that we approved of the procedure and the demands of Austria-Hungary, nor did we now seem inclined to hold back our ally from her course of action, which might lead to serious complications. But a moderate attitude on the part of Austria was the necessary preliminary to any successful mediation. The best method for the avoidance of a general war was the prevention of a local war. It was his opinion, therefore, that the latter should be the first aim of mediation, and that it should seek to satisfy Austria by the assurance of guaranties for Serbia's atonement and for her future good behavior.

I replied to the Minister that after all that Serbia had done against the Dual Monarchy since her promise of the year 1909, without being restrained by that Power which was now upholding the principle of European supervision, we could not help but understand why Austria-Hungary should seek by force the rights and the peace that had not been granted her. We had not interfered in her quarrel with Serbia, had exercised no influence on her decisions, and could not do so now. All further dangerous consequences of the conflict would be avoided if all the Powers should decide to adopt a like attitude. We had stated from the beginning that the Powers should earnestly strive for the localization of the conflict. In accordance with that principle we should take part in all efforts to prevent a general conflagration, provided that their aim was not to prevent Austria-Hungary against her will from following up her only too justifiable demands.

v. SCHOEN.

No. 351

Reporting Councilor von Bergen of the Foreign Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Mr. Beldiman, whom I keep informed as far as possible, asked me today to repeat to Your Excellency his urgent request to give his Government timely information should events lead up to war. His Government absolutely needs several days in which to prepare the party leaders and public opinion for any action against Russia.

v. B(ERGEN).

[1] Drawn up on the typewriter, initialed by Bergen.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 29, p.m. Jagow acknowledged the communication on the 29th of July.

No. 352

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office [1]

BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Although Mr. Sazonoff, as well as the Russian Minister of War, has assured us on his word of honor that mobilization has not yet been ordered in Russia, Russia is, nevertheless, according to consistent reports from Petersburg, Kiev, Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, taking comprehensive preparatory military measures. The Russian Minister of War also remarked to the Imperial German military attaché that the military districts facing toward Austria (Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan) would be mobilized in the event of our troops crossing the Serbian frontier.

The Chief of the Imperial and Royal General Staff now considers it ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL to determine with certainty whether we can advance against Serbia in full strength, or whether we shall have to turn our main forces against Russia. If Russia is actually mobilizing the military districts mentioned, it would be indispensable (especially considering the great importance of Russia's gain in time) that in view of the general situation Austria-Hungary, and Germany as well, should institute IMMEDIATE and extensive counter-measures.

Baron Conrad's opinion appears to Count Berchtold to be well worth attention, and as a result the latter believes it necessary to make an urgent request that the Berlin Cabinet carefully consider the question of whether or not it should be pointed out to Russia, in a friendly manner, that the mobilization of the districts referred to above would be equal to a threat and that in case it is carried out, it would compel the most extensive and immediate counter-measures on the part of the allied German Empire, as well as on that of the Monarchy.

Count Berchtold's view is that such a move should first be made by Germany alone, in order to render Russia's possible back-down easier; but we should of course be perfectly ready to join in making the move.

Plain speech seems to Count Berchtold at this time to be the best means to bring Russia to a realization of the full extent of her threatening behavior.

Furthermore as according to reports received from Bucharest by the German Cabinet, Roumania is favorably disposed, it might be well to make use of this disposition to exercise pressure on Russia on Roumania's part also.

To this end, the Imperial and Royal Government believes, the Austro-Hungarian and the Imperial German Ministers at Bucharest should be immediately instructed to approach King Carol with the request to declare publicly, either by Roumania's making a *démarche* at Petersburg (possibly also by means of a secret telegram from King Carol to the Emperor Nicholas), or by the open publication of the compact of alliance, that in the event of a European conflagration, Roumania would fight on the side of the Triple Alliance against Russia.

In order to accomplish its purpose, this publication should be made by August 1 at the latest.

[1] From the corrected copy. Unsigned.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 29, p.m. Jagow remarks in the margin that the Imperial Chancelor has been informed of the matter.

The Imperial and Royal Government believes itself at liberty to assume without fear of error that the controlling authorities of the German Empire, in view of the fact that the Russian attitude threatens both Empires, will not refuse their consent to these propositions.

No. 353

The English Ambassador to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

Sir Edward Goschen has been instructed by Sir Edward Grey to express to the Imperial Chancelor his thanks for the confidence which His Excellency has shown, a confidence which Sir Edward Grey much appreciates and will respect in accordance with the Chancelor's wishes. If the Imperial Chancelor can succeed in inducing the Austro-Hungarian Government to give the Russian Government assurances which will satisfy the latter, and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with Russia "we shall all join together in gratitude that the peace of Europe has been preserved." The Chancelor may rely upon His Majesty's Government continuing to omit no opportunity of working for peace.

No. 354

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople [2]

BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[3]

Your Excellency's obliging telegraphic report regarding Greek mobilization against Turkey has, at the command of the Emperor, been brought in part to the attention of the King of Greece, its source being kept secret. The latter accordingly sent to His Majesty the Emperor the following telegram, which I communicate to Your Excellency, p.p., for your personal information:

> I am grateful for the telegram . . . if the latter means to deal honorably.[4]

V. JAGOW.

[1] From the corrected copy [in English]. Without date, but plainly the execution of the instructions in the English Blue Book under No. 77, on the 29th of July. The Imperial Chancelor acknowledged it on the same date. On the 30th of July the communication was returned to the Central Bureau by Zimmermann, after Jagow also had read it. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 30, p.m.

[2] From the original draft.

[3] Sent on the 29th of July.

[4] Here is inserted a section, "I am grateful for . . . if the latter means to deal honorably," from King Constantine's telegram (No. 243), after the effecting of minor alterations and with the omission of the sentence "I again repeat to Your Majesty . . . in this matter."

No. 355

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 176. LONDON, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

On my visit today to the Foreign Office I had a brief conversation with Sir W. Tyrrell, who, after Sir E. Grey, and in consideration of the small importance of Sir A. Nicolson, is today the most influential as well as the best instructed person there. He again gave me to understand that according to their information the Triple Alliance would not stand the test of a world war. He knew that Italy would not participate in a world war that arose on account of Serbia, and we ought not to let ourselves be deceived by any official information giving a different impression. I judge that this view is based on reports made by Sir Renell Rodd, and I did not get the impression that Sir W. Tyrrell had invented it in order to intimidate us.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 356

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 128. VIENNA, *July 29, 1914.*[4]

Count Berchtold informs me, concerning his today's interview with Schebeko, that the Russian Ambassador was very conciliatory in his manner, but was apparently more or less excited beneath the surface, as he was as white as chalk. The Russian Ambassador had used about the same arguments as Sazonoff used to Count Szapary; he had said that doubtless some method would be found that would satisfy both parties, Austria and Serbia. The Minister opposed this, in a friendly way, with the statement that he, the Ambassador, had undoubtedly observed the frame of mind of the people both in Vienna and throughout the Monarchy during the past few days, and would have deduced therefrom that any further discussion with Serbia had become utterly impossible for the Austro-Hungarian Government; in fact, the possibility had been entirely wiped out. After remarking that he of course comprehended the frame of mind in Austria, Schebeko continued, although with little real conviction, his endeavors to prolong the attempt to institute further *pourparlers* with Serbia, without, however, expressing any definite suggestions or desires. The entire conversation was conducted in a friendly tone.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in London at 2.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.34 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m. Telegraphically communicated on the 29th of July by Jagow to the Ambassador at Rome, after the effecting of minor alterations in style and with the omission of the words "and in consideration . . . Nicolson"; to the Central Telegraph Office at 9.30 p.m.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in Vienna at 2 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.07 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m. For the purpose of its communication to the Ambassador at Petersburg, Bergen's draft of the 29th of July was prepared, but the communication was not made.

No. 357

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 174. LONDON, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Have just had a talk with Sir Edward Grey, who considers the situation to be extremely serious. Yesterday's telegram from Sir Maurice de Bunsen, according to which Count Berchtold flatly declined Sazonoff's proposal to empower Count Szapary to confer with him about the Austro-Serbian quarrel, made a most unpleasant impression on him. Even today Minister regards a direct exchange of opinions between Vienna and Petersburg as the most feasible way, but asked me, however, what was to happen if, as the Vienna telegram seemed to indicate, the conferences were to collapse? Would we then be in a position to make any sort of a proposition? He had suggested a conference of the ambassadors here, which had not appeared to us to be feasible; we had accepted the idea of a mediation *à quatre*, however, and he would be glad if we were in a position to make any kind of a proposal. I said that we regarded the Austro-Serbian quarrel as an affair in which we did not want to interfere, that we certainly could not expect Austria to submit to any humiliation. Austria was only doing what she had to do to create peace and order along her borders. This was also in the interest of the peace of Europe. Nor did Austria have any territorial acquisitions in view, but only the restoration of tolerable conditions.

He replied that he fully comprehended that Austria could not be humiliated, that there could be no talk of anything of that sort. He hoped that there might be found some way out which would permit Austria to receive full satisfaction, while not requiring Russia to stand inactively by until Austria had attained the final accomplishment of her warlike undertaking. That would be equal to the humiliation of Russia, which the latter could not possibly accept.

I replied that, as a matter of fact, Serbia did not concern Russia at all, and that Russia had all the less reason for interfering in this quarrel between neighboring nations, since Austria had no intention of annexing Serbia.

He replied that even without annexation there was a way by which Serbia might be transformed into a vassal state of Austria. Russia could not and would not stand quietly by and see that accomplished. Russia's position among the orthodox Christians was at stake. He then made a suggestion as to whether it might not be possible to bring about an understanding as to the extension of Austria's military operations and as to the Monarchy's demands.

I gathered again from the Minister's arguments today, that they are firmly convinced here, as I have repeatedly had the honor of reporting to Your Excellency, that unless Austria is willing to enter upon a discussion of the Serbian question, a world war is inevitable.

Sir E. Grey made here, half in joke, the remark that one never could tell whose house might remain unscorched in the midst of such a conflagration; that even little Holland was now arming herself.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in London at 2.08 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.07 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m. Regarding communication of Lichnowsky's telegram to the Ambassador at Vienna, see No. 384.

The Minister was visibly pleased at my statement that Your Excellency had hitherto been endeavoring with some success to mediate between Vienna and Petersburg,[1] and declared himself to be ready to participate in anything that promised the prospect of success.

I entreated the Minister again to warn Petersburg against any precipitate decisions, and especially to prevent a general mobilization there that would affect our frontiers also. The consequences would be beyond conception. The Minister promised me again to use his influence in this direction and to strive to keep them as cool-headed as possible.

The Minister informed me in conclusion that the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Rome had stated to the Marquis di San Giuliano that, with provision for certain interpretations as to the mode of participation by Austrian agents, Serbia would be inclined to swallow even Articles 5 and 6 of the Austrian note, thus accepting all demands. As it could not be assumed that Austria would be willing to enter upon direct negotiations with Serbia, the matter might be submitted to Serbia through the medium of the Great Powers in the form of advice. Marquis di San Giuliano thought that on this basis an agreement might be arrived at. Above all, however, the Minister desired the immediate inauguration of the conferences. Sir E. Grey has had Marquis di San Giuliano referred to the Vienna and Berlin Cabinets, as, without their consent, he would not be in a position to take up the matter of a conference.

Finally, the Minister communicated to me a telegram from Sir George Buchanan, according to which the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs had informed the representatives of the foreign press that as the negotiations between Vienna and Petersburg had come to an end without a result, Russia would feel herself obliged to regard the setting foot on Serbian soil by Austrian troops as a cause of war.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 358

The Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 19. CATTARO, *July 28, 1914.*[3]

Hear from a reliable source that yesterday's Ministerial Council came to the following determination: The expulsion of the Montenegrins from Cattaro, the subsequent confiscation of Montenegrin private property, as well as the closing of the telegraph lines by the Austrians were measures against which Montenegro, as long as war had not been declared, would have to protest. Should Austria declare war on Serbia, despite the latter's reply, which was regarded here as satisfactory, the Austrian Minister would be handed his passports. In such an event, Montenegro would adopt an attitude of self-defense, and eventually go to the assistance of the Serbian army. The garrison at Lowtschen has been reinforced.[4]

ZECH.

[1] See No. 314; cf. also No. 323.

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed at Cattaro July 28, arrived at the Foreign Office July 29 at 5.57 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m. Telegraphically communicated to the Ambassador at Vienna by Jagow on the 30th of July, after the effecting of minor alterations in style; to the Central Telegraph Office at 11.40 a.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 3 p.m.

[4] See No. 394.

No. 359

The Emperor to the Czar [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

I received your telegram [3] and share your wish that peace should be maintained. But as I told you in my first telegram,[4] I cannot consider Austria's [5] action against Serbia an "ignoble" war.[6] Austria knows by experience that Serbian promises on paper are wholly unreliable. I understand its action must be judged as trending to get full guarantee that the Serbian promises shall become real facts. This my reasoning is borne out [7] by the statement of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria does not want to make any territorial conquests at the expense of Serbia. I therefore suggest that [8] it would be quite [9] possible for Russia [10] to remain a spectator of [11] the Austro-Serbian conflict without involving [12] Europe in [13] the most horrible war she ever witnessed. I think a direct understanding between your Government [14] and Vienna possible and desirable and as I already telegraphed to you, my Government is continuing its exertions to promote it. Of course military measures on the part of Russia which would be looked on by Austria as threatening would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid and jeopardize my position as mediator which I readily accepted on your appeal to my friendship and my help.[15]

WILLY.[16]

[1] [English text.] The German draft in Jagow's handwriting, which was submitted in English translation to the Emperor, read: "Have received your telegram and share with you the wish for peace. But as I already explained in my first telegram, I can see in the Austrian action against Serbia not an 'ignoble war,' but only a just punitive expedition. That it is not more, is proved by the assurance given to your Government by the Vienna Cabinet, that Austria is aspiring to no territorial conquest in Serbia. I think, therefore, that given this guaranty it will be possible for you to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian conflict without driving the world into one of the most terrible of wars. I believe a direct understanding between you and Vienna to be possible and desirable, and I am quite ready to promote it. But Russian mobilization measures against Austria might 'set the house in flame' and would place me in a most difficult position." The Emperor materially altered and expanded the English draft.

[2] On the English draft as altered by the Emperor there stands at the top, in the Emperor's handwriting, the marginal annotation: "New Palace, July 29, 1914, 6.30 p.m." The telegram was then sent openly from Potsdam.

[3] See No. 332.

[4] See No. 335.

[5] "Austria's" an alteration by the Emperor from "the Austrian" of the draft.

[6] What follows here, "Austria knows . . . real facts" added by the Emperor. What was next written in by him after "facts" was eliminated by him again, as was also "It is an expedition in order to punish Serbia," which followed next after "ignoble war" in the draft.

[7] "This . . . out" is an alteration by the Emperor from the original. "That it is not more is clearly proved" of the draft.

[8] "I therefore suggest that" is an alteration by the Emperor from the original "I think that given this guaranty" of the draft.

[9] "quite" inserted by the Emperor.

[10] "Russia" an alteration by the Emperor from "you" of the draft.

[11] "of" an alteration by the Emperor from "in" of the draft.

[12] "involving" an alteration from "driving" in the draft.

[13] "in" an alteration by the Emperor from "into" of the draft.

[14] "your Government" an alteration by the Emperor from "you" of the draft.

[15] "and as I already . . . my help" an alteration by the Emperor from the original text of the draft, which read: "and am quite ready to promote it. But mobilization of your army against Austria could set the house on fire and would bring myself into the most difficult position."

[16] Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 34, No. 22, III. See also No. 366.

No. 360

The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 221.
Strictly confidential. ATHENS, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Minister Streit has the information, apparently emanating from French sources, that Austria is negotiating with Bulgaria and Turkey.[3] He has doubts, however, of its correctness, as it would be opposed to German policy, and as Austria made only the day before yesterday a declaration of sympathy to Greece.

BASSEWITZ.

No. 361

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [4]

Telegram 181. BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[5]

Prince Lichnowsky telegraphs: "The members of the local . . . would not be unjustifiable." [6]

These statements of the Austrian diplomats would appear to be the reflection of new desires and aspirations. I regard the attitude of the Austrian Government and its varying procedure toward the different Governments with increasing astonishment. At Petersburg it announces its territorial disinterestedness; us it leaves entirely at sea regarding its program; Rome is put off with meaningless phrases on the compensation question,[7] at London Count Mensdorff is giving away portions of Serbia to Bulgaria and Albania, and placing himself in direct opposition to Vienna's solemn declarations at Petersburg.[8] I must draw from these contradictions the conclusion that the disavowal of Count Hoyos communicated in telegram 83 [9] was only a play to the gallery, and that the Government at Vienna is entertaining plans which it finds it advisable to keep secret from us, in order to assure itself of German support in any event and not to expose itself to a possible refusal of that support by making them public.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Athens at 2.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m. The first sentence of the telegram was communicated by Jagow to the Ambassador at Constantinople as "secret" on the 30th of July. To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.55 a.m.
[3] See No. 512.
[4] From the original draft. Copy in Bergen's handwriting with alterations by Stumm and Jagow. See No. 340.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 8 p.m.
[6] Here Lichnowsky's telegram of the 28th of July (No. 301), with minor alterations and the omission of the sentences "When the news . . . actually stunned" and "that in this case . . . confidential relations," is inserted.
[7] The passage "At Petersburg . . . compensation question" read in the Bergen draft: "At Petersburg the pipe of peace is blown; toward its ally the Austro-Hungarian Government thinks it necessary to show itself silent; it refuses to give us any information about its program, or Rome any answer to her reasonable demand concerning the interpretation of Article 7 of the Triple Alliance treaty." With Stumm's alterations it became shorter: "In Petersburg the pipe of peace is blown; it leaves us entirely in the dark as to its program; Rome is put off with meaningless phrases about the compensation question." From these sprung the final draft of Jagow.
[8] "at Petersburg" added by Jagow; originally "solemn declarations" was followed by "that it intended to preserve the territorial integrity of Serbia." This, in the Bergen draft, was eliminated by Jagow.
[9] See No. 18.

Foregoing remarks are FOR THE PRESENT [1] intended for Your Excellency's personal information. I request that Count Berchtold's attention be called only to the fact that it would be advisable to avoid any suspicion as to the declarations made by him to the Powers [2] with regard to the [3] integrity of Serbia. I also request you to call his attention to the fact that the instructions sent to Baron Mérey can scarcely satisfy Italy.[4]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 362

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 179. LONDON, *July 29, 1914.*[6]

I hear in journalistic circles that it is said that an arrangement has been entered into between England and Italy whereby Italy has promised, in case of a European war, to undertake nothing against England, and *vice versa*.[7]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 363

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [8]

Telegram 149. ROME, *July 29, 1914.*[9]

To further remonstrances, Marquis di San Giuliano told me today more or less seriously that Austria's procedure was against Italian interests just so long as Austria did not recognize Article 7 of the Triple Alliance compact as in continuous existence,[10] and so long as Austria would not grant compensation in case of obtaining possession of territory in Serbia. For just so long Italy would not be able to grant Austria full [11] diplomatic support. So far as regarded the compensation question, he held firmly to his opinion that DIRECT negotiations with Vienna would lead to a break. It was therefore necessary that Berlin should at least initiate these negotiations. In any event, he would decline to deal with Baron von Mérey in the matter. That would mean a certain break. In deference to

[1] "for the present" a substitute by Stumm for Bergen's original "solely"; underscored by the Imperial Chancelor. The words are lacking in the decodification by the Vienna Embassy, while the words "for Your Excellency's personal information" are underscored.

[2] "any suspicion as to the" an alteration by Jagow from Bergen's original "a new interpretation of the."

[3] "to the Powers" added by Jagow.

[4] "I also request . . . satisfy Italy" added by Jagow.

[5] From the decodification.

[6] Filed in London at 5 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.15 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m. Telegraphically communicated to the Ambassador at Rome by Jagow under date of July 29; to the Central Telegraph Office at 3.20 a.m., July 30.

[7] See No. 458.

[8] From the decodification.

[9] Filed in Rome at 6.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.15 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m. The two first paragraphs "To further remonstrances . . . occupation of the place," and the three last sentences "Things are pretty bad . . . point of view" were communicated by Jagow on the 29th of July to the Ambassador at Vienna, after minor alterations had been effected; to the Central Telegraph Office at 9.45 a.m., July 30.

[10] See Nos. 150, 156, 168, 212 and 326.

[11] "full" eliminated in Jagow's telegram to the Ambassador at Vienna.

my urgent remonstrances, he had so far avoided doing anything that would represent a definite stand against the Austrian procedure, which was defending [1] Italy's interests; but time was pressing uncomfortably, for the moment was coming nearer at which they would have to decide here whether they should act diplomatically for or against Austria.

The Lowtschen situation looked very black to him. The Austrian military party was absolutely determined to have the mountain, and would make use of every incident as an excuse for bringing about the occupation of the place.

I replied, according to the tenor of telegram 25,[2] that we were already supporting Italy's wishes at Vienna, and I warned the Minister once more and very urgently against withholding [3] at this moment the flag of dissension within the Triple Alliance, which would only lead Russia to step in. The Minister was of the opinion that Russia's mind would be made up, not so much by Italy, as by an eventually too far-reaching procedure against Serbia. I have restrained the press here as far as I was able, and without Austrian support, up to the present, but I believe just the same that a plain, outspoken Austro-Italian controversy is inevitable in the long run. I am inclined to believe that we shall have to render some service at the same time. Things are pretty bad between Baron von Mérey and Marquis di San Giuliano. Both of them are sick and irritable.

Austrian Ambassador is very violently opposed to compensation for Italy, and is trying to influence Count Berchtold from this point of view.

FLOTOW.

No. 364

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 379. THERAPIA, *July 29, 1914.*[5]

Turkish Ambassador Rome reports:

Italy, for reasons of internal politics, remains for the present undecided. Germany absolutely wants war.

WANGENHEIM.

[1] Thus in the decodification.
[2] See No. 287.
[3] Thus in the decodification. [German, *enthalten*; evidently a clerical error for *entfalten* (unfold).—TRANSLATOR.]
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Therapia at 1.18 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m. Telegraphically communicated by Jagow to the Ambassador at Rome; to the Central Telegraph Office July 30, at 10.30 a.m.

No. 365

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 185. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Sazonoff, who just had me sent for, informed me that the Vienna Cabinet had replied with a categorical refusal to the wish he had expressed here to enter upon direct conferences.[3] As a result there was nothing left but to return to the proposal of Sir E. Grey for conversations *à quatre*. Minister stated that, in making this suggestion, the idea of expecting Austria to submit to a sort of European court of arbitration was far from his mind; that he was only looking for a way out of present difficulties, and that in doing so he was grasping at every straw. I replied again that I had no knowlege of the attitude of my Government toward Sir E. Grey's proposal, but that I could not help feeling that the order for Russian mobilization, in case it were really impending, was a great mistake, as long as they were insisting here that they really were serious in hoping to find a peaceable solution. Sazonoff did not deny the imminence of mobilization, but stated that Russia was compelled by Austria to take this step, but that mobilization, however, was far from meaning war.

POURTALÈS.

No. 365A

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 380. THERAPIA, *July 29, 1914.*[5]

FROM THE MILITARY MISSION:

Turkish military attaché Petersburg reports Russian mobilization.

Warsaw District: 6th, 14th, 15th, 19th, 23d Corps.
Moscow: Grenadier Corps, 5th, 13th, 17th, 25th Corps.
Kiev: 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 21st Corps.
Odessa: 7th, 8th Corps.

For these four districts, mobilization with the calling in of the reserves is planned. For military districts Vilna and Petersburg mobilization preparation without calling in reserves.

Turkish consul Batoum telegraphs: Here state of siege. Governor has told Mohammedan Chief war is possible. Mobilization order for Caucasian Corps not yet issued.

Turkish military attaché, Paris, and Turkish consul Rostow agree in reporting that Caucasian Corps, in case of war, would be used on the western border. In Azerbaijan there are at present 10,000 Russian troops, which in case of war are to march against Turkey south of Urmia.

WANGENHEIM.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Petersburg at 6.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.29 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m. Regarding communication of Pourtalès' telegram to the Ambassador at Vienna, see No. 396.
[3] See No. 397.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Therapia at 1.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.29 p.m.; communicated on the afternoon of the 29th of July to the General Staff, Admiralty Staff, Imperial Naval Office and Ministry of War.

No. 366

The Czar to the Emperor [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). PETERHOF PALACE, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Thanks for your telegram conciliatory and friendly. Whereas official message presented today by your Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone.[3] Beg *you to explain this divergency.* It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the *Hague conference.*[4] Trust in your wisdom and friendship.

Well! well! Thanks just the same.

Your loving

NICKY.[5]

No. 367

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 229. PARIS, *July 29, 1914.*[7]

Mr. Viviani does not deny military *precautionary measures,*[8] but emphasizes their *small* extent and quite *discreet* execution. Mobilization is not imminent. He would not feel troubled if the same thing happened on our side. Of course, measures on our side would be regrettable because[9] of alarming effect on public opinion. The best method of preventing that, he should *see in the most speedy prosecution possible of the mediation action*, no matter in what form. Viviani, also, refuses to give up hope for the maintenance of peace, which is honestly desired here.

Childish!

If he will only get Vienna to answer.

SCHOEN.

[1] From the copy [in English] from the Telegraph Office. See No. 359.
[2] Filed at Peterhof Palace at 8.20 p.m.; arrived at the New Palace at 8.42 p.m.
[3] See Nos. 342 and 378.
[4] On the margin at the right an exclamation-point by the Emperor.
[5] Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 35, No. 22, IV. For further telegram, see No. 390.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed in Paris at 6.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.12 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m. Marginal annotation by the Imperial Chancelor on July 30, "Minister of War and General Staff must undoubtedly be notified. v. B. H. 30." Whereupon at the order of Jagow, these offices were informed on July 30. Sent by messengers at 4.12 p.m. Copy of the decodification of Schoen's telegram sent to the Emperor on July 30. Came back to the Foreign Office, Aug. 1.
[8] To this a question-mark by the Emperor in the margin.
[9] To this a note by Jagow: "Evidently a word like 'further' lacking." At Jagow's order this note was also communicated to the military offices named above (note 7). In the copy prepared for the Emperor the word "further" is actually inserted.

No. 368

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 178. LONDON, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

The worst and most scandalous piece of English pharisaism that I ever saw! I will never enter into a naval convention with such scoundrels.

That sets me out of the running.

Sir E. Grey just sent for me again.[3] The Minister was entirely calm, but very grave, and received me with the words that the situation was continuing to grow more acute. Sazonoff had stated that after the declaration of war he will no longer be in a position to negotiate with Austria direct, and *had requested them here* [5] *to take up the mediation efforts again.*[6] The Russian Government regards the cessation of hostilities for the present as a necessary preliminary to mediation.

In spite of the Czar's appeal to me! [4]

Good.

We have been trying to accomplish this for days, in vain!

Instead of mediation, a serious word to Petersburg and Paris, to the effect that England would not help them would quiet the situation at once.

Sir E. Grey repeated his suggestion already reported, that we take part in a mediation *à quatre*, such as we had already accepted in principle.[7] It would seem to him to be a suitable basis for mediation, if Austria, after occupying Belgrade, for example, or other places, should announce her conditions.[8] Should Your Excellency, however, undertake mediation, a prospect I was able early this morning to put before him,[9] this would of course suit him equally well. But *mediation* seemed now to him to be urgently necessary, if *a European catastrophe were not to result.*

Aha! The common cheat!

Sir E. Grey then said to me that he had a friendly and private communication to make to me, namely, that he did not want our warm personal relations and the intimacy of our talks on all political matters to lead me astray, and he would like to *spare himself later the reproach (of)* [10] *bad faith.* The British Government desired now

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in London at 6.39 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.12 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m. Copy of the decodification submitted to the Emperor, who noted on it: "July 30, 1914, 1 p.m." The paragraphs "Sir E. Grey . . . to mediation," and "Sir E. Grey then . . . . a private explanation" were communicated on the 30th of July to the General Staff, the Admiralty Staff, the Imperial Naval Office and the Ministry of War. See No. 407.

[3] See No. 357.

[4] In the original on the left-hand margin.

[5] "here" twice underscored by the Emperor.

[6] "again" twice underscored by the Emperor.

[7] The sentence "such as we . . . in principle," was omitted from the copy of the telegram of Lichnowsky submitted to the Emperor.

[8] Cf. Nos. 293, 323 and 439.

[9] The sentence "a prospect I . . . put before him" is lacking in the copy of the telegram submitted to the Emperor.

[10] "of" is lacking in the decodification of the Foreign Office.

This means, we are to leave Austria in the lurch as if we were common as dirt and Mephistophelian! Thoroughly English, however.
Already made up.

This means they will attack us.

He has shown bad faith all these years just the same, down to his latest speech. We too!
Newly created![3] *If it wants to, it can turn and direct public opinion, as the press obeys it unconditionally.*

as before to cultivate our previous friendship, and it could *stand aside as long as the conflict remained confined to Austria and Russia. But if we*[1] *and France should be involved*, then the situation would immediately be altered, and the British Government would, *under the circumstances, find itself forced to make up its mind quickly.* In that event *it would not be practicable to stand aside and wait for any length of time.* "If war breaks out, it will be *the greatest catastrophe* that the *world has ever seen.*" It was far from his desire to express any kind of a threat; he only wanted to protect me from disappointments and *himself* from the *reproach of bad faith*, and had therefore chosen the form of a private explanation.[2]

It remains.

An absolute failure.

Sir E. Grey added also, that the *Government* of course had to *reckon with public opinion.* Up to the present it had in general been in favor of Austria, as the justice of a certain satisfaction due her was recognized; but now it was beginning *to turn completely*[4] *to the other side*, as a result of Austrian stubbornness.

With the aid of the jingo press.

To my Italian colleague, who has just left me, Sir E. Grey said that he believed, if mediation were accepted, that he would be able to secure for Austria every possible satisfaction; there was no longer any question of a humiliating retreat for Austria, as the Serbs would in any case be punished and compelled, with the consent of Russia, to subordinate themselves to Austria's wishes. Thus Austria could obtain guaranties for the future without a war that would jeopardize the peace of Europe.

LICHNOWSKY.

England reveals herself in her true colors at a moment when she thinks that we are caught in the toils and, so to speak, disposed of! That common crew of shopkeepers has tried to trick us with dinners and speeches. The boldest deception, the words of the King to Henry for me: "We shall remain neutral and try to keep out of this as long as possible." Grey proves the King a liar, and his words to Lichnowsky are the outcome of an evil conscience, because he feels that he has deceived us. At that, it is as a matter of fact a threat combined with a bluff, in order to separate us from Austria and to prevent us from mobilizing, and to shift the responsibility for the war. He knows perfectly well, that if he were to say one single, serious, sharp and warning word at Paris and Petersburg, and were to warn them to remain neutral, that both would become quiet at once. But he takes care not to speak the word, and threatens us instead! Common cur! England alone bears the responsibility for peace and war, not we any longer! That must also be made clear to the world. W.

[1] "we" twice underscored by the Emperor.
[2] See the marginal annotations of the Emperor to Nos. 382 and 401, as well as the Imperial letter, No. 474.
[3] Interlinear annotation, written over "public."
[4] In the margin a question-mark by the Emperor.

No. 369

The Administrator of the General Consulate at Moscow to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 6. MOSCOW, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Actual mobilization, according to information received, has apparently not yet taken place here. Receive information from an intermediary of Aide-de-Camp Swetschin that Moscow is to be mobilized within the next few days. From the same source I am told that according to the statements of the Secretary of the Mobilization Division of the Moscow-Kursk Railroad, this road is to keep cars ready for the transportation of the classes of 1905 to 1908. Mobilization order was said to have been issued yesterday evening. Very definite rumors are in the air. Another reliable authority, too, has received information of the intention to mobilize within the next few days. Tomorrow is already mentioned as the date. There is apparently great anxiety everywhere, however, as to the attitude of the working classes. Embassy notified. Very reliable source has just confirmed mobilization tomorrow.

HAUSCHILD.

No. 370

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 186. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 29, 1914.*[4]

Military attaché reports also for the General Staff:

Chief of General Staff asked me to call on him, and told me that he had just come from His Majesty; the Minister of War had requested him to assure me again that everything was just as the Minister had told me it was two days ago. He gave me his word of honor in the most solemn manner and offered me written confirmation of the fact that up to the hour of three o'clock in the afternoon no mobilization had commenced anywhere, that is, the calling in of a single man or horse. He could give no guaranties for the future, but would assure me most impressively that His Majesty, now as before, did not desire mobilization on the fronts along our borders.

We have here many reports concerning the calling of reservists to the colors that has taken place in various parts of the Empire, including Warsaw and Vilna. According to credible reports, horses are said to have been recruited for the local divisions of the army. Therefore I submitted to the General that his statements puzzled me. He replied that, on the word of an officer, such reports were mistaken, that it was simply a case of a false alarm here and there.

General admitted movements of troops for the protection of the frontier.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Moscow at 5.25 p.m., arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m. Communicated at 10.30 a.m. on the 30th of July to the General Staff, the Admiralty Staff, the Imperial Naval Office and the Ministry of War.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in Petersburg July 29 at 7 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.45 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, a.m. Communicated on the 29th of July (*sic*) to the General Staff, the Admiralty Staff, the Imperial Naval Office and the Ministry of War.

Those were measures that did not originate with him and were entirely measures of precaution.

He drew again a sharp distinction between the districts facing Austria and those facing Germany, and expressly excepted from the former the Caucasus.

By emphasizing again the subject of the Russian love of peace (?), General let it appear that even in the event of war, no offensive (?) was intended.

In view of the numerous and positive reports about recruitments, I am forced to consider his talk as an attempt to mislead me as to the extent of the measures taken up to the present time. Odessa reports at noon on the twenty-eighth: Troops from here are for the most part to be sent to the Austrian border, likewise three regiments from Kishinew. Roumanian border left bare.

Kiev reports today at noon: 8th Railroad Battalion has followed the 7th with Field Railroad equipment, Infantry Regiment 166 sent forward. Of the artillery only one battery of war strength is said to have remained behind. Mobilization of the military district of Kiev expected there today.

16th Hussars from Riga shipped off to Libau the evening of the twenty-seventh.

POURTALÈS.

No. 371

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Copenhagen [1]

Telegram 26.
Confidential. BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

For your information and the guidance of your speech in the event of the outbreak of war:

We have from the beginning looked upon the conflict between Austria and Serbia as an affair which concerns only these two nations. Our efforts are therefore constantly aimed at the localization of the conflict. Should, however, Russia take Serbia's part and attack Austria, we should be given a *casus foederis*, and a general conflagration would be inevitable. The question of the maintenance of peace, therefore, depends entirely on Russia.

In case of a European conflagration we have absolutely no intention of threatening the status of the Danish nation. The circumstances of the war might, however, without our will or consent, result in the extension of operations into Danish waters. Denmark must realize the seriousness of the situation, and make up its mind what its attitude will be in such an event.

JAGOW.

[1] From the original draft signed by Jagow. Marginal annotation of the Imperial Chancelor on the 27th of July: "His Majesty is satisfied with the accompanying instructions, but does not consider its dispatch to be urgent." B. H. 27.

[2] To the Central Telegraph Office only on the 29th of July, at 9.45 p.m.

No. 372

The Grand General Staff to the Foreign Office [1]

BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

THIRD REPORT [3]

AUSTRIA

The Archduke Friedrich has taken over the chief command against Serbia. The 1st Cavalry Division (Temesvár) of thirty-six squadrons and the 10th Cavalry Division (Budapest) of thirty squadrons are being mobilized against Serbia. The general mobilization is going on practically without disturbance, except that a lack of land conveyances is said to be making itself felt in the equipment of the trains in the district of the 7th Army Corps (Temesvár). The 3d Army Corps is equipped with only thirty-nine battalions; the total strength of the Army will average now about 400,000 men. The bridge over the Save at Mitrovicza is said to have fallen into Austrian hands without a struggle. The Danube monitors are assembled at Neusatz. The fleet lies united at Sebenico. The Landsturm has been called out for the eight various army corps.

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

As far as can be judged from the press, the situation is as follows: The troops south of Semendria are moving back up the Morava; on the Danube there remains only a weak force, Landsturm men among them. Along the lower Drina near Lesnica and to the southward, strong bodies of volunteers are being formed. Minor artillery duels have developed along both rivers. The chief bodies of troops on the Serbian west front are being reinforced. Portions of the newly formed Ibar Division are said to be marching from Novi Bazar to the Lim and portions to have pushed forward to Priboj on the frontier. This left Serbian wing is in touch with the right wing of the Montenegrins, which is reported to be in the neighborhood of Plevlie to the strength of one brigade with artillery. From one to two other brigades are said to be collected on the Rjegos and near Grahovo. The Lowtschen is being further fortified. The principal Montenegrin forces seem to be gathered along the Nikshitch. King and Government went to Podgoritza, where a higher Serbian officer arrived. The Serbian headquarters seem for the time being to be established at Nish. Contrary to the press reports, the Serbian Chief of the General Staff is said not to have been freed. From Vienna is reported the wholesale desertion of Serbian soldiers, who arrive in Hungarian territory with their weapons and complain of a lack of provisions. According to a statement by the Bulgarian Minister, there is a lack of means of subsistence in Nish also.

GREECE

It is known that the treaty of alliance does not require the support of Serbia against Austria. Greece will remain neutral. Press and people prejudiced against Austria.

[1] From the multigraph copy sent by the General Staff. The first and second reports of July 27 and 28 are not among the archives of the Foreign Office. See note 4 to No. 341.

[2] Recent stamp: July 29, p.m. Submitted to Zimmermann, Jagow and the Imperial Chancelor; returned by the Imperial Chancelor July 31.

[3] Information up to July 29 at 4 p.m.

Roumania, Bulgaria

Nothing new.

Turkey

Turkey will maintain her neutrality for the present, but fears an attack by the Greek fleet about the first of August (??).

Belgium

Army being brought from 55,000 to 100,000 men by the recruiting of three annual classes. Calling in of these reserves has been ordered. Frontier service to be strengthened. Belgium will resist the invasion of the French as well as of the Germans; appropriate measures; fortifications being equipped. Preparation of artificial works, etc. for explosion.

Holland

Mobilization being prepared for, the more important Meuse and Ijssel bridges occupied by troops. Forts being garrisoned and equipped, provision supply is apparently ample.

France

First. Border District. Frontier guard practise. Increased activity. Auto trucks said to be waiting in readiness at Audun, Longuyon and Longwy. Military railroad protection put through. Working on the landing places. Telephone communication between Paris and Germany interrupted sporadically today. Railroad equipment taken into the interior. No more cars turned over for ordinary traffic at Toul and Epinal. Equipping of the forts at Belfort in progress.

Secondly. In the interior. On the Paris-Herbesthal route information shows stations are being guarded and numerous empty trains are being side-tracked. No general recruiting of reservists. At the most, recruiting of latest annual class is possible. Field motor equipment observed on the 28th of July in the barrack yards at Paris. Lieutenant Colonel Dupont, Chief of the 2d Division Engineer Staff, expressed surprise at Germany's meager preparatory measures for defense. Preparations had only been observed at Metz, which were far excelled by those on the part of the French. War enthusiasm not present in the country. Fleet remains at Toulon. French press in part breaking into insults against Germany. A disturbance of the telephone connection with the Kaiserin Fortress at Metz is traced to outside influences.

England

Officers and men being recalled from leave, a measure that is taken whenever there is the least political tension. The first Fleet took on war material at Portland. A U-boat flotilla ran out unobserved. The second Fleet, in the home harbors, is filling up its crews. Naval schools are closed. The trial mobilization of the 2nd Division at Aldershot had been under contemplation for some time.

Italy

Is much occupied with the railway strike, and by Lybian and Albanian affairs, but hopes to pacify the railroad men. Promises Austria a free hand in Serbia;

demands in return a free hand in Albania. The attitude of the north-Italian press today was more or less pro-Serb.

RUSSIA

Troops of various arms have been drawn on for the reinforcement of the border guards, who are mobilized everywhere; at special places, for instance, Tschenstochau, Alexandrovo, Wirballen, even Pioneers, apparently bombing troops. The military border and railroad guard appears to have been raised all through the border districts. The statement concerning mobilization in the military districts of Vilna and Warsaw is still uncorroborated. Reservists not yet called in in great numbers. According to some reports, passes are no longer issued. Notice to the reservists to hold themselves in readiness is said to have gone out. Horse requisitions reported from different localities along the border. (It may be for reasons of security or requisitions for the mobilization of the border-guard.) Rolling stock is being put in readiness everywhere. Freight no longer being accepted anywhere on the Prussian-Russian border.

In particular: Infantry Regiments 110 and 111, together with artillery and one dragoon regiment, are posted at Wirballen; border from west of Suwalki to Schirwindt strongly occupied. Troops reported: at Ratshki (all arms, no numbers given); at Shtshutshin cavalry and infantry; from Ostrolenka on the march to the border (no numbers given as to strength); at Mlawa (parts of Infantry Regiments 8 and 29 from Warsaw); at Bshetz (southwest of Vloclavk) all arms, several regiments (?).

The closing of the Dünamünde by mines is confirmed, opened twice daily, harbor lights extinguished. The Schären,[1] between Helsingfors and Hango barred to merchant vessels, lights extinguished, buoys removed. Ship traffic to Petersburg not interfered with.

The official press considers Serbia's reply to be sufficient; believes Roumania will have to be looked for on the side of the Triple Alliance.

(Signed) v. GRIESHEIM.
For correctness:
v. BARTENWERFFER,
Major.

No. 373

The Imperial Chancelor to the English Ambassador[2]

(Orally.) BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[3]

We are continuing our efforts toward the maintenance of peace. However, should a European conflagration become inevitable, to our great regret, as the result of a Russian attack on Austria and of the obligations of our alliance which would result, we hope that England would remain a passive spectator. So far as

[1] [Name of some rocky islands in the Baltic, and of passage between.—TRANSLATOR.]

[2] From a typewritten draft prepared by Jagow with alterations in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor; cf. English Blue Book, 1914, No. 85, see further No. 497.

[3] Marginal annotation by the Imperial Chancelor on July 31: "Accompanying declaration was made by me on the 29th of July orally to Ambassador Sir Edward Goschen. v. B. H. July 31, 1914." According to the English Blue Book, the declaration was made late in the evening.

we are able to judge of English policy, she would not be willing, in view of the European balance of power, to permit the destruction of France. This last, however, is far from our intention. We can assure the English Cabinet, ON CONDITION of its maintaining a NEUTRAL attitude, that we ourselves, in case of a victorious war, seek no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France in Europe. We can further give it the assurance that we should respect the neutrality and integrity of Holland just as long as our opponents respected it. As to Belgium, we do not know to what measures, in the event of a war, France's counter-operations might compel us. But provided that Belgium did not take sides against us, we should be prepared to give an assurance in this matter also, according to which Belgium's integrity after the completion of the war should not be tampered with.

These provisional assurances have seemed to us to be the appropriate foundation for a further understanding with England, toward which all our policy up to the present time has constantly been tending. The assurance of a neutral attitude on the part of England in the present conflict "would enable me to a general neutrality agreement in the future of which it would be premature to discuss the details at the present moment." [1]

No. 374

Prince Henry of Prussia to the Emperor [2]

KIEL, *July 28, 1914.*

MY DEAR WILHELM:

Enclosed I send you a letter from Sophie, which she asked me to transmit to you with her very best wishes; I met her and Mossy last Sunday at the Zander Cathedral in Mairsfield.

As the newspaper reports sound very alarming and as I received confirmation of your return home, I decided to break short my stay in England and to return to my base here, where, as you have already been informed by telegraph, I await your orders until events have developed further.

Before my departure from London, as a matter of fact, last Sunday morning, I had, at my request, a brief interview with Georgie, who saw plainly the seriousness of the immediate situation and gave me the assurance that neither he nor his Government would leave anything undone in order to localize the struggle between Austria and Serbia; it was to that end that his Government had made the proposal that Germany, Italy, France and England, as you have long known, should intervene to attempt to hold Russia in check; he hoped that Germany would be able, despite the existence of her alliance with Austria, to agree to this proposal, in order to avoid a European war. To this, he said, we were closer than ever before. He said further, to quote his own words, "we shall try all we can

[1] In the draft there followed after "conflict": "and the prospect of a general neutrality agreement in the future, we should be able to answer with a naval agreement." The Imperial Chancelor crossed this out and wrote in its stead: "would make it possible for us to consider the prospect of a general neutrality agreement for the future. Naturally, I am unable today to go any more closely into the details and the general structure of such an agreement, as England would thus be led to a discussion of the whole question." This, too, was eliminated by the Chancelor, and he chose the English text "would enable . . . moment."

[2] From the corrected copy; it did not reach the Bureau of the Foreign Office until January, 1919.

to keep out of this and shall remain neutral." I am convinced that this statement was made in all seriousness, as was also that to the effect that England would remain neutral at the start; but whether she will be able to keep so permanently, I am not able to judge, but doubt it on account of her relations with France.

Georgie was in a very serious mood, drew logical conclusions, and was most earnestly and honestly attempting to avoid a possible world conflagration, in which attempt he was counting strongly on your assistance. I communicated the gist of the interview to Lichnowsky, with the request to transmit it to the Chancelor. As I learn now from Karpf, the report, which was spread about London to the general joy of the public, to the effect that you had had a talk with the French President on your way home, has not been confirmed. People were inclined to accept such a meeting as a guaranty of peace. Except for that, one noticed no trace of excitement in the general life of London, which can probably be ascribed to the fact that the "week-end" was playing its rôle, to which a country geographically so happily situated as England, can well afford to give itself up.

Lichnowsky, whom I met again on Sunday, assured me afresh of the loyal and upright intentions of Sir Edward Grey in connection with the present crisis.

Concerning this I am unable to report anything, as my stay in England only lasted from Saturday morning to Monday morning.

With you in thought during this troublesome period, I remain with the heartiest good wishes,

Your faithful and obedient brother,

HEINRICH.

No. 375

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Brussels [1]

BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

I respectfully request Your Excellency to keep the enclosure accompanying this dispatch safely locked up, and not to open it until you are so instructed by telegraph from here.

You will confirm by telegraph the receipt of this dispatch and enclosure.[3]

V. JAGOW.

[1] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting, prepared on July 29 by Stumm and Zimmermann.

[2] Sent by government messenger on July 29, accompanied by a sealed envelope (see No. 376). The document No. 375 is designated as dispatch 88, the enclosure, No. 376, as dispatch 87.

[3] The Minister at Brussels confirmed their arrival on July 30 by a telegram to the Foreign Office, which arrived at the Central Telegraph Office at Berlin July 30, at 2.47 p.m.; presented at the Foreign Office at 3.36 p.m.

No. 376

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Brussels [1]

BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

The Imperial Government is in receipt of reliable information relating to the proposed advance of French armed forces along the Meuse, route Givet-Namur. They leave no doubt as to France's [3] intention to advance against Germany through Belgian territory.

The Imperial Government cannot help being concerned over the probability that Belgium, despite the best of intentions, will be unable to resist without assistance a French [4] advance with a prospect of success so great that sufficient security against the menace to Germany may be found [5] therein. It is for Germany a dictate of self-preservation that she anticipate the hostile attack. It would therefore [6] fill the German Government with the deepest regret, should Belgium view as an act of hostility to herself the entrance of Germany upon Belgian soil, should she be forced by the measures of her opponents to do so in self-protection.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the Imperial Government makes the following statement:

1. Germany contemplates no hostile activities against Belgium. If Belgium should be willing to adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward Germany in the prospective war,[7] the German Government will bind itself to guarantee, at the conclusion of peace,[8] not only the sovereign rights and independence of the Kingdom in their full extent, but it will even be prepared to favor with the best of good will any possible claims of the Kingdom for territorial [9] compensation at the expense of France.[10]

2. Germany binds herself, under the above conditions, to evacuate the territory of the Kingdom as soon as peace shall have been concluded.

3. In case of the friendly [11] attitude of Belgium, Germany will be willing, under

[1] From the original draft. The Chief of the General Staff von Moltke forwarded to the Foreign Office under date of July 26 in his own handwriting a "Draft of a letter to the Belgian Government" (receipt stamp: July 26, p.m.). The draft was altered by Stumm and provided with a postscript; the completed document was not directed as a communication to the Belgian Government, but as a dispatch to the Minister at Brussels. The original was drawn up by Stumm, Zimmermann and the Chancelor; the completed document was signed by Jagow. With reference to the alterations in the text later made by the Minister at Brussels on Jagow's instructions, see No. 648. See also No. 375.

[2] On the draft the note in Stumm's hand: "Engrossed by Count Mirbach. Sent 29th, p.m., by Imperial messenger." On a copy also among the archives the date was changed by Stumm to the 2d of August; underneath, the note in Stumm's hand: "Publication August 8 through the Wolff Bureau."

[3] After "France's" in the draft of the General Staff there stood in brackets the following: "after junction with an English expeditionary corps". This was crossed out by Stumm.

[4] "French" an alteration from "Franco-(English)" of the General Staff draft, made by Stumm.

[5] General Staff had "seen" instead of "found".

[6] "therefore" instead of the General Staff's "however".

[7] "to adopt an attitude . . . toward Germany" an alteration by Stumm from the original "to take the side of Germany."

[8] The words "at the conclusion of peace" added in Stumm's hand.

[9] "territorial" added in Stumm's hand.

[10] "at the expense of France" inserted by Stumm in place of "in the matter of territory" of the General Staff.

[11] After "friendly" in the draft there stood in brackets the following: "or the benevolently neutral", later eliminated.

an arrangement with the Royal Belgian authorities, to buy for cash all the necessities required by her troops, and to make good every damage that may possibly be occasioned by German troops.

Should Belgium oppose as an enemy the German troops, and in particular throw obstacles in their way by the resistance of the Meuse fortifications, or by the destruction of railroads, roads, tunnels or other artificial structures, Germany would be obliged, to her regret, to regard the Kingdom as an enemy. In such an event, Germany would be unable to undertake any obligations to the benefit of the Kingdom, but would have to leave the future regulation of the relations of the two nations to each other to the decision of arms.

The Imperial Government ventures to feel definitely hopeful that this eventuality may not occur, and that the Royal Belgian Government will be able to take appropriate measures to prevent any such occurrences as those hereinbefore mentioned. In such an event, the friendly ties that bind the two neighboring nations would be subject to a further and a lasting consolidation.[1]

Your Excellency will communicate this matter to the Royal Belgian Government in detail and in the strictest confidence, and will request [2] the transmission of an unequivocal reply within twenty-four hours. Your Excellency will make me a detailed telegraphic report concerning the reception with which your announcement is met there and of the definite reply of the Royal Belgian Government.[3]

v. JAGOW.

No. 376A

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 180. PETERSBURG, *July 29, 1914.*[5]

Following telegram, undecipherable here, received from Warsaw, and decodification and communication of the same is requested here:

All troops recalled from the maneuvers, a part of them have departed for the Austrian border.

POURTALÈS.

[1] The paragraph "The Imperial Government . . . lasting consolidation" read in the draft of the General Staff: "The German Government ventures to hope that the Royal Belgian Government will be able to avoid all the occurrences last-mentioned, for the sake of its own interests. The present crisis would in that case contribute toward permanently consolidating the long-preserved friendly relations of the two neighboring nations."

[2] The General Staff had added at the bottom of the draft the note: "An unequivocal reply to this communication must be rendered within twenty-four hours after its delivery, otherwise hostilities will be opened at once."

[3] The sentence: "Your Excellency will make . . . Belgian Government" is added at the foot of the draft in pencil in Stumm's hand.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in Petersburg at 7.23 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.14 a.m. Returned to Petersburg by the Cipher Bureau. Communicated July 30, at 8 a.m. to the General Staff, Ministry of War, Admiralty Staff and Imperial Naval Office.

No. 377

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 189. BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Expect immediate carrying out of dispatch 174.[3]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 378

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 187. PETERSBURG, *July 29, 1914.*[5]

Have just made to Mr. Sazonoff the communication [6] as ordered, and stated in doing so that it did not imply a threat, but simply a friendly opinion. Minister, who accepted the communication in a state of great excitement, replied that he would report it to His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas.

Mr. Sazonoff has admitted to Count Szapary that mobilization is impending, and added that a "*note explicative*" would be published with the mobilization order, so that the mobilization would not be regarded as showing the intention of the Russian Government to go to war, but that it intended only to enter upon a state of armed neutrality.

POURTALÈS.

No. 379

The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 49.
Confidential. SINAIA, *July 29, 1914.*[8]

His Majesty the King received me this morning immediately after I had requested an audience. His Majesty repeated the communications he made to me yesterday, and added that it was very possible that the present Government in Bulgaria would remain calm, but that at the moment of a conflict Russia would wipe it out of existence, and Bulgaria would at once go over to the Russian camp. King again referred to the fact that Bulgaria was well equipped, and said that the temper of the country here would render the support of Austria very difficult. I have no knowledge as to how far Bulgaria's reliability is to be depended on. I

[1] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 10.30 p.m.; forwarded from there at 11.50 p.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna July 30, at 6 a.m.
[3] See No. 323. Already, before this, on the 29th of July at 10.18 p.m., an uncoded telegram (186) had been sent to the Embassy at Vienna: "Answer by wire immediately whether telegram 174 of yesterday has arrived there. Foreign Office." This telegram is only among the archives of the Embassy at Vienna. See further, No. 388.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in St. Petersburg at 8 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.55 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 29, p.m.
[6] See No. 342.
[7] From the decodification.
[8] Filed in Sinaia July 29 at 7.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11 p.m.; receipt stamp, July 30, a.m.

said to His Majesty that steps could be taken to influence public opinion in favor of Austria. The King's position, under the conditions, will be a very difficult one. Therefore he is anxious for Austria to finish the war quickly, and to be reasonable. He believes that Germany might use her influence with Austria in this direction, as she has already done. In a telegram sent by the King today to the Emperor Franz Joseph, who had notified him of the declaration of war, he says: "I am very desirous that the balance of power on the Balkan Peninsula, won by my country at the cost of so many sacrifices, be left undisturbed."

Emperor of Russia sent the King a telegram today in answer to his telegram in which he thanked the Czar for his friendly reception to the delegation from the Roumanian regiment. The telegram contains the following passage: "*Je ne doute que notre amitié personnelle facilitera notre collaboration pour saufgarder* [1] *si possible la paix à cette heure grave.*" [2] His Majesty the King brought both telegrams confidentially to my notice.

WALDBURG.

No. 380

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg [3]

Telegram 139.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[4]

Russian mobilization on Austrian border will, I presume, be followed by corresponding Austrian measures. To what extent the rolling stone can then be checked, it is hard to say, and I fear that Mr. Sazonoff's peaceful intentions can never be realized.[5] In order still to avoid [6] if possible the threatening catastrophe, we are working in Vienna to get the Austro-Hungarian Government to once more declare formally to Russia, in confirmation of its earlier assurance,[7] that it has no idea of territorial acquisitions in Serbia, and that its military measures contemplate solely a temporary occupation, in order to force from Serbia [8] a guaranty of future good behavior.

If Austria-Hungary should make such a declaration, Russia will have obtained all she desires. That Serbia must receive "the deserved lesson," Mr. Sazonoff himself has admitted to Your Excellency.

We expect, therefore, that, in case our step in Vienna proves successful, Russia will institute no belligerent conflict with Austria.[9]

[1] Thus in the decodification for "*sauvegarder.*"

[2] [I do not doubt that our personal friendship will facilitate our collaboration to safeguard peace, if possible, at this grave hour.]

[3] From the original. Draft in Rosenberg's handwriting, with alterations in the hand of Jagow. See No. 343.

[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.05 p.m.

[5] "Russian . . . be realized" an alteration by Jagow from Rosenberg's original: "The Russian Ambassador informed us here today that Russia is going to mobilize against Austria tomorrow. As Your Excellency and the Cabinet there both know, such a move on the part of Russia would shortly have to be replied to by corresponding counter-measures on our part."

[6] Thus Jagow, instead of Rosenberg's: "In order to avoid the then undoubtedly inevitable catastrophe if possible, even at the last hour."

[7] Jagow: "earlier assurance" instead of Rosenberg's: "assurances already given, not only to us but also to Russia."

[8] "The fulfilment of the Austrian demands and," which followed here, crossed out by Jagow.

[9] "Institute no belligerent conflict with Austria" substituted by Jagow for Rosenberg's original

Your Excellency will go fully into the matter with Mr. Sazonoff along the lines indicated above.

Wire report.[1]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 381

The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 222.
Confidential.

ATHENS, *July 29, 1914.*[3]

The reported declaration [4] of the Bulgarian Minister was not made officially; nevertheless Mr. Streit has taken official notice of it.

Greek Government claims to have information of a report from the Bulgarian General Staff to the Bulgarian Government which asserts definitely that the army of Bulgaria is strong enough to fight against Roumania and also to organize action against Serbian and Greek bands.

BASSEWITZ.

No. 382

Two Articles from the "Daily Chronicle" of July 29, 1914, with Marginal Annotations by the Emperor [5]

WHAT WAR WILL MEAN: THE REAL DANGER FOR GREAT BRITIAN

BY SIR HARRY JOHNSTON, G.C.M.G.

Speak very highly of both in our press and reprint.

At the time these lines are being written the fate of all Europe, of the British Empire, of Asia, and of Africa, hangs in the balance. Is a quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia to spread rapidly into a war between Germany and Austria on the one hand, and Russia on the other, with the Balkan States taking this side or that? And, more terrible still for us across the British Channel, is this war to involve the long-threatened revenge of France for her defeats in 1870, the invasion of Belgium and Luxemburg, and, perhaps, Holland, and, finally, a world war of the British against the German Empire and its allies?

The least blunder of our diplomacy and state-

[1] See No. 421.
[2] From the decodification.
[3] Filed in Athens July 29 at 8 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.55 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, a.m.
[4] See No. 336.
[5] Newspaper clipping from the Foreign Office, sent to the Emperor; receipt stamp, July 29; returned by the Emperor to the Foreign Office, July 31.

"put an end to the projected mobilization." Rosenberg's sentence, following "mobilization," which read: "The responsibility for the consequences of mobilization undertaken in spite of this, would rest exclusively on Russia's shoulders" was deleted by Jagow.

craft, the least persistence in any miscalculation of forces which may have taken place may involve our peoples in a struggle by sea, land and air out of which, even if we come victorious, we *shall be incredibly maimed and impoverished.* *Yes.*
Moreover, *our very victory*, as the partisans of Teuton or of Slav, or the ally of France (and consequently of Russia) may *upset the balance of power in Europe or Asia to our great disadvantage.* *Yes.*

How Britain is Situated

As things stand we *have no interests at stake in this clash of ambitions* between the Powers of Central and of Eastern Europe. We are friends with both—with, I should say, all—parties. The prosperity of Russia stimulates British commerce; the prosperity of Germany and of Austria-Hungary, similarly, is good for British and for British Imperial trade. Our commercial dealings with Serbia are on the up-grade. We should like to see all participants in the great renaissance of Eastern Europe happy and contented and satisfied as to their ambitions. But if they are not, and are about to resort to the arbitrament of arms to adjust their claims, well, it should be no concern of ours provided it did not lead to two developments—the aggrandizement of Russia in Europe or the defeat of France by Germany, with a consequent German irruption into Belgium and Holland.

What has provoked the present crisis? *The intrigues of Russia with Serbia.* Russia, in her unfaltering determination to gain free access to the Mediterranean, has *intrigued with Roumania* and, above all, with *Serbia and Montenegro* for the *last twenty years*, in order to stay the southward march of the Austrian Empire. Bulgaria she now regards as a negligible quantity; Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania constitute the *chain of vassal States she would like to bring within her sphere of* influence as an effectual barrier to any eastward *advance of Teutonic authority.* With these brought under her financial and diplomatic control, any German plans of railway or colonial adventure in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia would wither like a limb separated from its main arteries by a tight ligament. *Yes.*

Intervention of France

Where does danger for Great Britain lie in this *Teutonic conflict with the forces of Slavdom? In the intervention of France.* France, like every other Power, *ourselves included*, is perfectly *selfish* in her policy. Her thoughts are concentrated mainly on revenge for 1870–71 and the *recovery of Alsace-Lorraine.* That is the only reason she has allied herself with Russia. If *she can take Germany at a disadvantage* she may recover all or part of her lost provinces. She is indifferent to the other consequences of a German defeat (and in *all this talk about Austria-Hungary, Germany is the protagonist we all have in view*), careless as to whether or not it may mean a Russian advance through Lapland to the North Sea and an enfeeblement of Sweden, a *Russian annexation of Asia Minor, and an advance to the Persian Gulf.*

Right.
Good.
Yes.
I have always viewed it so.
At last an honest Briton!

Supposing France gets the worst of a struggle with Germany. It will mean *a German control over Belgium and Holland*, and a *disastrous strategic position* for Great Britain on the shores of the North Sea. Or if France is victorious, and consequently Russia likewise, a dangerous *elimination of Teutonia* from the *balance of power*, and an *ultimate duel between Britain and Russia for the control of Asia.* The *real danger* in this medley of problems is the *Franco-Russian Alliance.* But for that unhappy fact there really might have been a Franco-British alliance; there may yet *be if our diplomacy can*, at the last critical *moment detach France from the ambitions of Russia, and leave* that Power *entirely to herself*, to decide whether she has more to gain in fighting a coalition of Sweden, Germany, Italy, Austria and Bulgaria (with *Turkey possibly* superadded), or in disinteresting herself from the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula, resting content with the enormous share of Europe she already possesses, and applying her energies, warlike and administrative, to the control and colonization of half Asia.

Aha!
Yes.
Bravo!
She can! But will they?
Preeminent!

Britain's First Line of Defense

In that last capacity, as this civilizer of Armenia, Northern Persia, Turkestan, Mongolia, Siberia and Manchuria she has already gained

over the virtual concurrence of Great Britain; and her efforts there and their already patent results (especially in Central Asia) have won from British travelers and writers emphatic praise.

The safety, integrity and prosperity of France, the independence of Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg constitute British interests of the first order. They are our first line of defense. This is why the *Franco-Russian Alliance is an object of intense dislike and uneasy suspicion* to all far-seeing men and women on this side of the English Channel; for its provisions may at any *moment drag France—and behind her, Britain*—into quarrels between *Slav, Teuton* and *Magyar in the Near East* which *do not concern either the French or ourselves*; except that *both Powers* would suffer grievously in their interests if Russia *seated herself on the Byzantine throne.*

Right.

Quite right.

Excellent.

DUTY OF AVOIDING EUROPEAN CONFLICT

BY FRANCIS W. HIRST

I notice that the Yellow Press is screaming for war. It says that if France and Russia mobilize we ought to mobilize too. If they fight we ought to fight too. *Parliament has been solemnly informed* that we are *under no obligations of a military or naval kind either to Russia or to France. No British interest is involved.* It is difficult even to fix our individual sympathies.

But Grey has informed us that if we help our allies, England will attack us!

If the Afghans had been seeking a greater Afghanistan at the expense of India, and had assassinated a Prince and Princess of Wales in the streets of Peshawur, I am not sure that the vocal part of the British nation would not have called for a march to Candahar. And I am quite certain that in that case Austria would have raised no protest. Then what, I *would ask, is Mr. Churchill doing? What possible ground can there be for a mobilization of the fleet?* Was it a mere *outburst of meddlesome Chauvinism?*

Bravo!

This Is Not Our Quarrel

Certainly not.

My object in writing to you at this moment is to urge the prime duty of maintaining *right* throughout this awful crisis an attitude of strict neutrality. This is *not our quarrel*; nor would the

entrance into it of Russia, Germany, France or any other State *give any British Government any moral right to spill British blood or to spend British treasure* in a war whose only intelligible purpose would be the *destruction of civilization in Western Europe.* If four millions of Russians and Serbians are to be flung against four millions of Germans and Austrians that should be enough. If the military furies drag fifteen hundred thousand Frenchmen and an equal number of Italians into the conflict, that would supply three *million more reasons why Britain should remain at peace.*

Good.

Good.

In the City one is glad to learn—and I believe the same is true of business men all over the country—that one opinion prevails. "*It is no concern of ours*" is the general cry. *The greatest of British* interests is *peace.* The *folly and wickedness of fighting for Russia against Germany are not less clear than the folly and wickedness of fighting for Germany against France.*

Right.

Aha!

Ten Millions a Day

In *any case we shall suffer.* The appalling losses of such a war—which might cost in wealth alone anything up to ten millions sterling a day—will be spread over the whole world, and will fall heavily enough upon *London*, which supports the *delicate fabric of international credit.*

Yes.

The main hope just now—as a great banker said to me a day or two ago—is the dearth of money. Every great Continental State is living on capital or credit. The *extreme financial weakness of Russia and France* may give their rulers pause, may save them from ruin and bankruptcy.

But the empty treasuries of Vienna and Belgrade have not prevailed over the war fever. Financial prudence has not been able to restrain racial feuds or the cravings of military ambition. We, too, must beware. All the members of our ruling classes are not responsible and sober-minded people. The makers of war material are far more powerful than most of us suspect. *A cunning and unscrupulous press is at work on behalf of war.* All that Cobden and Morley have taught is in danger of being forgotten. If the war spreads and we are entangled, great finance houses, great merchants and manufacturers will

Yes.

go *down like ninepins.* Capital *will perish.* Mills will close. Shops will empty. Orders for advertisements will cease.

Employment will drop and wages fall. Then insurance funds will run dry in a few weeks or months, and perhaps (who knows?) the working classes, hitherto so loyal and patriotic, will turn savagely against the powers that be. Let us all, whatever our party, *stand together and do* what we can to avert this crowning calamity.

Excellent.

Bravo!

So these are the voices of public opinion that drove Grey to threaten Lichnowsky! Why, this is the exact opposite! He was either bluffing or lying outright.

No. 383

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 188. BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

For your information and reference.

His Majesty the Emperor last evening sent the following telegram to the Czar: "It is with . . . friend and cousin Willy." [3]

A telegram from the Czar [4] crossed this telegram, in which he made an appeal for the mediation of His Majesty. To this telegram His Majesty replied this evening with the following dispatch: "I received . . . my help. Willy".[5]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 384

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [6]

Telegram 190. BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[7]

Prince Lichnowsky telegraphs: "Have just had a talk . . . collapse . . . Sir Edward Grey informed me in confidence that the Serbian . . . matter of a conference." [8]

Kindly inform Count Berchtold at once [9] of the foregoing and [10] add that we consider [11] such compliance on the part of Serbia an appropriate basis for negotiations, if founded on an occupation of a portion of Serbian territory as a hostage.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the original draft in the Imperial Chancelor's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office July 30 at 12.10 a.m.
[3] Here No. 335 is inserted.
[4] See No. 332.
[5] Here No. 359 is inserted.
[6] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting with additions and alterations by Jagow and the Imperial Chancelor. See No. 432.
[7] To the Central Telegraph Office July 30 at 12.30 a.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna "early" July 30 (no hour named).
[8] Here are inserted the two sections of Lichnowsky's telegram of the 29th of July (No. 357), with slight alterations.
[9] "at once" inserted in Bergen's draft by the Chancelor.
[10] "and . . . hostage" added by Jagow to the Bergen draft.
[11] "that we consider . . . an appropriate basis" an alteration by the Chancelor from Jagow's original "that such compliance . . . would appear an appropriate basis."

No. 385

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 187. BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Russia has informed us that she has mobilized Kasan, Kiev, Moscow, Odessa, because Austria has mobilized eight corps, and these measures must be regarded in part as being directed against Russia.[3]

Russian mobilization, however, is far from meaning war, as in western Europe; the Russian army might be a long time under arms without crossing a frontier; relations with Vienna not broken off, and Russia wants to avoid war, if in any way possible. We called Petersburg's attention to the fact that mobilization would probably call forth Austrian counter-measures and thus start the ball rolling.

Russia complains that neither through Mr. Schebeko nor Count Szapary have the conferences made any headway. Hence we must urgently request, in order to prevent a general catastrophe, or at least to put Russia in the wrong, that Vienna inaugurate and continue with the conferences according to telegram 174.[4]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 386

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 130. VIENNA, *July 29, 1914.*[6]

My Russian colleague has just called on me. He said that the situation was very complicated. For Russia considers it necessary for her to mobilize four military districts—he thought Moscow, Odessa, Kiev, Kasan—were being mobilized. What he told me was official, and was, furthermore, also being reported to Berlin.

From his further statements it could be deduced that in *his* opinion, a localization of the Austro-Serbian conflict appeared to be impossible. Russia felt herself to be threatened in her status as a Great Power as the result of Austria's procedure against Serbia.

I talked according to the tenor of telegrams 172 [7] and 176,[8] and referred particularly to the declared territorial disinterestedness of Austria. Mr. Schebeko thought, however, that such a declaration was worthless.

[1] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting. An earlier draft, written by Rosenberg, was killed by Jagow. Rosenberg's draft had read: "The Russian Ambassador has informed us here that Russia is going to mobilize against Austria tomorrow. In order to put Russia in the wrong before the world for carrying out such a measure, it appears to us urgently necessary that the Vienna Cabinet make the declaration we recommended without delay at Petersburg and to the other Great Powers. The purpose of our advice is not prevarication, but solely an improvement of our moral position in the estimation of European public opinion."

[2] To the Central Telegraph Office July 30 at 12.30 a.m.; forwarded at 4.10 a.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 6 a.m.

[3] See No. 343.

[4] See No. 323.

[5] From the decodification.

[6] Filed in Vienna July 29 at 7.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 30 at 12.40 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, a.m.

[7] See No. 309.

[8] See No. 315, note 6.

My French colleague visited me after that. He told me that Mr. Schebeko had shortly before made the same communication to him, which had surprised him somewhat, as Mr. Schebeko had talked quite differently twenty-four hours before. Russia, he thought, had intended absolutely to prevent any war-like action on the part of Austria against Serbia. Since it was found impossible to prevent this, she replied by mobilizing. He no longer considered a localization feasible, although we certainly ought still to strive toward that aim.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 387

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg [1]

Telegram 140. BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

The following telegram from the Czar crossed the telegram of His Majesty [3] to the Czar transmitted yesterday through Your Excellency: "Am glad . . . too far. Nicky." [4]

This telegram His Majesty replied to this evening with the following uncoded telegram sent direct: "I received . . . my help. Willy."[5]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 388

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 133. VIENNA, *July 29, 1914.*[7]

Instructions carried out.[8] Count Berchtold's thanks for the suggestion. Minister is ready to repeat declaration concerning territorial disinterestedness which he has already made at Petersburg and through the local Russian representative. So far as the further declaration with reference to military measures is concerned, Count Berchtold says that he is not in a position to give me a reply at once.

In spite of my representations as to the urgency of the matter, I have up to this evening received no further communication.[9]

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office July 30 at 12.50 a.m.
[3] See No. 335.
[4] Here the Czar's telegram to the Emperor of July 29 (No. 332) is inserted.
[5] Here the Emperor's telegram to the Czar of July 29 (No. 359) is inserted.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed in Vienna July 29 at 11.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 30 at 1.30 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, a.m.
[8] See Nos. 323 and 377.
[9] See No. 407.

No. 389

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest [1]

Telegram 51.
Confidential.

BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Matters are getting more acute, inasmuch as Russia has today ordered mobilization of Kasan, Kiev, Odessa, Moscow. As a result Austria, on her part, can hardly fail to mobilize against Russia. Perhaps conflict could still be prevented by Roumanian move at Petersburg, or possibly by a direct telegram from King Carol to Emperor of Russia, in which Roumanian obligations were made plain.[3]

Friendly telegrams have been exchanged between His Majesty the Emperor and Emperor Nicholas, but up to the present without any positive result.

JAGOW.

No. 390

The Czar to the Emperor [4]

Telegram (unnumbered). PETERHOF PALACE, *July 30, 1914.*[5]

TO HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR, NEW PALACE.

Thank you heartily for your quick answer. Am sending Tatistcheff this evening with instructions. The *military measures which have now* [6] *come into force* [7] *were decided five days ago* [8] for reasons of *defense* [9] *on account of Austria's* [10] *preparations.*[11] I hope from all my heart that these measures *won't in any way interfere* with your part as mediator which I greatly value. *We need your strong pressure on Austria* [12] to come to an *understanding with us.*

NICKY.

*) *No! No there is no thought of anything of that sort!!!*

**Austria has only made a partial mobilization against Serbia in the south. On the strength of that the Czar—as is openly admitted by him here—instituted "mil. measures which have now come into force" against Austria and us and as a matter of fact five* [13] *days ago. Thus it is almost a week ahead of us. And these measures are for defense against Austria, which is in no way attacking him!!! I can not agree to any more mediation, since the Czar who requested it has at the same time secretly mobilized behind my back. It is only a maneuver, in order to hold us back and to increase the start they have already got. My work is at an end!*

W.

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office July 30 at 1.45 a.m.
[3] See No. 463.
[4] From the corrected copy [in English] of the Telegraph Office at the New Palace. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 35, No. 22, VI. There the telegram is dated 1.20 p.m. See also Nos. 359 and 366. See further No. 413.
[5] Filed at Peterhof Palace at 1.20 a.m.; arrived at the Telegraph Office at the New Palace at 1.45 a.m.; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office, July 30, p.m.
[6] "now" twice underscored by the Emperor.
[7] "force" twice underscored by the Emperor.
[8] "five" thrice, "days" twice underscored by the Emperor.
[9] "defense" twice underscored by the Emperor.
[10] "Austria" twice underscored by the Emperor.
[11] Exclamation-point by the Emperor on the left margin.
[12] The words "strong . . . Austria" twice underscored by the Emperor.
[13] "five" twice underscored by the Emperor.

No. 391

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg [1]

Telegram 141. BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

To the telegram transmitted to the Czar [3] through the agency of Your Excellency, the Czar has made the following reply: "Thanks for your . . . friendship. Your loving Nicky." [4]

Request Your Excellency, p. p., to clear up, by means of an immediate talk with Mr. Sazonoff, the alleged discrepancy between your speech and the telegram of His Majesty. Consideration of the Hague conference would in this case naturally be excluded.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 392

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg [5]

Telegram 142. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[6]

Please tell Mr. Sazonoff that we are continuing to mediate; condition, however, would be suspension for the time being of all hostilities against Austria on the part of Russia.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 393

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [7]

Telegram 188. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[8]

Kindly thank Sir E. Grey for his frank explanation and tell him that we are continuing to mediate in Vienna and are urgently advising the acceptance of his proposal.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office July 30, at 2.40 a.m.
[3] See No. 387.
[4] Here is inserted the telegram of the Czar to the Emperor of the 29th of July (No. 366).
[5] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 2.55 a.m.
[7] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[8] To the Central Telegraph Office at 2.55 a.m. See Nos. 368 and 418.

No. 394

The Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 20. CATTARO, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

Calmer guidance seems to have gained the upper hand at yesterday's meeting of the Ministerial Council. Minister for Foreign Affairs has told Italian colleague that despite the news of the outbreak of hostilities in Serbia, the Government would for the time being await the progress of events and make no change in their relations with Austria, nor hand back [3] the Minister his passports until further notice. General mobilization ordered.

ZECH.

No. 395

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [4]

Telegram 192.
Urgent. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[5]

The Imperial Ambassador at London telegraphs: [6]

Sir E. Grey just sent for me again. The Minister was entirely calm, but very grave, and received me with the words that the situation was continuing to grow more acute. Sazonoff had stated that after the declaration of war he will no longer be in a position to negotiate with Austria direct, and *had requested them here to take up the mediation efforts again.* The Russian Government regards the cessation of hostilities for the present as a necessary preliminary to mediation.

Sir E. Grey repeated his suggestion already reported, that we take part in a mediation *à quatre*, such as we had already accepted in principle. It would seem to him to be a suitable basis for mediation, if Austria, after occupying Belgrade, for example, or other places, should announce her conditions. Should Your Excellency, however, undertake mediation, a prospect I was able early this morning to put before him, this would of course suit him equally well. But *mediation* seemed now to him to be urgently necessary, if *a European catastrophe were not to result.*

Sir E. Grey then said to me that he had a friendly and private communication to make to me, namely, that he did not want our warm personal relations and the intimacy of our talks on all political matters to lead me astray, and he would *like to spare himself later the reproach (of) bad faith.* The British Government desired now as before to cultivate our previous friendship, and it could *stand aside as long as the conflict remained confined to Austria and Russia. But if we and France* should *be involved*, the situation would imme-

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Cattaro July 29, at 5 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 30, at 2.55 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, a.m. Communicated on July 30 to the General Staff, the Admiralty Staff, the Imperial Naval Office and the Ministry of War. See No. 358.
[3] Thus in the decodification.
[4] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting. Cf. Bethmann's speech before the Reichstag committee on the 9th of November, 1916 (*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* November 10, 1916).
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 2.55 a.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at noon.
[6] See No. 368.

diately be altered, and the British Government would, *under the circumstances, find itself forced to make up its mind quickly.* In that event *it would not be practicable to stand aside and wait for any length of time.* "If war breaks out, it will be *the greatest catastrophe* that the *world has ever seen.*" It was far from his desire to express any kind of a threat; he only wanted to protect me from disappointments and *himself* from the *reproach of bad faith*, and had therefore chosen the form of a private explanation."

As a result we stand, in case Austria refuses all mediation, before a conflagration in which England will be against us; Italy and Roumania to all appearances will not go with us, and we two shall be opposed to four Great Powers. On Germany, thanks to England's opposition, the principal burden of the fight would fall. Austria's political prestige, the honor of her arms, as well as her just claims against Serbia, could all be amply satisfied by the occupation of Belgrade or of other places. She would be strengthening her status in the Balkans as well as in relation to Russia by the humiliation of Serbia. Under these circumstances we must urgently and impressively suggest to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the acceptance of mediation on the above-mentioned honorable conditions. The responsibility for the consequences that would otherwise follow would be an uncommonly heavy one both for Austria and for us.[1]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 396

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [2]

Telegram 193. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[3]

Count Pourtalès telegraphs: "Sazonoff informed me . . . meaning any war." [4]

This report does not agree with the impression that Your Excellency gave during the course of the conference of Count Berchtold with Mr. Schebeko. Apparently there is some misunderstanding, which I beg to have cleared up. We can not expect Austria to deal with Serbia, with whom she is at war. The refusal to hold any exchange of opinions with Petersburg, however, would be a serious error, as it would be direct provocation of Russia's armed interference, which Austria-Hungary is beyond all else interested to prevent.[5]

We are, of course, ready to fulfil the obligations of our alliance, but must decline to be drawn wantonly into a world conflagration by Vienna, without having any

[1] See Nos. 434, 437, 440, 441, 450, 464, 465, 468 and 482.

[2] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting, with alterations and additions by Jagow and the Imperial Chancelor. Cf. Bethmann's speech in the Reichstag on the 19th of August, 1915.

[3] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3 a.m.; forwarded at 4.40 a.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 10 a.m.

[4] Here is inserted Pourtalès' telegram of July 29 (No. 365), after some abbreviation of it had been made, especially the omission of the words "and that in . . . grasping at every straw," "that I had no knowledge . . . Grey's proposal," and "in case it were . . . impending."

[5] In the Stumm draft here came next the sentence: "Kindly express yourself along these lines to Count Berchtold with all the impressiveness possible." The sentence, with the addition of the words "and great seriousness" in Jagow's hand, following "possible," was later taken out. (See, however, note 2, p. 346.)

regard paid to our counsel. Also, Vienna appears to disregard our advice in regard to the Italian question.[1]

Please talk to Count Berchtold at once with all impressiveness and great seriousness.[2]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 397

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg[3]

Telegram 143. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[4]

Vienna's refusal to enter into conferences must have occurred before our last *démarche* at Vienna, concerning the success of which we have as yet no report here.[5]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 398

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office[6]

Telegram 382. THERAPIA, *July 29, 1914.*[7]

From the beginning of the crisis Margrave Pallavicini has communicated to me the most secret dispatches to and from his Embassy, even telegrams marked "decode personally." Cooperation in the alliance question was already called for by the fact that the Grand Vizier himself, except for his most recent stand, has always dealt with both of us together. I do not believe that an alliance can come into being without Austria's participation, for the Porte would in no event agree to an alliance merely for the term of the present crisis. It is conceivable that Russia might attack not Austria, but Turkey,[8] in which case we should have to declare war on Russia without a *casus foederis* occurring for Austria. It would therefore not be unobjectionable to leave Austria entirely in the dark from now on. Margrave Pallavicini would be offended at my silence, especially if he should learn through some other source—perhaps through the Grand Vizier—that I was negotiating here. As soon as some basis of agreement can be arrived at between the Grand Vizier and ourselves, I would request that I be authorized to make a confidential communication to Pallavicini.[9]

Prospect of a commencement of the negotiations this evening.

WANGENHEIM.

[1] Paragraph "We are . . . question" added to the draft by Jagow's hand.

[2] The last sentence read at first, as written by Jagow: "Please attend to this at once." The Imperial Chancelor crossed out the last five words and wrote instead "talk to Count . . . seriousness." (See also p. 345, note 5.) See No. 448; in connection with it No. 433.

[3] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting.

[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.05 a.m.

[5] See Nos. 365 and 449.

[6] From the decodification.

[7] Filed in Therapia July 29 at 7.02 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 30, 5.40 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, a.m.

[8] To this a marginal annotation by the Imperial Chancelor; "Right. I have called attention to that myself."

[9] See Nos. 320, 411 and 431.

No. 399

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor [1]

BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

Your Imperial and Royal Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg reports in the telegram herewith humbly submitted,[3] that Mr. Sazonoff has informed him of the *mobilization of Russia against Austria*. Corroborating this announcement, the local Russian Ambassador has informed me today that Russia *was mobilizing Kiev, Kasan, Odessa and Moscow*,[4] which, however, did not mean war at all, and neither did it mean that diplomatic relations with Austria were not broken off. *No mobilization had in any way taken place against Germany.*[5]

I immediately instructed Your Majesty's Ambassador at Petersburg by telegraph to point out to the Russian Minister the probable *consequences of this mobilization against Austria*, and to request him, as long as the transactions with Vienna, with which we were attempting mediation, continued, to avoid any *armed* [6] conflict with Austria.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

According to this the Czar has simply been tricking us with his appeal for my assistance, and has deceived us. For one does not ask for help and mediation when one is already mobilizing! W.

Then I must mobilize too! It had already commenced on July 24. Presumably also the Guards.

According to the telegram of the Czar, it was already ordered five days ago, thus on the twenty-fourth immediately after the handing over of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, therefore long before the Czar begged me by telegraph to mediate. He expressly stated in his first telegram that he would presumably be forced to take to measures that would lead to a Europeon war. Thus he takes the responsibility upon himself. Actually, however, the measures were in full swing and he simply lied to me. The sending of Tatistcheff and the hope that I would not let his mobilization measures disturb me in my rôle of mediator are childish, and solely intended to lure us into the mire. I regard my mediation action as brought to an end, as the Czar, instead of loyally awaiting its results, had already mobilized behind my back, without letting me know anything about it. W.

No. 400

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 132. VIENNA, *July 29, 1914.*[8]

I have just received a statement from the Imperial and Royal Government to the following effect:

In answer to the English request to the effect that the Imperial Government take advantage of its influence with Vienna to get the latter either to regard the

[1] From the original (draft in Jagow's handwriting) and the corrected copy of the Imperial report, now also among the archives.

[2] Sent by messenger July 30 at 6 a.m. for immediate submission. Imperial marginal annotation on the corrected copy: "New Palace July 30, 7 a.m." Corrected copy returned by the Emperor on the same day to the Foreign Office, where, also on the same day, Jagow and Zimmermann took official notice of the Emperor's marginal annotations.

[3] See No. 343.

[4] "Moscow" twice underscored by the Emperor.

[5] Question-mark and exclamation-point in the margin by the Emperor.

[6] Under "armed" three exclamation-points by the Emperor.

[7] From the decodification.

[8] Dated at Vienna on the 29th of July, filed there July 30 at 3 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 30, at 6.50 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m. See No. 277.

reply from Belgrade as satisfactory or as the basis for negotiations, the Imperial and Royal Government first calls attention to the fact that the Serbian note in reply is by no manner of means, as Sir Edward Grey seems to think, an assent to all the Austrian demands with but a single exception; on the other hand, reservations are formulated in connection with most of the points, which materially detract from the admissions. Refusal, moreover, concerns just those points which contained some guaranty for the practical attainment of the ends which were their object.

The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal its surprise at the assumption that its action against Serbia is aimed against Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans, for it was the preliminary hypothesis that the hostile propaganda directed against the Monarchy was not only of Serbian, but of Russian origin. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, proceeded on the assumption that official Russia had nothing to do with these tendencies hostile to the Monarchy, and directed its present action exclusively against Serbia, while its feelings for Russia, as Count Berchtold can assure Sir Edward Grey, are throughout friendly.

Furthermore, the Imperial and Royal Government, to its great regret, is compelled to point out that it is no longer in a position to accept the Serbian reply in the light of the English suggestion, as in the course of the move made from here, a state of war between the Monarchy and Serbia has already been entered upon, as a result of which the Serbian note in reply has already been superseded by other events.

The Imperial and Royal Government also wishes to call attention to the fact that the Serbian Government proceeded to mobilize even before it handed over its reply, and that subsequent to the latter event, also, it let three days go by without announcing its willingness to alter the point of view of its note, whereupon a declaration of war followed on the part of Austria.

If, however, the English Cabinet is prepared to use its influence with the Russian Government toward the end of maintaining peace among the Great Powers and toward that of localizing the war forced upon Austria-Hungary by the Serbian machinations of many years' standing, the Imperial and Royal Government would welcome it.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 401

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 189.
Urgent.

PETERSBURG, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

Just had one and a half hours' conference with Sazonoff, who sent for me at midnight. Minister's purpose was to persuade me to advocate participation by my Government in a conference of

[1] From the decodification. Published in part in the German White Book of the year 1915, p. 7.
[2] Filed at St. Petersburg at 4.30 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.10 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, a.m. Copy of the decodification, with omission of the paragraph "From Sazonoff's statements . . . stands firm," sent to the Emperor on July 30, who noted on the upper margin: "7 o'clock in the evening." Copy came back to the Foreign Office August 1, Imperial Chancelor, Jagow and Zimmermann took cognizance of the marginal annotations of the Emperor.

four, in order to find a way to *move Austria by friendly*[1] *means to drop those demands which infringe on the sovereignty of Serbia.*[2] I confined myself to promising to report the conversation, and took the stand that any exchange of opinions appeared to me to be a very difficult if not an impossible matter now that Russia had *decided to take the fateful step of mobilization.* Russia was demanding of us to do that to Austria which Austria was being reproached for doing to Serbia; to wit, *infringing upon her rights of sovereignty.* Since Austria had promised to *consider Russian interests* by her declaration of territorial disinterestedness, which, on the part of a nation at war *meant a great deal*, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ought to be let alone while settling her affairs with Serbia. It would be time enough to return to the question of sparing Serbia's sovereign rights when *peace* was concluded. I added very earnestly that the whole Austro-Serbian matter took a *back seat* for the moment in the face of the *danger of a European conflagration.* I took great pains to impress the magnitude of this danger upon the Minister. Sazonoff was not to be diverted from the idea that Russia could not leave Serbia in the lurch. No Government could follow such a policy here *without seriously endangering the Monarchy.*

Is Russian mobilization a friendly means?!

Right.

Very good.

Good.

Yes.

Nonsense! that sort of policy conceals within itself the greatest dangers for the Czar!

During the course of the conversation *Sazonoff wanted* to *argue* the inconsistency between the telegram of His Majesty the Emperor to the Czar [3] and Your Excellency's telegraphic instructions number 134.[4] I decidedly denied any, and pointed out that *even if we had already mobilized*, an appeal by my Most Gracious Master to the common interests of monarchs *would not be inconsistent* with such a measure. I said that the communication I had made him this afternoon [5] according to the instructions of Your Excellency, had been no threat, but a friendly warning in the shape of a reference to the *automatic effect that the mobilization here would have to have on us in consequence of the German-Austrian alliance.* Sazonoff stated that the order for mobilization *could no longer possibly*[6] *be retracted*, and that the *Austrian mobilization was to blame for it.*

Nothing done as yet.

Right.

That was a partial mobilization of six corps for a limited purpose!

From Sazonoff's statements I received the impression that His Majesty's telegram did not fail of an effect on the Czar, but that the Minister is busily striving to make sure that the Czar stands firm.

POURTALÈS.

If mobilization can no longer be retracted—which is not true—why, then, did the Czar appeal for my mediation three days afterward without mention of the issuance of the mobilization order? That shows plainly that the mobilization appeared to him

[1] "friendly" twice underscored by the Emperor.
[2] Exclamation-point and question-mark in the margin by the Emperor.
[3] See No. 359.
[4] See No. 342.
[5] The 29th of July is meant. See No. 378.
[6] "no longer possibly" thrice underscored by the Emperor.

to have been precipitate, and that after it he made this move pro forma *in our direction for the sake of quieting his uneasy conscience, although he knew that it would no longer be of any use, as he did not feel himself to be strong enough to stop the mobilization. Frivolity and weakness are to plunge the world into the most frightful war, which eventually aims at the destruction of Germany. For I have no doubt left about it: England, Russia and France have agreed among themselves—after laying the foundation of the* casus foederis *for us through Austria— to take the Austro-Serbian conflict for an excuse for waging a war of extermination against us. Hence Grey's cynical observation to Lichnowsky "as long as the war is confined to Russia and Austria, England would sit quiet, only when we and France mixed into it would he be compelled to make an active move against us ("); i. e., either we are shamefully to betray our allies, sacrifice them to Russia—thereby breaking up the Triple Alliance, or we are to be attacked in common by the Triple Entente for our fidelity to our allies and punished, whereby they will satisfy their jealousy by joining in totally ruining us. That is the real naked situation* in nuce, *which, slowly and cleverly set going, certainly by Edward VII, has been carried on, and systematically built up by disowned conferences between England and Paris and Petersburg; finally brought to a conclusion by George V and set to work. And thereby the stupidity and ineptitude of our ally is turned into a snare for us. So the famous "circumscription" of Germany has finally become a complete fact, despite every effort of our politicians and diplomats to prevent it. The net has been suddenly thrown over our head, and England sneeringly reaps the most brilliant success of her persistently prosecuted purely anti-German world-policy, against which we have proved ourselves helpless, while she twists the noose of our political and economic destruction out of our fidelity to Austria, as we squirm isolated in the net. A great achievement, which arouses the admiration even of him who is to be destroyed as its result! Edward VII is stronger after his death than am I who am still alive! And there have been people who believed that England could be won over or pacified, by this or that puny measure!!! Unremittingly, relentlessly she has pursued her object, with notes, holiday proposals, scares, Haldane, etc., until this point was reached. And we walked into the net and even went into the one-ship-program in construction with the ardent hope of thus pacifying England!!! All my warnings, all my pleas were voiced for nothing. Now comes England's so-called gratitude for it! From the dilemma raised by our fidelity to the venerable old Emperor of Austria we are brought into a situation which offers England the desired pretext for annihilating us under the hypocritical cloak of justice, namely, of helping France on account of the reputed "balance of power" in Europe, i.e., playing the card of all the European nations in England's favor against us! This whole business must now be ruthlessly uncovered and the mask of Christian peaceableness publicly and brusquely torn from its face in public, and the pharisaical hypocrisy exposed on the pillory!! And our consuls in Turkey and India, agents, etc., must fire the whole Mohammedan world to fierce rebellion against this hated, lying, conscienceless nation of shop-keepers; for if we are to be bled to death, England shall at least lose India. W.*

No. 402

Marginal Annotations of the Emperor of July 30, a.m., to an Article in the "Morning Post" of July 28, 1914: "Efforts towards Peace" [1]

The ONLY POSSIBLE WAY to ensure or enforce peace is that England must tell Paris and Petersburg—its Allies—to remain quiet, i. e., neutral, to the Austro-Serbian conflict, then Germany can remain quiet too. But if England continues to remain silent or to give lukewarm assurances of neutrality; that would mean encouragement to its Allies to attack Austro-Germany. Berlin has tried to mediate between Petersburg and Vienna on the appeal of the Czar. But His Majesty silently had already *mobilized* before the appeal; so that the mediator—Germany—is placed "*en demeure*" and his work becomes illusory. Now only *England* alone can stop the catastrophe by restraining its Allies, by clearly intimating that—as Sir E. Grey declared—it had nothing to do with the Austro-Serbian conflict, and that if one of its Allies took an active part in the strife it could not reckon on the help of England. That would put a stop to all war. King George has communicated England's intention to remain neutral to me by Prince Henry. On the other hand the Naval Staff have this morning—July 30—received a telegram from the German military attaché in London, that Sir E. Grey in a private conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, declared, that if Germany made war on France, England would immediately attack Germany with its fleet! Consequently Sir E. Grey says the direct contrary to what his Sovereign communicated to me through my brother and places his King in the position of a double-tongued liar vis-à-vis to me.

WILLIAM I. R.

The whole war is plainly arranged between England, France and Russia for the annihilation of Germany, lastly through the conversations with Poincaré in Paris and Petersburg, and the Austro-Serbian strife is only an excuse to fall upon us! God help us in this fight for our existence, brought about by falseness, lies and poisonous envy!

No. 403

The Minister at Brussels to the Imperial Chancelor [2]

BRUSSELS, *July 28, 1914.*[3]

The Austro-Serbian conflict has greatly disquieted the public mind here, and only the fact that it has not yet come to open hostilities between the two opponents permits the hope that further consequences endangering the peace of Europe may be avoided.

That official circles are quietly expectant, I was able to gather from an interview

[1] Newspaper clipping [in English] sent to the Emperor by the Foreign Office; he made his marginal annotations on the morning of July 30, and sent it back to the Foreign Office. Imperial Chancelor and Jagow took cognizance of the marginal annotations of the Emperor on the 30th of July.

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 30, a.m. Report submitted to the Emperor, who, by marginal instructions, ordered its communication to the General Staff; came back to the Foreign Office from the Emperor through the General Staff on August 1.

with Mr. Davignon, and they are counting on the possibility that the influence of Germany and France at Vienna and Petersburg respectively, may perhaps succeed in calming the over-heated spirits.

No preparations for the mobilization of the Belgian army worth naming have so far been made, except that the furloughs to officers and men have been withdrawn. They are, however, engaged in making the necessary preparations so that in case of need mobilization may be put through smoothly.

VON BELOW.

No. 404

The Administrator of the Consulate at Kovno to the Foreign Office [1]

KOVNO, *July 29, 1914.*[2]

The garrison of Kovno, which before the crisis was for the greater part in camp at Murawjow near Kovno, has left the camp. The Infantry Regiments 109, 110 and 111 have marched off toward the German border. I have not been able to discover where they have taken up their quarters. The 3d Dragoons have been moved to Georgenburg. Thus at the present time there is nothing but artillery in the Fortress of Kovno.

The Fortress Commandant Grigorjew has cut short his leave and returned on Monday, the twenty-seventh instant. The military command has taken over the control of the electric plant.

The factories are continuing work.

There has been no sign of strike troubles here. At an attempt just made to get an advance of 2000 marks for the consulate's needs at the local branch of the Union Bank, the consular official was informed that no more money would be advanced on vouchers from the legation treasury, or against any vouchers of that nature, in fact. Therefore I ordered the official who brought this report to Eydtkuhnen to get 3000 marks at one of the banks there.

I have the honor of respectfully requesting that the legation treasury be informed of this.

The Imperial Embassy at St. Petersburg has been briefly informed by telegraph of the contents of this report. I enclose a copy of this report for that office, and respectfully suggest that it be forwarded there at convenience.

VON BÜLOW.

No. 405

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 386. THERAPIA, *July 30, 1914.*[4]

Grand Vizier told me the Greek Minister had just transmitted to him Venizelos' request that the postponed meeting take place now. He had selected

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 30, a.m. Communicated to the General Staff and Ministry of War July 31.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed at Therapia at 12.50 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.45 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 30th of July; came back to the Foreign Office on the 1st of August.

Munich as the location for the meeting, and would start for that place on the thirty-first instant, by way of Trieste. The matter of the alliance could be further handled with Talaat Bey during his absence.

WANGENHEIM.

No. 406

The Imperial Chancelor to the Minister at Stockholm [1]

Telegram 20.
Absolutely confidential. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

We have reason to assume that England will very soon take part in the war on the side of the Dual Alliance. Reservation of freedom of action in Swedish declaration of neutrality therefore very necessary.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 407

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor [3]

BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[4]

The accompanying telegram,[5] which I enclose with the greatest respect, reached here last night from Your Majesty's Ambassador at London.[6] Your Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna also reported last night that he had carried out Your Majesty's instructions concerning mediation toward Count Berchtold, but that up to midnight, despite his insistence, he had received no definite answer.[7] I instructed him, while referring to the probable English, Italian and Roumanian attitudes, to demand an immediate explanation from Count Berchtold,[8] in order that this episode may be closed in one way or another. I also called his attention to the fact that every declaration by Vienna to Petersburg concerning the purpose and extent of Austria's action against Serbia would only emphasize and openly label Russia's responsibility *Yes, of course.*

[1] From the original draft in the Imperial Chancelor's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11 a.m.
[3] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting, with alterations by the Imperial Chancelor. The corrected copy forwarded to the Emperor is also among the archives now.
[4] Corrected copy sent to the Imperial Chancelor for his signature at 11.15 a.m.; thence to be sent to the Emperor by automobile; marginal note by the Emperor on the corrected copy: "Sent 1.30 a.m. July 30, 1914. W." ("a.m." in error for "p.m.") Corrected copy reached the Chancelor again on July 30; he, with Jagow and Zimmermann, took cognizance of the Emperor's marginal annotations on the same day.
[5] See No. 368.
[6] The Imperial Chancelor only retained the first sentence of the Jagow draft, crossed everything else out and inserted instead the sentences "Your Majesty's Ambassador" to the end of the report. In Jagow's draft, "at London" was followed by: "I thereupon immediately sent the telegram, also respectfully enclosed, to Your Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, and instructed Your Majesty's ambassador at London to thank Sir E. Grey for his frankness and to tell him that we were still attempting to mediate at Vienna and had advised the acceptance of his proposals."
[7] See No. 388.
[8] See No. 395.

before the entire world. The English proposals once again repeated in Prince Lichnowsky's telegram I submitted to Count Berchtold for his serious consideration.

Should England act vigorously to secure for Austria the *results* [1] of which she holds out the prospect, Austria might find a possible satisfaction in them.

Your Majesty's most humble servant,

v. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

In the meantime a telegram arrived this morning from the naval attaché at London in which it says that Sir E. Grey told Lichnowsky in a private conversation that, in case we went to war against France, England would immediately proceed to attack us at sea with her fleet. Appropriate counter-measures, as far as they can be made inconspicuously against such attacks, p.p. (à la Port Arthur) are already under way. I am astonished that Lichnowsky has so far reported nothing. W.

No. 408

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor [2]

BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[3]

I venture to express to Your Majesty my most humble thanks for sending me the telegram [4] of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. At the same time I venture humbly to propose to Your Majesty to send another telegram to the Czar of the following tenor:

> I received your telegram with gratitude. My Ambassador's speech can not have been at variance with the tenor of my telegram. Count Pourtalès was to call the attention of your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of mobilization; I told you the same thing in my telegram. Austria has only mobilized against Serbia; if Russia, as has now happened, mobilizes against Austria, then the rôle of mediator which I took upon myself at your request will be endangered, if not made impossible. Yours alone is for the moment the responsibility of deciding.

As this telegram will be a particularly important document historically, I would most humbly advise that Your Majesty do not—as long as Vienna's decision is still outstanding—express in it the fact that Your Majesty's rôle as mediator is ended.

Most humbly,

v. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] "results" underscored by the Emperor. Question-mark by the Emperor in the margin.

[2] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting. The corrected copy, which was returned to the Foreign Office, is also among the archives.

[3] Sent at 11.15 a.m., July 30. On the corrected copy at the top, the marginal annotation of the Emperor: "July 30, 1914, 1 a.m. W." (1 p.m. is intended.) On the left-hand margin the text of the telegram in English, written in his own hand (No. 420).

[4] See No. 390. But see also No. 366.

No. 409

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [1]

Telegram 191. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

My hope that mediation may still be possible on the basis of the Grey proposal, is most seriously imperilled by the Russian mobilization against Austria and by French preparations for war. Austria will scarcely be able to avoid replying to the Russian mobilization with appropriate measures on her part. By reason of that, and on account especially of the French armament, our situation is becoming most critical. A demand from us to France that she cease her preparations could hardly be framed otherwise than as an ultimatum. That can only be avoided if Grey can succeed in persuading France to call a halt at once to her war-measures. Grey should furthermore act vigorously to get Russia to accept the conditions of his proposal, to prevent a further Russian ADVANCE against the Austrian border.[3]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 410

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 191.
Urgent. PETERSBURG, *July 30, 1914.*[5]

Mobilization comprises military districts Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kasan, Cossack armies of the Don, Kuban, Terek, Astrakhan, Orenburg, Ural.

Except for the mobilization of the fleet, no reservists have been called in for the military districts of Warsaw, Vilna, Petersburg.

POURTALÈS.

No. 411

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 385. THERAPIA, *July 30, 1914.*[7]

Grand Vizier accepts points 1 to 4; designates point 5, however, as wholly unacceptable. In the first place it is impossible to fix the time at which it will be certain that a war between Germany and Russia will not arise as a result of the Austro-Serbian conflict. Such a war might occur as the after-effect of an Austrian

[1] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.30 a.m.
[3] See No. 435.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed at Petersburg at 11 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.50 a.m.; receipt stamp, July 30, p.m. Telegram communicated to the General Staff, Admiralty Staff, Imperial Naval Office and Ministry of War.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.59 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m. On the margin, dated July 30, is the note in Zimmerman's hand: "In case we do not come to an agreement with the Turks at the present moment, we shall, in my opinion, drive them into the arms of our opponents. I think that under the present serious circumstances we should agree to a term of duration for the alliance until 1918—to the end of the Liman Mission—but in this case, we should absolutely draw Austria-Hungary in, too, as a second Power in the compact." See Nos. 320 and 508.

victory even one or two years later. It could not be demanded of Turkey that she bind herself to Germany at present, to find that she was left to look out for herself later, if Russia should wish to avenge herself on Turkey for her friendly attitude to the Triple Alliance. We would have to protect Turkey from all the possible consequences of her association with Germany. If he had talked of a shorter duration for the state of alliance earlier, he had simply meant that it was not to be an alliance forever or for a very long period. Both Powers ought naturally first to test out the value of such a state of alliance for a shorter period. He had been considering a term of seven years, but in no case would he be willing to let the compact run for a shorter time than General Liman's contract, which ran out at the end of 1918. It would only be logical if he were to insist that Germany, which desired by means of the Liman Mission to advance military reforms, should undertake to guarantee that Liman's activities should not be interrupted by a Russian attack.

WANGENHEIM.

No. 412

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 190. PETERSBURG, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

At our interview tonight [3] Sazonoff kept coming back to the fact that we were the only ones who could now check Austria. His Majesty the Emperor and King only needed to say a word, and they would listen to him. I replied to that that it was a very ticklish thing to try to stay the hand of a Great Power that had decided to take to arms for a just cause. We should, by doing so, run the risk of seriously disturbing our relations with our neighbor and of undermining her status as a Great Power, which was of the utmost importance to ourselves. Certainly such a policy could not, considering the general situation, be expected of Germany. That His Majesty the Emperor and King and His Majesty's Government had not been lacking in good advice to Vienna was well known. It was now up to Russia to cross this bridge so discreetly prepared for her by the declaration. Mr. Sazonoff brusquely replied: "This declaration does not satisfy us."

Russia's vital interests demanded not only the respecting of the territorial integrity of Serbia, but also that Serbia should not sink to the level of a vassal state of Austria by the acceptance of Austrian demands that infringed on her sovereign rights. Serbia was to become no Bokhara.

POURTALÈS.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Petersburg at 9.30 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.13 p.m.; receipt stamp of the office: July 30, p.m.
[3] See No. 401.

No. 413

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg [1]

Telegram 146. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

Tonight His Majesty received the following telegram from the Czar: "Thank you heartily . . . understanding with us. Nicky." [3]

His Majesty is constantly mentioning to me his lively satisfaction at the firmness and the skill with which Your Excellency is acting at the present crisis.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 414

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 152. ROME, *July 30, 1914.*[5]

Marquis di San Giuliano is constantly making declarations to the effect that he knows that at the outbreak of a general European war England will join the war and take the side of Russia and France.

FLOTOW.

No. 415

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 134. VIENNA, *July 30, 1914.*[7]

Mr. Dumaine has told the local representative of the Havas Agency that Cambon had lately reported from Berlin to Paris that Germany had driven Austria-Hungary to war. This report is said to have been sent from Paris to Petersburg during the presence there of Mr. Poincaré.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the original draft in the hand of the Imperial Chancelor.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 12.40 p.m.
[3] Here is inserted the telegram of the Czar to the Emperor on the 30th of July (No. 390).
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed at Rome at 11 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.05 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m. Communicated on the 30th of July to the General Staff, the Admiralty Staff, the Imperial Naval Office and the Ministry of War.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed at Vienna at 11.50 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.55 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m. Communicated by telegraph to the Ambassadors at Paris and Petersburg on July 31 by Zimmermann; to the Central Telegraph Office at 10.25 a.m.

No. 416

The Minister at Belgrade (temporarily at Nish) to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 7. NISH, *July 28, 1914.*[2]

FOR THE GENERAL STAFF:

The Austrian declaration of war made known Tuesday [3] afternoon at Nish. Depressed state of mind among army and people. Mobilization in full swing, but very slow, as Serbia is wholly unprepared. Lack of small-arms serious. Commander in Chief and Headquarters Staff not yet known. Misitch, Stephan Stephanovitch, Bojanovitch, Popovitch named as army commanders.

BÖHM.
GRIESINGER.

No. 417

Prince Henry of Prussia to the King of England [4]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[5]

HIS MAJESTY THE KING, BUCKINGHAM PALACE, LONDON:

Am here since yesterday, have informed William of what you kindly told me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday who gratefully received your message.

William, much preoccupied, is trying his utmost to fulfill Nicky's appeal to him to work for maintenance of peace and is in constant telegraphic communication with Nicky who today confirms news that military measures have been ordered by him equal to mobilization, measures which have been taken already five days ago.

We are furthermore informed that France is making military preparations, whereas we have taken no measures, but may be forced to do so any moment, should our neighbours continue, which then would mean a European war.

If you really and earnestly wish to prevent this terrible disaster, may I suggest you using your influence on France and also Russia to keep neutral, which seems to me would be most useful.

This I consider a very good, perhaps the only, chance to maintain the peace of Europe.

I may add that now more than ever Germany and England should lend each other mutual help to prevent a terrible catastrophe, which otherwise seems unavoidable.

Believe me that William is most sincere in his endeavors to maintain peace, but that the military preparations of his two neighbors may at last force him to follow

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Nish July 28, at 7.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 30 at 2.05 p.m. Receipt stamp: July 30, p.m. A copy of the decodification was sent at once to the General Staff.
[3] July 28.
[4] Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 44; see also No. 452.
[5] The telegram, written [in English] and signed in the handwriting of the Prince on a regular telegraph blank, was submitted to the Emperor, who noted on it: "Read, W. July 30, 1914. 12.15." Telegram then went to the Imperial Chancelor, who ordered its immediate dispatch; telegram to the Central Telegraph Office at 2.15 p.m.

their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenseless.

I have informed William of my telegram to you and hope you will receive my informations in the same spirit of friendship which suggested them.

HENRY.

No. 418

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 183. LONDON, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

Notified Sir E. Grey at once by letter.[3] Consider Berlin as more appropriate than London for mediation of an agreement between Vienna and Petersburg, as Sir E. is less acquainted with the whole question and also possesses less influence at Vienna, and as I foresee long and wearisome transactions here, especially in case an ambassadorial conference should take place. Count Mensdorff is also too timid and is lacking both in influence at Vienna and in personal initiative. For these reasons Grey's suggestions should serve as a basis.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 419

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 154. ROME, *July 30, 1914.*[5]

As Your Excellency knows, Marquis di San Giuliano makes no concealment of the fact that he considers Austria's procedure against Serbia a war of aggression, and that therefore Italy is not bound by the Triple Alliance compact to take part in a general world war resulting from this war. Even the violation of Article 7 of the treaty, he says, frees Italy of any obligation to go in. To my contentions against this point of view he always stubbornly replies: "I am not saying that Italy will not finally take part; I am only stating that she is not OBLIGED to take part." It is becoming more and more plain that Italy's object is to get something on this opportunity, and it is also a question worth considering whether it would not appear advisable, in the present political situation, to offer her the prospect of some advantage. All Italian deductions concerning Article 7 of the Triple Alliance treaty, tend, in my opinion, in this direction. The decision will lie with Austria. Unfortunately, the Austrian Ambassador here is violently opposed to any concession to Italy, and had yesterday a sharp verbal clash with Marquis di San Giuliano.[6]

FLOTOW.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in London at 11.43 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m.
[3] See No. 393.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed at Rome at 11.45 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.01 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m.
[6] Cf. Nos. 363 and 428.

No. 420

The Emperor to the Czar [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

Best thanks for telegram.[3] It is quite out of the question that my Ambassador's language could have been in contradiction with the tenor of my telegram. Count Pourtalès was instructed to draw the attention of your government to the danger and grave consequences involved by a mobilization; I said the same in my telegram to you. Austria has only mobilized against SERBIA and only a PART of her army. If, as it is now the case, according to the communication by you and your Government, Russia mobilizes against Austria, my rôle as mediator you kindly intrusted me with, and which I accepted at you(r) express prayer, will be endangered if not ruined. The whole weight of the decision lies solely on you(r) shoulders now, who have to bear the responsibility for peace or war.

WILLY.

No. 421

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 192. PETERSBURG, *July 30, 1914.*[5]

Have just talked with Sazonoff according to instructions in telegram 139.[6] Minister repeated his declaration of last night [7] that assurance of territorial disinterestedness on the part of Austria-Hungary did not satisfy Russia. Any other policy he could not at the present time prosecute without endangering the life of the Czar. I requested Sazonoff—stating in advance, however, that I believed any prospect of the fulfilment of his wishes by Austria to be hopeless—to formulate them once more for me, and in writing, and to bear in mind that, if there were in any case to be the least prospect of a peaceful solution, he would absolutely have to agree to some sort of a compromise. Minister thereupon set down the following:

> Si l'Autriche déclare qu'en réconnaissant que son conflit avec la Serbie a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, se déclare prête à éliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage à cesser tous préparatifs militaires.[8]

[1] From the original draft written [in English] by the Emperor. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 22, V. See No. 408.

[2] The original draft written by the Emperor reached the Imperial Chancelor, who, after taking cognizance of it, ordered the Imperial telegram to be sent immediately, uncoded, to the Czar at the Peterhof Palace. He sent a telegraphic report of its transmission to the Czar by the Emperor, and communicated the text of the Imperial telegram to the Czar by wire also to the Ambassador at Petersburg; telegram of the Emperor to the Czar and telegram of the Chancelor to the Emperor both to the Central Telegraph Office at 3.30 p.m.; telegram to Pourtalès (148) at 5.30 p.m.

[3] See Nos. 366 and 390.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed at Petersburg at 1.01 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.32 p.m. Marginal annotation by the Imperial Chancelor on July 30: "What points of the Austrian ultimatum has Serbia refused, anyway? To my knowledge, only the participation of Austrian officials in the judicial proceedings. Austria could abandon this participation on the condition that until the conclusion of the transaction she should occupy portions of Serbia with her troops." Beneath that Zimmermann's documentary note: "Settled by being submitted verbally."

[6] See No. 380.

[7] See No. 412.

[8] The text agrees with that of Count Pourtalès in his book: *On the Cross-Roads between War and Peace*, p. 52, with a separate facsimile, beside. See also in this connection No. 469, par. 2.

Even if these demands prove scarcely acceptable, it is still remarkable that Sazonoff's document should not contain a word requiring the immediate suspension of Austria's punitive expedition. The Minister would not agree to my proposition that Russia might, perhaps, declare herself to be satisfied if Austria should give certain assurances along these lines upon the CONCLUSION OF PEACE.

POURTALÈS.

Translatian[1] of Sazonoff's Formula

If Austria declares that in recognition of the fact that its conflict with Serbia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, it declares itself ready to eliminate from its ultimatum those points which infringe on Serbia's sovereign rights, then Russia agrees to suspend all military preparations.

No. 422

The Consul General at Warsaw to the Imperial Chancelor[2]

WARSAW, *July 30, 1914.*[3]

Russia is already in a state of complete preparation for war. From all that has become known up to the present time, it seems to be reasonably evident that Poland is being evacuated by the Russian troops according to the old plan, even the fortresses of Novogeorgievsk and Segrshe, as well as Pultusk and Ostrolenka, which were constructed with such haste. The troops operating against Germany are collecting along the Niemen between Lomza and Kovno, while the troops meant to attack Austria are gathering at Lublin and Kovel. Besides these there is an aggregation of troops at the camp of Skierniewice, to cover the troops stationed along the lines leading to Germany. The Kalisz line and the Warsaw-Vienna Railroad are completely occupied by infantry and sappers, who are laying mines under the roadbeds. Apparently all the lines leading into the interior are to be destroyed.

The other lines, too, are under military control; all the railroad officials have had to bind themselves in writing not to desert their posts. The Vistula Railroad is to be mobilized tomorrow, and freight traffic over the road is to be entirely stopped.

The stores of the management are already completely packed up and are to go to Smolensk as soon as possible. Most of the officers' ladies left yesterday.

The Reichsbank has, with very few exceptions, discontinued the discount of private bills of exchange drawn on Poles; only the bills of banks and of a few large institutions are still being accepted. While these measures are to a certain extent justified because of the unscrupulous Jewish element which seeks to make money by every shift, a complete collapse of trade here can be foreseen. Even now the number of refusals of payment is very great. For example, one of the greatest iron merchants, who is rated as worth three millions, has announced to the iron syndicate "Prodameta" that he has canceled all orders and will not make payment.

BRÜCK.

[1] As literal as possible.

[2] From the corrected copy.

[3] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 30, p.m. Report sent on July 31st to the General Staff with a request for its return. General Staff acknowledged its receipt by endorsement on August 1 and sent it back on August 2.

No. 423

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to a Number of German Diplomatic Representatives Abroad [1]

Confidential. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

In view of the facts which the Austro-Hungarian Government made public in its note to the Serbian Government, the last doubt that the bloody deed to which the heir to the Austrian throne and his wife fell victims was at least planned with the connivance of members of the Serbian Government and army must vanish. It was the result of the Greater-Serbia excitations, which, for a number of years, have become a lasting disturbance both to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and to all Europe.

The Greater-Serbian chauvinism stood out in particularly striking form during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-control and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and to the energetic intervention of the Great Powers, can be credited the fact that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary was at that time subjected on the part of Serbia, did not lead to war. The assurance of future good behavior which the Serbian Government gave at that period, it failed to live up to. Within the sight, or at least with the silent consent of official Serbia, the Greater-Serbia propaganda has continued to increase both in extent and intensity. It would be consistent neither with its dignity nor with its right to self-protection, should the Austro-Hungarian Government any longer regard inactively the machinations on the other side of its border by which the security and the integrity of its territory are being constantly threatened. In this state of affairs, both the procedure as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government must be deemed to be justified.

The reply of the Serbian Government to the demands made on it by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the twenty-third instant through its representative at Belgrade, in the meantime, goes to prove that the ruling authorities in Serbia are not inclined to cease from their previous policy or from their agitative activities. Thus, there remains nothing for the Austro-Hungarian Government to do, unless it is willing to make the final sacrifice of its status as a Great Power, but to enforce its demands by the use of heavy pressure, or, if need be, by taking military measures.

A number of Russian organs of public opinion consider it to be the self-evident right as well as the duty of Russia, actively to take the part of Serbia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The *Nowoje Wremja* even believes itself authorized to dare to allege German responsibility for the European conflagration which would result from such a step by Russia, because Germany did

[1] From a metallographed copy of a dispatch to the Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier; sent to Tangier August 1, but returned August 17 as undeliverable, and now among the archives. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 25, No. 2.

[2] The dispatch was sent on the 30th of July to Rome (Embassy), Brussels, The Hague, Sofia and Mexico; on the 31st of July to Constantinople, Madrid, Washington, Athens, Berne, Bucharest, Copenhagen, Christiania, Lisbon, Luxemburg, Stockholm, Bogotá, Carácas, Havana, Lima, Port-au-Prince, Santiago, La Paz, Teheran, Bangkok and Cairo. The copy of the dispatch intended for Guatemala went on the 11th of August to Washington. With reference to the tenor of the dispatch, see also No. 100.

not influence Austria-Hungary to yield. In this matter, the Russian press is distorting facts to suit itself. It was not Austria-Hungary which evoked the conflict with Serbia; but it was Serbia which, by unscrupulously favoring the Greater-Serbia aspirations, even in portions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, endangered the very existence of the latter and brought about conditions which ultimately found their expression in the criminal deed of Serajevo. If Russia believes herself compelled to enter the conflict on behalf of Serbia, she certainly has a right to do so. But she must fully understand that by so doing she is adopting as her own the Serbian efforts to undermine the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that she alone will be responsible if a European war results from the Austro-Serbian affair, which all the other Great Powers desire to localize. This Russian responsibility is as clear as day, and weighs all the more heavily since Count Berchtold has officially announced to Russia that it (Austria-Hungary) desires neither to acquire any Serbian territory nor to encroach upon the status of the Kingdom of Serbia, but is merely anxious to put an end to the Serbian intrigues which are endangering its existence.

The attitude of the Imperial Government in this matter is plainly foreshadowed. The final object of the Panslavic agitations carried on against Austria-Hungary is, through the destruction of the Danube Monarchy, the breaking-up or the weakening of the Triple Alliance and, as a result, the complete isolation of the German Empire. Accordingly, our most selfish interests summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty of preserving Europe from a general war, if that should be in any way possible, commands us at the same time to support those efforts which have the localization of the conflict as their object, faithful to the principles of that policy which we have prosecuted for over forty-four years in the interest of the maintenance of European peace. However should this conflagration center be extended, contrary to our hopes, and owing to Russia's interference, then, true to the obligations of our alliance, we should have to support the neighboring Monarchy with all the power of the Empire.

I request Your Excellency to utilize the foregoing communication for the regulation of your speech.

JAGOW.

No. 424

The Grand General Staff to the Foreign Office [1]

Report of the military attaché at Paris, sent 9.30 a.m.:

Quiet in Paris last evening and at present. Report of Janensch and local impressions confirm conclusions reported already, July 29, p.m.; that military measures at an end for the present, with no increase. Local protection of artificial structures varies in extent according to provisions of authorities of different towns; in and around Paris especially thorough, apparently from fear of sabotage. Reserves not called in at Paris. Cuirassier regiments in their barracks. Traffic

[1] Copy of the report from the military attaché at Paris sent over by the General Staff. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 30, p.m.

in merchandise at least going on in part. Answer given Ambassador yesterday by Viviani appears on the whole to be correct. Reported statement of Lieutenant Colonel Dupont on July 28,[1] probably braggadocio.

(Signed) v. GRIESHEIM.
For correctness.
VON BARTENWERFFER.
Major.

No. 425

Memorandum of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2]

BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[3]

COMMUNICATION FROM THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR

Count Szapary has received instructions relating to his announcement to Mr. Sazonoff, which can be summarized as follows: that Vienna, in her action against Serbia, has no intention of making any territorial acquisition, and intends in no way to destroy [4] the independent existence of the Kingdom. The Viennese procedure is in no way aimed at the Serbian race, but at the subversive propaganda emanating from Belgrade which is threatening Vienna.

The mobilization of the eight corps was evidently not an act of hostility against Russia, but was perfectly natural against an enemy like Serbia, which can put 400,000 men in the field.

Schebeko has received similar information from Count Berchtold. Vienna requests that Count Pourtalès be asked to address himself to Sazonoff along the same lines.

ZIMMERMANN.

[1] Presumably the statement in No. 372 (France 2d. par., In the Interior) is meant.
[2] In Zimmermann's handwriting.
[3] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 30, p.m. On the margin a note in Zimmermann's hand: "Request for communication to Petersburg complied with by instructions under A. 15239. Z. July 30." See No. 433, note 8 and No. 444, note 3.
[4] "destroy" crossed out by Stumm, and over it, in his handwriting: "put in question."

No. 426

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at The Hague [1]

Absolutely confidential. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

I respectfully request Your Excellency to preserve securely and unopened the enclosure [3] in this dispatch, and not to open it until you are instructed to do so.

I beg you to confirm by telegraph the receipt of this dispatch.[4]

JAGOW.

No. 427

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office [5]

BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[6]

NOTICE

Count Berchtold has just received the information from Mr. von Tschirschky that the latter had learned from the Russian Ambassador that the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan have been mobilized; that Russia feels that her honor as a Great Power has suffered injury and that she is compelled to adopt appropriate measures. Our Galician corps commanders also corroborate the news of the Russian mobilization, nor was it further denied by Mr. Sazonoff to the Imperial German Ambassador, as the Imperial and Royal military attaché reports.

Count Berchtold, who has instructed the Imperial and Royal Embassy to bring this to the knowledge of the Imperial German Government, adds that unless the Russian mobilization measures are at once discontinued, our own general mobilization must be at once inaugurated for military reasons.

The Imperial and Royal Government would consider it desirable, as a last attempt to prevent a European war, that our and the Imperial German representatives at Petersburg, and perhaps also at Paris, be instructed without delay to

[1] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting, written on July 29.

[2] Sent off on the 30th of July with a sealed envelope as enclosure, by Imperial messenger. Cf. No. 375.

[3] i. e., a copy of Jagow's dispatch to the Minister at Brussels of July 29 (No. 376). In the draft of the communication to the Belgian Government (see No. 376, note 1), presented by the Chief of the General Staff von Moltke and written in his own handwriting, there is at the bottom of the draft the note in Moltke's handwriting: "Copy to the Government of the Netherlands with accompanying letter (enclosure)." The enclosure added by Moltke, and likewise written by himself, read: "To the Government of the Netherlands. The German Government has the honor of making known to the Royal Netherland Government in the accompanying document a letter which has been directed from Berlin to the Royal Belgian Government.

At the same time the German Government declares that in the prospective war the neutrality of the Netherlands will be protected to its full extent on the part of Germany. If any frontier violations should be reported from the southern portion of the Province of Limburg, the Royal Government may rest assured that it can only be a matter of accident on the part of small bodies, which will at once be corrected by German authorities.

The Imperial Government believes that it can entertain the hope that the Kingdom of the Netherlands will preserve toward Germany a benevolent neutrality, thereby confirming the close and friendly relations of both race- and blood-related countries.

Underneath this a penciled note by von Moltke: "To be sent only after Belgium's reply has been received. v. M."

[4] Telegraphic confirmation of receipt by the Minister at The Hague received by the Berlin Central Telegraph Office July 31 at 9.10 p.m.; presented at the Foreign Office at 10.10 p.m.

[5] From the unsigned corrected copy.

[6] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 30, p.m.

declare in a friendly way to the Governments in both places that continuation of the Russian mobilization would have to be followed by counter-measures in Germany and Austria which would inevitably involve serious consequences.

It goes without saying that the Imperial and Royal Government will not permit itself to be deterred from its hostile action against Serbia.

Similar instructions are going to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Petersburg and Paris to make the declaration mentioned above, as soon as their German colleagues shall have received analogous instructions.[1]

The Imperial and Royal Government thinks that it should leave it to the Imperial German Government to decide whether Italy should be informed of this step. The Imperial and Royal Ambassador at Rome has, at any rate, received a copy of our instructions in this matter, in order to be able to inform the Italian Government, as soon as instructions to the same purpose should be issued to the Imperial German Ambassador.

No. 428

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office [2]

BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[3]

NOTICE

Extract from instructions of Count Berchtold to Mr. von Mérey at Rome, dated July 28:

I replied to the Italian Ambassador that our quarrel with Serbia concerned only that country and ourselves; that we had no idea of making any territorial acquisitions, and that therefore an occupation of Serbian territory did not come into the question.

To the expressed desire of the Duke d'Avarna that he receive a binding declaration to this effect, I replied that this would not be possible, for the reason that at the present time it was naturally not possible to foresee whether we might not be constrained against our will by the course of events during the war, to hold some Serbian territory under occupation. If things should develop normally, this was not to be expected, as we had absolutely no interest in further increasing the number of our Serbian subjects.

Your Excellency will inform Marquis di San Giuliano of this matter, and with regard to the claims for compensation based on Article 7 of the Triple Alliance treaty, you will further state:

As has already been emphasized to the Duke d'Avarna, we have absolutely no intention of acquiring any Serbian territory, but if we should find ourselves compelled to an occupation of Serbian territory that could not be regarded as merely temporary, we should be willing in such a case to enter upon an exchange of opinions with Italy concerning compensation.

On the other hand, we must expect from Italy that she would not obstruct the allies in their activities, but rather that she would continue to maintain unswervingly the friendly and loyal attitude she has held out as a promise.

For Your Excellency's personal information I will add that I have determined to make this concession because at the present time great issues are at stake, which in themselves are fraught with great difficulties, and which, except for the firm coherence of the Triple Alliance Powers, it would be entirely impossible to accomplish.

[1] See No. 429.

[2] From the unsigned corrected copy.

[3] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 30, p.m.

Count Berchtold, who has instructed the Imperial and Royal Embassy to bring the foregoing to the knowledge of the Imperial German Government, is under the impression that among many in authority in Italy, compensation at the expense of our territories with Italian populations, especially the Trentino, is what is in mind.

Count Berchtold states most emphatically, in regard to this, that the question of the separation of any part whatsoever of the Monarchy must not even be placed in discussion.[1]

No. 429

Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the Imperial Chancelor [2]

BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[3]

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador informs me under instruction from his Government just received,[4] that if the Russian mobilization measures are not at once discontinued, Austria-Hungary will have to proceed at once to a general mobilization. As a last move for the preservation of the peace of Europe, Count Berchtold proposes that the German and Austrian representatives at St. Petersburg, and also perhaps at Paris, be instructed to declare there in friendly way that continuation of Russian mobilization would result in counter-measures in Germany and Austria-Hungary that could but lead to serious consequences. The Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Petersburg and Paris are receiving instructions to make a declaration to this effect as soon as their German colleagues shall have received corresponding instructions.

Count Berchtold offers as a suggestion, that a communication to Italy in this connection be made.[5] I replied to Count Szögyeny that I should first have to speak to Your Excellency before I could give him a decision.

J(AGOW).

No. 430

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 231. PARIS, *July 30, 1914.*[7]

Tone of local press today arrogant, as result of conviction that in case of war English assistance can certainly be counted on. Delcassé said to have stated that English fleet could starve Germany out. Large portion of the press seems to think that chances for peace lie materially in the fact that war would be too dangerous a game for Germany in view of firm coherence of Triple Entente.

SCHOEN.

[1] Cf. No. 419.

[2] Written in Jagow's handwriting.

[3] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 30, p.m. In the margin a later note in Jagow's handwriting: "I informed Count Szögyeny that we can not cooperate in the move at Petersburg, as during the last day or two we had already talked 'in friendly fashion' along this same line, and could not do it again. Any renewal of such a discussion would have to be an ultimatum. Austria must make the move alone."

[4] See No. 427.

[5] See No. 442.

[6] From the decodification.

[7] Filed at Paris at 1 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.35 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m. In accordance with marginal instructions by Jagow, communicated to the Admiralty Staff on July 30; sent by messenger at 9.15 p.m.

No. 431

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople [1]

Telegram 284. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

Agree to strictly confidential communication to Margrave Pallavicini as soon as Your Excellency is convinced from your dealings with Grand Vizier that Turkey will go in according to the outlined proposal on all material matters.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 432

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 136. VIENNA, *July 30, 1914.*[5]

Instructions carried out.[6] Count Berchtold told de Bunsen he only refused to discuss the Austro-Serbian quarrel with Russia, but he is willing, however, as reported before, to discuss with the latter all questions directly concerning Austria and Russia.

He said that to claim that with the acceptance of Articles 5 and 6 of the Austrian note, the note would be accepted in its entirety, was an error, as Serbia had made reservations with regard to various other points. The integral acceptance of the demands of the note would have sufficed here, as long as a peaceful termination of the conflict between Serbia and the Monarchy was still possible. Now, since a state of war had supervened, Austria's conditions would naturally be different.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 433

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 135. VIENNA, *July 30, 1914.*[8]

In view of the collosal war preparations of Russia now discovered, this is all too late, I fear. Begin! now!

Berchtold and Count Forgach [9] have asked me to communicate the following: As a result of our suggestion[10] of yesterday, which is received with thanks, instructions have gone to Count Szapary for him *to begin* conversations with Mr. Sazonoff. Count Szapary is authorized to explain to the Russian Minister the note to

[1] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 4.45 p.m.
[3] See No. 398.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Vienna at 3.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.20 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m.
[6] See No. 384.
[7] From the decodification.
[8] Filed in Vienna at 2.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m. Submitted to the Emperor, came back from him to the Foreign Office July 31. Jagow and Zimmermann took cognizance of the Emperor's marginal annotations on the 31st of July, the Imperial Chancelor on the 1st of August. Tschirschky's telegram was communicated by Jagow on the 30th of July to the Ambassadors in London and Petersburg, after the effecting of minor alterations; to the Central Telegraph Office at 9.50 p.m. See No. 444 and note 3 thereto.
[9] The words "and Count Forgach have" were omitted by Jagow in the communication of the telegram to Petersburg and London.
[10] See Nos. 323 and 377; also No. 396.

Serbia, which, of course, has been superseded by war, and to receive every suggestion that may be made further on the part of Russia, as well as to discuss with Sazonoff all questions directly touching on Austro-Russian relations.[1] *Good.*

If Russian Government should seek to cavil at the setting on foot of eight corps as too extensive a military measure for a Serbian campaign, Count Szapary is instructed to say that this force, compared with a Serbian army of 400,000 men, corresponded to the military estimate of the requirements here.

Count Berchtold is going to ask Schebeko to call on him today and talk to him along the same lines. Furthermore, the Minister will tell the Russian Ambassador—and, as a matter of fact, the Minister made note of the following appropriate points in my presence—that the Monarchy has no idea of making any territorial acquisitions in Serbia, and that, *after the conclusion of peace,* it intends to occupy Serbian territory purely temporarily, in order to compel the Serbian Government to the complete fulfilment of its demands and for the *creation of guaranties* for future good behavior. Just to the extent that Serbia fulfils the conditions of peace, the evacuation of Serbian territory by the Monarchy will follow.

When is that going to come?

Hostage.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

Thus practically my proposition accepted and handled as I telegraphed it to the Czar as my view.

Good!

No. 434

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 137. VIENNA, *July 30, 1914.*[3]

Instructions most impressively carried out.[4] Count Berchtold will forward a full and complete answer after receiving the commands of the Emperor Franz Joseph.[5]

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] Cf. also No. 448, which is the answer to No. 396.
[2] From the decodification.
[3] Filed in Vienna at 5.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.56 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m.
[4] See No. 395.
[5] See Nos. 437, 440, 441, 450, 464, 465, 468 and 482.

No. 435

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 184. LONDON, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

Have just talked with Sir E. Grey along the lines referred to.[3] He tells me that he can assure me that the French are using all their influence at Petersburg toward a peaceable outcome. Also, according to reports received here, the recall of men on leave near the German border is the only measure that has been taken. There had been no actual war preparations, like the calling in of the reservists. He would, however, have a talk with Cambon this afternoon, and asked me to come and see him again, that he may tell me the result.

So far as the Russian war preparations are concerned, he will try to take steps today in the manner requested, through Count Benckendorff.

The Minister confidently hopes that Your Excellency's mediation activities will be successful in bringing about an understanding, and he will also get to work at Petersburg in behalf of his proposal. He had told a confidential friend this morning that if German-English cooperation was successful this time in preserving peace, our relations would be firmly established for all time, and that he would be able in the future to prevent the recurrence of such crises by using the appropriate influence on his associates.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 436

The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 223. ATHENS, *July 30, 1914.*[5]

Bulgarian Minister presented official notification of Bulgaria's declaration of neutrality here today.

BASSEWITZ.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in London at 4.11 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.56 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m. After the effecting of minor alterations, and with the omission of the sentences "He would, however . . . the result," and "He had told a confidential friend . . . on his associates," it was sent July 31, at 1.45 a.m., to the General Staff, the Admiralty Staff, the Ministry of War and the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] See No. 409.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed at Athens at 2 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.43 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, who, by marginal instructions, ordered its communication to the representatives at Vienna, Bucharest, Belgrade (Nish). It came back to the Foreign Office on July 31. Bassewitz's telegram communicated by wire August 1, at 10.05 p.m., to the representatives at Vienna, Bucharest and Belgrade. It had, besides, already been communicated over the wire to the Legation at Bucharest by Jagow on the afternoon of the 30th of July. See No. 453.

No. 437

The Emperor to the Emperor of Austria [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). NEW PALACE, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

I did not feel myself able to refuse the personal [3] plea of the Czar that I undertake to attempt mediation for the prevention of a world conflagration and [4] the maintenance of world peace, and had proposals submitted to your Government yesterday and today through my Ambassador. Among other things, they provide that Austria should announce her conditions after occupying Belgrade or other places. I should be honestly obliged to you, if you would favor me with your decision as soon as possible.[5]

In true friendship,

WILHELM.

No. 438

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 187. LONDON, *July 30, 1914.*[7]

Sir E. Grey has just told me that the British fleet has just sailed along the east coast into Scottish harbors, and that no mobilization preparations preliminary to an announcement of "strained relations" by the Foreign Office had yet been carried out.[8] As long as we did not mobilize, the French will not do it, nor England either. Cambon had assured him that the French were not doing any more than we were; simply certain precautionary measures were being taken.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 439

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [9]

Telegram 189. LONDON, *July 30, 1914.*[10]

Sir E. Grey has just shown me a telegram to Sir George Buchanan,[11] in which he instructs him to support our suggestion to enter upon conferences, in case Austria should agree to cease from hostilities after the occupation of certain

[1] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting. In the copy of this draft submitted to the Emperor, there are emendations in the Emperor's handwriting.

[2] The Imperial Chancelor sent "the draft commanded," with his Imperial report, to the Emperor, and proposed that it be sent direct from the New Palace. On the corrected copy of the Imperial report now among the archives, there is the note in the handwriting of the Emperor: "New Palace, July 30, 1914, received at 7 p.m.; telegram sent at 7.15 p.m. W." On the draft in his own hand, the note: "Sent July 30, 1914. 7.15. W."

[3] "personal" added in the handwriting of the Emperor.

[4] "the prevention of a world conflagration and" added by the Emperor.

[5] See Nos. 395, 434, 440, 441, 450, 464, 465, 468 and 482.

[6] From the decodification.

[7] Filed in London at 6.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.45 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m.

[8] See No. 460.

[9] From the decodification.

[10] Filed in London at 6.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.45 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m.

[11] See No. 460.

places on the frontier. At my desire, it no longer contains anything at all relative to the Austrian ultimatum, but is solely concerned with negotiations over the charges and obligations to be laid upon the Serbs. The reply of Mr. Sazonoff to Count Pourtalès concerning the alteration of the ultimatum, transmitted here through Count Benckendorff, I designated to the Minister as unacceptable, and therefore deemed it more practical henceforth to leave out the word ultimatum entirely.

The Minister was perfectly calm, and appeared not yet to have given up all hope.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 440

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

Reply from Vienna will not be here earlier than tomorrow noon, as Count Tisza will not be back in Vienna until early tomorrow.[3]

Your Majesty's most humble servant,

v. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 441

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [4]

Telegram 200.
Urgent. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[5]

If Vienna declines to give in in any direction, especially along the lines of the last Grey proposal (telegram 192),[6] as may be assumed from the telephone conversation of Your Excellency with Mr. von Stumm, it will hardly be possible any longer to place the guilt of the outbreak of a European conflagration on Russia's shoulders.[7] His Majesty undertook intervention at Vienna at the request of the Czar since he could not refuse to do so without creating the incontrovertible suspicion that we wanted war. The success of this intervention is, of course, rendered difficult,[8] inasmuch as Russia has mobilized against Austria. This we have announced to England [9] today, adding that we had already suggested in a friendly tone, both at Paris and Petersburg, the cessation of French

[1] Original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor. With it on an accompanying sheet, a note by the Chancelor on July 30; "It is probably necessary for me to send the accompanying telegram to His Majesty? If there are no scruples, kindly have it expedited."
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 8.55 p.m.
[3] See Nos. 395, 434, 437, 441, 450, 464, 465, 468 and 482. For Tisza's trip see No. 465, par. 4.
[4] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9 p.m.; to Vienna at 3 a.m. on the 31st.
[6] See No. 395.
[7] In the draft of the Chancelor there followed here after "shoulders," the following: "But then we shall find ourselves in an untenable position in the eyes of our own people;" the Chancelor then crossed out the sentence, to take it up again later in a somewhat different form.
[8] Before "rendered difficult," the Chancelor had originally written "extremely", and after "rendered difficult" he had originally written "if not endangered." Both were crossed out by him again.
[9] See No. 409.

and Russian war preparations, so that we could take a new step in this direction only through an ultimatum, which would mean war. We suggested to Sir Edward Grey, nevertheless, that he work energetically along this line at Paris and Petersburg, and have just received through Lichnowsky his assurance to that effect.[1] If England's efforts succeed, while Vienna declines everything, Vienna will be giving documentary evidence that it absolutely wants a war, into which we shall be drawn, while Russia remains free of responsibility. That would place us, in the eyes of our own people, in an untenable situation. Thus we can only urgently advise that Austria accept the Grey proposal, which preserves her status for her in every way.

Your Excellency will at once express yourself most emphatically on this matter to Count Berchtold, perhaps also to Count Tisza.

His Majesty this evening sent the following telegram to the Emperor Franz Joseph: "I did not feel myself able . . . as soon as possible." [2]

v. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 442

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [3]

Telegram 201. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[4]

Count Szögyeny has mentioned here the simultaneous *démarche* at Petersburg and Paris, according to which our ambassadors should in a friendly spirit point out the consequences of the Russian mobilization. I told Count Szögyeny that, since within the last few days we had already discussed this matter in the manner suggested both at Petersburg and Paris, we could not again take the same step.[5] Therefore we requested Austria to make the *démarche* alone. We also advise informing Rome of it.

JAGOW.

No. 443

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 139. VIENNA, *July 30, 1914.*[7]

To my question as to the attitude of the Austrian Government regarding our representations concerning the Italian compensation claims, I was informed by it that the formula in the instructions transmitted to Rome was based on the opinions expressed at Berlin. I did not relax my efforts to get to the bottom of the matter, and was permitted, at my special request, to see the telegram from Count Szögyeny of the twenty-seventh instant, which reads as follows:

[1] See No. 435.
[2] Here is inserted the telegram of the Emperor to the Emperor of Austria of the 30th of July (No. 437). See also Nos. 434, 440, 450, 451, 464, 465, 468 and 482.
[3] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9 p.m.
[5] See Nos. 427 and 429.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed in Vienna at 7.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.20 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m.

Mr. von Jagow is entirely satisfied with the answer received from Your Excellency's Italian ambassador (Your Excellency's telegram of yesterday), and finds it wholly proper that Your Excellency has at the beginning gone into no explanations as to the interpretation of Article 7. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State is of the opinion that Your Excellency should now, and without reference to Article 7, expressly declare to the Italian Government that in the case of an occupation of Serbian territory not to be described as transitory, which might possibly, though against our wishes, be regarded as an unavoidable necessity, Your Excellency would agree to make compensation to Italy (without any reference as to its extent).

Mr. von Jagow thinks, as does also Mr. Zimmermann, that a declaration of that nature would pacify Italy, which is constantly making representations here in this connection.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 444

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [1]

Telegram 192.
For confidential communication. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

The Imperial Ambassador at Vienna telegraphs: "Berchtold asked me . . . Monarchy will follow." [3]

The telegram refers to our earlier suggestions concerning direct discussions between Vienna and Petersburg, and shows so much compliance on the part of Vienna that we hope that England will try to influence Petersburg to an equal degree, and particularly in regard to the discontinuation of its war measures.

JAGOW.

No. 445

The Military Plenipotentiary at the Russian Court to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 195. PETERSBURG, *July 30, 1914.*[5]

FOR HIS MAJESTY:

Prince Troubetzkoi said to me yesterday, as he arranged for the immediate transmission of Your Majesty's telegram to the Emperor Nicholas: "God be praised, a telegram from your Emperor; but I fear it is too late." He told me just now that the telegram made a deep impression on the Emperor, but he was unfortunately unable to make any further changes, as mobilization against Austria had been ordered, and Sazonoff has undoubtedly con-

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.50 p.m.
[3] Here is inserted Tschirschky's telegram of the 30th of July (No. 433) after the effecting of minor alterations. See also Nos. 323, 377, 388, 448, 489. The telegram was transmitted (as 149) at the same time to the Ambassador at Petersburg.
[4] From the decodification. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 32, No. 20.
[5] Filed in Petersburg at 5.46 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.05 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, came back to the Foreign Office July 31. Imperial Chancelor, Jagow and Zimmermann took cognizance on July 31 of the Emperor's marginal annotations. Regarding par. 2, see also No. 505.

vinced His Majesty that a retreat is no longer possible. I told him that this premature mobilization against Austria in a local war between herself and Serbia would now have to be responsible for incalculable consequences, since Germany's reply to it was probably already made, and that Russia had assumed the responsibility, despite Austria's assurance that she had no intention of making any territorial acquisitions in Serbia. When he said that *no one here could any longer believe* such assurances on the part of Austria, *I replied* that in that case there would be time later to reckon with Austria about it. Austria had not mobilized against Russia, but against Serbia, and there was no reason for Russia's interfering at once. I further stated that, since the frightful *crime of Serajevo, Germany could no* longer understand Russia's pet phrase, "we can't leave our brethren in Serbia in the lurch." He finally gave, as his only argument, *the slow mobilization of Russia*, but I got the impression that he was convinced that Russia had acted too precipitately. When I told him that he ought not to be surprised if the German forces were mobilized, he broke off in horror and said that he had to go back to Peterhof at once.

Rot! Insolence!

Aha! under all circumstances to gain time and be ready for us!

The Grand Duke Nicholas Michaelovitch told me at the club that he had information that the Belgian army was mobilized, as Belgium had a treaty of alliance with France; I mention it, although the Grand Duke says a great many things that he cannot back up. Except for a few demonstrations, the city of Petersburg is quiet, as strong police protection has been afforded the Austrian and German embassies.

Rot!

In . . .[1] circles, where the spirit is extremely friendly, they are looking for an agreement between Germany and Russia on the strength of German guaranties against any aggrandizement of Austria after the war with Serbia, or against the complete destruction of the latter, which I offer without any comment.

Austria has already promised it.

With relation to the mobilization, I was told by superior officers at the club that interference with it or breaking it off was not feasible in Russia, on account of the enormous distances, and would only result in confusion; furthermore, in Russia it was a long step between the *commencement of mobilization* and the *inception of a war*, which argument *might* always be made use of for friendly explanations.

I have the impression that they have mobilized *here from a dread of coming events* without any *aggressive intentions*, and *are now frightened at what they have brought about.*

Right, that is it.

CHELIUS.

[1] Gap in the decodification. According to a copy in the archives of the German Embassy at Petersburg, "club" should be read in here.

No. 446

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 156. ROME, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

Marquis di San Giuliano is very much alarmed at the news that the direct negotiations between Austria and Russia have been broken off. He thinks there is no longer any question that Russia is ready for war and that England will take part in it. The substance of the difference between Austria and Russia, however, is very meager, since Austria has declared that she has no intention of acquiring any territory. The thing to do now was to find out just what Austria wanted, and then to inquire at Petersburg whether Russia could agree to Austria's intentions. It was absolutely necessary that the Imperial Government should get into touch with Vienna, not in order to persuade Austria to give in, but only to determine definitely the demands and intentions of Austria.[3] Then the other Powers, principally England, but also Italy, could negotiate at Petersburg on this basis in order to avoid a European war.

I replied that the breaking off of relations between Russia and Austria was presumably brought about by the Russian mobilization, and that I could understand it. Minister said that that did not preclude further negotiations.

Confidential: Mr. Bollati has reported that the Imperial Government is now convinced, contrary to its previous assumption, that Russia and England are going to take part in the war.

FLOTOW.

No. 447

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 191. LONDON, *July 30, 1914.*[5]

Only peaceable solution, according to my views and those held here, would be for Count Berchtold to be persuaded by us to announce that, out of regard for the peace of Europe and the wishes of his allies, he was willing to remain satisfied with his success up to the present time, to suspend military operations for the time being, and, through our mediation, to discuss with Sazonoff the conditions to be laid upon Serbia, in case Russia would cease from further war preparations on the Austrian border. I have also talked along this line to my Austrian colleague.

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed at Rome at 7.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.05 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m.
[3] See No. 457.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in London at 7.49 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m.

No. 448

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 141. VIENNA, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

Have interrogated Count Berchtold with regard to the contradiction between my report and that of Mr. Schebeko on the last conference with the Minister.[3] Count Berchtold remarked that there was, in fact, as Your Excellency surmises, a misunderstanding, and that on the part of the Russian representative. Mr. von Schebeko had gone on the assumption that Count Szapary had had a friendly conversation with Sazonoff, also about the note to Serbia, and had said at the end of the conversation: "*ce serait utile de continuer cette conversation.*" [4] At this point he, the Minister, had certainly remarked that Count Szapary had been authorized, it was true, to make "*explanations*" as to the note, but that he would have distinctly to decline to discuss the individual points of the note—its justification, etc. From this Mr. Schebeko probably drew the conclusion that Austria did not want to confer with Russia at all.

This conclusion was all the less justified for the reason that Mr. Schebeko had further stated during the course of the conversation: "*nous pourrions aussi causer de nos propres affaires,*" [5] and he, the Minister, had in no way shown himself unreceptive of this suggestion.

After he, Count Berchtold, had also been informed by Count Szapary of this misunderstanding, and we had at the same time strenuously urged entering upon conferences with Russia, he had at once forwarded appropriate instructions to Count Szapary (cipher telegram 135).[6]

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 449

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 197. PETERSBURG, *July 30, 1914.*[8]

Telegrams 142[9] and 143[10] used in conversation with Sazonoff just now. Minister agreed that Russia would refrain for the time being from hostilities, in case she receives no provocation from Austria.

For the rest, I could only come to the conclusion that Sazonoff refuses now as before to withdraw from the position made known to Your Excellency through my recent reports.

POURTALÈS.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Vienna at 8.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30, p.m. Communicated by wire on the 31st of July to the Ambassador at London by Jagow "for use," after the effecting of minor alterations; to the Central Telegraph Office at 2.20 a.m.
[3] See No. 396.
[4] [It would be useful to continue this conversation.]
[5] [We could also chat of our own affairs.]
[6] See No. 433.
[7] From the decodification.
[8] Filed in Petersburg at 9.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.05 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 30.
[9] See No. 392.
[10] See No. 397.

No. 450

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 202.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

Please do not carry out instructions number 200 [3] for the present.[4]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 451

Draft of an unsent telegram from the Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [5]

BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[6]

I canceled the order of instructions in No. 200,[7] as the General Staff just informs me that the military preparations of our neighbors, especially in the east, will force us to a speedy decision, unless we do not wish to expose ourselves to the danger of surprise. General Staff earnestly desires to be informed definitely and immediately as to Vienna's decisions, particularly those of a military nature. Please use your utmost endeavor to get us a reply tomorrow.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 452

The King of England to Prince Henry of Prussia [8]

Telegram (unnumbered). LONDON, *July 30, 1914.*[9]

PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA, BERLIN:

Thanks for your telegram. So pleased to hear of William's efforts to concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed I am earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war should be averted. My Government is doing its utmost suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations, if Austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of *Belgrade and neighboring* Serbian territory as a *hostage for satisfactory settlement* of her demands *other* countries meanwhile

Hostage.[10]

[1] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[2] Sent, uncoded, to the Central Telegraph Office at 11.20 p.m.
[3] See No. 441. [4] See No. 464.
[5] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[6] Receipt stamp: July 30, p.m. On a sheet attached, the notation, under date of July 30: "At the telephonic order of the Under-Secretary of State is not to be sent for the present." Actually, the telegram was never sent. See No. 464.
[7] See No. 441.
[8] From the [English] text written on a regular telegraph blank, with completion of the punctuation. See No. 417.
[9] Filed in London at 8.54 p.m.; arrived at the Berlin Central Telegraph Office at 11.08 p.m. The telegram was submitted to the Emperor, who added interlinear annotations. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 30, p.m. To the Emperor was also submitted another copy of the telegram, endorsed by Prince Henry personally, on the 31st of July; on this copy is the marginal annotation of the Emperor: "July 30, 1914, 11.30 p.m."
[10] Interlinear annotation by the Emperor, over the word "hostage."

suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his great influence to induce Austria to *accept this proposal* thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to preserve peace of Europe.[2]

Austria has this evening made the same proposals.[1]

GEORGE.

No. 453

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Athens[3]

Telegram 102. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[4]

Please wire more detailed substance of declaration of neutrality.

JAGOW.

No. 454

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office[5]

Telegram 193. LONDON, *July 30, 1914.*[6]

Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith made statements today in the Lower House, in which they emphasized the great seriousness of the situation. The former announced that England, now as before, continued to follow the one great aim of the preservation of peace. Asquith dropped the Amendment Bill from the order of the day, as a party contest was out of place at present, and as England, though not directly interested herself, must present a united front. He hoped that the patriotism of all parties would contribute, if not to prevent the threatening danger, at least to confine it within bounds.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 455

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office[7]

Telegram 233. PARIS, *July 30, 1914.*[8]

Embassy and General Consulate are being stormed by Germans asking for advice about leaving. In view of the possibility that the French Government might at the outbreak of hostilities intern or expel to Spain, Germans capable of

[1] Interlinear annotation by the Emperor, over "accept this proposal."
[2] Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 45.
[3] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.50 p.m. See No. 436.
[5] From a copy at the Foreign Office.
[6] Filed in London July 30 at 9.05 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12 midnight. Receipt stamp: July 31, a.m.
[7] From the decodification.
[8] Filed in Paris July 30 at 8.47 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12 midnight. See No. 461.

bearing arms, we think immediate return home of men liable to service advisable. Other Germans settled here can wait, as far as they are not dismissed from their places, which so far has happened very rarely.

Does Your Excellency agree?

SCHOEN.

No. 456

Protocol of the Session of the Royal Prussian Ministry of State on July 30, 1914 [1]

BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*

Present:

The President of the Ministry of State, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.

State Ministers

von Tirpitz,	Dr. Baron von Schorlemer,
Dr. Delbrück,	Dr. Lentze,
Dr. Beseler,	von Falkenhayn,
von Breitenbach,	von Loebell,
Dr. Sydow,	Kühn,
Dr. von Trott zu Solz,	His Excellency von Jagow was absent.

As Commissioner of the Imperial Chancelor, Under-Secretary of State Wahnschaffe.

Under-Secretary of State Heinrichs.

The Ministry of State held a session today at which the following business was transacted:

1. The President of the Ministry informed the meeting that he had called the Ministers of State into the present session in order to give them a view of the political situation of the moment, as far as was possible. The situation was changing from hour to hour, and was even now doubtful, owing to the uncertain factors of its development.

(a) HIS MAJESTY HAD ATTEMPTED TO BRING ABOUT AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE VIENNA AND THE PETERSBURG GOVERNMENTS. The Vienna Government had declared at Petersburg, after the refusal of its demands by the Serbians, that it sought no territorial acquisitions and did not wish to shake the stability of the Serbian nation.

The German Government had suggested to the Vienna Government to declare at Petersburg: that Serbia had only in part made promise of the fulfilment of the wishes of Vienna, and, furthermore, it was questionable if the promises given would be kept. The Vienna Government intended, therefore, to acquire for itself a guaranty of its demands and of the future good behavior of the Serbian Government by a temporary occupation. This *démarche*, made yesterday, had not been replied to so far today. That attitude of Germany toward the present conflict was controlled by the following reasons: It was of the greatest importance to put Russia in the position of the guilty party, and this could be accomplished by means of an Austro-Hungarian declaration such as would bring the assertions

[1] From a copy placed at our disposal by the Prussian Ministry of State.

of the Russian Government *ad absurdum*; next, it must be considered that the Serbian reply had been an actual consent to the Austro-Hungarian demands except in unimportant points.

(b) Simultaneously with these transactions with Vienna, there was running an exchange of dispatches between His Majesty and the Czar. In one of his telegrams, the Czar had characterized the Austrian attack on Serbia as an unworthy war, and had appealed to the Emperor for assistance in avoiding a European war. The Emperor had represented to the Czar in his telegram that all monarchical nations had an interest in protecting themselves against the destructive tendencies cultivated in Serbia, and culminating in regicide and revolution. These telegrams had crossed each other. The further exchange of telegrams had not come to any conclusive ending, which was made all the more difficult as in the meantime the Russian mobilization had taken place; the proposals directed to Vienna had, as a result, gained a more or less illusory character.

(c) Finally, the proposals of the English Secretary of State Grey, came into consideration. These were to the effect that Austria should make representations at Vienna similar to those recommended by Berlin. Nor had these transactions been brought to a conclusion.

(d) GERMANY AND ENGLAND HAD TAKEN ALL POSSIBLE STEPS TO AVOID A EUROPEAN WAR. The Russian mobilization had been explained, it was true, by statements that Russia's mobilization measures were not to be compared with those of the western European nations; that the Russian troops might stand fast in a state of mobilization for weeks to come; and that Russia did not intend to go to war, but had only been driven to take these measures by Austria. On the other hand, however, emphasis must be laid on the fact that the four Austro-Hungarian corps mobilized in the southern part of the Monarchy were not aimed against Russia, and also on the fact that the corps mobilized in the north, in Bohemia, possessed more of a local value in view of the dubious political attitude of the Czechs.

HIS MAJESTY HAD CONSENTED THAT BEFORE ANY FURTHER DECISIONS WERE ARRIVED AT, THE MOVE AT VIENNA, PREVIOUSLY EXPLAINED, SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO A CONCLUSION. Military measures: Declaration of a "state of threatening danger of war" meant mobilization, and that, under present conditions—mobilization on both sides—meant war. But one could not conveniently carry on military and political activities at the same time. Presumably the Vienna decision concerning the English and the German proposals would be given today.

So far as the attitude of other nations was concerned, any hope based upon England was nil. England would probably take sides with the Dual Alliance. Italy's attitude was not quite clear. The Austro-Serbian conflict was unpopular in Italy, as they saw in it danger to Italian interests in the Balkans. Italy feared that she would not be able to adhere to her written promise to render aid, at least to its full extent. He had tried to use his influence with Austria to persuade her to come to an understanding with Italy, but so far this had not been brought to pass; as, in fact, Austria was very uncompromising, in the prosecution of her policies. Roumania's assistance was not to be counted on, nor was that of Bulgaria, as the present Government would probably be dissolved and replaced by one friendly to Russia.

(f) [1] The measures adopted in Russia as well as in France were somewhat similar to those following a "declaration of the threat of danger of war" with us. In Russia, so far as the German border was concerned, the frontier guard had been strengthened, and in the Government of Kovno a state of war had been declared. The light-houses in the Baltic Sea had been extinguished, and the wireless stations closed. Beyond that, Russia had announced even early this morning that no mobilization against Germany had been carried out.

France had declared a state of war, but had undertaken only preparatory defensive measures. All other rumors were unreliable.

(g) The President laid final emphasis on the fact that all Governments, including that of Russia, and the great majority of the nations, were peaceable themselves, but control had been lost, and the stone had started rolling. As a *politician*, he would NOT YET GIVE UP HIS HOPE NOR HIS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN PEACE, as long as his *démarche* at Vienna had not been repelled. The decision might come in a very short time; then another marching route would be chosen. General public feeling was good in Germany (which was confirmed by all). Nor was there anything particular to fear from Social Democracy or from the leadership of the Social Democratic party, as he believed he could conclude from his transactions with Reichstag Delegate Südekum. There would be no talk of a general strike or of sabotage.

2. Minister of State Tirpitz here brought up the opinion that in case of threatened danger of war, His Majesty, in behalf of the naval authorities, should order a "state of security," in order to be able to put through the necessary measures for the protection of harbors, of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal, of the North Sea estuaries, and for the guarding of marine traffic, etc. He could inaugurate the principal measures on his own authority, it was true, which would arrest less attention, but would not have so thorough an effect.

The President stated that the military authorities had expressed the desire that a "state of threatening danger of war" be proclaimed, but he had successfully defended before His Majesty the objections he had just suggested, and measures had been confined to military protection of the railroads.

Ministers of State von Tirpitz and von Falkenhayn argued in opposition to this view that the "threatening danger of war" went farther than the "security," if only because of the calling in of the reserves, and furthermore that the "security" was not published.

After Minister of State von Breitenbach had made the point that the "security" would correspond more or less to the measures taken on land, the President stated that he had no scruples about the "security" as a purely defensive measure, and left it to Minister von Tirpitz to lay an appropriate proposal before His Majesty.

3. Upon the inquiry of the Minister of Justice, it was decided that it would be advisable to let the pending judicial proceedings, concerning the prosecution of the public speakers who had been inciting to a general strike, take their course for the present.

At this point in the proceedings, the President and Ministers of State von Tirpitz and von Falkenhayn left the session, and Minister of State Dr. Delbrück took the chair.

[1] Letter (e) omitted by error.

4. Minister of State Dr. Baron von Schorlemer raised the question of whether or not an export embargo on grain should be decreed.

Minister of State von Breitenbach announced that he had already instructed the managements of the eastern railroads to hold up grain transports and automobiles on the border; these measures could be extended to all districts.

Minister of State Dr. Delbrück pointed out that a general export embargo required the consent of the Bundesrat, which could be obtained tomorrow.

Minister of State Dr. Sydow approved of a general export embargo in regular form, which would automatically operate also against Austria. Exports to particular countries, as, for instance to Switzerland, which according to information from Minister of State Dr. Delbrück, would not be objectionable, could then be allowed by special regulation of the Imperial Chancelor.

After further discussions, which ran particularly to the question of livestock exports, Minister of State Dr. Delbrück grouped the results of the transactions into a statement that the Ministry of State was agreed on the decree of an export and transport embargo for agricultural and garden products, with some exceptions as yet to be definitely decided on, as well as on an export and transport embargo on automobiles and on horses.

5. Minister of State Dr. Delbrück communicated to the session the twenty-five draft laws and regulations described in the supplement hereto, which ought to be put in force in case of mobilization, and should be submitted to the Federal Council.

These were placed under discussion, in the course of which Minister of State Dr. Beseler expressed a doubt as to whether, when the entire Landsturm was called to the colors, including even the second reserve, the administration of justice could be maintained in regular and orderly fashion, whereupon others pointed out the possibilities of reclamation.

No other objections to the drafts were raised.

Minister of State von Loebell inquired whether, in case of a declaration of war, it was planned to issue a summons to the Diet. In his opinion, it would not be necessary to make any legislative proposals in such event; nevertheless, he thought that such a summons would indicate a respectful consideration for the Diet.

Decision was postponed.

Signed: v. Bethmann-Hollweg
v. Breitenbach
v. Schorlemer
v. Tirpitz
Sydow
Lentze
v. Loebell
Delbrück
v. Trott zu Solz
v. Falkenhayn
Kühn
Read: v. Jagow

No. 457

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Rome [1]

Telegram 147. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

We have been constantly trying to mediate between Russia and Austria, both by direct exchange of dispatches between His Majesty and the Czar and by agreement with Sir Edward Grey. All of our efforts have been greatly impeded by Russia's mobilization, if not actually rendered futile. Russia's demands, too, have up to the present been unacceptable. According to all our information, Russia is taking such extensive measures even against us, and despite her pacific assurances, that the situation is becoming constantly more threatening.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 458

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 158. ROME, *July 30, 1914.*[4]

Marquis di San Giuliano tells me that he can assure me absolutely that the rumor of an agreement between Italy and England, according to which neither country would undertake anything against the other in case of war, is a fiction devoid of any foundation.[5] He is convinced that England is going to take part in the war. That in itself would suffice to preclude for the Italian Government at this moment any secret agreement with England.

FLOTOW.

No. 459

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 196. PETERSBURG, *July 30, 1914.*[7]

Sazonoff asserts that he has received information from the Minister of Marine that the German Fleet is lying at Danzig in a state of mobilization. That Russia must therefore take counter-measures. Am I authorized to contradict this report? [8]

POURTALÈS.

[1] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 33, No. 21. See No. 446.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 12.45 a.m.
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Filed at Rome July 30 at 9.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 31 at 12.52 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, a.m. Communicated on the 31st of July to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office; sent by messengers at 11.45 a.m.
[5] See No. 362.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed at Petersburg July 30, at 8.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 31, at 12.52 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, a.m.
[8] See No. 362.

No. 460

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 192. LONDON, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

TELEGRAM TO SIR G. BUCHANAN, PETERSBURG: [3]

German Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Serbian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavored to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible (relief) [4] to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

The Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by Sazonoff, as quoted in your telegram 155 and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Serbian rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighboring Serbian territory, declares herself ready in the interest of European peace to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military *preparatives* [5] provided that other Powers did the same.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 461

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Paris [6]

Telegram 175. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[7]

Departure [8] of Germans advisable.

JAGOW.

No. 462

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Petersburg [9]

Telegram 150. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[10]

Story invented.[11] Please deny it vigorously.

JAGOW.

[1] From the decodification. See No. 439.
[2] Filed in London July 30 at 9.56 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 31 at 12.52 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, a.m.
[3] Cf. English Blue Book, No. 103.
[4] Gap in the decodification, filled in according to sense at the Foreign Office.
[5] Thus for "preparations" in the English Blue Book.
[6] From the original in Jagow's handwriting.
[7] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.30 a.m.
[8] See No. 455.
[9] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[10] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.55 a.m.
[11] See No. 459.

No. 463

The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 52.
Confidential. SINAIA, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

His Majesty the King, who just received me, considers the Russian mobilization to be a measure adopted for the purpose of pacifying public opinion. To the proposal that Roumania make a move at Petersburg or that he send a telegram to the Emperor of Russia, the King said it would be a difficult matter for him to send any such telegram. King again spoke of disturbing news from Bulgaria, and gave me information of a telegram according to which England would not remain indifferent in the case of our attacking Russia. He had advised Belgrade to accept Austria-Hungary's first definite conditions under any circumstances. King stated that he was trying to prepare public opinion here for a possible war on Russia, but kept constantly referring to the great difficulties in the way of his living up to the obligations of his alliance.

WALDBURG.

No. 464

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [3]

Telegram 203. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

I canceled the order of instructions in number 200 [5] in consideration of the following telegram from the King of England to Prince Henry: "Thanks for your telegram . . . peace of Europe." [6]

Your Excellency will communicate the telegram to Count Berchtold without delay and, if he wishes, leave him a copy for the benefit of Emperor Franz Joseph.

A definite decision in Vienna during the course of today is urgently desired.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 465

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 142. VIENNA, *July 30, 1914.*[8]

Telegram 192,[9] which arrived at noon, was brought to me immediately after being decoded at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while I was breakfasting with Count Berchtold. Immediately after getting up from table I carried out the

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Sinaia July 30, at 10.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 31, at 2.35 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, a.m. See No. 389.
[3] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting, final sentence ("a definite . . . desired") added in the hand of the Imperial Chancelor.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 2.45 a.m.; Embassy, Vienna, at 9 a.m.
[5] See Nos. 441 and 450, further, 451.
[6] See No. 452.
[7] From the decodification.
[8] Dated July 30, filed at Vienna July 31 at 1.35 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.35 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, a.m.
[9] See No. 395.

instructions contained in it relative to Count Berchtold, in the presence of Count Forgach. The Minister, who listened, pale and silent, while it was read twice—Count Forgach taking notes—said at the conclusion that he would make a report to his Emperor at once about it.

I called the attention of the Minister particularly to the fact that the justifiable claims of Austria would seem to be fully protected by a castigation of Serbia together with the acquisition of guaranties for the latter's future good behavior by the acceptance of the mediation proposal, and that the object declared from the beginning by the Monarchy to be that of the action against Serbia, would thus be attained without unchaining a world war. Under these circumstances, it seemed to me that a complete refusal of the mediation was out of the question. The honor of the Austrian arms would be satisfied by the occupation of Serbian territory by Austro-Hungarian troops. That this military occupation was to take place with the express consent of Russia unquestionably meant an important strengthening of Austrian influence with regard to Russia and in the Balkans. I begged both gentlemen to keep in mind the incalculable consequences of a refusal of the mediation.

When Count Berchtold left the room to change his dress for his audience with the Emperor, I appealed very seriously to Count Forgach's conscience; he too expressed it as his opinion that agreement to the mediation was requisite. Just the same, the restriction of the military operations now in progress appeared to him to be scarcely possible.

This afternoon, both before and after the telephone conversation with Mr. von Stumm, I again took occasion to speak very seriously, from our point of view, with Count Forgach and Count Hoyos. Both of them assured me that restriction of the military operations was, in their opinion, out of the question, in view of the feeling in the Army and among the people. Count Tisza will appear in Vienna early tomorrow. His opinion must be obtained on this far-reaching decision.

Conrad von Hötzendorf was to submit to the Emperor this evening the order for general mobilization as the reply . . .[1] to the measures already taken on the part of the Russians. They were not quite clear as to whether, in the present state of affairs, the mobilization was called for.[2]

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] Gap in the decodification; note of the Cipher Bureau regarding it: "has come; 'Baron von Berckheim in general'." According to the archives of the Vienna Embassy there is not a word lacking between "reply" and "to."

[2] See also Nos. 434, 437, 440, 441, 450, 464, 468 and 482.

No. 466

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor [1]

BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

Am awaiting submission of a telegram in reply to King of England and possibly a communication to the Czar, about English and Viennese proposals which are almost exactly like mine.
W.

With the deepest respect I venture to propose to Your Imperial and Royal Majesty the following answer to King Constantine to his telegram of July 27, herewith most humbly returned.

I thank you from my heart for your telegram transmitted to me through Count Bassewitz, which has given me unusual satisfaction. I, too, now as before, regard an understanding between Greece and Turkey as a good [3] policy and will endeavor with all my might to further it in the future.

As long as the conflict remains confined to Austria and Serbia, it is self-evident that neither Turkey nor Bulgaria will be permitted to interfere. If it comes to a general European conflagration, not only these, but all the Balkan nations will have to make their choice. I feel that it goes without saying that the very memory of your father, who fell at the hand of a murderer, will keep you and Greece from taking the part of the Serbian assassins against my person and the Triple Alliance. But even from the standpoint of pure usefulness to the interests of Greece, it seems to me that the place for your country and your dynasty is at the side of the Triple Alliance. Even Serbia, which cannot be saved from her fate except by Greek support, will understand that it is *force majeure* that determines the attitude of Greece. No nation has regarded Greece's remarkable rise under your leadership with more envious eyes than has Russia. Never will there be a better opportunity than now for Greece, under the mighty shield of the Triple Alliance, to cast off the hegemony that Russia is endeavoring to impose upon the Balkans.[4]

Should you, against my confident expectations, align yourself on the side of the enemy, Greece would at once be exposed to the attacks of Italy, Bulgaria and Turkey, and also our personal relations would probably have to suffer forever as a result.[5]

Wilhelm.

I have spoken frankly, and beg you to communicate your decision to me without delay and with equal frankness.

With matters as they stand, it might be well that the Chargé d'Affaires at Athens be for the present authorized to an oral reading only, and not to the delivery of the telegram in writing.

v. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the original. Draft in Rosenberg's handwriting, with alterations in another handwriting. Corrected copy with the marginal annotations of the Emperor as given above is now among the archives. On the above corrected copy, the marginal annotation by the Emperor: "New Palace July 31, 1914, 6.45 a.m." See Nos. 243 and 504.

[2] On the original draft the note in the hand of the Imperial Chancelor: "Must be engrossed today. v. B. H. 30." Corrected copy was sent off by messenger at 6 a.m. July 31.

[3] "A good" an alteration in another handwriting from Rosenberg's original "the only correct."

[4] Here Rosenberg next wrote, in the draft, "and to find a rich prize in the Serbian hinterland of Saloniki. It will be my care to make sure of the just partition of the Serbian spoils among our companions-at-arms." This was later stricken out.

[5] "And also . . . as a result" in the draft an alteration from Rosenberg's original "and between me and you the ties would be cut for all time."

No. 467

The Consul General at Antwerp to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

ANTWERP, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

The Austro-Serbian conflict seems to have taken the Belgian mercantile and banking world wholly by surprise. The anxiety over the economic consequences for the country is increased by reports of arbitrary procedure by the Banque Nationale de Belgique, which, it is stated, wishes to decline even to discount commercial bills of exchange. According to information I have acquired, it is true that foreign drafts (banks, large industries and mercantile houses) on Belgian banks are, until further notice, not being discounted by the Banque Nationale, as well as drafts by Belgian banks and private individuals in Belgium on Belgian banks; while on the other hand, drafts by Belgian commercial houses and industries on Belgian banks are being discounted as before.

Copy is going to the Imperial Legation in Brussels.

v. SCHNITZLER.

No. 468

Memorandum of the Director of the Political Division of the Foreign Office [3]

BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

Mr. von Tschirschky telephones that Austria has ordered a general mobilization and has declared at Petersburg that it is merely a question of countermeasures to the Russian mobilization.

As well as I could understand Mr. Tschirschky, the reply to our proposal presumably will not be an unconditional refusal.[5]

No. 469

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 194. LONDON, *July 31, 1914.*[7]

Would not a telegram to the Czar from the Emperor, in which His Majesty proposes the suspension of Russian mobilization in the interest of European peace, provided Austria should suspend operations against Serbia, and the acceptance of the mediation of Your Excellency in the solution of the Serbian question, prove an available way?

[1] From the corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 31, a.m. Communicated on the 2d of August to the Reichsbank, the Ministry of Finance and the shipping business.
[3] Von Stumm's handwriting.
[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 31, a.m. Imperial Chancelor, Jagow, Zimmermann, took cognizance of the information July 31.
[5] See Nos. 395, 434, 437, 440, 441, 450, 464, 465 and 482.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed in London at 7.38 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.05 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, a.m.

In regard to the two conditions [1] announced to Count Pourtalès by Sazonoff, it might be claimed, perhaps, that the first was, in fact, fulfilled by Count Berchtold's willingness to enter upon an exchange of opinions with him through Your Excellency, and, regarding the ultimatum, that he was ready to take into consideration and discuss other guaranties?

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 470

The Princess of Pless to the Emperor [2]

Telegram (unnumbered). LONDON, *July 31, 1914.*

HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR, NEW PALACE.

Belgrade has fallen, Serbia is punished, let Austria return now so that the peace of Europe is assured. Only Your Majesty can influence this and hold Russia back, otherwise under such conditions I fear for Germany. God be with Your Majesty now and always.

DAISY.

No. 471

Unused draft of a telegram from the Emperor to the King of Roumania [3]

To the shocking assassination at Serajevo have succeeded events the further development of which I look forward to with serious dread. With typical concern for the welfare of his people, our venerable friend and ally the Emperor Franz Joseph has required atonement from Serbia for the horrible murder of his nephew, and abandonment of the murderous policy directed against Austria-Hungary. We had a right to expect the fulfilment of these just demands by Serbia, as well as their moral support among the monarchs of Europe and all civilized nations. Panslavism, however, feels compelled to hold a protecting hand over Serbia's head. Russia takes her place by the side of Serbia, and in so doing adopts as her own the Serbian efforts toward the undermining of the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that the agitations conducted against Austria-Hungary by the Panslavists have as their ultimate object, by means of the destruction of the Danube Monarchy, the weakening or the dissolution of the Triple Alliance, and, as a result, the isolation of my Empire, in order that they may then extend their lordship unhindered over the south-eastern part of Europe. The obligations of my alliance, my honor and self-preservation force me, therefore, to the side of Austria-Hungary. At this fateful hour I turn my thoughts to you, who, in the Eastern Marches of Europe, have

[1] See No. 421.

[2] [Telegram in English] filed in London at 8.24 a.m.; received at the telegraph office of the New Palace at 10.17 a.m.; reached the Foreign Office from the Emperor July 31; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m.

[3] Undated, typewritten, unparagraphed draft with alterations in Bergen's handwriting. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 30, p.m. The telegram was not sent in the text of this draft, but in the form as given (No. 472).

dedicated your blessed capacity for government to the nation-saving work of civilization and to the erection of a strong outer dam against the rising Slavic flood. I know that you, as a thoughtful lord of your country and as a Hohenzollern prince, in this [1] grave hour will stand faithfully by your friend.

No. 472

The Emperor to the King of Roumania [2]

BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*

Since the ruthless deed at Serajevo, our venerable friend and ally the Emperor Franz Joseph has demanded atonement from Serbia. Russia, which lays claim to the hegemony of the Balkans, by defending Serbia, adopts as her own the latter's efforts toward the undermining of the Austrian Monarchy. Nor can I shut my eyes to the fact that the Panslavist tendencies have for their purpose, with the destruction of the Danube Monarchy, the dissolution of the Triple Alliance and the isolation and enfeeblement of Germany, in order to stabilize the domination of Russia over all southeastern Europe. Fidelity to the alliance, honor and self-preservation force me to the side of Austria. At this grave hour my thoughts hasten to you, who have created a civilized nation in Europe's Eastern Marches and thereby erected a dam against the Slavic flood. I trust that as a king and a Hohenzollern, you will stand faithfully by your friend and unconditionally fulfil the obligations of your alliance.[3]

WILHELM.

No. 473

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 199. PETERSBURG, *July 31, 1914.*[5]

General mobilization of the army and fleet ordered. First day of mobilization, July 31.

POURTALÈS.

[1] Here the draft read originally: "country, as a Hohenzollern prince and officer, in this . . ."

[2] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting with an addition in the handwriting of the Emperor, to whom the Imperial Chancelor forwarded Jagow's draft with an Imperial report on the 30th of July. Marginal annotation by the Emperor on the corrected copy of the Imperial report: "July 31, 1914, 7.45 a.m. W. Agreed." Telegram was transmitted telegraphically on the 31st of July by the Imperial Chancelor to the Legation at Bucharest, with the request to have it go to the King without delay. To the Central Telegraph Office at 10.55.

[3] "and unconditionally . . . alliance" added by the Emperor. See No. 471.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed at Petersburg at 10.20 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.40 a.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m. Communicated on the 31st of July to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

No. 474

The Emperor to the Imperial Naval Office and the Admiralty Staff [1]

FOR THE GUIDANCE OF IMPERIAL NAVAL OFFICE AND ADMIRALTY STAFF

Absolutely secret. *July 31, 1914, 12 o'clock noon.*[2]

Since yesterday—July 30—Chief Admiralty Staff gave me information of the telegram of the Naval Attaché at London, concerning the interview of Sir E. Grey with Prince Lichnowsky, at which Germany was given to understand that only the betrayal of her ally by not participating in the war against Russia could preserve us from an immediate English attack, there arrived, very soon thereafter, the report of the Ambassador relative to this conversation and corroborating it, sent to me by the Foreign Office without comment.[3] It was plain to me that Sir E. Grey by this held up before me his own King, who had just officially forwarded to me through Prince Henry a plain declaration of neutrality [4]—delivered orally on the 29th—as untruthful. As I am now convinced that the whole crisis was caused by ENGLAND ALONE, and can be dissolved by ENGLAND ALONE (by pressure on the allied Russians and Gauls), I decided to send a telegram of a private nature to the King, who is apparently far from clear as to his rôle and his responsibility in the crisis. Through Prince Henry I had something like the following telegraphed: [5] I was very much obliged to His Majesty for his declaration of neutrality, which the Prince had been commissioned to bring me. I was very much preoccupied over the situation and working desperately hard to solve it. A continuous telegraphic exchange of opinions between Czar and myself was taking place, as the former had appealed to me to mediate between him and Vienna, which I willingly undertook to do. Unfortunately the Czar had only told me on the twenty-ninth that he had mobilized, whereby it appeared from the date that three days before his appeal to me he had ordered mobilization, without informing me of it.[6] I had called the Czar's attention to the fact that by these unexpected measures he was making my status as mediator illusory,[7] was giving Austria cause to take it as a threat, and was thus taking upon his shoulders the enormous responsibility of a world-conflagration. I was of the opinion that from now on the only possibility of preventing a world-conflagration, which England could not wish for either, lay in London, not in Berlin. Instead of making proposals for conferences, His Majesty the King should order France and Russia, frankly and plainly, at one and the same time—they were HIS ALLIES —to DESIST at once from the mobilization, remain NEUTRAL and await Austria's proposals, which I should immediately transmit as soon as I was informed of them. The FULL RESPONSIBILITY for the most frightful world-conflagration that had

[1] From the copy written in the Emperor's own hand.

[2] Original sent by the Chief of the Naval Cabinet first to the Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office, with the request that it be returned. The latter confirmed his cognizance of it at 2.15 (p.m.) and it was thence forwarded direct to the Chief of the Admiralty Staff, who took official cognizance of it at 2.50 (p.m.). Müller then sent the original copy to the Chief of the General Staff, who endorsed his official cognizance on it at 8 p.m., and then sent it on its way to the Minister of War, who endorsed his official cognizance at 8.10 p.m. The document only reached the Foreign Office in January, 1919. The Emperor added to the document at the top the note: "*Copy to the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of War.*"

[3] See No. 368. [4] See No. 374. [5] See No. 417.

[6] Telegram of the 30th of July No. 390, is referred to. [7] See No. 420.

ever raged would absolutely rest on HIS SHOULDERS, and he would be misjudged for it by the world and by history. I could do nothing more DIRECT; it was for him to take hold now and prove the honesty of English love for peace. He could feel assured of my loyal and liveliest support. The enclosed telegram from the King is the answer.[1] His proposals are similar to mine, which I suggested [2] to the Vienna Cabinet, which has left us for six days without an answer, and which were likewise telegraphed us as such from Vienna last evening. I transmitted them to London [3] and the King's reply to Vienna.[4] Diplomatic conferences have at last commenced between Vienna and Peterhof, and Peterhof has also begged London for mediation. In Petersburg, according to today's report from the Ambassador,[5] there is almost NO war enthusiasm, on the contrary a feeling of depression, as yesterday evening there were again violent street fights between revolutionaries and police, and the mood of a sick Tom-cat prevailed at court and in the army, as, coming to their senses, they are getting a scare about what they have done and may do yet with their premature mobilization.

WILHELM I. R.

No. 475

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest [6]

Telegram 55. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[7]

Please wire if reports are correct that general feeling there is continually growing more anti-Austrian.

JAGOW.

No. 476

The Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje to the Foreign Office [8]

Telegram 22. CATTARO, *July 30, 1914.*[9]

Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom I went to see immediately after receiving Your Excellency's telegram,[10] told me that the general mobilization bore . . . only the character of a preventive measure. Montenegro had no intention of attacking Austria, but nevertheless had to mobilize, as it had to be ready for an Austrian attack at any moment. To my reply that I saw no reason why Austria

[1] See No. 452. [2] See No. 323, also No. 395 and the numbers referred to there.
[3] See No. 477. [4] See No. 464.
[5] See No. 339; report was of July 27, arrived on the 29th and was sent to the Emperor on the 30th.
[6] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting.
[7] To the Central Telegraph Office at 12.25 p.m.
[8] From the decodification.
[9] Filed in Cattaro July 30 at 10.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 31 at 12.50 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m. Communicated on the 31st of July by Jagow to the Ambassador at Vienna as telegram 210, after the effecting of minor alterations and with the omission of the final sentence; to the Central Telegraph Office at 8.05 p.m. Likewise, at Jagow's order, and after minor alterations and with the omission of the final sentence, communicated on the 31st of July to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office; sent by messenger at 8.25 p.m. Extracts from it communicated also on the 31st of July by Bergen to Count Khün, Secretary of Legation to the Austro-Hungarian Embassy.
[10] See No. 322.

should attack Montenegro, the Minister replied that official Austria and Count Berchtold harbored, perhaps, no designs against his country. The proceedings at Cattaro had shown, however, that for the moment the military element was alone setting the pace in the Monarchy, and an attack might be expected any day from these gentlemen. He would give nothing for Austria's promises; these had been made for thirty-five (years), but had never been kept. That Austria was particularly free with the necessary promises at the present moment should cause no surprise. Under existing circumstances, it would be particularly inconvenient for Austria to be involved in a war with Montenegro, especially as Russia could not look quietly on a war between Austria and two Slav nations. Besides, he had heard that Russia had already moved into Galicia, and that the Slav regiments were refusing to march. I warned the Minister against giving too much credit to such unconfirmed reports and letting himself personally . . .[1] be drawn into taking action without due deliberation.

The Minister stated further that in no case could Montenegro stand quietly by and watch Serbia be carved up. Surrounded on all sides by Austria, Montenegro would be fated to destruction. I replied that I did not believe that Austria had any such intention, and remonstrated to the Minister that under the present circumstances a war with the Monarchy would have no chance of success. Thereupon the Minister declared a second time that for the present Montenegro had no intention of attacking Austria, but that an attack . . .[1] would be resisted to the last.

. . .[2] he states is too busy to receive diplomats, but is said to have made the same statement, however, a few days ago.

ZECH.

No. 477

The Emperor to the King of England [3]

Telegram (unnumbered). NEW PALACE, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

HIS MAJESTY THE KING, BUCKINGHAM PALACE, LONDON:

Many thanks for your kind telegram.[5] Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the statements I got this night from Vienna which I have had forwarded to London. I just received news from Chancelor that official notification has reached him that this night Nicky has ordered the mobilization of his whole army and fleet. He has not even awaited the results of the mediation I am working at and left me without any news. I am off for Berlin to take measures for ensuring safety of my eastern frontiers where strong Russian troops are already posted.

WILLY.

[1] Cipher group incomprehensible. [2] Cipher group lacking.

[3] From the copy of the Berlin Central Telegraph Office (see under note 4). Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 45.

[4] The telegram was sent from the New Palace telegraph office at 12.55 p.m. to the King of England. At the Emperor's order it was telegraphically dispatched from the New Palace to the Imperial Chancelor and the Foreign Office, for their cognizance (telegrams received at the Berlin Central Telegraph Office at 1.37 p.m.; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 31, p.m.). To the inquiry of the Foreign Office as to the procedure, the telegraph office at the New Palace informed the Foreign Office of the details (as related above).

[5] See No. 452.

No. 478

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 198. PETERSBURG, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

Military attaché also reporting for General Staff:

Information comes from reliable source that, contrary to many rumors, no troops have so far been sent away from military district of Petersburg.

1st Army Corps said to have received mobilization order at noon of the twenty-ninth, which was rescinded an hour later. It is said by Bulgarian officers, attached to a regiment of the 37th Division,[3] that this division received order for mobilization this afternoon. Information will be carefully investigated tomorrow. It is said that the Guard will be used on the west front if occasion should arise. Orenburg Cossacks to take their place at Petersburg.

All reports received so far regarding movement of unmobilized troops toward the frontier give the impression that nervous frontier guard measures are being taken prematurely, by which the progress of the mobilization may be affected.

Supplementing the reports concerning the withdrawal of ammunition and material from Warsaw, it is stated in reliable quarters that on account of the non-completion of the new works at Novogeorgievsk the evacuation of this fortress has been decided on and has already been begun.

Fleet is said to have been at Sweaborg until the twenty-ninth and to have received mobilization order on the thirtieth at two o'clock in the morning. Fleet at Reval and Cronstadt evidently in an excited state of war preparation. Order to open fire on every German warship appearing in Russian waters can thus be explained.

POURTALÈS.

No. 479

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [4]

Telegram 204. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[5]

Since the Russian mobilization we have declared threatening danger of war, which will presumably be followed within forty-eight hours by mobilization. This inevitably means war. We expect from Austria immediate ACTIVE participation in the war with Russia.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Dated July 30, filed at Petersburg July 31 at 9.10 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office July 31 at 1.35 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m. Communicated on the 31st of July to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] The Staffs of the First Army Corps and of the 37th Division belonging to the 18th Army Corps were stationed at Petersburg.

[4] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting.

[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.45 p.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 4.20 p.m.

PART III

FROM THE PUBLICATION OF THE RUSSIAN GENERAL MOBILIZATION TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR ON FRANCE

No. 480

The Emperor to the Czar [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

On your appeal to my friendship and your call for assistance began to mediate [3] between your and the Austro-Hungarian Government. While this action was proceeding [4] your troops were mobilized against Austria-Hungary, my ally.[5] Thereby, as I have already pointed out to you, my mediation has been made almost illusory.

I have nevertheless continued my action. I now receive authentic news of serious preparations for war on [6] my eastern frontier. Responsibility for the safety of my Empire forces preventive measures of defense upon me. In my endeavors to maintain the peace of the world I have gone to the utmost limit possible. The responsibility for the disaster which is now threatening the whole civilized world will not be laid at my door.[7] In this moment it still lies in your power to avert it. Nobody is threatening the honor or power of Russia who can well afford to await the result of my mediation.[8] My [9] friendship for you and your Empire, transmitted [10] to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me [11] and I have honestly often [12] backed up Russia when she was in serious trouble, especially in her last war.[13]

The peace of Europe may still be maintained by you, if Russia will agree to stop the military measures which must threaten [14] Germany and Austria-Hungary.

WILLY.[15]

[1] From the [English] original. Draft in Count Wedel's handwriting with alterations and additions in the handwriting of the Emperor. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 9.

[2] Sent out from the New Palace July 31 at 2.04 p.m. Telegram crossed with No. 487.

[3] "began to mediate" an alteration by the Emperor from Wedel's "I have taken up an action of mediation."

[4] "proceeding" an alteration by the Emperor from Wedel's "still going on."

[5] "my ally" an alteration by the Emperor from Wedel's "allied to me."

[6] "on" an alteration by the Emperor from "near" of the draft.

[7] "be . . . door" an alteration by the Emperor from Wedel's "fall back on to me."

[8] "who can . . . mediation" added by the Emperor.

[9] Wedel: "The."

[10] Wedel: "overcome."

[11] "by my . . . to me" an alteration by the Emperor from Wedel's "by my ancestors, has never been forgotten by me."

[12] "often" added by the Emperor.

[13] "especially . . . war" added by the Emperor.

[14] "will agree . . . threaten" an alteration by the Emperor from Wedel's "will stop threatening."

[15] "Willy" added to the draft by the Emperor. For reply see No. 546.

No. 481

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 160. ROME, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

San Giuliano informed me that according to his telegrams from Bucharest, Roumanian Government, just as the Italian, sees its interests menaced by the violent action against Serbia.

FLOTOW.

No. 482

The Emperor of Austria to the Emperor [3]

Telegram (unnumbered). VIENNA-SCHÖNBRUNN, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

P. C. HIS MAJESTY THE GERMAN EMPEROR, KING OF PRUSSIA, BERLIN.

I hasten to thank you most sincerely and heartily for your friendly telegram.[5] Immediately after your Ambassador transmitted the mediation proposal of Sir Edward Grey to my Government, I received the official report of my Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the effect that the Emperor of Russia had ordered the mobilization of all the military districts along my borders. Count Szögyeny reports to me that you had told Emperor Nicholas in a very pointed manner that the Russian mobilization would have to be stopped, as otherwise the whole responsibility for a world war would fall on his shoulders. In the consciousness of my grave obligations toward the future of my Empire, I have ordered the mobilization of my entire armed forces. The movements of my Army against Serbia now in progress can suffer no disturbance through the threatening and challenging attitude of Russia. A rescue of Serbia by means of Russian intervention at the present time would bring about the most serious consequences for my territories, and therefore it is impossible for me to permit such an intervention. I am aware of the full meaning and extent of my decision, at which I arrived with confidence in the justice of God, combined with the certainty that the strength of your defense will with unflinching fidelity,[6] furnish security for my Empire and for the Triple Alliance.

FRANZ JOSEPH.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Rome at 12 noon, arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.05 p.m. Receipt stamp: July 31, p.m.
[3] From the copy of the Palace telegraph office.
[4] Filed at Vienna-Schönbrunn at 1.06 p.m.; arrived at the Palace telegraph office in Berlin at 2.45 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m.
[5] See No. 437; cf. also Nos. 395, 434, 440, 441, 450, 464 and 465.
[6] For reply see Nos. 502 and 503.

No. 483

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 235. PARIS, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

Public opinion a little less excited today, thanks to the efforts of the Government. Hope of success in pending negotiations revived. Suspicion that we are inciting to war fading away. Mood, in the event peace can not be preserved, that of determined resignation.

SCHOEN.

No. 484

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 197. LONDON, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

Sir Edward Grey has just told me that he was wrong in what he told me yesterday, in that there is no intermediate state between that in which the fleet finds itself today and its mobilization, since the naval preparations were all made.[5] He did not want to feel that he had told me anything that might give me any misconception.

I have today for the first time the impression that the improved relations with Germany of late years and perhaps also some friendly feeling for Germany in the Cabinet makes it appear possible that, in case of war, England will probably adopt an attitude of watchful waiting.

To this end it would be of the utmost importance for us, in case war should prove inevitable, to be able to kill the suspicion, still in evidence here, that we have unconditionally supported the Austrian point of view, by a tangible—not merely formal—admission on the part of the Austrian Government resulting from our efforts at mediation.

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Paris at 12.50, arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.50 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m.
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Filed in London at 12.13 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.50 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m. The first paragraph, "Sir E. Grey . . . misconception" was communicated to the Emperor, and the first two paragraphs, "Sir E. Grey . . . waiting," to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office, both on the 31st of July.
[5] See Grey's communication of July 30 (No. 438).

No. 485

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 236.
Confidential.

PARIS, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

I called Mr. Iswolski, who has been nurturing the suspicion here that we have been inciting to war, personally and energetically to account. He talked very little and assured me that he was endeavoring to keep things calm, since it had become evident that we were honest in desiring to maintain peace. I hear also from journalistic quarters that he is becoming more cautious.

SCHOEN.

No. 486

The Minister at Luxemburg to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 14.

LUXEMBURG, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

Mr. Eyschen asks if the German Government could not make an announcement, in order to calm the excitement prevailing here, to the effect that Germany will respect Luxemburg's neutrality as long as it is not violated by anybody else.[5] Mr. Eyschen has made a similar request of the French Minister.[6]

BUCH.

No. 487

The Czar to the Emperor [7]

Telegram (unnumbered).

PETERSBURG, PALACE, *July 31, 1914.*[8]

HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR, NEW PALACE.

I thank you heartily for your mediation which begins to give one hope that all may yet end peacefully. It is *technically* impossible to stop our military preparations which were obligatory owing to Austria's mobilization. We are far from wishing war. So long as the negotiations with Austria on Serbia's account are taking place my troops shall not take any *provocative* action. I give you my

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Paris at 12.12 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.50 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m.
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.50 p.m., July 31 (the time of departure from Luxemburg is not given); receipt stamp: July 31, p.m.
[5] On an attached sheet the note by Thermann on July 31: "According to instructions I submitted the substance of telegram A 15376 to the Chief of the General Staff. His Excellency von Moltke stated to me that absolutely no regard would be paid to the national boundaries of Luxemburg (here the following words "owing to the necessities of our operations" were crossed out by Thermann).
[6] See No. 606.
[7] From the copy [in English] of the Palace telegraph office.
[8] Filed in Petersburg Palace, July 31, at 2.55 p.m., arrived at the Berlin Palace telegraph office at 2.52 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, a.m. (in error for p.m.). Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 8. Telegram crossed with No. 480.

solemn word for this. I put all my trust in God's mercy and hope in your successful mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and for the peace of Europe.

Your affectionate,

NICKY.

No. 488

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [1]

Telegram 196.
For communication.

BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

In spite of the still pending and apparently not hopeless mediation, and although we ourselves had taken no mobilization measures of any kind,[3] Russia has today [4] ordered the mobilization of her entire army and navy, thus against us also.[5] We have had to declare a state of threatening danger of war, which must be followed by mobilization,[6] in case Russia does not suspend all war measures against Austria and ourselves within twelve hours.

I do not consider it impossible that the Russian mobilization can be traced to rumors rife here yesterday—absolutely false and at once officially denied, but which were reported to Petersburg as fact—that mobilization was taking place here.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 489

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 196.
Reply to Telegram 192.[9]

LONDON, *July 31, 1914.*[8]

I have just used the above telegram in a talk with Sir E. Grey. The Minister thought at first that Russia had become somewhat sensitive about the war preparation questions, as a suggestion from us relative to them had been understood as a threat. But he will endeavor to use his influence as desired.

With reference to the Austro-Hungarian conversations he thought that everything depended on Austria's conceding so far as to put Russia in the wrong, and if the latter should then still refuse, he would be in a position where he could use pressure on Paris and Petersburg. He also indicated to me that under the circumstances it was just this question of reasonableness that would tip the scale in

[1] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting with alterations and additions in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor. See also Nos. 490, 491 and 492.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.10 p.m.
[3] "and although . . . measures" added by the Chancelor to the draft of Jagow.
[4] "today" inserted by the Chancelor.
[5] "thus against us also" added by the Chancelor.
[6] After "mobilization" there at first followed "It looks as if war with Russia were hardly to be avoided" (Jagow). This was crossed out by the Chancelor, who substituted therefor "in case Russia . . . taking place here" (see text above).
[7] From the decodification. Cf. also last paragraph of No. 496.
[8] Filed in London at 12.15 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m.
[9] See No. 444.

the matter of England's attitude, as she was bound by no absolute agreements. Should France be drawn into the affair, public feeling here would become very much wrought up, although up to the present time it had not in any way manifested itself against Germany; and he must then be in a position to base a reticent attitude on the part of England upon some palpable injustice on the part of Russia. He did not make this statement directly, but he made it plainly understood that he could vindicate the idea of failing immediately to take the part of France, only if he were in a position to point to some tangible concession. He repeatedly insisted that England was bound by no treaties of any kind. I assume that he still has in his mind his original suggestion of the suspension of the military operations in Serbia, after the transmission of which Your Excellency authorized me to announce that you intended to work on this plan at Vienna, in accordance with our telegram 178 [1] and your telegram 188.[2]

I think myself, if Count Berchtold should confine himself to the repetition of familiar declarations and explanations, that the negotiations would hold out little prospect of success, and that Russian public opinion would not permit the advance of Austrian Armies into Serbia, together with the destruction of cities and towns, and might perhaps force the Government to intervene against its will. From my knowledge of conditions in Vienna, nothing less than very energetic pressure exercised from Berlin will succeed in bringing Vienna to an acknowledgement of such a nature that its granting might have a determining effect on England's attitude in the war, if things come to that pass notwithstanding.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 490

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg [3]

Telegram 153.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

In spite of the still pending negotiations for mediation and although we ourselves have up to the present hour taken no mobilization measures of any kind, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy, thus against us also. For the security of the Empire, we have been compelled by these Russian measures, to declare a state of threatening danger of war, which does not yet mean mobilization. Mobilization must follow, however, in case Russia does not suspend every war measure against Austria-Hungary and ourselves within twelve hours and make us a distinct declaration to that effect. Please inform Mr. Sazonoff of this at once, and wire the hour of your communication. I know that Swerbejew telegraphed to Petersburg yesterday that we had mobilized, which is untrue up to the present hour.[5]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] See No. 368. [2] See No. 393.
[3] From the original draft in the Imperial Chancelor's handwriting. See in connection with this also No. 488. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 36, No. 23.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.30 p.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Petersburg at 11.10 p.m.
[5] After "hour" the Chancelor had at first added: "Up to yesterday we had made no military preparations at all." See No. 536.

No. 491

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris [1]

Telegram 180.
Urgent. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

In spite of the still pending negotiations for mediation and although we ourselves have taken no mobilization measures of any kind,[3] Russia has mobilized her entire army and fleet, thus against us also. As a result we have declared a state of threatening danger of war, which must be followed by mobilization in case Russia does not suspend every war measure against Austria and ourselves within twelve hours. Mobilization will inevitably mean war.[4] Please ask the French Government if it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Answer must be given within eighteen hours.[5] Telegraph immediately hour at which the inquiry is made. Utmost haste necessary.

Secret: If, as is not to be presumed, the French Government declares its intention to remain neutral, Your Excellency will inform the French Government that we shall have to demand the turning over of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun as a pledge of neutrality; these we would occupy and return after the completion of the war with Russia. Reply to last proposition must be here by four o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 492

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Rome [6]

Telegram 150.
Urgent. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[7]

Notwithstanding the fact that our negotiations for mediation were still pending and although we ourselves have taken no mobilization measures of any kind,[8] Russia has ordered the mobilization of her entire army and navy, thus against us also. As a result we have declared a state of threatening danger of war, which must be followed by mobilization [9] in case Russia does not suspend every war measure against Austria and ourselves within twelve hours. Mobilization will mean war. We have put the question to France whether she will remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Respite of eighteen hours. If France's reply should be in the

[1] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting with additions in the handwriting of the Chancelor. See also No. 488. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 36, No. 24.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.30 p.m.
[3] "and although we . . . of any kind" added by the Chancelor in Jagow's draft.
[4] "in case Russia . . . mean war" added by the Chancelor.
[5] For answer see Nos. 528 and 571; see also No. 543.
[6] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting with additions by the Imperial Chancelor. See in connection with this also No. 488.
[7] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.30 p.m.
[8] "and although . . . any kind" added by the Chancelor.
[9] After "mobilization" in Jagow's draft followed the words "which will inevitably mean war," but they were eliminated by the Chancelor, who substituted for them the sentence "in case Russia . . . mean war."

negative, as we certainly expect, war between France and ourselves will also have to be declared at once.

We are counting with assurance upon the fact that Italy will live up to the obligations she has assumed.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 493

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 143. VIENNA, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

Mr. de Bunsen has told the editor in chief of the *Fremdenblatt* that if Austria and Germany can plainly show that they have been provoked by Russia, public opinion in England, which has up until the present time been in favor of the Austrian procedure against the regicidal Serbia, will continue so disposed, and that it will thus be rendered much easier for the English Government to maintain a neutral attitude in a great war.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 494

Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [3]

BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

Replied to Count Moltke that I was grateful for the declaration [5] of benevolent neutrality, and that we had no intention—as long as Denmark did or could maintain her neutrality—of drawing Danish territory or Danish waters into the field of our war operations (provided that our opponents did not do so), and that, furthermore, we had no intention of infringing on the status of the Danish nation.

We advised Denmark to protect its harbors, etc., against occupation by either the British or the Russian fleets.

v. JAGOW.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Vienna at 12.35 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.45 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m.
[3] In Jagow's handwriting.
[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 31, p.m. Zimmermann took official note of the memorandum on July 31.
[5] The declaration was made orally by the Danish Minister Count Moltke (memorandum in Radowitz's handwriting; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 31, p.m.).

No. 495

Memorandum of Reporting Councilor Count Mirbach of the Foreign Office [1]

BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

The Belgian Minister just called on me and stated that he considered it important to announce that the calling of three annual classes to the colors which had just taken place in Belgium bore nothing of the character of a mobilization, but was solely for the purpose of filling up their unusually weak ranks.

MIRBACH.

No. 496

Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [3]

BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

Germany is to sound Vienna, England, Petersburg, to see whether it is possible for the four disinterested Powers to seek to secure for Austria the complete satisfaction of her demands on Serbia, provided that these demands do not infringe on Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Austria has already declared that she is prepared to respect Serbia's integrity and sovereignty.

The four Powers might inform Russia that they will guarantee that Austria's demands do not go so far as to violate Serbia's sovereignty and integrity.

Naturally, all Powers would have to suspend military preparations and operations.

Grey told Lichnowsky early today [5] that, if Germany were able to bring matters to the point where a sensible proposal should be made, which would make it perfectly plain that Germany and Austria were attempting to preserve the peace of Europe, and which, Russia and France could not sensibly turn down, then Sir E. Grey would support this proposal both at Paris and Petersburg, and would go so far as to say that if Russia and France did not accept it, the English Government would no longer concern itself with the consequences. Otherwise, Grey told the German Ambassador, should France become a participant, England would also be drawn in.

[1] In Mirbach's handwriting.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 31, p.m. Imperial Chancelor, Jagow and Zimmermann took official note of the memorandum on the 31st of July. It was communicated by the Foreign Office on the 2d of August, after minor alterations had been effected, to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] From the memorandum written by Jagow. Cf. with English Blue Book of 1914, No. 111.

[4] Presentation endorsement in Jagow's handwriting: presented July 31, 1914; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 1, p.m.

[5] See No. 489.

No. 497

The English Ambassador to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

Sir Edward Goschen has been instructed to make the following communication to the Imperial Chancelor:

The proposal that His Majesty's Government should bind themselves to neutrality on the terms proposed can not possibly be entertained.[2]

The proposal is, in effect that so long as Germany does not take French territory, as distinct from colonies, His Majesty's Government should engage themselves to stand aloof while France is being beaten and her colonies perhaps annexed. Such a proposal is unacceptable from a material point of view, for, while no further territory in Europe might be taken from her, France could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power and become subordinate to German policy. But apart from that material consideration, it is the opinion of His Majesty's Government that to make this bargain with the Imperial Government at the expense of France would be a disgrace from which the good name of Great Britain would never recover. Neither could His Majesty's Government entertain the bargain with regard to Belgium, for they are in effect asked to bargain away whatever obligation or interest they have as regards her neutrality.

Under these circumstances, and having said so much, His Majesty's Government feel that it would serve no useful purpose to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between Great Britain and Germany would offer sufficient positive advantages to compensate His Majesty's Government for having their hands tied at the present moment. Sir Edward Grey's answer to the Imperial Chancelor's communication must be that His Majesty's Government must reserve their full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to them to require in the event of the crisis developing in the unfavorable manner contemplated by the Chancelor.

Sir Edward Goschen is instructed to add most earnestly that one way of maintaining good relations between England and Germany is that the two countries should continue to work together to preserve the European peace; if they succeed in that object the mutual relations of Germany and England will, in Sir Edward Grey's opinion, be *ipso facto* strengthened and improved. His Majesty's Government will work with all sincerity and good-will in pursuance of that object.

Sir Edward Grey adds that if this crisis can be safely passed and the peace of Europe preserved, his own object would be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party and by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by Russia, France or Great Britain, either separately or jointly. Sir Edward Grey has desired this and worked for it as far as lay in his power all through the last Balkan crisis; and as Germany had a corresponding object, the relations between the two countries showed sensible improvement. Sir Edward Grey says that the idea of such an arrangement has hitherto been regarded as too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, which is more acute than any which Europe has for generations had to face, be safely passed, he nourishes the hope that the relief and reaction that will ensue may render possible some more definite RAPPROCHEMENT between the Powers than has hitherto proved feasible.

[1] From the undated and unsigned corrected copy [in English]. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 31, p.m. Cf. English Blue Book, Nos. 101 and 109.

[2] See No. 373.

No. 498

Memorandum of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

Count Szögyeny confirms on behalf of his Government the substance of the telegram sent today to the Chief of the General Staff by Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf, to the following effect:

It has been decided, on the strength of the determination of the Emperor, to prosecute the war against Serbia, to mobilize the rest of the Army, and to assemble it in Galicia. First mobilization, August 4. Mobilization order goes out July 31. The decision was made yesterday.

ZIMMERMANN.

No. 499

The Minister of War to the Imperial Chancelor and to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [3]

Secret. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

State of threatening danger of war ordered.

v. FALKENHAYN.

No. 500

The Grand General Staff to the Imperial Chancelor [5]

BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[6]

I respectfully request Your Excellency to kindly inform the Swiss Federal Government as soon as possible that the order for the closing of the Swiss-German frontier was given for the sole purpose of preventing French espionage which, according to reliable news, has been initiated through Switzerland.[7]

By order of,

COUNT WALDERSEE.

No. 501

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at Vienna and Rome [8]

Telegrams 206, 149.
Urgent. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[9]

We are attempting to keep Greece from taking part against the Triple Alliance.

JAGOW.

[1] In Zimmermann's handwriting.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 31, p.m. Imperial Chancelor and Jagow took official note of the memorandum July 31.
[3] From the corrected copy of the letter signed by Falkenhayn and sent to the Imperial Chancelor as the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the Secretary of State of the Foreign Office.
[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 31, p.m.
[5] From the decodification.
[6] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: July 31, p.m.
[7] See No. 514.
[8] From the original. Draft in Rosenberg's handwriting.
[9] To the Central Telegraph Office at 4 p.m.; arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 7 p.m.

No. 502

Unused draft of a telegram from the Emperor to the Emperor of Austria [1]

BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*

I thank you from my heart for the confiding and courageous words that you sent to me.[2] Just as the mediation action in connection with your Government, which I had undertaken by agreement with the English Government, was made futile through the Russian mobilization measures directed against you, so the Emperor Nicholas has forced me, by the mobilization of his entire forces on land and sea, which was ordered today, to declare a state of threatening danger of war for the protection of my realm. I have demanded of the Russian Government that it suspend within twelve hours all military preparations against Germany and Austria; otherwise I should be compelled to proceed on my own part with the mobilization of my armed forces.

I trust in God that He will even at the last hour bring the Czar to his senses and avert the frightful disaster which Russia's procedure threatens to bring upon the world. Should that not be possible, however, I trust that, shoulder to shoulder, we may win victory in the war that has been forced upon us, just as we have been unitedly striving with all our strength, now for over five and thirty years, to maintain peace.

No. 503

The Emperor to the Emperor of Austria [3]

Telegram 208. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR FRANZ JOSEPH, VIENNA.

The incipient mobilization of my entire Army and Navy, ordered by me today, will be followed within the shortest period of time by actual mobilization. I am planning on the second of August as the first day of mobilization, and I am ready, in fulfilment of the obligations of my alliance, to commence war at once against Russia and France. It is of the utmost importance in this grave struggle that Austria oppose her principal forces to Russia, and not fritter away her strength by a simultaneous offensive against Serbia. This is of all the more importance, as a great part of my Army will be employed against France. Serbia plays in

[1] Draft in Stumm's handwriting, gone over by Zimmermann and the Chancelor. The draft of the Imperial report, written by Bergen and altered by Jagow, but not reviewed by the Chancelor, which was to go to the Emperor with the draft of the telegram to be completed by the Emperor, is also extant. Both documents went into the discard, as the text sent from the Foreign Office to the Palace (No. 503) was telegraphed to Vienna. The Foreign Office had also prepared the draft of a telegram from the Emperor to the King of Italy, which was also to be sent to the Emperor for execution, with the Imperial report already referred to; this draft can not be found in the archives.

[2] See No. 482.

[3] From the copy in the archives of the Foreign Office. See also No. 482, and cf. No. 502.

[4] The original draft of the telegram was handed to the Foreign Office by the aide-de-camp on duty at 4.05 p.m., July 31, with the Emperor's orders to have it sent in cipher and to report its dispatch as soon as completed. The telegram was communicated by wire to the Ambassador at Vienna with the request to transmit it at once to the Emperor Franz Joseph; to the Central Telegraph Office at 4.40 p.m., arrived at the Embassy in Vienna at 7 p.m.

this gigantic fight, upon which we are entering shoulder to shoulder, a very subordinate rôle, which requires of us only the defensive measures absolutely necessary. Success in the war, and with it the continued existence of our monarchies, can only be hoped for if we both oppose our new and powerful opponent with all our forces. I beg you further to do everything to persuade Italy to participate, making every possible concession. All else must be made subordinate, in order that the Triple Alliance may unitedly enter upon the war.[1]

WILHELM.

No. 504

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Athens [2]

Telegram 104.
Urgent. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[3]

I beg you to transmit at once, by reading it aloud to him, the following telegram from the Emperor to His Majesty the King:

"I thank you from my heart . . . equal frankness." [4]

Your Excellency will refrain from communicating the telegram in writing. Wire report.

JAGOW.

No. 505

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Brussels [5]

Telegram 39. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[6]

Military Plenipotentiary at Petersburg telegraphs:[7] "Grand Duke Nicholas Michaelovitch tells me that he hears Belgium has concluded a treaty of alliance with France."

Please communicate the foregoing assertion confidentially to the local Government.[8]

JAGOW.

[1] See No. 601.
[2] From the original. Draft in Rosenberg's handwriting.
[3] To the Central Telegraph Office at 5.00 p.m.
[4] Here is inserted telegram 466 from the Emperor.
[5] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 5.30 p.m.
[7] See No. 445.
[8] See No. 581.

No. 506

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest[1]

Telegram 58. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

Please state to King Carol and Mr. Bratianu at once:

Should war with Russia prove unavoidable, the Imperial Government would, in the event of a favorable outcome, guarantee that Roumania should receive Bessarabia as a reward for the fulfilment of her alliance obligations and for active participation in the war on our side.[3]

Confirm receipt by wire. Telegraph report concerning the execution of the instructions.[4]

JAGOW.

No. 507

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna[5]

Telegram 207. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[6]

The Imperial Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest is receiving the following instructions:[7]

Please ask the Austrian Government to make at once a similar declaration to King Carol and the Roumanian Government.[8]

JAGOW.

No. 508

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Constantinople[9]

Telegram 290.
Urgent.
Secret. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[10]

Please notify the Grand Vizier at once that we agree to the Porte's wish to limit the term of the compact to 1918, and are ready to conclude it immediately.[11] We are advocating the extension of the German-Turkish alliance, both at Vienna and Rome, to become part of the Triple Alliance.

[1] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting with alterations in Jagow's handwriting. See No. 563.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6 p.m.
[3] This paragraph reads in the original draft in Jagow's handwriting: "state . . . that, in view of the general mobilization ordered in Russia, the outbreak of war is imminent. Should it come to a war with Russia, the Imperial Government would see to it that Roumania should receive the whole of Bessarabia as a reward for fulfilment of alliance obligations and active participation on our side."
[4] See No. 582.
[5] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting with alterations by Jagow.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6 p.m.
[7] See No. 506, paragraph 2. [8] See No. 561.
[9] From the original. Draft in Rosenberg's handwriting, with alterations by the Imperial Chancelor.
[10] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.45 p.m.
[11] See Nos. 320 and 411; cf. also No. 517.

Your Excellency is authorized to sign as soon as possible,[1] but it should be determined first whether Turkey either can or will undertake any action against Russia worthy of the name. In case she should be unable to do so, the alliance would, of course, be worthless, and should not be signed.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 509

The Minister at Berne to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 17.
Secret.

BERNE, *July 31, 1914.*[3]

Swiss Federal Council has, should conditions call for it, determined on the mobilization of the entire army, furthermore, on the immediate so-called picket disposition, i. e., a state of preparation for mobilization and the calling to the colors of Landsturm bodies for the necessary garrisons, even on the German border, for form's sake, as the Chief of the General Staff expressed it. Decree will probably be issued today.

ROMBERG.

No. 510

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 144.

VIENNA, *July 31, 1914.*[5]

Duke d'Avarna, who called on me early today, thought that it might be advisable for the Imperial Government to make some plain hints to Rome regarding the alliance emergency, in view of the Russian aggression, plainly evidenced by the mobilization. My Italian colleague's suggestions were not to be taken to presume disloyalty on the part of Italy, but he felt that this was just the time for plain speech by Berlin to Rome. I must ask that the suggestion of the Duke d'Avarna be treated in a STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL manner, as any leak would necessarily compromise my Italian colleague, who has always shown himself to be unbendingly loyal to the Triple Alliance.

I again pointed out today most definitely to Count Berchtold that it was Austria's duty at this moment to bind Italy unconditionally to us by the greatest concessions.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] After "authorized" Rosenberg first wrote: "For your own exclusively personal information. The treaty must not be wrecked on any obstacle connected with the term. Your Excellency will thus grant a seven-year term, if absolutely necessary." This was crossed out by the Chancelor, who substituted for it "but it should . . . not be signed" (as in the text above).

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed in Berne at 3 p.m., arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.47 p.m. Receipt stamp: July 31, a.m. (thus wrongly for p.m.). Decodification sent to the Emperor July 31. In accordance with marginal instructions by Jagow, Romberg's telegram was communicated on the 31st of July to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office; sent by messengers at 8.45 p.m.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in Vienna at 4.30 p.m., arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.41 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m.

No. 511

The Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). LUXEMBURG, *July 31, 1914.*

The export embargo on foodstuffs, etc., extended to the Luxemburg border as a result of the declaration of a state of war, is against the agreements of free traffic between the customs-union states. It is injurious to the local population in the highest degree, especially to the large iron industries, which are three-quarters in purely German hands, and which threaten to have to close down for the lack of coal and cars. I, therefore, urgently request that an exception be made of the German-Luxemburg border. Grand Ducal Government agrees to make use of absolutely every means to prevent abuse.

MINISTER OF STATE EYSCHEN.

No. 512

The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 227. ATHENS, *July 31, 1914.*[3]

The communications to the local Government reported by me,[4] according to which Austria was negotiating with Bulgaria and Turkey, appear to emanate directly from the Russian Legation. Austria has in the meantime made the declaration here that she was exerting all her influence at Sofia to keep Bulgaria quiet.

BASSEWITZ.

No. 513

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [5]

Telegram 199. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[6]

On the twenty-ninth the Czar requested His Majesty by telegraph to mediate between Russia and Austria.[7] His Majesty immediately declared himself willing to do so, informed the Czar by telegraph, and at once made a move at Vienna.[8] Without awaiting the result,[9] Russia mobilized against Austria. His Majesty thereupon called the attention of the Czar by telegraph to the fact that he was thereby making the mediation action almost futile, and requested the Czar to

[1] Filed in Luxemburg at 6.21 p.m., arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.50 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m.
[2] From the decodification.
[3] Filed in Athens at 2.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m.
[4] See No. 360.
[5] From the original in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor, with additions in Stumm's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 8.30 p.m.
[7] See No. 332.
[8] See No. 359.
[9] "Without . . . result" added in Stumm's handwriting. The Chancelor had written "On . . . Russia had."

suspend his military preparations against Austria.[1] This has not been done. In spite of that fact, we have been continuing our attempts at mediation in Vienna, and we have even gone, in the extreme urgency of our proposals, to the utmost limit of what we could venture toward a sovereign State which is our ally.[2] Our proposals at Vienna were quite along the lines of the English proposals, which we recommended to the earnest consideration of Vienna. They were under discussion at Vienna this morning. During the discussion, even before it had been brought to an end, Count Pourtalès reported officially the mobilization of the entire Russian army and navy.[3] This action on the part of Russia cut short Austria's pending reply to our mediation proposal. It [4] is directed also against us, thus against the Power from which the Czar had personally requested mediation. This action, which we can not regard otherwise than hostile, we shall have to reply to with serious counter-measures, unless we want absolutely to sacrifice the safety of our fatherland. We can not stand idly by as spectators and watch Russian mobilization on our borders. We have told Russia that we should have to mobilize, which would mean war, unless, within twelve hours, the military preparations against Austria-Hungary and ourselves were suspended.[5] We have asked France whether she would remain neutral in a German-Russian war.[6] Please use every means to insure that this course of events is duly recognized in the English press.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 514

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Berne[7]

Telegram 21. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[8]

Kindly inform the Swiss Federal Government that the order for the closing of the Swiss-German frontier was given for the sole purpose of preventing French espionage which, according to reliable news, has been initiated through Switzerland.

JAGOW.

[1] See No. 420.
[2] See Nos. 395 and 396.
[3] See No. 473.
[4] "cut short . . . It" inserted in Stumm's handwriting.
[5] See No. 490.
[6] See No. 491.
[7] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting. Sent as a result of the request of the General Staff, see No. 500.
[8] To the Central Telegraph Office at 8.30 p.m.

No. 515

The Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 33. STOCKHOLM, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

Swedish Minister at Petersburg telegraphs:

Czar has this evening ordered general mobilization for the army and navy of all annual classes. First mobilization day, today. Even the Landwehr is called to the colors.

REICHENAU.

No. 516

The Minister at The Hague to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 27. THE HAGUE, *July 31, 1914.*

I am told in official quarters that Her Majesty the Queen has by means of a decree issued today summoned the army, the navy and the Landwehr to arms.

MÜLLER.

No. 517

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 392. THERAPIA, *July 31, 1914.*[5]

Russian mobilization has made an impression upon the Porte, and has roused fear of a Russian attack on Turkey. The sudden cancellation by Greece of the meeting of Venizelos and the Grand Vizier, is also seen here as a stroke of the Triple Entente, which is said to desire to prolong the Turco-Greek tension in order that Greece might be able to block the entrance into the Dardanelles of the Turkish dreadnoughts, apt to be inconvenient for Russia. If we are to close with Turkey, it is high time.[6] We might otherwise find 300,000 Turks against us instead of with us. General Liman is beginning to doubt that Turkey will . . .[7] declare herself for Germany. Austria's hesitation toward Bulgaria appears to my Austrian colleague a little too fastidious.

WANGENHEIM.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Stockholm at 5.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.06 p.m.; receipt stamp, July 31, p.m. Communicated on July 31 to the General Staff, Ministry of War, Admiralty Staff and Imperial Naval Office.

[3] Filed at The Hague at 8 p.m.; received at the Berlin Central Telegraph Office at 9.23 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m. Copy submitted to the Imperial Chancelor on the 31st of July, sent by him to the Emperor, returned to the Foreign Office through the Chancelor August 1. Communicated on the 1st of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in Therapia at 3.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m.

[6] See Nos. 320, 411, 508 and 547.

[7] Cipher group incomprehensible.

No. 518

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 200. LONDON, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

Sir William Tyrrell informs me that local Government has so far no information concerning mobilization of entire Russian army and navy, and will at once get into communication with Petersburg.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 519

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome [3]

Telegram 154. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

King Carol has told Count Waldburg [5] that he was negotiating with Italy concerning the possibility of sending Italian troops over the land route.

If unobjectionable, please communicate something definite there concerning this suggestion and its acceptance.[6]

JAGOW.

No. 520

The Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 31. STOCKHOLM, *July 31, 1914.*[8]

In order to work in the right direction, it would be important for me and the military attaché to learn whether and in what way military authorities are counting on Swedish cooperation, in case it can be acquired.

REICHENAU.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in London at 4.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m.
[3] From the original in Bergen's handwriting.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.10 p.m.
[5] Reported by the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest in a telegram from Sinaia July 30 at 4.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.50 p.m.
[6] See No. 550.
[7] From the decodification.
[8] Filed in Stockholm at 5.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.35 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 31, p.m. Communicated on the 1st of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

No. 521

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 202. PETERSBURG, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

Military attaché reports for General Staff:

Military plans as reported from officers' circles through foreign legations: Five armies will be set on foot: First and Second Armies in Baltic Provinces, probably including Grodno; Third Army Warsaw and the East; Fourth and Fifth Armies against Austria; First to Third Army, from three to five corps each; Fourth and Fifth Armies, five corps each; First and Second Armies, defensive; Third Army according to circumstances; Fourth and Fifth Armies, offensive. When Petersburg seems to have been secured, no tenacious defensive with the northern army is planned, but a slow retreat as in 1812.

Finland is to be left to itself, probably with the 22d Army Corps, General Ivanoff commanding.[3] It is said to have been decided as early as the twenty-ninth that the Czar was to accompany the advance of the southern army. It has recently been stated again that portions of the 2d Division of the Infantry of the Guard have already gone to Courland.

Many cavalrymen of the Guard are said to have been enlisted in other cavalry regiments.

POURTALÈS.

No. 522

Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [4]

BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[5]

England inquires whether we will bind ourselves to respect the neutrality of Belgium, as long as it is violated by no other Power. The same question has been put to Paris by England. In view of existing treaties it is necessary for England to know this.

No. 523

The Minister at Belgrade (temporarily at Nish) to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 14. NISH, *July 31, 1914.*

In view of the wide-spread news of the mobilization of Russia and the slow action of Austria-Hungary, concerning which everyone is astonished here, the spirits of the army and the people are beginning to rise. Serbian officers assert that their mobilization will be completed today.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Petersburg at 7 p.m., arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.35 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, a.m.
[3] See No. 552; cf. also No. 551.
[4] In Jagow's handwriting.
[5] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 1, p.m. For inquiry and answer, both of the 31st of July, see English Blue Book, Nos. 114 and 122 (last number reached England only on the 1st of August).
[6] Copy from the archives of the Belgrade Legation. Telegram did not reach the Foreign Office.

It is reported by telephone from Belgrade that 500 refugees are being sheltered in the Austro-Hungarian and our Legations. Up to the present time everything all right. Austrians are continuing the bombardment at long intervals.

GRIESINGER.

No. 524

The Grand General Staff to the Foreign Office [1]

Strictly confidential.
Written by an officer.

BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

FIFTH COMMUNICATION [3]

State of "threatening danger of war" proclaimed today.

AUSTRIA

Mobilization going on normally. Spirit of the population (all nationalities) excellent. The army commanders and chiefs of the general staffs of the armies against Serbia are made known:

1. General of Infantry Ritter von Frank; Chief: General von Csicserics.
2. General of Cavalry von Böhm-Ermolli; Chief: General von Mecenseffi.
3. General of Ordnance Potiorek; Chief: General von Böltz.

An aero station has been established at Neusatz.

MOBILIZATION OF THE WHOLE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMY proclaimed today (July 31).

From theater of war: Semlin Bridge still passable for pedestrians. Skirmishing at Gradizhsk, Semendria, Belgrade and Prhovo.

SERBIA

The Serbian army apparently consists of eleven divisions, of which one is at Poscharevatz, one behind the Vk. Krschna-Lasarevatz line, one at Valjevo, one in the Sanjac, advanced troops south-east of Fotcha, and seven at Kraguyevatz-Krusevatz. Generals Misitch, Stephan Stephanovitch, Bojanovitch and Popovitch have been named army commanders. Fourth Austrian Army Command reports that 60,000 Russians are to be sent through Roumania by way of Negotin to the Serbs (perhaps Serbians liable to service are meant). Minister reports that lack of small arms is making itself felt.

MONTENEGRO

Has not yet come to a decision.

GREECE, ROUMANIA

Nothing new.

[1] From the multigraph copy sent over from the General Staff.

[2] Receipt stamp: July 31, p.m. Was submitted to Zimmermann, Jagow and the Imperial Chancelor; returned by the two first on the 31st of July, by the last on the 1st of August.

[3] Third Communication (report) about the 29th of July, see No. 372. The Fourth Communication, relating to the 30th of July came to the archives of the Foreign Office on the 1st of August, but having been superseded, was not taken up there. News up to July 31, at 4 p.m.

BULGARIA

A paper of the Geschow party challenges Bulgaria to make Serbia pay for Bulgarian neutrality by a demand for compensation of the latter. Rumors of an alliance between Bulgaria and Turkey are being heard.

TURKEY

See Bulgaria.

BELGIUM

Is proceeding with mobilization; work being done on the equipment of the fortifications at Liège. Preparations being made for blowing up the Vesdre Viaduct and the tunnel at Dolhain. The Belgian cavalry division is of no great strength. Apparently a treaty of alliance with France.

HOLLAND

Nothing new.

FRANCE

Spirit is higher. At Nancy there was a run on the bank. The fleet at Toulon, with the reserve squadron, is fully manned and equipped. The Mediterranean steamship companies have received instructions to prepare themselves for the transport of troops from Algiers to France. Activities increasing on the frontier, although the Frontier Guard is not posted. Supervision of frontier traffic more acute. Power trucks no longer allowed to cross. Empty cars on all lines being collected in the rear as far as the Paris-Rouen division. On the eastern front at Verdun, work is being done on the defensive outpost of an exposed position at the foot of the Côtes de Meuse between the Verdun-Metz railroad and the Verdun-Manheulles Chaussée on the Eix-Moulainville-Chatillon s.l.C. line. The de la Laufée (eastern front) work is being strengthened. Masonry work is being commenced on the Grand Mont d'Amance northeast of Nancy. Briey, an aviation depot; the 8th Chasseurs are doing bridge guard duty at Audun and Villerupt. Border chasseur battalions appear to have called in reservists, companies from 250 to 280 files strong; apparently an inconspicuous strengthening of the Frontier Guard troops.

ENGLAND

bragging about her obligations and interests (security of India, the interests of the over-seas possessions). Extensive preparations and precautionary measures are being made and taken everywhere. Steamer service between England and the Hook of Holland is said to be suspended, in order not to interfere with the Admiralty measures. Coast Guards are to be called up. Preparations for defense of Gibraltar made. Lively military preparations at Malta. Military maneuvers in the Union of South Africa called off. The First Fleet has apparently taken up a position of readiness for attack on Germany at Hull-Grimsby.

ITALY

Preparations for mobilization being made by the General Staff. Schoolship squadron recalled from the English coast. The entire fleet (*in completo arma-*

mento) is gathering at Tarento. The *Avanti* reports that mobilization is imminent. The Exchange is giving evidence of no material fluctuations. The *Tribuna*, however, asserts again that Italy is going to be true to her alliance obligations.

SWEDEN

Feeling against Russia growing.

DENMARK

Being said more and more that Denmark will mobilize after the first German defeat.

NORWAY, SPAIN

Nothing new.

RUSSIA

Contrary to the assurances of the Russian Government, mobilization has been ordered in the districts bordering on Germany, also. Frontier guard assembled everywhere in accordance with mobilization plans. Russian cavalry divisions may be ready for invasion, as "war preparation period" is several days old. Reference is made in Supplement 1 to the "directions for covering the advance." Assembling of cavalry divisions apparent, as in "assumed first measures"; infantry divisions as reserve. Infantry in strength behind the line Lomza-Augustowo-Wirballen. Reports indicate weakness in manning and occupation of Warsaw, Novogeorgievsk and Ostrolenka; railroad protection on the lines leading west and south-west from Warsaw probably only until the completion of mobilization. Garrison of Kalisz (3d Rifles) has been removed in the direction of Lodz. 13th Cavalry Division apparently around Sieradz. 14th Cavalry Division being assembled around Czenstochowa-Myszkow. Bridges east of Myslowitz over the Prezemza and near Granica blown up. Rolling stock southwest of the Vistula withdrawn behind the Vistula. Reports coming from Turkey about the transportation of troops from Baku into the interior. Fleet at Helsingfors. A new dreadnought aground at Hangö, apparently severely damaged. All the torpedo boats and submarines as well as the seaplanes have left Libau.

VON BARTENWERFFER,
Major.

No. 525

The Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 32. STOCKHOLM, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

According to a communication from Mr. Wallenberg, Denmark will proclaim neutrality tomorrow. Norway, on the contrary, will wait on Sweden for hers.

REICHENAU.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Stockholm July 31 at 5.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 1 at 12.30 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, a.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, returned by him on the 1st of August.

No. 526

The Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 30. STOCKHOLM, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

Reuter office is disseminating insidious dispatches, according to which the maintenance of the peace of the world depends entirely upon the good intentions of Germany. Consider it necessary that the Wolff Telegraph Bureau should counteract this opinion-manufacturing by providing the Svenska Telegraph Bureau and the other northern telegraphic agencies with dispatches that present the responsibility of England and Russia in a clear light.

REICHENAU.

No. 527

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 206. PETERSBURG, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

After Sazonoff had formulated the Russian demands for me in writing yesterday, and there seemed to be no prospect of success in further transactions, I put our point of view also in writing, in the following résumé:

> Pour prouver son esprit pacifique ainsi que ses dispositions amicales envers la Russie et se rendant compte de la position difficile dans laquelle se trouve cette dernière en face de l'action de l'Autriche contre la Serbie, le Gouvernement allemand a engagé le cabinet de Vienne a donner au cabinet de St. Petersbourg des assurances qu'il n'a pas l'intention de toucher à l'intégrité territoriale de la Serbie ni de léser les intérêts légitimes de la Russie. C'est à la suite du conseil donnée par l'Allemagne à Vienne que l'Autriche a fait une déclaration qui, d'après l'avis du Gouvernement allemand, doit suffire pour la Russie.
>
> Une pareille déclaration par laquelle une grande Puissance qui se trouve en état de guerre se lie d'avance les mains pour la conclusion de la paix, doit être considérée comme une très-grande concession et comme une preuve d'esprit de conciliation.
>
> La Russie doit se rendre compte qu'en voulant amener l'Autriche à aller au-delà de cette déclaration, elle lui demande de faire une chose qui n'est plus compatible avec sa dignité et son prestige de grande Puissance. Tout en réprochant à l'Autriche d'empiéter sur les droits de souveraineté de la Serbie, elle veut porter elle-même atteinte au même droit de l'Autriche.
>
> Le Gouvernement russe ne devrait pas perdre de vue que le prestige de l'Autriche-Hongrie comme grande Puissance est en même temps un intérêt allemand, et que l'on ne peut pas exiger de l'Allemagne d'agir sur l'Autriche dans un sens contraire à ses propres intérêts.
>
> Dans ces conditions, si Russie insiste sur ses demandes et refuse à recon-

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Stockholm July 31, at 5.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 1, at 12.30 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, a.m. Marginal annotation by Riezler on the 1st of August: "Instructions have been given to Wolff."

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in Petersburg July 31 at 9.35 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 1 at 12.30 a.m.; receipt stamp, August 1, a.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, returned by him to the Foreign Office August 1. Pourtalès' telegram communicated to the Ambassador at London August 1 by Zimmermann; to the Central Telegraph Office at 5 p.m.

naître dans l'intérêt de la paix européenne la necessité absolue de localiser le conflit austro-serbe, elle doit en même temps se rendre compte de l'extrême gravité [1] de la situation.

POURTALÈS.

Translation of the French portion

In order to prove her pacific intentions as well as her friendly feeling toward Russia, and realizing the difficult position in which the latter finds herself as a result of Austria's procedure against Serbia, the German Government has induced the Vienna Cabinet to give to the Petersburg Cabinet the assurance that it has no intention of infringing on the territorial integrity of Serbia, or of injuring Russia's legitimate interests. It is as a result of the advice given Vienna by Germany, that Austria has made a declaration which, in the opinion of the German Government, should be sufficient for Russia.

Such a declaration, by which a Great Power, finding itself in a state of war ties its hands in advance for the conclusion of peace, must be regarded as a very great concession and as evidence of a conciliatory disposition.

Russia must realize that in wishing to induce Austria to go beyond this declaration, she is requiring her to do something which is no longer compatible with her dignity and her prestige as a Great Power. While reproaching Austria with infringing on Serbia's rights of sovereignty, she herself wishes to infringe upon that same right of Austria.

The Russian Government should not lose sight of the fact that Austria's prestige as a Great Power is at the same time a matter of interest to Germany, and that it cannot be demanded of Germany to act towards Austria in a manner contrary to her own interests.

If, under such circumstances, Russia should insist upon her demands, and should refuse to recognize the compelling necessity for localizing the Austro-Serbian conflict in the interest of European peace, she must at the same time realize the extreme gravity of the situation.

No. 528

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 237. PARIS, *July 31, 1914.*[3]

Inquiry made at seven o'clock.[4]

Premier said that he had no news of any general Russian mobilization, only of precautionary measures. Therefore he was not willing quite yet to give up hope of avoiding the extreme event. He promised an answer on the neutrality question by one o'clock tomorrow at the latest.[5]

SCHOEN.

[1] Incomprehensible, ". . . ité" of the decodification filled in by Jagow according to sense to read "gravité."

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed in Paris at 8.17 p.m., July 31; arrived at the Foreign Office August 1 at 12.30 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, a.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, returned by him on the 1st of August. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office on the 1st of August.

[4] See Nos. 491, 571, and the French Yellow Book, No. 117. See also No. 543.

[5] Expiration of the eighteen-hour respite.

No. 529

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [1]

Telegram 200. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

It will have to be the duty of Your Excellency to awaken British comprehension to the fact that our geographical and military position did not permit us to do otherwise than to reply immediately to the Russian mobilization with the declaration of a state of threatening danger of war, which must be followed by mobilization, if Russia does not suspend her military preparations at once.[3] We could not sit back quietly and wait to see whether a more common-sense view would gain the upper hand at Petersburg, while at the same time the Russian mobilization was proceeding at such speed, that, if the worst came, we should be left completely outstripped in a military sense. Should Russia complete her mobilization without ourselves mobilizing, East Prussia, West Prussia and perhaps even Posen and Silesia would be left helpless at the mercy of the Russians.[4] The Czar declared in his last telegram to His Majesty the Emperor, that he would refrain from every "provocative action." [5] That can not fail of having its effect on England if it should become known there, but it is of little purpose. A mobilized Russian army on our borders, when we, ourselves, have not mobilized, is a deadly menace to us, even without any "provocative action." The provocation of which Russia is guilty toward us in having mobilized against us at a moment when we were mediating at Vienna at her request, is in itself so strong that no German would understand, if we failed to reply to it with strong measures.[6]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 530

The Emperor to the King of Italy [7]

Telegram 155. (BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*)[8]

TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ITALY.

While I was directing all my efforts as mediator between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and while I was still exchanging telegrams on the subject with the Emperor Nicholas, Russia mobilized her entire army and navy, and by so doing

[1] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting, with alterations and additions by the Imperial Chancelor.

[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.50 a.m., August 1.

[3] The clause "which must . . . preparations at once," added by the Chancelor.

[4] "Should Russia complete . . . of the Russians" an alteration by the Imperial Chancelor from Stumm's original: "Thus, for example our Province of East Prussia would be left hopelessly at the mercy of Russian conquest, if we did not at once take the most serious preventive measures." ("preventive" a first alteration by Stumm from "preparatory", which he originally wrote).

[5] See No. 487.

[6] The clause "but it is of little . . . with strong measures," an alteration by the Imperial Chancelor from Stumm's original: "To be pacified by such an assurance, even if it were made in good faith, would be an impossibility from a military and practical point of view, and would be an inexcusable piece of folly of those who are responsible for the safety of the Empire."

[7] From the typewritten draft [in French] that was submitted to the Emperor for his signature, with an accompanying letter from the Imperial Chancelor, on the 31st of July. Notice of the date on the accompanying letter in the Emperor's handwriting: "July 31, 1914. W." Draft of the accompanying letter in Bergen's handwriting, with additions in the handwriting of Jagow.

[8] Imperial telegram dispatched in cipher on the 31st of July to Flotow for transmission to the

threatens Germany. In order to secure the safety of the Empire, I was compelled to announce to Russia that I was also forced to proclaim mobilization, unless Russia revoked all the measures she had taken against me and my ally, Austria-Hungary.[1] War with Russia appears to me to be imminent and inevitable. I have just had the question put to Paris, whether France in a Russo-German war, would be willing to remain neutral.[2] Unfortunately, there is no doubt about the answer.

At this supreme moment, recollecting the ties of friendship and alliance that exist between us and our countries, my thoughts turn to you in complete confidence.[3]

Your brother and ally,

WILLIAM.

No. 531

The Counselor of the Embassy at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 208. PETERSBURG, *July 31, 1914.*[5]

Military attaché reports also for the General Staff:

The mobilization order does not specify the annual classes to be called to the colors. It can not yet be ascertained which classes are to be retained, but it is certain that the Reichswehr people will have to report to the Reichswehr authorities. At Kiev eight annual classes are said to have been kept in the service.

The commanding officer of Petersburg is advertizing for workmen and carpenters at high wages for earthworks and for cutting down wooded districts. It is apparently for the purpose of provisional fortification of the capital. 56,000 workmen are said to be necessary for the purpose. Work has already begun at Kolomjagi immediately north of the city. High wages and assured support by the Government make plain the intention of diverting the strike tendencies of the population.

MUTIUS.

[1] See No. 490.
[2] See No. 491.
[3] For reply see No. 755.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Petersburg at 1.10 a.m., on the 1st of August; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.05 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, a.m. Communicated on the 1st of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

King, under instructions of the Chancelor. The telegram of the Chancelor to the Ambassador (draft in Langwerth's handwriting), and sent to the Central Telegraph Office August 1, at 1.55 a.m., reads: "Please transmit to the King at once the following telegram. Confirm receipt by wire." Flotow's telegraphic confirmation was filed in Rome August 1 at 10 p.m., and arrived at the Foreign Office August 2 at 5.25 a.m. (receipt stamp: August 2, a.m.).

No. 532

The Minister at Copenhagen to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 41. COPENHAGEN, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

Mr. von Scavenius sent to me, Chief of Division Kruse of the Foreign Ministry, who informed me in the name of the Minister, with reference to our confidential conversation of today, that the Danish Minister at Berlin was in receipt of instructions to communicate the following to the Imperial Government:

> In view of the increasingly grave conditions, it is considered advisable to call in about 1400 men to the fleet and about 1300 to the seaboard fortifications.

The Minister had him add in explanation: That this measure was not intended as a mobilization measure, was evident; nevertheless, he had wanted to inform me of it immediately; the measure was the result of the desire to quiet the public, who had become excited, and had demanded that measures be taken to secure the maintenance of neutrality. The Government considered this number to be the least possible requirement for the purpose.[3]

RANTZAU.

No. 533

The Consul General at Genoa to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 7. GENOA, *August 1, 1914.*[5]

The English steamers, the White Star liner *Celtic* and the British India Company's *Malda*, lying in the harbor here, have been instructed by their companies to sail as soon as possible and . . . to the west . . .[6]

HERFF.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Copenhagen August 1 at 1.20 a.m., arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.20 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, a.m. Telegram submitted to the Emperor on the 1st of August, returned by him to the Foreign Office on the same day; telegram communicated at once to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] On the margin a note by Jagow concerning a communication from the Danish Minister at Berlin: "Berlin, August 1. Count Moltke made the same communication, and added: 'The present strength is far below peace strength. Without mobilizing, it would take the enlistment of from 10,000 to 15,000 men to reach peace strength. The military authorities wish the enlistment of this number now, but the Government is holding back until German mobilization takes place.'"

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in Genoa at 1.05 a.m. on August 1; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.20 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, a.m. Telegram communicated at 9.05 a.m. on August 1 to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[6] Cipher group incomprehensible.

No. 534

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 161. ROME, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

The local Government has discussed, at the Ministerial Council held today, the question of Italy's attitude in the war. Marquis San Giuliano told me that the Italian Government had considered the question thoroughly, and had again [3] come to the conclusion that Austria's procedure against Serbia must be regarded as an act of aggression, and that consequently a *casus foederis*, according to the terms of the Triple Alliance treaty, did not exist. Therefore Italy would have to declare herself neutral. Upon my violently opposing this point of view, the Minister went on to state that since Italy had not been informed in advance of Austria's procedure against Serbia, she could with less reason be expected to take part in the war, as Italian interests were being directly injured by the Austrian proceeding. All that he could say to me now was that the local Government reserved the right to determine whether it might be possible for Italy to intervene later in behalf of the allies, if, at the time of doing so, Italian interests should be satisfactorily protected. The Minister, who was in a state of great excitement, said in explanation that the entire Ministerial Council, with the exception of himself, had shown a distinct dislike for Austria. It had been all the more difficult for him to contest this feeling, because Austria, as I myself knew, was continuing so persistently with a recognized injury to Italian interests, as to violate Article 7 of the Triple Alliance treaty, and because she was declining to give a guaranty for the independence and integrity of Serbia. He regretted that the Imperial Government had not done more to intervene in this connection to persuade Austria to a timely compliance. I have the impression that it is not yet necessary to give up all hope for the future here, if the Italians should be met half way with regard to the demands mentioned above, or in other words, if compensation should be offered them. Nevertheless, it can not be denied that the attitude England has assumed has decidedly diminished the prospects of an active Italian participation in our favor.

In the meanwhile, I pointed out to the Minister in the plainest manner possible the extremely regrettable impression which such an attitude would make on us, and then called to his attention the consequences which might develop for Italy in the future as a result.

FLOTOW.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Rome July 31 at 11.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.55 a.m., August 1; receipt stamp: August 1, a.m. By marginal instructions Zimmermann ordered that Flotow's telegram be communicated as soon as possible—*citissime*—to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. This occurred August 1 at 10.25 a.m. Flotow's telegram, after minor alterations and with the omission of the passage "Nevertheless, it can not . . . future as a result" communicated to the Ambassador at Vienna as "urgent" by Jagow, on August 1. Jagow, who wrote the draft of the telegram, added: "I consider an immediate decision on the part of Austria to be imperatively necessary." Jagow's telegram to the Central Telegraph Office August 1 at 11 p.m.

[3] See No. 419.

No. 535

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 204. ST. PETERSBURG, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

FOR HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR.

I respectfully report to Your Majesty that I have just been received by His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas at an audience which I requested early this morning. I pointed out to the Czar with the greatest earnestness the impression that would be made upon us by the order, promulgated early today, for the mobilization of the entire Russian army and navy, after we had been given repeated assurances that only the mobilization of the military districts along the Austrian border was contemplated. I expressed the fear that these measures might even have given rise to irreparable consequences already. But above all I expressed my anxiety lest the mobilization against Germany during the progress of a mediation action conducted by Your Majesty and not yet proved unsuccessful, be regarded by Your Majesty as an offense, and, by the German nation, moreover, as a provocation. I begged him, if it were possible in any way, to check or to revoke these measures. His Majesty replied to me that for technical reasons that was no longer possible. The Czar then showed me a telegram [3] sent to Your Majesty this afternoon, and mentioned to me a letter that he had commenced to write to Your Majesty. I replied that I did not know but that the letter and the telegram might come too late, as matters stood. The Czar then sought to prove to me that it was absolutely necessary for the peace of Europe that we should exercise more influence, and, in certain cases, pressure on Austria. I replied that the influence which we were able to exercise on Austria had been shown in repeated instances during the Balkan disturbances of the previous year, and had even been recognized by Russia. So far as concerned exercising pressure, however, that could not be considered under any circumstances, as, in our position in Europe we could not dispense with Austria's friendship. We had always shown ourselves to be ready and willing to exercise a friendly influence and one for mediation, and the Czar must admit that Your Majesty was even now showing no lack of effort in this . . .[4]

Unfortunately I was not able to overcome the impression that, in spite of the earnestness of my arguments, the Czar is not yet conscious of the gravity of the situation. The Czar dismissed me with the utmost graciousness, and thanked me for my frank speech.

After the audience I saw Count Fredericks again, who is entirely aware of the seriousness of the situation. I explained to him thoroughly our point of view, against which he found little to object, and expressed my anxiety over the impression to be expected on Germany of the mobilization order here. Count Fredericks had evidently advised sending the Czar's telegram of today to Your

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Petersburg July 31, at 7.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 1 at 5.45 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, a.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, returned by him on the 1st of August.

[3] See No. 480.

[4] Cipher group incomprehensible. According to the original, found in the archives of the German Embassy at Petersburg, it should read here, "regard."

Majesty. I gathered from some hints dropped by the Minister of the Household that it was the Minister of War and the Minister of the Interior who put through the mobilization order. The former is controlled by the fear of being taken by surprise, and the latter had persuaded the Emperor that internal conditions made a decision compulsory.

Most humbly,

POURTALÈS.

No. 536

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 209. PETERSBURG, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Have just carried out instructions, at midnight.[3] Mr. Sazonoff referred again to the technical impossibility of suspending the war measures, and attempted once more [4] to convince me that we overestimated the significance of a Russian mobilization, which was not comparable with that of our own. He urgently requested me to call Your Excellency's attention to the fact that the assurance of the Czar, on his word of honor, given in today's telegram from His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas [5] to His Majesty the Emperor and King, should satisfy us as to Russia's intentions. I pointed out to him in return that the Czar by no means obligated himself under all circumstances to refrain from warlike action, but only so long as there still remained a prospect of composing the Austro-Russian quarrel on account of Serbia. I put to the Minister the direct question: could he give me a guaranty that Russia intended to keep the peace, even in the event that an agreement with Austria was not reached? The Minister was unable to give me an affirmative answer to this question. In that case, then, I replied, nobody can blame us for our unwillingness to allow Russia a longer start in mobilization.

POURTALÈS.

No. 537

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 203. LONDON, *August 1, 1914.*[7]

Reply to telegram 199.[8]

I have just learned (two o'clock a.m.) from the private secretary of the Premier, to whose attention I had the above telegram brought at once through Sir W. Tyrrell, that King George has forwarded its contents to the Czar [9] together with some accompanying words of his own.

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] From the copy of the telegram in the archives of the Embassy at Petersburg, now restored to the Foreign Office.

[2] Filed in Petersburg August 1 at 1 a.m.; time of arrival not entered; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 1. Decodification submitted to the Emperor.

[3] See No. 490. [4] See No. 343. [5] See No. 487.

[6] From the decodification.

[7] Filed in London at 3.50 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.07 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, a.m.

[8] See No. 513. [9] Cf. No. 574, final sentence.

No. 538

The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 228. ATHENS, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

As the statements of the Bulgarian Minister, reported in telegram 220,[3] were accepted by the Government and press only as the personal declarations of the Minister himself, the latter informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday that he had been instructed by his Government to declare officially: "Que la Bulgarie gardera la neutralité." [4]

No further conversation concerning this declaration took place. Mr. Streit is nevertheless of the opinion that it primarily concerns itself with the Austro-Serbian war.

The Minister further told me confidentially, that he has been informed from various quarters that Bulgaria is organizing bands along the new Serbian and Grecian frontier.

BASSEWITZ.

No. 539

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Russian Minister of the Household, Count Fredericks [5]

SATURDAY, 7.30 A.M.

MY DEAR COUNT:

I take advantage of the friendly permission you were so kind as to grant me, to turn to you in case of need. That which I foresaw has come to pass.

The mobilization of the ENTIRE Russian army has made the most unfortunate impression in Berlin. They can not understand how this order could have been given, while the mediation of my Sovereign was in progress and had not yet met with failure. Do not forget that it is only a few days since we were informed in a formal manner that mobilization would be put through only on the Austrian frontier, and not on that of Germany.[6] Consequently the situation has become EXTREMELY serious, and I am seeking everywhere the means to avert a catastrophe, for a war would be an enormous danger to ALL MONARCHIES. I have received instructions tonight to say at once to Mr. Sazonoff that we are not yet mobilizing, but that if, UP TO NOON TODAY [7] Russia has not declared positively to us that she will suspend her preparations for war against AUSTRIA AND OURSELVES, the order for mobilization will be given today. You know what that means in our country. We can not conceal from ourselves that in such an event we are but a finger's

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Athens July 31 at 9 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 1 at 6.32 a.m.; receipt stamp, August 1, a.m.

[3] See Nos. 336 and 381.

[4] [That Bulgaria will maintain neutrality.]

[5] From a copy [in French] in the archives of the German Embassy at Petersburg. On an attached sheet the note: "A letter from Count Pourtalès addressed to Count Fredericks was delivered July 19; August 1, 1914, at 10.30. Count Fredericks." The letter, after altering the first person into the third, was read by Counselor of Embassy Mutius to the Russian Minister of Agriculture Krivoshein on the 1st of August.

[6] See Nos. 343 and 370.

[7] See No. 490.

breadth from war, a war that neither you nor we desire. I know how difficult it is to stop a machine set in motion. But the Emperor of Russia can do everything in this connection. I ENTREAT you, do what you can to prevent a catastrophe.

Your very sincerely devoted and deeply afflicted,

POURTALÈS.

No. 540

The Minister at Brussels to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

BRUSSELS, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

In view of the political situation, the Government has given orders for calling to the colors the three last annual drafts of reserves. Furthermore, all bodies of troops at the present time absent from their garrisons at training camps are being sent back to their quarters in special trains.

These measures are the result of various conferences held by the King—His Majesty having shortened his visit at Ostend and returned to Laeken—with the Minister of War and the other members of the Cabinet. The official *Journal de Bruxelles* states in connection with the matter that by calling in the three annual classes, the army will be brought up to the reinforced peace footing, and that the measures are being taken solely as a matter of precaution. There is, so far, no talk of mobilization, it continues, these measures being only a means of rendering the latter less difficult, should it later appear necessary.

With a view to quieting public excitement, it adds, that, for the moment, there is no reason for the belief that the horrors of a possible war would be introduced into Belgium. Confidence in the guaranties of the Powers as well as in the strength of the army was too strong for any such belief, and therefore the progress of events could be calmly awaited.

V. BELOW.

No. 540A

Memorandum of the Imperial Chancelor [3]

(BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*)

His Majesty has approved the tenor of the declarations of war.

V. B. H.

[1] From the corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 1, a.m.
[3] From the memorandum in the hand of the Imperial Chancelor. Appended as a note of record on a separate sheet to the ultimatum to France of July 31 (No. 491).

No. 541

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome [1]

Telegram 156.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

According to reports from Vienna, an agreement was finally reached between Count Berchtold and the Duke d'Avarna in the presence of Mr. von Tschirschky, with reference to Article 7. Please communicate this fact at once to the Marquis di San Giuliano, since I understand that the attitude of the Government there will be changed by it.

JAGOW.

No. 542

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Petersburg [3]

Telegram 159.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[4]

In case the Russian Government should make no satisfactory reply to our demand, Your Excellency will present it [5] with the following declaration at 5 o'clock this afternoon, according to Central European time:

> Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise, de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir qui Lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, d'accord avec l'Angleterre, S'était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de S. Pétersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer.
>
> A la suite de cette msure menaçante, motivée par aucun préparatif [6] militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eut manqué de parer à ce péril, il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent, le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de S. M. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires.

[1] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting at the end of the memorandum No. 556, which according to this, must have been prepared earlier.

[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 12.10 p.m.

[3] From the original. The German portion of the draft written by Rosenberg on July 31, to which the Chancelor made additions, and Jagow added the final paragraph.

[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 12.52 August 1. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 36, No. 25.

[5] Between "it" and "the following" there originally stood the following words: "immediately upon the expiraton of the respite, at the latest, however, this afternoon at five o'clock." Of this the words: "immediately . . . however" were crossed out; the words "at the latest . . . o'clock" were at first enclosed in brackets, which were later removed. The words "according to Central European time" were added by the Chancelor. For the explanation of the originally intended omission of the calculation of the respite, cf. the marginal annotation on the draft of an unsent declaration of war on France. (See No. 608.)

[6] In place of "*préparatif*" the decodification at the Petersburg embassy developed "*presage*" (archives of the German Embassy at Petersburg). Thus, also, in the Russian Orange Book, No. 76.

La Russie $\frac{\text{ayant refusé de faire droit}}{\text{n'ayant pas crû devoir répondre}}$ [1] à cette démande et ayant manifesté par $\frac{\text{ce refus}}{\text{cette attitude}}$ [1] que son action était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce qui suit:

S. M. l'Empereur, mon Auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire, relève le défi et Se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie.

Please wire receipt and time of carrying out these instructions, according to Russian time. Urgent.[2]

Please demand your passports and turn over protection and affairs to the American Embassy.

JAGOW.

First draft of No. 542 [3]

Pendant que l'Allemagne, appliquée dès les débuts de la crise à trouver une solution pacifique, continuait encore, en exécution des ordres de Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi, mon Auguste Souverain, son rôle de médiateur entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, cette dernière a procédé à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et mer. La sécurité de l'Empire Allemand se trouvant menacée par cette mesure qui n'avait été précedée, en Allemagne, d'aucune mesure analogue, le Gouvernement Allemand en a informé le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies en demandant la cessation de ces entreprises de caractère belliqueux.

La Russie $\frac{\text{ayant décliné}}{\text{n'ayant pas crû devoir répondre à}}$ cette démande et documenté par cette attitude que ses procédés se dirigaient contre l'Allemagne, S. M. l'Empereur, mon Auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire, déclare accepter la guerre qui Lui est octroyée.

Second draft of No. 542 [4]

Le Gouvernement Impérial . . . (as in the final form) . . . forces de terre et mer. La sécurité de l'Empire Allemand se trouvant menacée par cette mesure, motivée par aucun préparatif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, le Gouvernement Allemand s'adressa au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie . . . (to the end like the final form).

Translation of the final form

The Imperial Government has been striving, since the commencement of the crisis, to bring about a peaceful solution. Complying with a desire expressed to

[1] At these points the text in its double form was not only telegraphed to Petersburg, as is evident from the decodification in the archives of the German Embassy, but was also presented to the Russian Government; cf. Russian Orange Book, No. 76, note. The gaps in the printed form, due to a technical oversight, are not present in the original.

[2] See No. 588.

[3] Written in the hand of Count Mirbach on the 31st of July.

[4] Evolved from the first draft, which Stumm had provided with additions and alterations in pencil. The second draft in typewritten form lay before Jagow at the time. The Secretary of State provided the latter with additions and alterations, thus putting it into the final form.

him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the German Emperor has been applying himself, in accord with England, to playing the rôle of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia, without awaiting the result, proceeded to the mobilization of her entire land and sea forces.

As a consequence of this threatening measure, occasioned by no military preparation on the part of Germany, the German Empire found itself face to face with a grave and imminent danger. Had the Imperial Government failed to prepare itself to meet this peril, it would have endangered the security and the very existence of Germany. The German Government, therefore, felt itself compelled to address the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias insisting upon the suspension of the said military activities.

Russia ——— having refused to accede to this demand, / having believed it unnecessary to respond to this demand, ——— and having made it manifest by this refusal / attitude that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honor, on behalf of my Government, to inform Your Excellency as follows:

His Majesty the Emperor, my August Sovereign, accepts the challenge in the name of the Empire, and considers himself as being in a state of war with Russia.

Translation of first draft of No. 542

While Germany, striving since the commencement of the crisis, to find a peaceful solution, was still continuing, in execution of the orders of His Majesty the Emperor and King, my August Sovereign, its rôle of mediator between Austria-Hungary and Russia, the latter proceeded to the mobilization of her land and sea forces. The security of the German Empire being menaced by this measure which had not been preceded in Germany by a similar measure, the German Government informed the government of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias to this effect, demanding the cessation of these warlike measures. Russia ——— having declined / having believed it unnecessary to respond to ——— this demand and supported by this attitude that its proceedings were being directed against Germany, His Majesty the Emperor, my August Sovereign, in the name of the Empire, declares that he accepts the war which is forced upon him.

Translation of second draft of No. 542

The Imperial Government . . . (as in the final form) . . . entire land and sea forces. The security of the German Empire being menaced by this measure, occasioned by no military preparation on the part of Germany, the German Government addressed itself to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, insisting upon the cessation of the said military activities. Russia . . . (to the end like the final form).

No. 543

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris [1]

Urgent.
Telegram 184. BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Your Excellency is empowered in case of necessity to grant the French Government a respite of two hours—up until three o'clock, French time—for the purpose of replying to the eventual proposal.[3]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 544

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [4]

Telegram 215. BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[5]

Of greatest importance in case of war that Roumania should be able to put whole army into field against Russia. But complete freedom of action can only be possible if security of Bulgarian frontier is not required. Thus it is imperatively necessary that Bulgaria give Austria-Hungary and Roumania a binding declaration that in case of war she will act according to our wishes. Please request Count Berchtold to hasten the inauguration of a move in this direction at Sofia.

JAGOW.

No. 545

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Tokyo [6]

Telegram 24. BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[7]

Russia has ordered the complete mobilization of her army and navy. Austria-Hungary is taking corresponding measures, and we are upon the verge of doing the same. War with Russia will thereupon be practically inevitable. We are convinced that the Japanese Government will be able to draw the appropriate conclusions for Japan from a correct estimate of the great importance of the event. Please express yourself accordingly there with regard to Japanese neutrality, and telegraph your impressions concerning Japan's intentions.[8]

JAGOW.

[1] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.05 p.m.
[3] See Nos. 491, 528 and 571.
[4] From the original. Draft, July 31, in Bergen's handwriting with alterations in the handwriting of Zimmermann.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.10 p.m., August 1.
[6] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[7] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.30 p.m.
[8] See No. 785.

No. 546

The Czar to the Emperor [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). PETERHOF, PALACE, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR, Berlin.

I received your telegram.[3] Understand you are obliged to mobilize but wish to have the same guaranty from you as I gave you, that these measures DO NOT mean war and that we shall continue negotiating for the benefit of our countries and universal peace dear to all our hearts. Our long proved friendship *must* succeed, with God's help, in avoiding bloodshed. Anxiously, full of confidence await your answer.[4]

NICKY.

No. 547

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Constantinople [5]

Telegram 296. BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[6]

In case General Liman is convinced that Turkey will even now, in the event of war with Russia, take a stand for us actively and effectively, Your Excellency is authorized to close an alliance dating to 1918 with a clause providing for the possibility of extension.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 548

The Minister at Sofia to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 41. SOFIA, *July 31, 1914.*[8]

Radoslavoff and Tontschew have jointly assured me that there exist no inimical intentions toward Roumania, and that no military measures will be taken on the Roumanian border. They had this announced at Bucharest yesterday. Should it not prove possible to localize the Austro-Serbian conflict, Bulgaria will observe a friendly attitude toward Roumania, and will renounce all intentions relative to the eventual regaining of the Dobrudja provided that Roumania will place no obstacles in the way of Bulgarian aspirations in Macedonia.

[1] From the copy [in English] of the Palace telegraph office. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 10.

[2] Filed in Peterhof, Palace, 2.06 p.m.; arrived at the Palace telegraph office in Berlin at 2.05 p.m.; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 1.

[3] See No. 480. [4] See No. 600.

[5] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.

[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 2.30 p.m. See No. 517.

[7] From the decodification.

[8] Filed in Sofia July 31 at 7.10 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.14 p.m. on August 1; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Communicated August 1 to the General Staff, Ministry of War, Admiralty Staff and Imperial Naval Office; sent by messengers at 9.40 p.m. Paragraph "Radoslavoff . . . in Macedonia" telegraphed on August 1 to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest "for his information and any use that may appear appropriate"; to the Central Telegraph Office at 9.20 p.m.

Bulgarian Minister at Bucharest reports that Russian Emperor has made telegraphic request for King Carol's support toward the maintenance of peace.

MICHAHELLES.

No. 549

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia [1]

Telegram 43. BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

We are advocating at Vienna an immediate understanding with Bulgaria concerning her attitude in the threatening European war. Please support emphatically any step of your Austrian colleague to this end. Wire report.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 550

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 166. ROME, *August 1, 1914.*[5]

According to information it is true that a Roumanian inquiry about military measures has been received here. But they have so far avoided making any answer to it here.

San Giuliano takes the stand that direct assistance in the Austrian procedure against Serbia is as impossible for Roumania as for Italy.

FLOTOW.

No. 551

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 210. PETERSBURG, *August 1, 1914.*[7]

Military attaché reports, also for the General Staff, Grand Duchy of Finland is placed under martial law. Maintenance of peace and order turned over to the commander in chief of the military district of Petersburg. Rumor in various quarters, uncorroborated, that a portion of the Guard is to be transported to Finland.[8]

POURTALÈS.

[1] From the original. Draft in Rosenberg's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.20 p.m.
[3] See No. 673.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Rome at 12.55 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.25 p.m.; receipt stamp of the office: August 1, p.m. Copy of "According to information . . . to it here" was communicated to the General Staff on the 2d of August, after minor alterations had been effected. See No. 519.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed in Petersburg at 11.35 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Communicated on August 1 to the General Staff, Ministry of War, Admiralty Staff and Imperial Naval Office; dispatched by messengers at 4.30 p.m.
[8] See to the contrary No. 521.

No. 552

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Stockholm [1]

Telegram 25.
For confidential use. BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

According to reports from St. Petersburg,[3] Russia intends in the event of war against Austria and ourselves to leave Finland to herself, probably with the 22d Army Corps under Commander in Chief Ivanoff.

JAGOW.

No. 553

From the protocol [4] *of the twenty-seventh session of the Federal Council* (SECTION 664)

PRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION

The Chairman [5] announced:

Contrary to our desire and despite all our efforts, unless God performs a miracle at the eleventh hour, a crisis greater than ever was seen before, is breaking upon the peace of Europe and Germany.

The cause is well known to the high and federated Governments. On the twenty-eighth of June of this year the heir to the Austrian throne and his wife were murdered. The investigation developed that the Greater-Serbia movement, of many years' standing, the object of which is the undermining of the existence of Austria-Hungary, had found its expression in the crime of Serajevo. It was not only the right but the duty of Austria-Hungary to take steps against this movement. The Emperor Franz Joseph has informed us of the steps to be taken. It is to our own interest that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy be kept powerful, that it shall not succumb in the struggle with the southern Slavs, over whom Russia believes herself able or compelled to act as protector. Should the Austrian nation be destroyed, a blow would at the same time be struck at the roots of the German Empire. It is from this view-point that the policy which we have pursued for thirty years has taken its guidance. For that reason, when Austria-Hungary informed us that she was forced to take steps, we replied: "Concerning what you must do, we venture to express no judgment; it is not our affair. But it goes without saying that should an emergency of the alliance arise, we shall stand faithfully at your side."

Austria's ultimatum to Serbia and Serbia's reply are well known. In her reply, Serbia complied in certain respects with the Austrian demands, but made many of her agreements strongly conditional, and refused some important demands. The historical experiences that Austria has had with Serbia have shown that Serbia's bare promises are of no value, and that, on the other hand, actual guaranties must be given.

The conflict which thereupon broke out between Austria and Serbia we wished to localize. We supported this intention from the beginning, before all cabinets. We were in agreement with all of them, with the exception of Russia's, which declared from the beginning that it regarded it as impossible that Austria and Serbia should fight their fight out alone. Thus the state of affairs became more acute, although England was willing to mediate, in

[1] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.40 p.m.
[3] See No. 521.
[4] Done at Berlin, August 1, 1914.
[5] i. e., the Imperial Chancelor.

order that an Austro-Russian conflict should not develop from the Austro-Serbian quarrel.

During this period Russia entered upon secret military preparations which at first were directed against Austria-Hungary. During these preparations Russia approached us and asked that we should undertake mediation at Vienna. This occurred by means of a telegram from the Czar to the Emperor. I will only touch briefly on the successive phases of the development of this action, as I have already gone into the preliminary history of the present crisis in a communication in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. In this telegram the Czar begged the Emperor in urgent phrases, appealing to our traditional friendship, to use his influence to persuade Austria-Hungary not to go too far with her demands. Thereupon His Majesty, although we ever took the view that the conflict between Austria and Serbia concerned in every way only those two nations, at once declared his willingness to undertake the rôle of mediator, in order to preserve the peace of Europe, and informed the Czar of this fact on the very same day. During this time the Russian Government was assuring us, with the most solemn professions, that no military measures of any sort were being undertaken against us. Thereupon we inaugurated the mediation action at Vienna; it was based upon the following facts and assumptions:

Austria-Hungary had repeatedly declared at Petersburg that she intended to make no territorial acquisitions in Serbia, that her object was far more to secure peace for herself from the Greater-Serbian agitations. From this we evolved the consequent proposition that Austria be advised that she should, if this was her point of view, state it, once more, solemnly at Petersburg, and, in accordance with it, define the purpose of her military procedure as that of wishing to secure, by the occupation of portions of Serbian territory, a guaranty for the fulfilment of her demands.

The mediation proposals of England, which we transmitted to the Austrian Government with the request to give them earnest consideration, were much along the same lines.

During these transactions, we were taken by surprise on the thirtieth of July by the mobilization of the Russian corps against Austria-Hungary. The Emperor at once pointed out in a telegram to the Czar the fact that the mediation action was made difficult, if not impossible, by these measures; for it was perfectly plain that if Russia mobilized against Austria-Hungary, it would become extremely difficult for Germany to give advice as a mediator to the Austro-Hungarian Government. In spite of this, we continued with our mediation action.

Yesterday it was to be decided whether or not Vienna should approach Russia along the lines of our or of the English proposal. In any event, Austria-Hungary had taken up again, at our instigation, the direct transactions with Russia, which had been broken off. Thus an understanding was being considered at Vienna yesterday, and, in connection with the matter, we had gone to the utmost limit of the proposals which may be made to a Great Power, and an allied Great Power at that. We did this in the pursuit of the peace policy which we have followed for forty-three years. And at this moment Russia mobilized her entire military forces on land and sea. Only two days before, the solemn assurance had been given us that absolutely no measures were being taken against us. Actually, however, reports concerning such measures had been continually arriving. A general mobilization we can only accept as a hostile act directed against us. It places us in a position from which we can escape only by action, unless we are willing to sacrifice our honor and our security. It is nothing less than a challenge, when mobilization is directed against us while we are engaged in mediation. Russia is attempting to so represent matters that no hostile action against us will be per-

ceived in this mobilization. Should we commit ourselves to this view, we should be transgressing against the safety of our fatherland. Germany has been watching with an astonishing, not to say an almost inexcusable, calmness the preparations for war in Russia and France, which, if they did not actually constitute mobilization themselves, were nevertheless calculated to expedite it tremendously. By so doing we have become subject to the danger of losing the advantage of the start which lies in the possibility of the more rapid mobilization of our troops; we risked the danger of finding both on our eastern and western borders, within a short period of time, an army equipped for war and ready to strike; we no longer dared to remain inactive, unless Prussian territory in the east was to be occupied, and at the same time, the crown lands in the west, imperiled.

Thus we have been obliged to direct an ultimatum against the mobilization in Russia, requiring the mobilization to be suspended within twelve hours; otherwise we should have to take corresponding steps ourselves: and we added that there existed no doubt with us as to what mobilization meant. In this situation it was not to be avoided, that His Majesty should, yesterday, declare a state of threatening danger of war. Simultaneously we inquired of France, while laying before her our point of view, what the attitude of France would be in the case of a Russo-German war. We attached to the ultimatum to Russia a very brief respite because our own safety did not permit of allowing a further postponement of military preparations. The reply was due today at twelve o'clock noon. I do not yet know what it is. In view of the congestion of the telegraph system, I shall probably have to wait several hours to find out. But I am afraid that Russia will not comply with our demands.

The French reply is due at one o'clock in the afternoon. We do not know the exact terms of the alliance agreement between France and Russia. But from all that is known to us of this treaty, we are compelled to fear that France will not be able to avoid active participation on the side of Russia.

If the Russian reply should prove unsatisfactory and France does not make a plain and unconditional declaration of neutrality—under the circumstances we must absolutely insist on a thoroughly reliable declaration of neutrality by France—the Emperor will declare to the Russian Government that he is forced to consider himself to be in a state of war with Russia, provoked by Russia herself; and to France he will state that we are at war with Russia, and, as France will not guarantee her neutrality, he must assume that we are at war with France also.

I am still forced to make these statements as conditional, as I do not know what the replies will be. I wanted to make these explanations to the Federal Council now, however, in order to lose no more time.

I hope that the Federal Council has gained from my exposition the conviction that Germany has been working up to the last moment for the maintenance of peace, along the lines of her ever-pursued peace policy. But the provocation we have received from Russia is impossible for us to bear, if we are not to abdicate as one of the Great Powers of Europe. In doing as we do, we shall have, on our part also, to take the consequences of the alliance existing between Russia and France. It is with a good and a clear conscience that I can ask the consent of the high and federated Governments to the measures which I have just laid before you. We did not wish the war; it was forced upon us. The war will demand from the German people the most extreme sacrifice that has ever been demanded from them. We rely, however, on the help of God, as we did not bring about the war, but wished to prevent it, and will go bravely and determinedly into the struggle, which we must wage for the honor, the freedom and the power of the German Empire.

After the Chancelor had requested and had received unanimously the consent of the federated governments to the proposal that, in case satisfactory declarations were not received from Russia and from France, His Majesty the Emperor should announce to both Powers that they had brought about a state of war with the German Empire, he added:

> Thus my explanations have met with the general approval of the high and federated Governments. If the iron dice are now to be rolled, may God help us.

No. 554

The Minister of War to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Mobilization ordered. First day of mobilization August 2, 1914.[3]

V. FALKENHAYN.

No. 555

Draft of an unsent Telegram from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [4]

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[5]

According to reports from Constantinople, Austria does not yet appear to have come to a final agreement with Sofia. Austrian hesitation might drive Bulgaria into the camp of our opponents and call others among the Balkan states, notably Turkey, into the arena against us. Your Excellency will urgently request Count Berchtold to come to an understanding with Bulgaria. Wire report.

JAGOW.

No. 556

Memorandum of Reporting Councilor von Bergen of the Foreign Office [6]

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[7]

Vienna has telephoned to the Austrian Embassy here that the Austro-Hungarian Government had expressly requested Avarna to report in its name to Rome that Austria would grant the concessions agreed upon to Italy if the latter fulfils her treaty of alliance obligations.[8]

[1] From the corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 1, p.m.
[3] The same communication was made by the Minister of War to the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Imperial Chancelor). According to the German White Book of May, 1915, p. 10, mobilization order was decreed at 5 p.m.
[4] Draft in Rosenberg's handwriting.
[5] Not sent; according to a marginal annotation by Zimmermann: "Otherwise attended to."
[6] Memorandum for the Secretary of State in Bergen's handwriting.
[7] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 1, p.m.
[8] See No. 541, which was written as a result of the above memorandum.

No. 557

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office [1]

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*

NOTIFICATION

According to a report of the Imperial and Royal Military Attaché at Rome, dated on the twenty-ninth ultimo, the tide of public sentiment in Italy turned in our favor about two days ago, and they are earnestly desirous of going hand in hand with us.

The General Staff is engaged in putting through the mobilization of a certain army group. In accomplishing this, they find no small difficulties to be overcome, as, the Imperial and Royal Military Attaché reports, a large part of the annual class of 1891, with the colors, was used to reinforce, or to put upon a war footing, those bodies of troops which are stationed in politically uncertain territories.

Furthermore, there are even today infantry regiments and Alpine battalions of the 5th Corps of Verona—which belongs to the army group referred to—in the department of the 7th Corps, while their mobilization equipment is in the department of the 5th Corps.

Those battalions belonging to the army group referred to which are still in Libya must be replaced by others.

No. 558

The Prussian Minister at Stuttgart to the Minister for Foreign Affairs (the Imperial Chancelor) [2]

Confidential. STUTTGART, *July 31, 1914.*[3]

The Premier has just informed me of a private conversation on the political crisis which he had yesterday with my local Russian colleague; the latter had just come direct from Paris, where, according to his statement, he had also seen Iswolski. He said that Mr. Lermontoff made use of unbelievably stale arguments, none of which he left unanswered; as a noteworthy instance, perhaps, Mr. von Weizsäcker told me that the Russian had claimed that the Cabinets at Paris and Petersburg were very far from being inclined to war, but that the London Cabinet was, since it was figuring that the German power, now as ever highly embarrassing to the English and regarded by them as a menace, would in any case, as the result of a world conflagration, be materially weakened. The Minister told me, however, that he did not get the impression that Lermontoff's tirades had any basis in fact, but rather that the poison doctors on the Seine and the Neva had once again concoted something new with which to try to bluff us. Mr. von Weizsäcker suggested to me that I report to Your Excellency this impression of his.

In addition to this, my Russian colleague was given some hard truths to swallow on this occasion; for instance, when he began the statement that the Russians

[1] From the unsigned corrected copy; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 1, p.m.
[2] From the corrected copy.
[3] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 1, p.m.

could not desert the Serbs, and quoted an expression of the Czar's about the "*corréligionnaires*, whom one had to protect," the Minister answered him *bluntly* that, in his opinion, "everyone who had one spark of monarchical feeling left in him, would have to break with the Belgrade regicides," and furthermore that "the dragon seed, sowed there for years by Russian and French agitators, was at last beginning to sprout at Belgrade."

The question as to the real reason why Mr. Lermontoff had conducted the discussion on such delicate themes, the Minister answered by saying: "perhaps it was that he only wanted to pour out his heart to me, and perhaps he also had the intention of doing a little agitating himself, especially since he came from Iswolski."

BELOW.

No. 559

The Minister at Brussels to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

BRUSSELS, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

Yesterday evening there took place here a meeting of the International Socialistic Union, at which protests against the war were raised. Perhaps 10,000 people took part in the meeting. There were short speeches against the war, the reproduction of which would be superfluous, by such various Socialist leaders, domestic and foreign, as: Vandervelde (Belgium), Haase (Germany), Keir Hardie (England), Morgari (Italy), Rubanovitch (Russia), Troelstra (Holland), and Jaurès (France). Following the meeting, the crowds moved in long columns through some of the principal streets of Brussels, chanting the Internationale and frequently shouting "à bas la guerre!" finally separating peacefully at about half past eleven at night. Nothing is known of any unpleasant incidents of any kind on this occasion.

VON BELOW.

No. 560

The Danish Legation to the Foreign Office [3]

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[4]

MEMORANDUM

The Imperial Government will have gathered from the reports of the Royal Legation as well as from the statements of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau that it should appear perfectly explicable to the Imperial Government that the calling of troops to the colors in Denmark should follow as a consequence of mobilization in Germany. The Danish Government is not contemplating a general mobilization, under present circumstances, as they are now developing; but it is

[1] From the corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 1, p.m.
[3] From the unsigned corrected copy.
[4] In the corrected copy, the date is placed at the end; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 1, p.m. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

compelled to take into consideration the execution of those provisions of the army law which regulate the enlistment to so-called security strength. These forces will, as a matter of fact, only bring the Danish army up to a strength corresponding to the peace strength of other Powers. It would be a matter of calling to the colors from 10,000 to 15,000 men. The military authorities wish to have this summons go out now. The Royal Government, however, wishes to take it into consideration only when mobilization has been ordered in Germany.

The Royal Legation is instructed to bring the facts referred to above to the knowledge of the Imperial Foreign Office, in connection with the communication made through the courteous instrumentality of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau concerning calling to the colors yesterday 1,400 men for the royal navy, and 1,300 men for the sea-coast fortifications. It has, furthermore, the honor of adding that these communications are made with full confidence in the friendly sentiments which His Excellency the Secretary of State has expressed toward Denmark.

No. 561

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 149. VIENNA, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Local Government will have similar declaration made to King and Bratianu.[3]

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 562

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 205. LONDON, *August 1, 1914.*[5]

Sir E. Grey has just had me informed through Sir W. Tyrrell that he hopes, as the result of a Ministerial Council now in session, to be able to give me this afternoon some facts which may prove useful for the avoidance of the great catastrophe. Judging from Sir William's hints, this would appear to mean that in case we did not attack France, England would remain neutral and would guarantee France's neutrality. I shall learn more this afternoon.[6]

Sir E. Grey has just called me on the telephone and asked me if I thought I could assure him that in case France should remain neutral in a Russo-German war, we would not attack the French. I assured him that I could take the responsibility for such a guaranty, and he is to use this assurance at today's Cabinet session.

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Vienna at 1.05 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m.

[3] See Nos. 506, 507 and 582.

[4] From the decodification. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 46.

[5] Filed in London at 11.14 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.23 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Communicated on the 1st of August by Zimmermann's order to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office; sent by messengers at 8.10 p.m.; decodification submitted to the Emperor.

[6] See Nos. 570, 575, 596, 603, 630 and 631.

P. S. Sir W. Tyrrell urgently begged me to use my influence to insure that our troops did not cross the French border. Everything would depend upon that. The French troops had retired after one border crossing that had occurred.

No. 563

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest [1]

Telegram 63.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

For use. In view of repeated solemn declarations by the Bulgarian Government, a friendly attitude of Bulgaria toward Roumania seems assured.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 564

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 211.

PETERSBURG, *August 1, 1914.*[5]

Military attaché reports also to the General Staff:

It is reported from Moscow that eight trains with cavalry were dispatched on the twenty-ninth of July from Tver to Moscow, thence further, it is alleged. On July 31 the 1st Regiment of Don Cossacks and the 1st Hussars left, latter ostensibly for Suwalki.

Four regiments of Cossacks are said to be coming to Moscow. On the thirtieth of July the 2d, 6th and 11th Grenadier Regiments are said to have been sent away without reservists in the direction of Kiev, followed on the thirty-first of July by the 1st Grenadier Regiment with many reservists. Apparently the reservist classes have been called in, and moreover, it is certain that there were called in on the thirty-first of July, at noon, by public wall-posters, the Reichswehr men who have had six weeks service. Of the latter, four or five annual classes, it is alleged.

The opinion is general at Moscow that the troops there are to be used against the Austrians. Lack of boots for the infantry is said to be noticeable. Kiev reports the removal of the 129th Infantry Regiment on the thirtieth of July.

Great difficulty at Moscow over tightness of money.

Moscow reports, from a source alleged to be absolutely responsible, that on the twenty-ninth of July sixty persons started from Petersburg and Moscow for Germany with large sums of money, with the purpose of creating disturbances there. A former editor named Wolchow is said to be one of the leaders.

POURTALÈS.

[1] From the original. Draft in Rosenberg's handwriting. See also No. 506.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 4.40 p.m.
[3] On the margin in Rosenberg's handwriting the note: "Based on information from the Counselor of the Austrian Embassy to Mr. von Bergen. Count Berchtold requests us to make a pacifying declaration at Bucharest."
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Petersburg at 2 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.21 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

No. 565

The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 19. BRUSSELS, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

General mobilization of the Belgian army ordered for today.

BELOW.

No. 566

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 167. ROME, *August 1, 1914.*[4]

When I again called the attention of the Marquis di San Giuliano, today, to the baneful effect upon our country of the Italian proclamation of neutrality, the Minister told me that material considerations relating to the Monarchy had helped to influence Premier Salandra in making this decision. Participation in a war conducted in the Balkans contrary to Italian interests might, under the circumstances, wipe out the Monarchy here. With regard to the compensation question, I found the Minister more pessimistic than ever; he thought it would be difficult to decide on compensation. Valona, he did not want under any conditions; all that Italy desired was not to have Valona fall into other hands.

English considerations had decidedly influenced the Italian attitude. Minister said today, however, that he did not yet consider English participation in the war as definitely determined on, but he believed that it was true that in any case Italian neutrality was regarded in England as a fact favorable to English neutrality.

FLOTOW.

No. 567

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 151. VIENNA, *August 1, 1914.*[6]

They have made here the following promises to Montenegro, in case she should remain neutral: Maintenance of her independence, inviolability of her territory, financial support, territorial extension into the Sanjac, and, as far as might be permitted by agreement with Italy, also into Albania.

An attack on Lowtschen is not being considered here.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Brussels at 12.26 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.21 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Communicated on the 1st of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Telegram submitted to the Emperor on the 1st of August.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in Rome at 1.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.21 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m.

[5] From the decodification.

[6] Filed in Vienna at 2.05 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.28 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Communicated by telegraph to the German Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje by Zimmermann on August 2, with the omission of the final sentence; to the Central Telegraph Office August 2 at 11.10 a.m. See No. 476, note 9.

No. 568

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 168.
Urgent.

ROME, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Official communication in the *Tribuna* states: The Italian Government believes that neither by the letter nor the spirit of the Triple Alliance treaty is it obliged to take part in a war that does not bear the character of a war of defense; reserves the right, however, to determine subsequently in what way it can assume an attitude favoring the allies while preserving its own interests.

FLOTOW.

No. 569

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 150.

VIENNA, *August 1, 1914.*[4]

Local Government suggests informing them at Bucharest that Turkey and Bulgaria want to connect themselves with the Triple Alliance, latter on condition of respecting present territorial status of Roumania. Roumania would thus be assured of protection in the rear in the event of active procedure against Russia.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Rome August 1 at 1.14 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office; sent by messengers August 2, at 12.15 a.m. Wolff's Telegraph Bureau submitted the text of the communication in the *Tribuna* to the Foreign Office on the 3d of August, with the inquiry whether there were any objections to its publication. Jagow stated, in a marginal annotation on the query, that it depended on "how far public opinion had already been prepared for it."

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in Vienna at 2.05 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.45 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Telegram communicated by Jagow on the 1st of August, after minor alterations, to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest; to the Central Telegraph Office at 8.45 p.m. The Ambassador at Vienna was notified by telegraph on the 1st of August of its communication to the Chargé d' Affaires at Bucharest; telegram to the Central Telegraph Office at 9.45 p.m.

No. 570

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 209. LONDON, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Inform Rome at once of this, as well as of the afternoon telegrams. As Italy will go timidly with the Triple Alliance so long as there is any fear of England's opposing her. W.

In addition to Telegram 205.[3] Sir William Tyrrell has just called on me to tell me that Sir E. Grey wanted to make proposals to me this afternoon regarding England's neutrality,[3] *even in the event that we should have war with France as well as Russia.* I am to see Sir E. Grey at three-thirty and will report at once.[4]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 571

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 239.
Urgent. PARIS, *August 1, 1914.*[6]

In connection with telegram 237.[7]

To the definite and repeated question, whether France would remain neutral in case of a Russo-German war, the Premier stated to me, *hesitatingly* that France would act in accordance with her interests.[8] He based the uncertainty of this statement on the fact that he regarded the situation as changed since yesterday. It is officially reported here that *Sir E. Grey's proposal of a general suspension of military preparations* has been accepted in principle [9] by Russia, and that Austria-Hungary has declared that she will not infringe on Serbia's territory or sovereignty.

Do not know of any. I received none. What does that mean? [10]

SCHOEN.

[1] From the decodification. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 48.

[2] Filed in London at 2.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.04 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, who noted on it: "8.30 p.m." The words emphasized in italic type were underlined by the Emperor. Zimmermann noted on the 2d of August concerning the Imperial marginal instructions: "Instructions of the Emperor rendered futile by further reports from the Ambassador." Telegram was communicated at 8 p.m. to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] See No. 502.

[4] See Nos. 575, 578, 579, 596, 603, 630 and 631.

[5] From the decodification. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 37, No. 26.

[6] Filed in Paris at 1.05 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor; his note: "8.30 p.m."; returned by him on the 1st of August.

[7] No. 528. See also Nos. 491, 543 and 598.

[8] Exclamation point by the Emperor in the margin.

[9] The solution of the cipher group as "in principle" is doubtful.

[10] Interlinear annotation, placed over the word "principle"; following "principle" a question mark by the Emperor.

No. 572

Reporting Councilor Dr. Hammann, of the Foreign Office, to the Director General of the Hapag [1]

Telegram (unnumbered).
Urgent.

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Hear with astonishment that in France, and even elsewhere in the world, it is believed that Germany wants to carry on a preventive war and has for that reason brought about the present situation. They are saying that the Emperor considers the right moment to be at hand for dealing with his enemies. What kind of distraction is this! Whoever knows him as well as I do, whoever knows how seriously he takes the responsibility of the crown, how deeply his moral views are rooted in a true religious belief, that man must wonder that anything of this sort could be attributed to him. He did not want the war; it was forced upon him by the force of circumstances. He has worked tirelessly for the maintenance of peace, and together with England has summoned all his influence in an effort to discover a peaceful solution, in order to spare his people the horrors of war. But everything was ruined by Russia, which, in the midst of negotiations that offered a prospect of success, mobilized her armed forces and thereby gave documentary evidence that she was not in earnest with her protestations of peaceful intentions. Now Germany's borders are threatened by Russia, who is drawing her ally with her into the war; now Germany's honor is at stake—could the most peace-loving Monarch do anything but draw the sword to defend the most sacred possessions of the nation? And, finally, the German people! In them is firmly rooted the saying of Prince Bismarck against preventive wars: "One should not look into the cards of Providence."

It must be said once more: Russia alone is forcing war on Europe, a war that none but she desired; the whole weight of the responsibility rests on Russia.

Please wire at once place of publication as well as any possible alterations.[3]

HAMMANN.

No. 573

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 152.

VIENNA, *August 1, 1914.*[5]

After the Duke d'Avarna had for the first time discussed the compensation question directly with Count Berchtold yesterday morning, and a comparative agreement had been reached, I drafted, with the Duke d'Avarna last evening, the following declaration, which Count Berchtold was to give to the Ambassador this morning:

[1] From the original. Draft in Radowitz's handwriting with an addition in the writing of Hammann.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.15 p.m.
[3] Sentence "Please . . . alterations" added by Hammann.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Vienna at 6.05 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.34 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Overtook the previous telegram 147 (No. 577).

Si cependant, par la force des choses, l'Autriche-Hongrie serait [1] obligée à faire des acquisitions territoriales dans la péninsule Balcanique, notamment en Serbie et au Monténégro, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est prêt à se concerter avec l'Italie au sujet des compensations à lui accorder, soit que l'Italie prête son concours à l'Autriche dans le cas que se présente le casus foederis visé par le traité, soit qu'elle prête son concours sans que le casus foederis se présente. Cette déclaration contient les éléments qui constituent la substance même de l'interprétation que l'Italie donne à l'article 7 et que je consens à faire à l'Italie bien que je ne partage pas cette interprétation même.

After I had secured, early this morning, upon my request, a WRITTEN admission from the Duke d'Avarna that the above declaration was satisfactory to him, I submitted the declaration before noon today to Count Berchtold, who likewise accepted it. Thus a complete understanding has been reached here within twenty-four hours.[2]

TSCHIRSCHKY.

Translation of the French Portion

If, nevertheless, Austria-Hungary should be compelled by the force of circumstances to make territorial acquisitions in the Balkan Peninsula, especially in Serbia and Montenegro, the Imperial and Royal Government stands ready to come to an agreement with Italy upon the compensation to be awarded the latter, whether Italy lends her assistance to Austria in case of the occurrence of the *casus foederis* as provided by the treaty, or whether she grants her assistance without the occurrence of the *casus foederis*. This declaration contains the very substance of the interpretation which Italy gives to Article 7 and which I am prepared to concede to Italy, even though I myself do not agree with that interpretation.

No. 574

The King of England to the Emperor [3]

Telegram (unnumbered). LONDON, *August 1, 1914.*[4]

THE EMPEROR, BERLIN.

Many thanks for your telegram.[5] Last night I sent an urgent telegram to Nicky [6] expressing my readiness to do everything in my power to assist in reopening conversations between Powers concerned.

GEORGIE.

[1] Thus in the decodification.
[2] See No. 594.
[3] From the copy taken down [in English] at the Palace telegraph office. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 45.
[4] Filed in London at 5.25 p.m.; arrived at the Berlin Palace telegraph office at 7 p.m. Reached the Chancelor from the Emperor on the 1st of August. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 2, p.m. Crossed with No. 575.
[5] See No. 477.
[6] Cf. No. 537.

No. 575

The Emperor to the King of England [1]

Telegram (unnumbered).
Urgent. BERLIN, PALACE, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

HIS MAJESTY THE KING, LONDON.

I just received the communication from your Government offering French neutrality under guaranty of Great Britain.[3] Added to this offer was the inquiry, whether under these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking France. On technical grounds my mobilization which had already been proclaimed this afternoon must proceed against two fronts east and west as prepared.[4] This cannot be countermanded because I am sorry your telegram came so [5] late. But if France offers me neutrality which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army I shall of course refrain from attacking France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on my frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephon[e] from crossing into France.[6]

WILLIAM.

No. 576

The Embassy at London to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 208. LONDON, *August 1, 1914.*[8]

According to the official report the Premier made the following declaration in the Lower House yesterday:

> We have just heard, not from St. Petersburg, but from Germany that Russia has proclaimed a general mobilization of her army and fleet and that in consequence of this, martial law was to be proclaimed for Germany. We understand this to mean that mobilization will follow in Germany, if Russian mobilization is general and is proceeded with. In the circumstances, I should prefer not to answer any questions till Monday next.

GERMAN EMBASSY.

[1] From a draft written [in English] in an unknown hand on a telegraph blank of the Palace telegraph office. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 46.
[2] Sent out from the Palace August 1 at 7.02 p.m. Crossed with No. 574.
[3] See No. 562.
[4] For "as prepared" there was written originally "until all troops have been disembarked."
[5] In a copy of the draft in the archives "too late" instead of "so late."
[6] See No. 612.
[7] From the copy of the uncoded telegram written down at the Berlin Central Telegraph Office.
[8] Filed at London at 1.33 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.15 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m.

No. 577

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 147. VIENNA, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

With reference to today's telephone conversation between Foreign Office and Count Forgach.

Count Berchtold will immediately notify Rome that, in view of existing conditions, he accepts Article 7 according to the Italian interpretation.[3]

Minister, to whose attention I sharply called the fact that I had for weeks been pointing out to him in the most urgent manner the importance of this matter, and that I had requested him, again and again, to bring it to a conclusion, as there was danger in delay, argued that it was yesterday that Duke d'Avarna had for the first time discussed the question with him. It was also yesterday that, with my cooperation, Count Berchtold's declaration was drafted, which received also the approval of the Duke d'Avarna.[4] Italy would have, in consequence, no right to claim that her wishes were being disregarded. Minister thinks that Italy's attitude is the result of the stand England has taken.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 578

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [5]

Telegram 204. BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[6]

Germany is willing to agree to the English proposal,[7] provided England will pledge security with all her armed forces for the unconditional neutrality of France in a German-Russian conflict, and, moreover, for a neutrality to last until the final completion of this conflict. Germany alone would have to decide when that completion had been reached.

Germany's mobilization took place today in reply to the Russian challenge, before the arrival of telegram 205.[8] As a consequence our advance movements, even toward the French border, can no longer be altered. We will guarantee, however, not to cross the French frontier before Monday, August 3, at seven o'clock in the evening, in case England's agreement should be obtained within that time.[9]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Vienna at 1.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.15 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Was overtaken by telegram 152 (No. 573) filed later.
[3] See No. 594.
[4] See No. 573.
[5] From the draft in Jagow's handwriting. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 46.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 7.15 p.m.
[7] See Nos. 562 and 570.
[8] See No. 562.
[9] See Nos. 603, 630 and 631.

No. 579

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [1]

Telegram 205. BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Please give Sir Edward Grey our best thanks for his proposal, which unfortunately arrived here after the proclamation of mobilization, but which, we hope, will yet bring results. Detailed answer is being sent simultaneously in cipher and calls for speediest action.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 580

Lord Rothschild to the Emperor [4]

Telegram (unnumbered). LONDON, *August 1, 1914.*[5]

His Imperial Majesty the German Emperor,
Berlin.

SIRE: I am fully aware that Your Majesty is straining every nerve in favor of peace and it is because I am aware of this and because I have always been such a warm and devoted admirer of Your Majesty's policy, that I venture to address Your Majesty at such a very critical moment, when the blessings of peace or the horrors of war are evenly balanced. Will Your Majesty therefore send me a proposal which I could at once lay before my friends and which would be of such a nature as would find favor both at St. Petersburg and Vienna and which could be warmly supported by my friends? I venture most earnestly to hope that Your Majesty will most graciously reply [to one] who begs to subscribe himself Your Majesty's most faithful and obedient servant,

ALFRED DE ROTHSCHILD.

1 Seamore Place.[6]

An old and very much honored acquaintance of mine! Somewhere between 75 and 80 years old!

[1] From the draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 7.20 p.m.
[3] See Nos. 562, 570 and the numbers referred to in note 4 of the latter.
[4] From the copy [in English] of the Palace telegraph office.
[5] Dispatched from London, August 1, 3.45 p.m.; received in Berlin at the Palace telegraph office, 7.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1.
[6] On an attached sheet the note by Zimmermann, "Answer in the name of His Majesty?" and Stumm's further remark: "As cable is closed, no use."

No. 581

The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 20. BRUSSELS, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Baron van der Elst, to whom I confidentially communicated the statement of the Grand Duke,[3] looked upon it as a joke, and assured me that there was absolutely no foundation for it. Belgium only had the desire and the duty of protecting herself against everyone who wished to injure her.

In connection with this talk, Baron van der Elst stated, as his own personal opinion, that in view of the present highly excited state of public feeling in the country, it would be of the greatest advantage to be able to receive a declaration from the Imperial Government to the effect that the frontiers of the Kingdom would be respected by Germany. To my inquiry whether such a declaration had already been made on the part of France, the Secretary General answered me in the negative. So far only a verbal and quite unofficial promise in this regard had been received. Belgium had not even asked for such a declaration from France up to the present time. But he believed that she would be granted it if she asked for it.

Baron Elst hinted further that England had forwarded a communication here that was known in Berlin and Paris.[4] He would say nothing more definite about it. It may perhaps be connected with the rumor current here just now, emanating from banking circles, to the effect that England, in case necessity demanded, planned to send over an expeditionary corps of from 30,000 to 100,000 men to Zeebrugge. It is said further that eleven torpedo boats are lying at Zeebrugge and 141 English war-ships outside of Vlissingen.

BELOW.

No. 582

The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 54. SINAIA, *August 1, 1914.*[6]

Instructions carried out.[7] Italian Minister has just stated, in behalf of his Government, to His Majesty the King, that Italy did not consider herself bound by the alliance in the event of an impending conflagration, since she took the view that it was a case of aggressive action on the part of Austria-Hungary.[8] His Majesty the King, who graciously informed me of this matter, added that such a clause was also part of his compact. His Majesty intends to summon a Crown Council, in order to discuss the dispositions to be made. Premier Bratianu

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Brussels at 1.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Communicated on August 2 at 12.05 a.m. to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] See No. 505.

[4] See Nos. 522 and 584.

[5] From the decodification.

[6] Filed in Sinaia at 3 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Telegram communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office; sent by messenger August 2 at 1.30 a.m.

[7] See No. 506.

[8] See No. 534.

assured me that he was quietly preparing for mobilization, and intended to mobilize very soon. He referred to the difficulties in connection with popular sentiment, which was ABSOLUTELY hostile to Austria. He insisted, however, that he would do everything possible to carry out the obligations of the alliance. Bratianu desires that the Roumanians in Transylvania should be given certain assurances on the part of Hungary to the effect that after the war they would be granted greater rights. With regard to Bessarabia,[1] Bratianu stated that it would only be of value to Roumania in the event that Russia had to surrender further territories also to Austria and to Germany, and should become so weakened that that province would actually remain a possession of Roumania permanently. Russian Minister has asked Bratianu what attitude Roumania would assume in the event of a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Bratianu replied that at the present moment he was unable to say anything on that subject. Bratianu further said that in case Italy did not take part, the contingent to be raised here by Italy, amounting to 40,000 men, would be lacking.

Feeling here now, as before, hostile to Austria.

WALDBURG.

No. 583

The President of the Bureau of International Peace to the Emperor [2]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERNE, *July 28, 1914.*[3]

TO HIS MAJESTY EMPEROR WILLIAM II, NEW PALACE.

Confiding in the sense of justice and in the pacific spirit of which Your Majesty has given the world so many proofs, we beg you to put an end to the anguish of nations, and by your mediation to accomplish a peaceful composition of the Austro-Serbian conflict. In the name of the Bureau of International Peace,

LA FONTAINE,
President.

No. 584

The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 21. BRUSSELS, *August 1, 1914.*[5]

Communication to Belgium.

Mr. Davignon sends word to me that the French Minister has just made the official declaration in the name of his Government that France intends, in the event of an international conflict, to respect Belgian neutrality. This determination would be

[1] See Nos. 506, 507 and 561. [2] From the copy of the telegraph office in the New Palace.
[3] Filed in Berne at 6.50 p.m., July 28; arrived in Berlin July 28 at 8.07 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Brussels at 4.15 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.12 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Communicated on the 2d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office; sent by messengers at 12.05 a.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor (marginal annotations evidently of the 2d of August). *Re* execution of his marginal instructions see No. 682. See also No. 581.

Our fear, which we have already expressed in the note to be handed to Belgium this evening, is strengthened by the fact that France has already, against international law,

subject to a possible alteration only if Belgium's neutrality were to be violated on the part of another nation. This declaration was to be made public through the press this evening.

With regard to the English communication, of which Baron Elst hinted to me, Mr. Davignon informed me that it referred to the inquiry of the Government of Great Britain at *Berlin* and Paris concerning the *observance of the neutrality of Belgium*.[1]

BELOW.

begun hostilities against us (dropping avaition bombs on German territory, crossing of the border with cavalry patrols). Instruct Minister at Brussels to make a point of mentioning this when handing over the note.
It is on this that England's going in against us will depend.

No. 585

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram 153.
Confidential.

VIENNA, *August 1, 1914*.[3]

Count Berchtold believes it to be imperative that Bulgaria should be informed from Berlin, as soon as possible, of the existence of the agreement with Turkey, as this might be a deciding factor in determining the Bulgarian attitude.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 586

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople[4]

Telegram 298.

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914*.[5]

Margrave Pallavicini has received instructions from Vienna concerning the accession of Turkey.[6]

JAGOW.

[1] See No. 522.
[2] From the decodification.
[3] Filed in Vienna at 5.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m.
[4] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 8.30 p.m.
[6] The Ambassador at Vienna had been informed on the 31st of July (by telegram 212, to the Central Telegraph Office at 12.25 p.m., August 1) of the alliance transactions with Turkey (No. 320), and had been instructed "to try earnestly to arrange that Austrian representative at Constantinople be immediately instructed to enter upon similar transactions with Porte." Whereupon the Ambassador at Vienna had reported on August 1 (telegram 148, from Vienna at 1.05 p.m., to Foreign Office at 4.10 p.m.): "Margrave Pallavicini to receive similar instructions at once."

No. 587

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Paris [1]

Telegram 186.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Grey has offered Prince Lichnowsky prospect of proposal [3] whereby England would guarantee France's neutrality if we did not attack France. We hope to be able to agree to this if our conditions, which we telegraphed at once to London, are accepted.[4] Foregoing only for Your Excellency's personal information.

Please keep the French quiet for the time being. ON OUR PART, no hostile action against France is contemplated, despite mobilization, which had already been ordered before arrival of London proposal.

JAGOW.

No. 588

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 214.

PETERSBURG, *August 1, 1914.*[6]

Telegram 159 [7] arrived here at 5.45 p.m., Russian time. After decodification at seven o'clock, Russian time, I asked Mr. Sazonoff three successive times whether he could make me the declaration demanded in telegram 153,[8] concerning the suspension of hostile measures against Austria and us. After my question had been answered in the negative three times, I handed over the note as instructed.

POURTALÈS.

No. 589

The Swiss Minister to the Foreign Office [9]

(BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*)

The Federal Council has decided on the mobilization of the whole army beginning from today. The sole object of this measure is the maintenance of the integrity and neutrality of Switzerland. Kindly acquaint the German Government with the foregoing, advising it that a formal declaration of neutrality will be transmitted to it later.

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.
HOFFMANN.

[1] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 8.45 p.m.
[3] See No. 562.
[4] See Nos. 575 and 578.
[5] From a copy prepared at the Foreign Office from the records of the Embassy at Petersburg. Telegram did not reach the Foreign Office at the time. Number supplied from the records of the Embassy.
[6] Sent from Petersburg August 1 at 8 p.m.
[7] See No. 542.
[8] See No. 490.
[9] From an undated copy [in French] given to the Secretary of State by the Swiss Minister on the 1st of August, in the evening. Communicated at 9.15 p.m. by messenger on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

No. 590

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 240. PARIS, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Mobilization of the entire French army ordered Saturday [3] at 5 p.m. Sunday, first day of mobilization.

MILITARY ATTACHÉ KLÜBER.

SCHOEN.

No. 591

The Senatorial Committee for Imperial and Foreign Affairs of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram (unnumbered). HAMBURG, *August 1, 1914.*[5]

Undersigned Senatorial Committee requests to be informed by telegraph how soon passports should be handed to the local Russian Minister, and how soon, and with what respite, French Consul General with his personnel should be requested to leave Hamburg. In case passports are to be handed to French Consul General in connection with request to leave Hamburg, beg to be so informed.[6]

SENATORIAL COMMITTEE FOR IMPERIAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

No. 592

The Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 31. ALEXANDRIA, *August 1, 1914.*[8]

The Austrian Minister asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs today, without having been instructed and quite informally, if Egypt were going to remain neutral in case England took part in any eventual war. It developed from the involved explanations of the Minister that the Khedival Government would prefer, as a matter of fact, to remain neutral, but realized that under English pressure, Egyptian ports would at all times remain open to *English war-ships* to an *unlimited extent.* It is true, that the idea, that under these *circumstances*, Egypt might be regarded as

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Paris at 6 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.06 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Communicated on the 1st of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.
[3] Saturday: August 1. [4] From the copy of the telegram.
[5] Filed in Hamburg at 8.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.07 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m.
[6] See No. 636. [7] From the decodification.
[8] Filed in Alexandria at 1 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.16 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, who, by marginal instructions, ordered its communication to the General Staff and the Admiralty Staff; returned by the Emperor on the 2d of August. Richthofen's telegram communicated on the 1st of August to the General Staff, the Admiralty Staff, the Imperial Naval Office and the Ministry of War.

an *enemy country* by the Triple Alliance, that a move might be made against Alexandria, for example, and that under certain conditions an *Italian invasion* might be the result, is arousing anxiety even among the English; Egypt is even now suffering severely from a *lack of credit and money*, and will soon suffer from a *lack of foodstuffs*. *Yes.* *Yes.*

RICHTHOFEN.

No. 593

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Petersburg [1]

Telegram 161. BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Kindly inform Government there in writing, when you hand over the declaration of war, that we are seizing merchant ships in our harbors, flying the Russian flag, but will release them if we receive within forty-eight hours a corresponding promise in return.

JAGOW.

No. 594

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [3]

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[4]

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

Count Berchtold instructs me to inform Your Excellency that he has handed over the following declaration to the Royal Italian Ambassador at Vienna:

> Je considère qu'une divergence de vue sur l'interprétation de l'Article VII forme un élément d'incertitude pour nos relations du présent et de l'avenir qui pourrait être préjudiciable aux rapports d'intimité entre les deux puissances. J'accepte l'interprétation donnée à l'article VII par l'Italie et l'Allemagne à condition que l'Italie observe une attitude amicale par rapport aux opérations de guerre engagées actuellement par l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie et remplira ses devoirs d'allié dans le cas où le conflit actuel pourrait amener une conflagration générale.

Mr. von Mérey is instructed to bring the foregoing to the attention of the Marquis San Giuliano immediately.

Your sincerely devoted,

SZÖGYENY.

[1] From the original draft. Draft dictated by the Director of the Law Division of the Foreign Office, Dr. Kriege.

[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.40 p.m.

[3] From the corrected copy brought to the Foreign Office by Baron Haymerle at the instructions of Count Szögyeny. Bergen noted hereon on the 1st of August: "The text does not agree with that telegraphed by Mr. von Tschirschky (No. 573). The Emperor Franz Joseph has directed a telegram to His Majesty that Count Szögyeny will transmit to His Majesty tomorrow." Cf. also No. 577.

[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 2, p.m. See also, Austro-Hungarian Red Book, II, No. 20. German text there also.

Translation of the French Portion

I consider that a difference of opinion on the interpretation of Article 7 brings an element of uncertainty into our present and future relations that might prejudice the intimate relations of the two Powers. I accept the interpretation given to Article 7 by Italy and Germany on condition that Italy shall observe a friendly attitude with regard to the hostilities now going on between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that she shall fulfil the obligations of her alliance in the event that the present conflict should lead to a general conflagration.

No. 595

The English Embassy to the Foreign Office [1]

AIDE MÉMOIRE

Sir Edward Grey states that he hears from the Russian Government that the Austro-Hungarian Government are prepared to discuss matters with the Russian Government and that the Russian Government are prepared to accept mediation as the basis of such discussion, a basis which is not open to the objections which were raised to the formula originally suggested by Russia.

Sir Edward Grey still believes that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time could be gained before war is begun by one of the Great Powers. His Majesty's Government are, he states, taking care to abstain from taking any action which may precipitate matters, and he hopes that the Imperial Government may see their way to making some use of the above-mentioned communication from the Russian Government with a view to relieving the existing tension.

Whilst Russia and Austria are ready to converse, he says, matters ought not to be hopeless.

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

No. 596

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 212. LONDON, *August 1, 1914.*[4]

This drivel of Grey's shows that he absolutely doesn't

Sir E. Grey has just read to me the following statement, which was unanimously drawn up by the Cabinet: "The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Bel-

[1] From the corrected copy [in English]. Cf. English Blue Book, 1914, Nos. 131 and 138. No. 138 only reached London on the 2d of August.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 2.

[3] From the decodification. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 48.

[4] Filed in London at 5.47 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.02 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Submitted to the Emperor, according to the latter's own marginal annotation (July [August] 2, 1914. 4.30 p.m., 5.30 p.m.) on the afternoon of the 2d of August, and returned by him to the Foreign Office on the same day.

gium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same positive reply as that which has been given by France,[1] it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country."

know what he is to do. We will now await England's decision. I just learn that England has already cut the cable to Emden. A war measure, then! While she is still negotiating. Then he's a false rascal!

. . .[2] question, whether he could give me a *definite declaration on the neutrality of Great Britain* on the condition that we respected Belgian neutrality, the Minister replied that *that would not be possible for him*, though this question would play an important rôle in connection with public feeling here. Should we violate Belgian neutrality in a war with France, a reversal of public feeling would take place that would *make it difficult for the Government here to adopt an attitude of friendly neutrality.* For the present, *there was not the slightest intention of proceeding to hostilities against us.* But it would be difficult *to draw a line beyond which we might not go* without causing them on this side to step in. He kept returning to the question of Belgian neutrality and stated that in any case, this question would play an important rôle. He had also been wondering whether it would not be possible for *us and France* to remain facing each other *under arms, without attacking each other*,[3] in the *event of a Russian war.* I asked him if he were in a position to say whether France would agree to a pact of that sort. Since we intended neither to ruin France nor to conquer any territory, I could imagine that we might enter upon that sort of an agreement, if it assured us of Great Britain's neutrality.

Humbug! it has not adopted it so far.

He lies! He told Lichnowsky so himself four days ago!

Unless an English equivalent is named!

So he already has my offer of yesterday afternoon, that is very plain! And then the King talks of a misunderstanding! Rot!

The rascal is crazy or an idiot! Besides that, the French have begun the war and the violation of international law with their bomb-hurling fliers.

The Minister said that he *would inform himself*,[4] but he did not fail to realize the difficulty of restraining the soldiers of both sides in a state of inactivity.

[1] See No. 584.

[2] . . . Text mutilated. According to the draft in the archives of the London Embassy, it reads here "To my."

[3] Exclamation-point by the Emperor in the right margin.

[4] Exclamation-point by the Emperor in the left margin.

My impression is that Mr. Grey is a false dog who is afraid of his own cheapness and false policy, but who will not come out into the open against us, preferring to let himself be forced by us to do it.

My impression as a whole is, that if it is possible in any way, they want here, to keep out of the war, but that the reply of the Secretary of State to Sir Edward Goschen concerning Belgian neutrality has caused an unfavorable impression.[1]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 597

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 154. VIENNA, *August 1, 1914.*[3]

Agreed. Good. Roumania must make public at once her treaty with Austria and mobilize against Russia at once.

Count Tarnowsky is instructed to persuade them at Sofia to have Bulgaria announce at Bucharest that *as long as Roumania stands by the Triple Alliance*, she will have *nothing to fear from Bulgaria.*

Bulgarian Minister at Bucharest has already received appropriate instructions from his Government.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 598

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 241. PARIS, *August 1, 1914.*[5]

Telegram 184 only arrived after three o'clock.[6]

At a renewed conversation with the Premier at five-thirty, the latter, in spite of my urgency, stuck to his formula of this morning concerning France's attitude in a Russo-German war.[7]

Premier stated to me that the mobilization just ordered here (first day, Sunday), did not in any way indicate aggressive intentions, as was emphasized in the proclamation. There was always a chance for the continuation of negotiations on the basis of Sir E. Grey's proposal, to which France agreed and which it warmly advocated. Precautions against collisions on the frontier had been taken by France in the form of a ten-kilometer zone. He could not abandon his hope for peace.

SCHOEN.

[1] See Nos. 562, 570, 603, 630 and 631.

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed in Vienna at 8.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.17 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1 p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, who noted thereon: "5.30 p.m."; returned to the Foreign Office on August 2. Kaiser ordered its communication to the Ministry at Bucharest and to the General Staff; communication to the General Staff not accomplished; Tschirschky's telegram communicated to Bucharest on August 2, to the central Telegraph Office at 1.25 a.m.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in Paris at 7.05 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.17 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. At Zimmermann's order communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[6] See No. 543.

[7] See No. 571.

No. 599

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor [1]

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

I accompany this most humbly with the draft of a telegram from Your Majesty to the Czar.[3] While sending it off the idea comes to me that it might be well for Your Majesty to slip in an additional word to the effect that the Czar should issue immediate and unconditional orders that his troops shall not commit border violations of any kind.

Most humbly,

V. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No news from Petersburg.

No. 600

The Emperor to the Czar [4]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *Aug. 1, 1914.*[5]

Thanks for your telegram.[6] I yesterday pointed out to your Government the way by which, alone, war may be avoided. Although I requested an answer for noon today, no telegram from my Ambassador conveying an answer from your Government [7] has reached me as yet. I therefore have been obliged to mobilize my Army.

Immediate, affirmative, clear and unmistakable [8] answer from your Government is the only way [9] to avoid endless misery.[10] Until I have received this answer,[11] alas, I am unable to discuss [12] the subject of your telegram. As a matter of fact I must request you to immediately order your troops on no account, to commit the slightest act of trespassing over our frontiers.[13]

WILLY.

[1] From the corrected copy in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.
[2] Marginal annotation in the Emperor's handwriting: "August 1, 1914, 9.45 p.m., W."
[3] See No. 600.
[4] From the draft [in English] in the handwriting of Count G. Wedel with alterations and additions in the handwriting of the Emperor. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 10.
[5] Draft submitted to the Emperor at 9.45 p.m. and was returned to the Chancelor at 10 p.m., who urgently ordered that it be immediately forwarded, uncoded. To the Central Telegraph Office at 10.30 p.m.; according to No. 666, was dispatched by wire at 10.45 p.m.
[6] See No. 546.
[7] "conveying . . . your Government" added by the Emperor.
[8] "clear and unmistakable" added by the Emperor.
[9] Emperor: "the only way" instead of "necessary" of the draft.
[10] Emperor: "endless" instead of "inconceivable" of the draft.
[11] "I have . . . this answer" added by the Emperor.
[12] Emperor: "discuss" instead of "enter upon" of the draft.
[13] Sentence: "As a matter . . . our frontiers" added by the Emperor.

No. 601

The Emperor of Austria to the Emperor [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). [*August 1, 1914.*]

I thank you, my dear friend, for your heart-inspiring communication,[2] and in this serious hour I am at one with you and pray to God that he may grant our allied Armies the victory in their battle for the right.

As soon as my General Staff had learned that you were determined to commence war against Russia at once and to carry it on with all your strength, we here came to the firm determination, too, to assemble our principal forces against Russia.

You may rest assured that on the part of my Army the utmost will be done to bring the great fight to a successful conclusion. I am overjoyed and filled with enthusiasm at your extensive arrangements to reinforce our fighting strength by the inclusion of new allies.

In view of the seriousness of the situation, my Ambassador at Rome has already received instructions to declare to the Italian Government that we are ready to accept its interpretation of Article 7 of the treaty, in case Italy should now absolutely live up to the obligations of her alliance.[3] I myself am also telegraphing to the King of Italy to tell him that, after thirty years' labor in behalf of peace, we are now counting on the prospect that the three allies will unite their armies for this decisive conflict.[4]

No. 602

The Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [5]

Telegram (unnumbered). LUXEMBURG, *August 1, 1914.*[6]

Prussian officers and soldiers today took possession of the Luxemburg station of Ulflingen and tore up the rails beyond it on our . . . [7] They are said to belong to the 69th Regiment of Treves. I can only assume that there was some mistake in the matter, and expect an apology, but am all the more impelled to repeat the request already made to the Foreign Office through the local German

[1] From the unsigned copy reproduced at the Austro-Hungarian Embassy and handed to the Emperor by the Ambassador. Marginal annotation by the Emperor: "Berlin Palace August 1, 1914, given me by Count Szögyeny at 10.30 p.m. Wilhelm I. R." Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 2. Note of Aide-de-Camp von Mutius on August 2: "General Staff has received a copy." Marginal annotation of the Emperor: "Foreign Office submit reply." On an attached sheet the instructions of the Chancelor on August 2: "Draft, please."

[2] See No. 503.

[3] See No. 594.

[4] See Nos. 672 and 700.

[5] From the copy, completed at the Central Telegraph Office, of the uncoded telegram directed to the Secretary of State personally.

[6] Filed in Luxemburg August 1 at 9.30 p.m.; received at the Berlin Central Telegraph Office at 10.45 p.m.; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 2, p.m.

[7] Thus in the copy, in which "territory" is apparently lacking.

Minister to the effect that the Imperial Government make a declaration, as it did in 1870, that it will respect the neutrality of Luxemburg as long as that neutrality is not violated by another Power.[1]

MINISTER OF STATE EYSCHEN.

No. 603

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 214. LONDON, *August 1, 1914.*[3]

My today's telegram 205 [4] superseded by my later telegram 212.[5] As a positive proposal on the part of England is, on the whole, not in prospect, your telegram 204 [6] settled by that fact. Therefore I have taken no further steps.[7]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 604

The Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to the Foreign Office [8]

Telegram 55. SINAIA, *August 1, 1914.*[9]

Nothing known here about mobilization at Braila and Constantza, nor could anything be learned here about troop movements out of Constantza.

WALDBURG.

No. 605

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [10]

Telegram 206.
Urgent. BERLIN *August 1, 1914.*[11]

Paris just reports that France mobilized this afternoon at five o'clock, thus at exactly the same hour and minute that we did.[12] We can naturally only keep our promise not to overstep the French boundary before seven o'clock Monday afternoon,[13] on the condition that France will also respect our boundary most strictly.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] See Nos. 619 and 640.
[2] From the decodification. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 49.
[3] Filed in London at 8.26 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m.
[4] See No. 562.
[5] See No. 596.
[6] See No. 578.
[7] See also Nos. 630 and 631.
[8] From the decodification.
[9] Filed in Sinaia at 7.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, a.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. The telegram is a reply relative to reports of mobilization measures at Braila and Constantza originating at the Military Mission at Constantinople; reported to Berlin July 29, and from there on the 30th to Vienna (191) and Bucharest (52).
[10] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.
[11] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.30 p.m.
[12] See No. 590.
[13] See No. 578.

No. 606

The Minister at Luxemburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 15. LUXEMBURG (*August 1*), *1914*.[2]

Since, according to a Havas dispatch, the French Minister at Brussels has declared that the French Government will not violate the neutrality of Belgium in case it should not be violated from other quarters, Mr. Eyschen desires to receive acquiescence to the request contained in telegram 14 [3] before the Chambers convene on Monday.

BUCH.

No. 607

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassadors at Vienna and Rome [4]

Telegrams 220, 159. BERLIN, *August 1, 1914*.[5]

For Your Excellency's personal information, exclusively.

Sir E. Grey has offered Lichnowsky the prospect of a proposal according to which England is to remain neutral and will also guarantee the neutrality of France, if we do not attack France. We hope to be able to accept this, if the conditions, which we immediately communicated to London, are met.[6]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 608

Draft of an unsent telegram from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Paris [7]

Urgent.[8] BERLIN, *August 1, 1914*.

In case the French Government should make no satisfactory reply to our inquiry, Your Excellency will present it with the following declaration at six o'clock this afternoon, according to Central European time: [9]

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Time of filing the telegram in Luxemburg not given; arrived at the Foreign Office August 1 at 11.35 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, a.m.

[3] See No. 486.

[4] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.

[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.55 p.m.

[6] See No. 562; also No. 613.

[7] The draft was written by Rosenberg on the 31st of July after the ultimatum had been sent to Paris (see No. 491), was signed by Jagow August 1, was dated as of this day, was amended in Jagow's handwriting after the arrival of the final answer from Paris (August 1 at 6.10 p.m., see No. 571), and was provided with alterations and additions by the Imperial Chancelor and Hammann. The draft was not engrossed, but was written into the records by Rosenberg after an inquiry by Stumm on the 3d of August.

[8] On the margin a note by Rosenberg intended for the Imperial Chancelor: "Imperial Chancelor, with the respectful suggestion that he get the approval of the Emperor. The passage enclosed in brackets made with a pencil was included at the express desire of the General Staff. It might not, nevertheless, be unquestionable, since, at the time indicated, the period of the respite of 18 hours may not have expired. The accompanying telegram must go by 12 o'clock noon tomorrow at the latest."

[9] Originally the draft read: "Your Excellency will turn over to it . . . immediately upon the expiration of the respite, at the latest, however, this afternoon at 6 o'clock." The words

The German Government has been striving to reach a peaceful outcome from the commencement of the crisis. But while, at the desire of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, and in cooperation with England, she was still endeavoring to mediate between Vienna and Petersburg, Russia mobilized her entire army and her fleet. By these measures, which had been preceded by no extraordinary preparations for war in Germany, the security of the German Empire was threatened. Not to take measures to meet such a menace would have meant to stake the existence of the Empire. The German Government therefore required the Russian Government to suspend at once the [1] mobilization against Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary. Simultaneously,[2] the German Government acquainted the French Government with the matter, and, in consideration of the well-known relations of the Republic to Russia, requested a statement as to whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war. To this inquiry [3] the French Government returned the equivocal and evasive answer that France would act in accordance with her interests.[4] By this reply, France reserves the right to place herself at the side of our opponents, and is in a position to attack us in the rear at any moment, with an army which has been mobilized in the meantime. Germany is forced,[5] under these conditions, to perceive a threat in this, all the more since no reply has been returned to the demand she had made upon Russia to suspend the mobilization of her armed forces, notwithstanding the period of respite has long expired, and since a Russo-German war has now broken out as a result. Germany is unable to leave to France the choice of the time when the menace to her western frontiers shall be brought into action, but, threatened from two sides, is forced to proceed in her own defense at once.

Thus I am instructed to make known to Your Excellency the following announcement:

"His Majesty the German Emperor declares in the name of the Empire that he considers himself as being in a state of war with France."

Please wire initiation and time of execution of these instructions at once, according to Western European time.

Please demand your passports, and turn over protection and affairs to the American Embassy.[6]

JAGOW.

[1] "the" by the Imperial Chancelor, in place of "its."

[2] The passage "Not to take measures . . . simultaneously" added to the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.

[3] The passage "to this inquiry . . . mobilized in the meantime" was added principally in Jagow's handwriting after the arrival of the final reply from Paris, the words "with her army, which has been mobilized in the meantime," being added in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor. Jagow's additions were based on several preliminary drafts in his handwriting.

[4] See No. 571.

[5] The passage "Germany is forced . . . following announcement" is in Hammann's handwriting.

[6] Final sentence added in Jagow's handwriting.

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which the General Staff wished to have inserted were "at the latest, however, this afternoon at 6 o'clock." They were put in brackets with a pencil, the brackets later being eliminated. The words "immediately upon the expiration of the respite" and ' at the latest, however," were finally crossed out. Cf. with these various alterations the like procedure in constructing the declaration of war on Russia (No. 542).

No. 609

The Grand General Staff to the Foreign Office [1]

Strictly secret.
Written by an Officer.

BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

SIXTH COMMUNICATION

AUSTRIA

For the corps not yet mobilized, first mobilization day, August 4; enlisting reserves in their recruiting districts. Serbian frontier not yet crossed. 1st Battalion 73 (Prague) to the south to guard Grand Headquarters.

SERBIA

Pashitch makes the statement that Serbia may rely on the assistance of Russia and the sympathy of France and England. The Serbian army in a very awkward situation (lack of ammunition, supplies, weapons). First defensive position on the Arala (fifteen kilometers south of Belgrade).

MONTENEGRO

No intention of attacking Austria, but will not consent to partition of Serbia.

GREECE

Nothing new.

ROUMANIA

Guard on Bulgarian border in war strength. King Carol is of the opinion that in case Russia goes into the war, Bulgaria will attack Roumania. Public feeling against Austria. Government does not want to support Russia.

BULGARIA

Minister at Athens has officially declared neutrality of Bulgaria in case of war between Austria and Serbia. Bulgar-Serbian border district flooded with Serbian deserters.

TURKEY

Nothing new.

BELGIUM

Nothing new.

HOLLAND

is forced by England to take her stand on the side of the Triple Entente. Mobilization of army, national guard and navy has been ordered.

FRANCE

Order for occupying border protection positions issued on the evening of July 31.

[1] From the multigraph copy sent by the General Staff. See No. 524.
[2] Receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Submitted to Zimmermann and Jagow on the 1st of August. News up to August 1, 4 p.m.

Separately: Opposite Diedenhofen probably the 4th Cavalry Division (Sedan); west of Metz portions of the 6th Army Corps (Verdun); north and east of Nancy the 20th Army Corps (Toul-Nancy); northeast of Lunéville the Chasseurs and the 2d Cavalry Division (Lunéville); in the Central Vosges portions of the 21st Army Corps (Epinal); east of Belfort portions of the 14th Infantry Division (Petite-Croix).

Unreliable reports: Large troop assemblages at Belfort.

England

Government for going into the war at once (in order to overcome the economic disaster quickly). Feeling of the people against a war with Germany. Assembling of the expeditionary corps for all contingencies being planned in the county of Essex. Feverish activity in the Ministry of War and in the camps. Woolwich arsenal carefully guarded. Infantry battalions and territorial troops on the Isle of Wight. First fleet on the east coast of Scotland. Probably the third fleet passed Dover early this morning in an easterly direction. Second fleet at the mouth of the Thames with four mine-laying vessels. Cruisers along the Holland coast and west of Helgoland. Admiralty Staff planning on the eventual disembarking of an English expeditionary corps in Dutch and Belgian harbors under protection of the second and third fleets and simultaneous close blockade of the German bight by the first fleet.

Italy

Imperial Austrian military attaché gives assurance that Italy will faithfully perform her alliance obligations.

Switzerland

According to a decree of July 31, the assumption of picket positions is ordered. In case of necessity, mobilization will follow. The Landsturm is being called to the colors; measures are directed neither against Germany nor against France.

Sweden

Probably on the side of the Triple Alliance, as popular feeling is against Russia.

Denmark

13,000 men are enlisted for the coast fortifications, 14,000 for the fleet.[1] Measures only taken to quiet excited public feeling, which is demanding measures for the maintenance of neutrality.

Norway

Reservists at present called in, Government considers no further enlistments necessary immediately. Apparently no agreement with England.

Spain

Nothing new.

Russia

Rumors that Russia intends to evacuate the western bank of the Vistula are gathering. Strong force of cavalry, with infantry, still stationed at Tschen-

[1] Nos. 532 and 560 say 1300 and 1400 men.

stochau (14th Cavalry Division). Kalisz apparently occupied. Kalisz-Sieradz railroad torn up at several places. At Sieradz there are still stationed portions of the 13th Cavalry Division (patrols at Siemianowitz). Farther north border guard said to be retiring. No news about 15th Cavalry Division. East of the Vistula in the vicinity of Tshechanow a detachment of all arms is entrenched. Nothing new concerning the 6th Cavalry Division. Apparently advanced columns of the 15th Army Corps at Kolns.[1] Advanced column of the 6th Army Corps at Shtshutshin. Strong force of cavalry (4th Cavalry Division) still at Grajewo. Apparently 15th Army Corps assembling at Lomsza, 6th Army Corps at Osowietz, presumably together with 16th Infantry Division. Reports of cavalry movements in a southerly direction have come in from the neighborhood of Suwalki. Augustowo is said to be strongly occupied. Situation at Wirballen unchanged. Reports about the fortresses of Novogeorgievsk and Lomza are to the effect that they are not to be equipped, while work is being feverishly pushed on the equipment of Osowietz. The Osowietz-Grajewo railroad is practically destroyed. News of this nature concerning the district between Mlawa and Tshechanow still lacks corroboration. Large transportations of troops from Moscow in the direction of Smolensk and from Warsaw in the direction of Brest are reported. Reports of the assembling of troops at Kjelze-Iwangorod are being repeated.

By order of,

VON BARTENWERFFER.
Major.

No. 610

The English Embassy to the Foreign Office[2]

(BERLIN, *August 1* (?), *1914*).

The boats of the Great Central Railway Company and other boats have been detained by force at Hamburg.

Sir E. Grey requests that they be permitted to leave without delay, because the effect on public opinion would be deplorable.[3]

[1] Thus in the multigraphed copy.

[2] From a memorandum [in French] in the handwriting of Jagow. Note by Stumm: "*praesentatum* August 2, at night." Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 2. See English Blue Book, No. 130, of August 1.

[3] On the margin the note in Stumm's handwriting: "Inquiry of the English Ambassador. He has been notified that the vessels were released." The inquiry was given attention at 12.45 a.m., August 2, by the Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office; see No. 634 and note 6 thereto.

No. 611

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 213. LONDON, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Westminster Gazette considers situation to be extremely critical. England must decide on the position she is to take. Premier had once made the statement in the Lower House that England was not bound, by treaties of any sort, to take part in case of war. Thus England had a *free hand now.* But Germany must realize that there existed *certain public treaties, the violation of which by Germany* would bring *England into a difficult situation.* Germany further was aware that a German-*English* [3] conflict might have consequences which would inflame public opinion in England and induce England *to give up her neutrality.*[4] The attempt being made on many sides, to stir up a war fever here and to propagate a plan for sending an expeditionary corps to the continent, ought to be utterly condemned. England had to consider the obligations of her world empire, and especially the safety of Egypt and India. England's strength lay in her sea power, and the latter must serve to keep peace for England and to confine the war to other countries and within certain limits. There was, it was true, a certain danger in a peace policy, but it was very much to be hoped that England would be in a position to maintain her character as a place of assemblage for those who wanted peace in Europe.

French!?

Twaddle.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 612

The King of England to the Emperor [5]

Telegram (unnumbered). (LONDON, *August 1, 1914.*) [6]

In answer to your telegram [7] just received I think there must be some misunderstanding as to a suggestion that passed in friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon when they were discussing how actual fighting between German and French armies might be avoided while there is still a chance of some agreement between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will arrange to see Prince Lichnowsky early tomorrow morning to ascertain whether there is a misunderstanding on his part.

GEORGE.

[1] From the copy received by the Central Telegraph Office. Telegram not coded.
[2] Filed in London August 1 at 6.30 p.m.; received at the Central Telegraph Office at 10.45; arrived at the Foreign Office August 2 at 12.10 a.m. Copy submitted to the Emperor, who returned it to the Foreign Office on the 2d of August.
[3] In the margin two question-marks by the Emperor.
[4] "to give up her neutrality" twice underscored by the Emperor.
[5] From a copy [in English]. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 46.
[6] Time of filing in London and arrival at Berlin not noted on the copy. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 2.
[7] See No. 575.

No. 613

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassadors at Vienna and Rome [1]

Telegrams 221, 160.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

Prince Lichnowsky's announcement [3] based on a misunderstanding.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 614

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 169.

ROME, *August 1, 1914.*[5]

Together with the Austrian Ambassador, I again urged most earnestly Italy's joining with the allies. Marquis di San Giuliano claimed to have received no news from Vienna so far and would make no promises, but was willing to bring the matter before the Ministerial Council for discussion once more this evening. He persistently repeated the foreign and internal reasons [6] *accepted here* in defense of *non-participation* in the war.

Scoundrel, the King hasn't even answered me. So if we do not respect Belgian neutrality, England attacks us and Italy deserts us, that is the situation in a nutshell! So there is betrayal of the allies, as well!

Austrian Ambassador has the same impression that I have, that consideration for *attitude of England* is controlling factor *here.* Marquis di San Giuliano repeatedly insisted that Italian coasts and harbors could not be exposed to English cannon.[7] They are also afraid here that troops in Libya might be cut off from subsistence. I learn secretly from a confidential agent of Mr. Barrère's that Mr. Barrère had stated that the *Italian Government* had taken steps to approach the *English Government.* So perhaps in spite of Marquis di San Giuliano's denials, *some sort of agreement* with England *has been reached.*

FLOTOW.

[1] From the original. Draft dictated by Stumm.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 12.50 a.m.
[3] See No. 607.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Rome at 10.55 p.m., August 1; arrived at the Foreign Office August 2 at 1.07 a.m.; receipt stamp, August 2, a.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, who, by marginal instructions, ordered its communication to the General Staff; returned by the Emperor on August 2. Communicated on the same day to the General Staff, the Admiralty Staff, the Imperial Naval Office and the Ministry of War.
[6] Three exclamation-points by the Emperor in the margin. See Nos. 745, 748 and 840.
[7] Exclamation-point by the Emperor in the margin.

No. 615

The Ambassador at Madrid to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 18. SAN SEBASTIAN, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Spanish Minister of State informed Austrian Ambassador upon his inquiry that Spanish Government *will maintain an absolute neutrality.* Request rules for my conduct in case Spain should nevertheless later fail or be unable to preserve her neutrality. Austrian Ambassador making the same inquiry of Vienna.

RATIBOR.

Then she can not permit troops from Morocco to be brought through her territories! [3]

No. 616

The Minister at Copenhagen to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 42. COPENHAGEN, *August 1, 1914.*[5]

Danish Minister at Berlin being instructed to make following communication to the Imperial Government:

> For the completion of the "*peace strength,*" *eighteen thousand more* men are being called in to the various garrison localities over the country.[6]

i. e., They are mobilizing.

The troops will not be concentrated at specific places, for instance, on the frontier, and the measure does not indicate mobilization, the Minister for Foreign Affairs insistently reiterated to me personally. Mr. von Scavenius added that it was being definitely stated here that Germany was mobilizing. The Danish Government was therefore compelled to order these enlistments, by means of which an effective peace strength would be reached; there would now be *about thirty thousand men* under arms. The radical Cabinet, the Minister declared, was in a particularly difficult situation with relation to the country, since Minister of War Munch was known to be an anti-militarist. The *military men wanted to prove* that *they had a raison d'être,* consequently the Government was compelled to make this concession, in order to avoid the reproach that they had endangered the safety of the nation and the chance of maintaining its neutrality.

The next proof will be the crossing of our frontiers.

The Minister told me confidentially that His Majesty was

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in San Sebastian at 9 p.m., August 1; arrived at the Foreign Office August 2 at 1.35 a.m.; receipt stamp, August 2, a.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, who noted on it: "5.30 p.m." Returned to the Foreign Office August 2. Communicated to the Admiralty Staff by telephone.

[3] See No. 618.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in Copenhagen August 1 at 8.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 2 at 2.40 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, a.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, was returned to the Foreign Office August 2. Communicated to the General Staff, the Admiralty Staff, the Ministry of War and the Imperial Naval Office.

[6] See No. 724.

seriously troubled. Minister of War Munch was being sharply attacked in the papers and his resignation was being demanded. Mr. Scavenius stated, however, that he hoped and felt sure that the Cabinet would survive.

RANTZAU.

No. 617

The Minister at Lisbon to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 66. LISBON, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Premier informed German journalists today that it was out of the question that Portugal should *fail in fulfiling the obligations of her alliance with England.* Under these circumstances we must reckon on the possibility of having to break off diplomatic relations. Please wire instructions as to whether in such an event,
Yes. I should go to Spain, and turn over Legation as well as German interests to Spanish Legation.[3]

ROSEN.

No. 618

The Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 88. TANGIER, *August 1, 1914.*[5]

As stated in unrefuted reports in the Casablanca papers of Thursday,[6] the Resident General is instructed to hold *20,000 men ready for embarkation for France.* Reliable reports are coming from Casablanca that *concentration of troops* is taking place *there.* The fact that since early this morning the Sheriff has permitted no more telegrams in code to come through is further evidence that *troop movements are taking place*[7] (which) they are endeavoring to keep secret. *In accordance with news which has leaked through in Casablanca,* the French Government is said to have the intention of *withdrawing from the interior of Morocco* at the outbreak of war and to confine itself to the *protection of the coast cities,* in order to be able to throw all the *troops possible into the European theater of war.*[8]

DIECKHOFF.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Lisbon at 9.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.40 a.m. August 2; receipt stamp, August 2, a.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor and returned to the Foreign Office August 2.
[3] See No. 651.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Tangier at 10.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 2 at 3.13 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, a.m. Submitted to the Emperor, returned to the Foreign Office August 2. Communicated on the 2d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.
[6] July 30.
[7] Evidently a word missing in the decodification.
[8] Cf. No. 665.

No. 619

The Minister at Luxemburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 16. LUXEMBURG, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

Minister of State Eyschen has just informed me: "This [3] evening about seven o'clock five officers and a number of soldiers of the 69th Regiment Trèves came in automobiles to Ulflingen, took possession of the railroad station and telegraph office and destroyed the latter as well as 150 meters of rail in the direction of Belgium. Later other automobiles arrived, which summoned away the first automobilists and stated that a mistake had been made." Mr. Eyschen, who had already appealed by telegraph to the Foreign Office, very evidently does not take the happening too seriously, and said that the occurrence would be considered settled upon the receipt of an apology to the local Government.[4]

BUCH.

No. 620

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [5]

Telegram 222.
Urgent. BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*[6]

His Majesty the Emperor ordered general mobilization this afternoon at five o'clock.

JAGOW.

No. 621

The Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [7]

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[8]

I beg to be informed immediately in writing whether naval operations against Russia are to begin at once, and, if so, whether proclamation of the declaration of war against Russia may be made to the Navy.[9]

v. TIRPITZ.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Luxemburg at 12.10 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.57 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, a.m. Communicated on the 2d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.
[3] The 1st of August is meant; see No. 602.
[4] See No. 640.
[5] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office August 2 at 4.35 a.m. Arrived at the Embassy at Vienna at 8.30 a.m.
[7] From the corrected copy. Marginal annotation in Radowitz's handwriting: "presented August 2, 4.50 a.m."; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 2, a.m.
[8] Below the communication a note in Radowitz's handwriting: "In spite of explanations by telephone, the State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office insists on immediate written authorization, as without it he cannot undertake any military measures."
[9] See No. 623.

No. 622

The Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 24. CATTARO, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Today at a single session the assembled Skupshtina gave the Ministry a vote of confidence and decided to leave the Government a free hand in every direction. It demands, however, that war be declared on Austria, in order that they may go to the aid of the Serbian brothers. The Government, so I was informed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is not bound by this demand, and intends first to await the progress of events.

ZECH.

No. 623

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office [3]

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[4]

As a result of the crossing of our frontiers by Russian troops we find ourselves at war with Russia.

I have the honor of most respectfully suggesting to Your Excellency to undertake whatever military measures may be necessary in this case.

v. JAGOW.

No. 624

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Petersburg [5]

Telegram 163. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[6]

Please demand your passports from the Russian Government and turn over the protection of German interests to the American Embassy.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Cattaro at 11.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.20 a.m., August 2; receipt stamp: August 2, a.m. Communicated on the 2d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. On August 4, p.m. also communicated to the Ambassador at Vienna.

[3] From the original. Draft in Radowitz's handwriting.

[4] Sent by messenger August 2 at 6.02 a.m. See No. 621.

[5] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting.

[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.10 a.m.

No. 625

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Paris [1]

Telegram 187. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

Kindly inform Government there in writing, when you deliver the declaration of war, that we shall detain merchant ships in our harbors, flying their flag, but shall release them if we receive within forty-eight hours a corresponding promise in return.

JAGOW.

No. 626

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [3]

Telegram 207. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[4]

In the event that England should declare war on us or we on England, kindly inform the Government there in writing:

1. That we shall detain merchant ships in our harbors flying their flag, but shall release them if we receive within forty-eight hours a corresponding promise in return.
2. That in consideration of English law, we shall suspend English claims against German subjects, if we do not receive within twenty-four hours consent to the continued legal validity of German claims against English subjects.

JAGOW.

No. 627

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [5]

Telegram 223.
Urgent. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[6]

We are now at war with Russia, since Russian troops crossed our frontiers at several points yesterday and committed hostile acts. We had already instructed the Imperial Ambassador at Petersburg to declare war yesterday afternoon, in the event that an unsatisfactory reply to our demands was received; but we have received from the Ambassador neither any report concerning Russia's answer to our demands, nor the delivery of the declaration of war. We expect from Austria the fulfilment of the obligations of her alliance and an immediate and energetic activity against Russia.

Please inform them there immediately of the above, and wire answer.[7]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the original. Draft dictated by the Director of the Law Division of the Foreign Office, Dr. Kriege. [2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.20 a.m.
[3] From the original. Draft dictated by Kriege.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.20 a.m.
[5] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.35 a.m. Time of arrival at the Embassy in Vienna not entered in the records there.
[7] See No. 672.

No. 628

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Rome [1]

Telegram 161. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

His Majesty the Emperor ordered general mobilization yesterday at five o'clock. As the result of the attack of Russian troops on German territory we find ourselves in a state of war with Russia. We had already instructed the Imperial Ambassador at Petersburg to declare war yesterday afternoon, in the event that an unsatisfactory reply to our demands was received, but we have received from the Ambassador neither any report concerning Russia's answer to our demands, nor the delivery of the declaration of war. The war with Russia will unquestionably result in an attack upon us by France and in a war with the latter. We expect from Italy the fulfilment of the obligations of her alliance. Please inform them there immediately of the above and wire answer.[3]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 629

The Imperial Chancelor to the Emperor [4]

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[5]

YOUR MAJESTY:

According to a report from the General Staff (at four o'clock this morning), there was an attempt at railroad wrecking and an advance by two squadrons of Cossacks on Johannisberg. Have reported the foregoing at once to Vienna and Rome with request for statement concerning fulfilment of alliance obligations, and added, for the benefit of Rome, that we expected a French attack. Passports are being handed to the Russian Ambassador.

In accordance with understanding with Ministry of War and General Staff, presentation of declaration of war to France not necessary today for any MILITARY reasons. Consequently it will not be done, in the hope that the French will attack us.

Communication concerning state of war with Russia to be published early today, at half past four, through Wolff dispatch.

Your Majesty's most humble servant,

v. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No news from Petersburg.

[1] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.35 a.m.
[3] See No. 675.
[4] From the corrected copy.
[5] Forwarded by the Emperor to the Imperial Naval Office August 2 at 9 a.m., through Aide-de-Camp von Mutius; returned to the Foreign Office on the morning of the 3d of August through the Military Cabinet.

No. 630

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram (unnumbered).
Urgent.

LONDON, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

As is apparent in my recent telegrams,[3] the matter again referred to in telegram 206 [4] from there is entirely settled, and our freedom of action is not affected by it.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 631

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 217.

LONDON, *August 2, 1914.*[6]

Suggestions of Sir E. Grey, which were founded on wish to secure France's permanent neutrality, if possible, were made without previous communication with France and without knowledge of the mobilization, and have since been abandoned entirely as hopeless. Urgently request reply as to whether telegrams 212, 214 and urgent uncoded telegram unnumbered [7] have arrived.[8]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 632

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris [9]

Telegram 188.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[10]

Telegram 187[11] does not mean that Your Excellency is to present the declaration of war at the present time.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the copy of the telegram, sent uncoded.
[2] Filed in London at 5 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.52 a.m.; receipt stamp, August 2, a.m.
[3] See Nos. 596 and 603.
[4] See No. 605.
[5] From the decodification. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 47.
[6] Filed in London at 6.28 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.55 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, a.m. See No. 605; cf. also No. 562.
[7] See Nos. 596, 603 and 630.
[8] For answer see No. 635.
[9] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting.
[10] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.10 a.m.
[11] See No. 625.

No. 633

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris [1]

Telegram 189.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

Announcement of Prince Lichnowsky based on a misunderstanding.[3]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 634

The Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [4]

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[5]

I have the honor of replying to Your Excellency concerning the telephonic inquiry made last night at 12.45 by the Under-Secretary of State of the Foreign Office relative to the holding of the English merchant vessels, as follows:

Foreign merchant vessels were detained at Cuxhaven solely DURING THE LAYING of the mine barriers, as otherwise the vessels would have been endangered. AFTER the mine barriers HAVE BEEN COMPLETED, at noon today, vessels will be allowed to run out of naval harbors.[6]

For the Secretary of State,

V. CAPELLE.

No. 635

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [7]

Telegram 208.

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[8]

All telegrams have arrived.[9]

JAGOW.

[1] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.45 a.m., August 2.
[3] See No. 587.
[4] From the corrected copy in Capelle's handwriting.
[5] Received at the Foreign Office on the 2d of August.
[6] On this is Zimmermann's marginal instruction, dated August 2: "Please request His Excellency to have the English Ambassador receive an oral explanation in connection with his representation of yesterday." See No. 610. In the archives is also a copy of the telegraphic order of the Imperial Naval Office to the North Sea stations, Cuxhaven and Geestemünde Commands: "At the urgent request of the Foreign Office, and until further notice, do not detain foreign merchant vessels, particularly the English ones. When there are special military reasons, apply here for permission to detain. Naval Office."
[7] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting.
[8] To the Central Telegraph Office August 2 at 11 a.m. Telegram was sent uncoded.
[9] See No. 631.

No. 636

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Senatorial Committee for Imperial and Foreign Affairs of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

Please hand passports to the Russian Minister, but not to the French Consul General at the present time.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 637

The Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [4]

Telegram (unnumbered).

I have the honor of bringing the following facts to the knowledge of Your Excellency: According to information just received by the Grand-Ducal Government, early Sunday morning, August 2, German troops forced their way into Luxemburg across the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, making their way principally toward the south of the country and toward the city of Luxemburg capital of the Grand-Duchy. A certain number of armed trains loaded with soldiers and munitions were transported over the railroad from Wasserbillig toward Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected at any moment. These facts imply actions manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government has not failed to protest energetically against this act of aggression to the representative of His Majesty the Emperor in Luxemburg.[5]

EYSCHEN,
Minister of State and President of the Government.

August 1,[6] 1914.

[1] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11 a.m., August 2.
[3] See No. 591.
[4] From the copy [in French] of the Central Telegraph Office. Filed in Luxemburg at 8 a.m.; received at the Berlin Central Telegraph Office at 11.10 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, a.m.
[5] See Nos. 638, 644, 647 and 649.
[6] Plainly an error for August 2.

No. 638

The Grand Duchess of Luxemburg to the Emperor [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). LUXEMBURG, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

HIS MAJESTY THE GERMAN EMPEROR, BERLIN.

At this moment the Grand Duchy is being occupied by German troops. My Government has lodged a protest in the proper quarter and has demanded an explanation of the occurrence. I beg Your Majesty to hasten this explanation and to respect the country's rights.[3]

MARIE ADELHEID.

No. 639

Draft of a Note to the Luxemburg Government submitted by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army [4]

To its great regret, the German Government was so suddenly faced with the necessity of sending forward a few troops on to Luxemburg territory for the protection of the German railroads in Luxemburg, that there was no time for it to make arrangements with the Luxemburg Government in advance. The measure we took was made unavoidable by the reports from France which have been received here, and according to which, French armed forces are now advancing toward the Luxemburg frontier. The Luxemburg Government may rest assured that absolutely no hostile intentions on the part of Germany against her neighbor and friend Luxemburg, lie at the bottom of the action made compulsory by the military situation. The German Government gives the binding assurance that it intends neither to infringe on or to threaten in any way the stability of the Duchy or of its rulers. On the contrary, Germany will gladly undertake to guarantee that, if Luxemburg on her part undertakes no hostile action against Germany or her troops, the Luxemburg nation will be unconditionally recognized as it is at present constituted, upon the conclusion of peace.

[1] From the copy of the Palace telegraph office. Uncoded telegram.

[2] Filed in Luxemburg August 2 at 10.45 a.m.; received at the Berlin Palace telegraph office at 11.10 a.m. Through Aide-de-Camp von Mutius first forwarded to the Chief of the General Staff, who took note of it August 2, and thence to the Imperial Chancelor. Receipt stamp: August 2, p.m.

[3] See Nos. 637, 644, 647 and 649. Reply was made on the 6th of August; to the telegraph office at 5.45 p.m.

[4] Written at Moltke's dictation on August 2. Superseded by the telegrams here printed (Nos. 640, 642 and 643). General Staff informed of them August 2 at 12.15 p.m. by telephone from the Foreign Office. The draft contains later penciled additions and eliminations by the Foreign Office.

No. 640

The Imperial Chancelor to the Minister at Luxemburg [1]

Telegram 12. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.* [2]

Our military measures in Luxemburg indicate no hostile action against Luxemburg, but are solely measures for the protection of the railroads under our management there, against an attack by the French. Luxemburg will receive full compensation for any possible damages. Kindly inform local Government.[3]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 641

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 218. LONDON, *August 2, 1914.*[5]

The question as to whether we are going to violate Belgian territory in our war with France may be of decisive importance in determining that of England's neutrality. This impression of mine is decidedly corroborated, not alone by Sir E. Grey's statements, but by information from the Austrian Embassy and by the local press. Should we violate the neutrality of Belgium and a war with the Belgians were to result from it, I believe that the Government would be unable to remain neutral much longer, in the face of the storm that could then be expected from aroused local public opinion. On the other hand, should we respect Belgian neutrality, it is always possible that England would remain neutral, if, in the event of victory over France, we should proceed with moderation. But since it is beginning to be believed here that a violation of Belgian neutrality is to be reckoned with, I think it not impossible that England will take a stand against us within a very short time. Today, Sunday, a meeting of the Cabinet takes place, and I assume that this question will undoubtedly be taken up at it.[6]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 642

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris [7]

Telegram 190. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[8]

Our military measures in Luxemburg indicate no hostile action, but are solely measures of protection for the railroads under our management there by virtue of a state treaty. Kindly explain to the Government.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting, with alterations by the Imperial Chancelor.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office August 2 at 11.30 a.m. The telegram was sent uncoded.
[3] See Nos. 602 and 619. [4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in London at 9.10 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.47 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Communicated on August 2 to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. [6] See No. 667.
[7] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting, with alterations by the Imperial Chancelor.
[8] To the Central Telegraph Office on the 2d of August at 11.55 a.m.

No. 643

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [1]

Telegram 209. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

We were compelled to undertake military measures in Luxemburg for the protection of the railroads there under our management by virtue of a state treaty and engaged in our service, against a threatening attack by the French. The measures indicate no hostile action against Luxemburg, which is promised full compensation for any possible damages.

Kindly explain to the Government.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 644

The Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (?) [3]

Telegram (unnumbered). LUXEMBURG, *August 2, 1914.*[4]

I have just informed Your Excellency, over the telephone, of the fact of the appearance of German officers and troops on Grand Ducal territory. I learn that a railroad train with a force of occupation is on its way to Luxemburg, and that a great number of automobiles have passed through Wasserbillig to Luxemburg. The Grand Ducal Government protests energetically against this flagrant violation of the neutrality of the country, reserving all further rights. Kindly transmit this protest to the Imperial Government at once.[5]

MINISTER OF STATE EYSCHEN.

No. 645

The Consul General at Basel to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 3. ST. LUDWIG, *August 2, 1914.*[7]

A French woman . . . ,[8] whose son is an officer at Belfort, is said to have reported early this morning in passing through Basel, that at the present moment there were 180,000 men assembled at Belfort and 45,000 at Delle.

[1] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting.

[2] To the Central Telegraph Office on the 2d of August at 12.15 p.m.

[3] From the copy received at the Central Telegraph Office. Uncoded telegram. To judge from the manner of the address and the closing sentence it would appear to be based on a telephone conversation between the Luxemburg Minister of State and the German Minister at Luxemburg, which was sent forward in this form.

[4] Filed in Luxemburg at 10.40 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office on the 2d of August. The Luxemburg Minister handed the same protest to the German Minister at Luxemburg at 6.35 a.m. on the 2d of August; it was sent by the latter to the Foreign Office by telegraph; filed in Luxemburg at 8.26 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.20 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m.

[5] See Nos. 637, 638, 647 and 649.

[6] From the decodification.

[7] Filed at St. Ludwig at 9.50 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.45 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office on the 2d of August.

[8] Gap in the decodification.

Today a French spy, who was releasing carrier-pigeons, was arrested at Basel. He is said to have been sending to France, by carrier-pigeons, information concerning German troop movements, which he had secured from a peasant at Blotsheim and a reserve officer at Mühlheim.[1]

WUNDERLICH.

No. 646

The Imperial Chancelor to the Minister at Bucharest[2]

Telegram 68. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[3]

Please declare to King Carol and Government immediately that we have been forced into war with Russia by the behavior of Russia and by her attack upon our territory. General mobilization order was issued yesterday. We request the immediate mobilization of the Roumanian army and its advance against Russia. Telegraph confirmation of receipt. Wire report.[4]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 647

The Minister at Luxemburg to the Foreign Office[5]

Telegram 18. LUXEMBURG, *August 2, 1914.*[6]

At eight-thirty o'clock this morning Mr. Eyschen informed me that the Luxemburg railroad station and the line from Treves to Luxemburg were under occupation. Mr. Eyschen urgently demands a reply to the question whether the occupation is to be restricted to a portion of the country, or whether the entire country is to be occupied, and what is the purpose, direct or indirect, of these measures.

BUCH.

[1] See No. 678.
[2] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting.
[3] To the Central Telegraph Office at 12.50 p.m.
[4] See No. 786. Telegraphic confirmation of receipt (60) was sent on the 3d of August.
[5] From the decodification.
[6] Filed in Luxemburg at 12.54 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.20 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, 1914. See Nos. 637, 638, 644 and 649.

No. 648

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Brussels [1]

Telegram 42.
Urgent.
Secret.

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

Your Excellency will open the enclosure [3] of dispatch 88 [4] immediately and carry out the instructions contained therein thsi evening at eight o'clock, German[5] time. However, under No. 1 in the declaration of the Imperial Government, the words "not only" and the clause beginning "but it will even be prepared" are to be omitted. Furthermore, the reply thereto is to be demanded within twelve hours, and not within twenty-four hours, consequently by eight o'clock tomorrow morning. Please assure the Belgian Government most earnestly [6] that there is absolutely no doubt of the accuracy of our information as to the French plans, despite the promises made at Paris.[7]

For Your Excellency's personal information: [8] Belgian answer must be received here by two o'clock tomorrow afternoon, German time. Your Excellency will therefore wire the reply here as quickly as possible, and, furthermore, immediately upon receiving it, forward it by automobile to General von Emmich at the Union Hotel at Aix, through a member of the Imperial Legation, preferably the Military Attaché.

The Belgian Government must be left under the impression that *all* of the instructions relating to this affair had reached you for the first time today.[9] I further suggest that you propose to the Belgian Government that it might retire with its troops to Antwerp, and that we, if it should be so desired, could undertake the protection of Brussels against internal disturbances.[10]

Telegraph confirmation of receipt.[11]

JAGOW.

[1] From the typewritten copy at hand, with alterations and additions in the handwriting of Rosenberg and Jagow; an original first draft in the handwriting of Rosenberg, on which this draft was based, is also in the archives.

[2] The final draft was gone over by Jagow (no date given), and by Zimmermann, Stumm and Rosenberg on the 2d of August; to the Central Telegraph Office August 2. The first draft was paraphrased by Rosenberg on no given date, and by Zimmermann on the 31st of July. Cf. No. 662, note 2.

[3] See No. 376.

[4] See No. 375 and note 2 there.

[5] "German" an alteration by Rosenberg from "Central European." In the first draft room was left before "European" for the insertion of either "Central" or "Western".

[6] Thus instead of "expressly" in the first draft.

[7] Instead of "promises made at Paris" the first draft read "French promises of neutrality."

[8] "For Your Excellency's personal information" added by Jagow.

[9] Sentence as in the first draft: "The Belgian Government must also get the impression that the dispatch ordering the declaration was dated yesterday and just came through today." ("yesterday" crossed out and replaced by "today"; latter crossed out in its turn and "yesterday" written in again for the second time).

[10] Sentence: "I further suggest . . . internal disturbances" added in Jagow's handwriting.

[11] Telegraphic confirmation from Below to the Foreign Office filed at Brussels at 5.25 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.38 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m.

No. 649

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

The military measures were, to our great regret, made unavoidable by the fact that we have received reliable information according to which French armed forces are advancing on Luxemburg. We were forced to take the measures for the protection of our Army and for the security of the railroads. No hostile action against the friendly Luxemburg is in the least intended by us. There was unfortunately no time for previous arrangement with the Luxemburg Government, as the danger was imminent. The Imperial Government assures Luxemburg of full compensation for any damages caused by us.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 650

The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 22. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[5]

Chief of the General Staff Selliers has told Captain Brinckmann that the Belgian army would oppose, in case of need, any landing of English troops. As against this, an official of the Ministry of War says he has heard from the mouth of the Premier that a landing on the part of the English will be permitted. Official referred to is Flemish and a friend to the Germans.

BELOW.

No. 651

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Lisbon [6]

Telegram 53. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[7]

Should the Portuguese Government break off diplomatic relations with us, please confide Legation and German interests to the care of the American Legation. Your Excellency's return route left to your own judgment.[8]

JAGOW.

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting. See Nos. 637, 638, 644 and 647.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office August 2, at 2.10 p.m. Telegram sent uncoded.
[3] See No. 730.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Brussels at 12.39 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Communicated on the 2d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, who noted on it: "7 o'clock p.m." Returned to the Foreign Office on the 2d of August.
[6] From a copy of the original draft.
[7] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3 p.m.
[8] See No. 617.

No. 652

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 396. THERAPIA, *August 1, 1914.*[2]

Margrave Pallavicini has just informed the Grand Vizier in my presence that, according to reliable information received in Vienna, an attack on the Bosphorus by the Russian fleet is planned.

In case the *Goeben* is not necessarily to be used in the Mediterranean, she might, reinforced by the Turkish fleet, be able to hold the Russian Black Sea fleet in check, assure the cable connection with Roumania, and prevent a Russian landing on the Bulgarian coast.[3] In case the cable should be cut, notwithstanding that, we would under the circumstances for the moment be cut off from Europe. Austrian station ship *Taurus* has left Constantinople. *Loreley* is without wireless apparatus.

WANGENHEIM.

No. 653

The Minister at Christiania to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 22. CHRISTIANIA,[5] *August 2, 1914.*[6]

Learn from private French sources that French Legation here has advised men subject to military service to leave as soon as possible, before connections are interrupted, although mobilization order has not yet arrived here.

OBERNDORFF.

No. 654

The Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [7]

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[8]

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE:

According to a communication from the Imperial Post Office, Anglo-German cable connections have been broken by England.[9]

I respectfully request Your Excellency to inform us in writing whether, as a result of this fact, we are to consider ourselves as in a state of war with England.[10]

v. TIRPITZ.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Therapia August 1 at 12.20 p. m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 2 at 3.20 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] See Nos. 683, 712 and 775.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] "Hamburg" in the decodification.

[6] Filed at Christiania at 2.10 (a.m. or p.m. not indicated); arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.43 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[7] From the corrected copy.

[8] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office, August 2, p.m.

[9] See No. 680.

[10] See No. 657.

No. 655

The Chief of the Admiralty Staff to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

Absolutely secret. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

Following telegram was sent at 11.10 a.m. today to the Fleet Command, the North Sea Station, the Commander of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces and the Baltic Sea Station:

Outbreak of hostilities against France probably August 3. Hostile intervention of England then to be immediately expected. Since England's decision has not yet been made, measures unfriendly to England must in every way be avoided for the present.

Secrecy order still holds.

By order of the Admiralty Staff,

BEHNCKE.

No. 656

The Belgian Minister to the Foreign Office

THE BELGIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE BELGIAN MINISTER AT BERLIN [3]

BRUSSELS, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

MY DEAR BARON:

The international situation is serious; the possibility of a conflict between several of the Powers can no longer be excluded from our calculations.

We have always observed, with the most scrupulous exactness, the duties of a neutral State which are imposed upon us by the treaties of April 19, 1839. Whatever the circumstances, we shall unswervingly devote ourselves to the fulfilment of these duties.

The friendly disposition of the Powers toward us has so often been confirmed, that we are confident that Belgian territory will remain free from any attack, in the event that hostilities should break out on our frontiers.

All the necessary measures to insure the preservation of our neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government of the King. The Belgian army is mobilized and is stationed in the strategic positions which have been selected in order to insure the defense of the country and respect for its neutrality. The forts at Antwerp and on the Meuse are in a state of defense.

It is scarcely necessary, my dear Baron, to point out the nature of these measures. They have no other object than that of placing us in a position to fulfil our international obligations. It goes without saying, that they are not and could not be inspired either with the purpose of taking part in an armed conflict between the Powers, nor by a feeling of defiance against any one of them.

[1] From the corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp: August 2, p.m.
[3] From a copy [in French] presented by the Belgian Minister. See first Belgian Grey Book, No. 2, Supp. and No. 16.
[4] Note by Zimmermann on the 2d of August: "Communicated by the Belgian Minister." Receipt stamp: August 2, p.m.

I beg you to read and to leave a copy of this dispatch with His Excellency the Secretary of State of the Imperial Foreign Office, and to request His Excellency to take note of it.

The same communication has been made to the other Powers which are guarantors of our neutrality.

Accept, my dear Baron, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 657

Draft of an unsent communication from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office [1]

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

I have the honor of replying to Your Excellency's respected communication of today that, according to our views, the interruption of the Anglo-German cable communication by England does not constitute an occasion for a state of war.

No. 658

The Ambassador at Rome to the Imperial Chancelor [3]

ROME, *July 30, 1914.*[4]

The Italian Government has now set down its point of view on the pending questions in three newspapers, the *Giornale d'Italia*, the *Popolo Romano* and the *Tribuna*. The official explanations are summed up in the following sentences:

Italy's position is, in its fundamentals, plainly and firmly established by the international agreements, to which it holds with the utmost conscientiousness. The principles which Italy has to maintain in her policy can only be determined by her own personal interests, and by the obligations undertaken by her in view of these interests, both of which are connected with each other by the closest intimacy. Events and their consequences will determine her future attitude.

German journalists here regard the declaration as favorable to the interests of the Triple Alliance. They are influenced in this opinion by the fact that in the first publication of the statement in the *Giornale d'Italia* a sentence was included that bore a sting for Austria. This sentence stated that Italy would not permit the exercise of domination in the Balkans by another Power. The non-appearance of this sentence in the second and the following editions they attribute to the direct interference of the administration. They are still further supported in their optimistic view by a speech of the nationalist leader Pantaleoni, which was very friendly to the Triple Alliance. They say that the latter would not have expressed himself in this manner, had he not known that he was voicing the views of the Government.

[1] Draft in Stumm's handwriting. In the margin a note of Stumm's on August 2: "Stop. Attended to by a similar notification to Admiral von Tirpitz."

[2] See No. 654.

[3] From the corrected copy.

[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 2, p.m.

I am unable to agree with this opinion, without further evidence. The involved phraseology of the official communication, as well as the absence of any definite statement regarding the attitude of the Government, seem to me rather to indicate that under any circumstances, it will be necessary to count upon a sophisticated interpretation of the terms of the treaty.

FLOTOW.

No. 659

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the Foreign Office [1]

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*

NOTIFICATION

The Imperial and Royal Ambassador at Tokyo reports that according to the opinion of the Chinese Minister there, who is probably the most interested party, Japan, in the absence of Chinese opposition, and once Russia were deeply involved in the war, could, even without any doubt, take both Manchuria and Mongolia. The case, as it existed two years ago, that China and Japan together were to drive Russia out of Mongolia, would no longer come into consideration. Should England also be drawn into the war, Japan could also take the Yangtse Valley on her own terms.[2]

No. 660

The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Imperial Chancelor [3]

ATHENS, *July 27, 1914.*[4]

As I have already had the honor of reporting to Your Excellency,[5] the Greek Government has given the Serbian Government to understand that it will not take part in a military conflict between Austria and Serbia.

This declaration may have occasioned some disappointment in Serbia, since they had apparently held the hope there that the ally of Serbia, who stood at her side in all the Balkan matters, would not remain neutral in a conflict with Austria. At any rate I learn quite confidentially that the local Serbian Minister had expressed the distinct expectation that Greece would openly take the part of Serbia, and he appeared to have been greatly surprised and disappointed—of course, in the friendliest manner—at the refusal to do so.

Out of consideration for the general public opinion here, which is very friendly to the Serbians, the Government has, for the present, confided its attitude confidentially only to the representatives of a few of the Powers, and no official announcement relating to the matter has yet been issued.

[1] Handed over unsigned by Baron Haymerle on the 2d of August. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 2, p.m.

[2] To this is added a note of Zimmermann's, dated August 3: "It seems superfluous to me to pass on this very fantastic piece of information any further."

[3] From the corrected copy.

[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 2, p.m. Report was submitted to the Emperor. Returned to the Foreign Office on the 4th of August.

[5] See No. 189.

The too pro-Serbian expressions of the press, concerning which I respectfully propose to report later, appear to be causing the Government some discomfort.

At any rate, Mr. Streit is attempting to prevent their circulation, and has stated to a local German correspondent that they do not represent the views of the Government.

It is apparent from this fact that the Greek Government is earnestly striving to prevent from being disturbed the newly established good relations with Austria.

R. BASSEWITZ.

No. 661

Article from the "Berliner Tageblatt" of August 2, 1914,[1] with marginal annotations by the Emperor [2]

WHAT WILL ENGLAND DO?

Telegram from our Correspondent. LONDON, *August 1.*

The Liberal English press is also announcing emphatically today that England is reserving for herself FREEDOM OF ACTION. The *Daily Chronicle* states definitely that it depends ENTIRELY ON CIRCUMSTANCES, whether England will take part, or not, and adds: "In case of the outbreak of war on the continent, we are involved in NO OPEN OR SECRET AGREEMENTS limiting our FREEDOM to DECIDE whether we shall take part in such a war or not. This has repeatedly been declared both by the Premier and by Sir Edward Grey." The paper goes on to say that in the main, the test of strength lies between Germany and Russia, and then continues: "Before we could agree to the SUPPORT OF RUSSIA, it would be absolutely necessary that the Foreign Office should obtain from RUSSIA A PROMISE that she would not continue her anti-British policy in PERSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA." The conservative *Times* says: "England's policy is clearly and unmistakably indicated in advance. We want peace, and, furthermore, will do our utmost to maintain it. When we consider ourselves to be compelled to draw the sword, it will be with the greatest reluctance and without passion. Whatever may occur, this war can not be for us a war of national hatreds. There is nothing for us to take and nothing to gain. But we can not stand by with folded arms and look quietly on when our friends are threatened with the danger of destruction. If we should do this, our own turn would come soon, and no one would stir a hand to save us. It is not peace which, at such a moment, is of the most importance to us, but the right of self-preservation, which is common to all mankind. In case it should become necessary for us to intervene, then all England will hesitate at no sacrifice to end the war with victory."

The English fleet protects France's northern coast by tying up our Fleet. That is the cooperation of an ally. Instead of the attitude of a neutral. For England prevents the cooperation of my Fleet with my army against the opponent with whom I am already at war. The latter commenced the war without declaring it, in violation of international law. Things can't be left this way! England must absolutely show her colors! Immediately! One way or another!

[1] Sunday edition.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 2. Returned by the Emperor to the Foreign Office on the 3d of August.

No. 662

The Chief of the General Staff of the Army to the Foreign Office [1]

Secret. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

I have the honor of presenting herewith to the Foreign Office some suggestions of a military-political nature, to which I attribute some value from a military point of view.

v. MOLTKE.

TURKEY

The treaty of alliance with Turkey should be made public immediately. Turkey ought to declare war on Russia as soon as possible.[3]

ENGLAND

Attempts must be made to instigate an uprising in India, if England takes a stand as our opponent.

The same thing should be attempted in Egypt; also in the Dominion of South Africa.

Should England make her neutrality in the German-Austro-Russo-French war dependent upon Germany's assurance "that she would act with moderation in case of a victory over France" (Foreign Office, No. 218; of August 2, 1914), then this assurance could be given her unconditionally and in the most binding form. It is not of consequence to us to ruin France—it is only of consequence to us to vanquish her. England's neutrality is of such importance to us that this concession could be made unconditionally.

SWEDEN

We should strive to get Sweden to mobilize her entire armed forces immediately and to proceed as soon as possible with her 6th Division against the Finnish border. Sweden's undertakings should be so guided that her measures would inspire and maintain in Russia the fear of an attack by her on Finland, as well as the possible landing of Swedish troops on the Russian coast. We must promise unconditionally to fulfil all of Sweden's desires, whether they relate to regaining Finland or are desires in other directions, so long as they are compatible with German interests.

Should Sweden declare herself willing to enter upon a joint war with Germany, then notice of this fact should at once be given at Copenhagen, with the request that the example of Sweden be followed.

Similar demands should be made of Norway, with allusion to Russia's aspiration—well recognized in Norway—to possess an ice-free harbor on the Norwegian coast, a wish that Russia would unquestionably turn at once into fact, were she to emerge a victor from the present war. The Russian aspirations can be effec-

[1] From the corrected copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 2, p.m.; evidently at hand before No. 648 was drawn up, as in the latter the "Belgium" of No. 662 is used.

[3] Beneath the text the note in Rosenberg's handwriting, under date of August 4: "The matter is satisfactorily settled."

tually blocked, if the Scandinavian nations will join with Germany to oppose Russia's unappeasable hunger for territory.

Germany has absolutely no intention of infringing upon the political status of the Norwegian kingdom, and would gladly oppose all Russia's schemes to this end, both at present and in the future.

Denmark

No further measures are necessary. Let our already announced declaration agreeing to respect her neutrality remain, so long as our opponents' measures do not force us to new counter-measures.

The Balkans

It is necessary to bring about as soon as possible a clarification of the situation in the Balkans. Austria must state frankly whether, under the present conditions of war, she will allow the agreements, which she has made with Bulgaria, to be realized. The attitude of Greece, and that of Roumania, must be also clarified.

All the information that can be obtained by us concerning the Balkan states must be passed on to Austria and to Turkey immediately.

Should Italy join in the war, she, too, should be kept fully and permanently instructed as to the situation in the Balkans. The information which, to my knowledge, has been received here, to the effect that Roumania was forced to remain neutral in a Russo-Austrian conflict, but had faithfully promised that under no circumstances would she go over to Russia's side, is of the greatest importance to Austria and must be communicated to her at once.

Belgium

So far as I know, the reply to Germany's summary demand is supposed to arrive, at the latest, tomorrow, Monday, August 3, at 2 p.m. I propose that a respite of twelve hours be granted for making the reply. If this should not be possible, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, the time set for presenting the demand should be altered accordingly. But I consider a twelve-hour respite to be the better plan.

Presentation of the note to Holland, simultaneously with the copy of the note to Belgium.

The same thing simultaneously in England, with the additional announcement that Germany, even in the event of a hostile clash with Belgium, will not threaten her status as a nation, but, on the other hand, will, after the conclusion of peace, guarantee that Belgium's integrity is preserved. England should be asked in this case to regard Germany's procedure merely as an act of compulsory self-protection against a French menace to German territory.

Italy

It is absolutely necessary that Italy be brought to declare immediately whether or not she is willing to take an active part in the approaching war, in accordance with the obligations of her alliance. To me it is of no importance that Italy should carry out to its full extent her agreement to dispatch bodies of troops to Germany; if she should send only one division of cavalry, that would appear sufficient to me.

It is not of consequence that Italy should support us actively with a strong force, but it is of consequence that the Triple Alliance, as such, should enter upon the war united. That would be shown by the smallest conceivable contribution of troops. I call attention to that document No. 2 of General Pollio given to the Foreign Office, "le Gouvernement me charge de dire à Votre Excellence p. p." [1]

Should Italy decide to take part in the war, it is necessary for us to receive early information as to the military measures planned by Italy, as well as the announcement of the date of the first day of mobilization in Italy, which could be accomplished by direct communication between the two General Staffs.

Russia

A declaration of war against Russia, or, respectively, of Russia against us, has become of no consequence, owing to the Russian invasion across our eastern boundary. If no declaration of war from Russia has reached us, or should be presented only after the first Russian operations, then Russia has acted contrary to the Hague agreements.

France

Our possible declaration of war is entirely independent of the move made in Belgium. One does not necessarily follow the other. I do not consider it necessary yet to deliver the declaration of war to France; on the other hand, I am counting on the likelihood that, if it is held back for the present, France, on her part, will be forced by public opinion to organize warlike measures against Germany, even if a formal declaration of war has not been presented. Presumably France will move into Belgium in the rôle of the protector of Belgian neutrality, just as soon as the step taken by Germany in Belgium becomes known in Paris.

On our side arrangements have been made so that the crossing of the French frontier will be avoided until activities on the part of France render it necessary.

Japan

Japan should be urged to use this favorable opportunity for satisfying her various aspirations in the Far East now, preferably by means of inaugurating hostilities against a Russia tied up by a European war.

Such desires as Japan believes she could accomplish by means of German cooperation, must be promised her. We can promise Japan anything that she wishes from us in this direction.

Persia

Persia should be urged to use the favorable opportunity for shaking off the Russian yoke, and, if possible, to go hand in hand with Turkey.[2]

[1] [The government instructs me to say to your Excellency. p.p.]

[2] To the words "hand in hand with Turkey," Mirbach remarks in a note: "This would presumably lead only to endless and resultless exchanges of opinion between the two clumsy and over-cautious Mussulman Governments."

No. 663

The Chief of the General Staff of the Army to the Foreign Office [1]

COMMUNICATION

CHIEF COMMAND 15 TO THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF

Telegram (unnumbered). STRASSBURG, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

During the night of August 1, frontier violations by French infantry took place opposite Markirch. The French opened fire first. No losses. Apparently there were also French frontier violations at the pass in the gorge. Corroboration of the latter to follow.

CHIEF COMMAND 15.

No. 664

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome [3]

Telegram 162. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[4]

In accordance with the report of the Chief Command of the 3d Bavarian Army Corps, French aviators are dropping bombs in the distant neighborhood of Nuremburg.[5] Furthermore, French patrols have crossed the frontier.[6] These hostile acts before a declaration of war constitute an attack on us by France.[7] As a result, a *casus foederis* is afforded.[8]

Russia, too, opened hostilities yesterday, before a declaration of war had been made.

JAGOW.

No. 665

The Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier to the Foreign Office [9]

Telegram 89. TANGIER, *August 2, 1914.*[10]

Yesterday's Casablanca paper reported an alleged exchange of dispatches between the French Minister of War and the Resident General. The latter was said to have stated himself ready to turn over thirty thousand men, in the

[1] From a copy.

[2] Given to the Foreign Office for its information by Lieutenant Colonel von Fabeck on behalf of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army. Receipt stamp: August 3, a.m.

[3] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.

[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 4.35 p.m.

[5] See No. 758.

[6] "Furthermore . . . frontier" added in Stumm's handwriting.

[7] This sentence originally cast in the singular, altered to the plural as the result of the addition of the preceding sentence added by Stumm.

[8] See No. 745.

[9] From the decodification.

[10] Filed in Tangier at 1.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.06 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor August 2. Communicated on the 2d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Also communicated to Rome on the 2d of August, after minor alterations, and addition of the words: "For communication, in case Italy joins us." To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.20 p.m.

event of a European conflict, and to have offered to lead them to France himself. Up to last evening there was nothing unusual visible at the military railroad station or in the harbor of Casablanca.[1]

DIECKHOFF.

No. 666

The Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 215.
Urgent.

PETERSBURG, *August 2, 1914.*[3]

Mr. Sazonoff has just inquired of me by telephone how the following could happen: His Majesty the Emperor of Russia had received a few hours before a telegram from our Most Gracious Master, which was dated at 10.45 p.m.,[4] and the last sentence of which contained the request that the Emperor Nicholas would order his troops in no event to cross the frontier. Mr. Sazonoff asked me how I explained such a request after having handed over the note of last evening.[6] I replied that I was unable to give [7] any other explanation than that probably the telegram of my Emperor had been filed at 10.45 night before last. If there is anything further to communicate [8] or to be cleared up here, I suggest that it be attended to direct, or perhaps through the medium of the Italian Ambassador, since I leave by way of Stockholm in three hours.

As Russians have already burned down Prussian villages and blown up railroads my reply is not needed.[5] *Russia didn't answer us, either.*

POURTALÈS.

No. 667

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [9]

Telegram 210.
Secret.

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[10]

We have certain information that the French, in spite of their declaration, have assembled large bodies of troops along the Belgian border and are making preparations for an invasion of Belgium. In order to prevent a surprise attack, we shall presumably have to take counter-measures. In this event, we will give Belgium the assurance, if she promises to observe a BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY toward us, that after the conclusion of the campaign we will respect the integrity of Belgium

[1] Cf. No. 618.
[2] From a copy of the uncoded, "urgent" telegram.
[3] Telegram filed in Petersburg at 5.50 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.19 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Submitted to the Emperor, returned by him August 2.
[4] See No. 600.
[5] The words: "reply is not needed" underlined by Mirbach with a blue pencil.
[6] See No. 542.
[7] According to a correcting telegram, received at the Foreign Office August 3 at 10.35 a.m., read "was able," an alteration from the original: "might be able."
[8] According to correcting telegram, read "to communicate," an alteration from the original: "to add in addition."
[9] Original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[10] To the Central Telegraph Office at 5.30 p.m. See No. 641.

to the fullest extent and will accord Belgium full compensation for requisitions and for any damages caused by us. England should see in Germany's procedure only an act of necessary self-defense against a French menace. Even in the event of a hostile encounter with Belgium, Germany will, after the conclusion of peace, guarantee that Belgium's integrity is preserved. Please communicate this information to the local Government, but not before tomorrow, Monday morning.[1]

JAGOW.

No. 668

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 155. VIENNA, *August 2, 1914.*[3]

Count Berchtold informed the Duke d'Avarna as follows this morning:

He had received the information from Rome, that it was eventually intended there to remain neutral, or only to take part later. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, he would say to him *que la déclaration que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a donnée hier* [4] *à votre Gouvernement au sujet de l'acceptation de votre interprétation de l'article 7, a été faite sur la base de notre ferme conviction que l'Italie remplisse dès le début ses devoirs d'allié conformément à l'article 3 du traité d'alliance.*

Report follows.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

Translation of the French Portion

that the declaration which was given yesterday to your Government by the Imperial and Royal Government concerning the acceptance of your interpretation of Article 7, was given on the strength of our firm conviction that Italy would perform from the beginning her obligations as an ally in accordance with Article 3 of the Treaty of Alliance.

No. 669

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 220. LONDON, *August 2, 1914.*[6]

TO THE ADMIRALTY STAFF AND THE GENERAL STAFF:

With the Foreign Office cipher.

Ambassador has the distinct impression, from conversation with Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, that England would like to remain neutral, if it is possible in any way. In order not to make this difficult, it would be advisable

[1] See No. 764.
[2] From the decodification.
[3] Filed in Vienna at 3.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m.
[4] See No. 594.
[5] From the decodification.
[6] Filed in London at 12.19 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.50 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor August 2. Communicated the same day to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

that our Navy should refrain from all activities which might lead to accidents or be regarded as provocations.

In this category would belong ABOVE ALL any naval operations against the northern coast of France, which has been left exposed on account of the confidence felt in England.[1] Naval operations against Russia are matters of no concern to England. The English will for the time being not approach German waters, and expect the same consideration from us. That is the view of the local Cabinet. Binding agreements have by no means been made.

MILITARY ATTACHÉ,
LICHNOWSKY.

No. 670

The Chief Command of the 8th Army Corps to the Grand General Staff [2]

Telegram (unnumbered). COBLENZ, *August 2, 1914.*[3]

President of the Government of Düsseldorf reports that early this morning eighty French officers in Prussian officers' uniforms attempted to cross the frontier in automobiles at Walbeck, west of Geldern, but without success.

CHIEF COMMAND 8.

No. 671

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at The Hague [4]

Telegram 26. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[5]

Our military measures in Luxemburg were unavoidable and for the protection of our army and our railroad there, since, according to our information, French armed forces were moving on Luxemburg. The measures indicate no hostile action of any kind against Luxemburg. We have stated this to the Luxemburg Government and assured it of full compensation for all damage that may possibly be incurred.[6]

Kindly communicate this to the Netherland Government.

JAGOW.

[1] Cf. No. 676, paragraph 2, and No. 714.
[2] From the corrected copy of the Central Telegraph Office.
[3] Filed in Coblenz on the 2d of August with no further detail as to time; arrived at 3.01 p.m.; General Staff noted at 5.50 p.m.; forwarded to the Wolff Bureau August 2 at 6.35 p.m.; was submitted to Stumm. Placed on the records of the Foreign Office on the 6th of August, p.m. See No. 677.
[4] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6 p.m.
[6] See No. 640.

No. 672

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 156. VIENNA, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

Instructions carried out.[3] Count Berchtold confirms to me, what was already agreed upon in the reply telegram of the Emperor Franz Joseph [4] to our Most Gracious Master: that everything possible to do will be done, on the part of Austria, in order that an active move may be made at once against Russia with the main forces. Count Forgach remarked in relation to this that only that which was necessary for a defensive campaign would be directed against Serbia.

Furthermore, Count Kageneck informs me that General von Conrad had given General von Moltke, in a letter received early this morning, full information concerning the altered advance.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 673

The Minister at Sofia to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 43. SOFIA, *August 2, 1914.*[6]

Premier, with the consent of the King, proposed to my Austrian colleague and myself today the accession of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance on the following basis:

1. The Triple Alliance guarantees to Bulgaria her present territorial status against any attack of every kind, no matter from what source.
2. The Triple Alliance promises Bulgaria its support in her efforts toward the future acquisition of territory in which she possesses historic and ethnographic rights and which is under the domination of a country not belonging to the Triple Alliance.

In the event that Roumania were to go with the Triple Alliance, she would have nothing to fear from Bulgaria, and in case of later territorial changes, Bulgaria would seek territorial acquisitions only toward the west. Should Roumania go over to the side of Russia, Bulgaria should have a free hand to make good her claims on the Dobrudja once more, and might possibly take the field against Roumania.

Premier has not yet informed my Italian colleague, and leaves to Your Excellency the understanding to be reached with Rome.[7]

MICHAHELLES.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Vienna at 5.20 p.m. on the 2d of August; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.05 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Communicated August 2 to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.
[3] See No. 627.
[4] See No. 601.
[5] From the decodification.
[6] Filed in Sofia at 1.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.05 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. See No. 549.
[7] See Nos. 697 and 698.

No. 674

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at The Hague [1]

Telegram 25.
Secret. Urgent. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

Your Excellency will immediately open the enclosure [3] in dispatch 79 [4] and inform the Royal Netherland Government tomorrow, Monday morning [5] of the step to be taken at Brussels this evening at eight o'clock. The respite for the Belgian reply is not set at twenty-four hours, but at twelve.[6] Your Excellency will state to the local Government that the Imperial Government is counting with security upon the assumption that the Netherlands [7] will maintain toward Germany a benevolent neutrality and so further confirm the [8] friendly relations between the two [9] countries. On this assumption, the neutrality of the Netherlands will be respected to the full by Germany.[10] The Netherland Government must be given the impression that *all* of the instructions relating to this matter arrived only today. Please send an immediate telegraphic report upon the arrival of this telegram as well as the time of your announcement and the reception accorded it.[11]

JAGOW.

No. 675

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [12]

Telegram 170. ROME, *August 2, 1914.*[13]

State of war communicated here. Marquis di San Giuliano replied that yesterday's Ministerial Council had come to the decision that no *casus foederis* was offered, since it was a matter of a war of agression. Italy had not been consulted in advance, and therefore was not bound. She had not even been given opportunity to make any military preparations. For these reasons she would

[1] From the original. Draft in Rosenberg's handwriting.
[2] Draft, paraphrased by Zimmermann on the 31st of July; two paraphrases by Rosenberg, of which one is dated the 2d of August, while on the second—the earlier one—no date can be deciphered. The dating of the telegram as of the 2d of August was done later. Telegram sent to the Central Telegraph Office August 2 at 6.15 p.m.
[3] See No. 376. [4] See No. 426.
[5] "tomorrow, Monday morning" added in Stumm's handwriting.
[6] Passage "of the step to be . . . but at twelve," an alteration from the original "of the step to be taken at Brussels, with the statement that the declaration will be made today at Brussels. At the same time."—An alteration by Rosenberg.
[7] "during the impending war," which followed "Netherlands" in the original draft, eliminated by Rosenberg.
[8] After "the" the words "close and" which originally followed were crossed out in the draft.
[9] After "the two" the words "race and blood-related," which followed here originally, were stricken out in the draft.
[10] Originally this was intended to be followed by the sentence "If any frontier violations . . . corrected by German authorities," from the communication to the Government of the Netherlands as prepared by Moltke (see No. 426, note 3, 2d paragraph).
[11] See Nos. 738 and 797. [12] From the decodification.
[13] Filed in Rome at 2.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.20 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Submitted to the Emperor on the 2d of August. Paragraph "State of war communicated here . . . possibility more than once" communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office by messenger at 7.25 a.m. on the 3d of August. See No. 628.

have to remain neutral for the present, reserving the right later to arrive at some decision favorable to the allies. The Minister emphasized this last possibility more than once.

The report of the attack by Russian troops on German territory made an impression on him. But when he went so far as to remark that it probably was a matter of minor border skirmishes, that perhaps did not warrant such serious measures, I took issue with him strongly.

The Minister said in reply to my reproaches that he would tell me in strict confidence that, according to consistent and well-founded reports, the Italian Government would have a revolution on its hands if it took part in the war. It must be admitted that the danger can not be entirely denied. Conditions here during the past year have become very serious. But I believe, however, that the fear of England was even more of a deciding factor than that of revolution in determining the Italian attitude, and that it will scarcely be possible to succeed in accomplishing anything, unless England's participation in the war can be prevented.

The Minister said that Roumania would adopt the same attitude that Italy did.

FLOTOW.

No. 676

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 221. LONDON, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

I have succeeded so far in maintaining for us here a feeling that is friendly in the extreme, and I should like to utter an urgent warning against endangering this feeling by any sort of provocative measures. Among such I should count first an attack by the German Fleet on the northern coast of France, as well as any approach of our Fleet into British waters. I am convinced that for the present there is not the slightest intention of declaring war on us; that, to the contrary, they prefer first to await the course of events.

Having learned that the decisive meeting of the Cabinet is to take place today, following which Asquith will make a statement in the House of Commons tomorrow, I have just called on the Premier and discussed our point of view with him exhaustively. Tears repeatedly stood in the eyes of the old gentleman, and he said to me: "A war between our two countries is quite unthinkable." I pointed out to him the great unity of our mutual interests, which had of late undergone so material an extension and development, and the impossibility of ever again knitting such confidential ties, once the two countries had been at war. In order to weaken the chief argument of the English—that of having to protect France—I called his attention to the fact that it was really we, who most needed protection, since we had to deal with two opponents and the French with only one. Should Great Britain remain out of the strife, she would be in a much

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in London at 1.23 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.48 p.m., August 2; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Immediately communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office by Zimmermann's order. See No. 626.

stronger position to mediate as a neutral at the rehabilitation of peace, than if she took part in a war which would then become a war of annihilation for the entire civilization of Europe.

Asquith replied that a war between England and Germany, in the present state of English public feeling, would be very unpopular, but that a neutral attitude on the part of the local Government would be greatly hindered by two things:

1. By the violation of the neutrality of Belgium, of which England was one of the guarantors. Gladstone had said in the year 1870 that the violation of the neutrality of Belgium would be for Great Britain a cause of war. In any case, there would then occur a serious reversal of public feeling.
2. By any attack by German war-ships on the totally unprotected northern coast of France, which the French, with a firm faith in British support, had exposed for the benefit of their Mediterranean fleet.[1] He would not say that even in such an event Great Britain would have to take a hand, but it would be made very difficult for the British Government to maintain the neutral attitude as planned for the present.

I have the distinct impression that England is holding back for the present out of regard for us, but I would urgently advise bearing in mind so far as possible the state of feeling here.

I have just talked again with Sir E. Grey before the session, and once more called most urgently to his attention the importance of not destroying for all time to come, our mutual cooperation, of late so fruitful.

The Minister repeated that he could give me no definite assurances. But it was plain from his words that he would prefer to refrain from any intervention. We can not conceal from ourselves, however, that the good intentions of the Government, which undoubtedly exist, and the general pro-German feeling would, in the violation of Belgian neutrality, be put to a severe test the outcome of which, as a matter of fact, should we win brilliant victories in France, or even press forward as far as Paris, would be a very doubtful one for us.

Our declaration of war on Russia has created an unfavorable impression here, since they think that the Czar was still striving to mediate further, and had given his word that no soldier should pass the frontier so long as there was hope of a peaceful solution. I naturally met this reproach with a reference to the mobilization that took place in Russia despite the mediation action initiated by His Majesty at the desire of the Czar.[2]

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] Cf. Nos. 669 and 714.
[2] See No. 696.

No. 677

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ministers at Brussels and The Hague and to the Ambassador at London [1]

Telegrams 43, 27, 211. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

Please inform the local Government that early this morning eighty French officers in Prussian officers' uniforms made an attempt to cross the German frontier at Walbeck west of Geldern in twelve automobiles.[3] This signifies the worst conceivable violation of neutrality on the part of France.[4]

JAGOW.

No. 678

The Consul General at Basel to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 4. ST. LOUIS-BASEL, *August 2, 1914.*[6]

Report about carrier-pigeons [7] confirmed. Five persons have been arrested, among whom are two former French officers. One half empty and three full baskets of carrier-pigeons seized.

WUNDERLICH.

No. 679

The Senatorial Committee for Imperial and Foreign Affairs of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg to the Foreign Office [8]

Telegram (unnumbered). HAMBURG, *August 2, 1914.*[9]

Passports handed to the local Russian Minister at one o'clock this afternoon.

SENATORIAL COMMITTEE FOR IMPERIAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

No. 680

The Central Telegraph Office to the Cipher Bureau of the Foreign Office [10]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[11]

For some time, although the lines are in order, no telegrams have been sent from London to Berlin, while London is receiving all messages sent there from Berlin.[12]

CENTRAL TELEGRAPH OFFICE.

[1] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.55 p.m.
[3] See No. 670.
[4] See Nos. 709, 738 and 797.
[5] From the decodification.
[6] Filed in St. Louis at 5.14 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Communicated on the 2d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.
[7] See No. 645.
[8] Uncoded telegram.
[9] Filed in Hamburg at 5.45 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. See Nos. 591, 636 and 685.
[10] Uncoded telegram.
[11] Filed at the Central Telegraph Office at 7.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m.
[12] See Nos. 654, 686 and 720.

No. 681

The Minister at Berne to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 22.
Urgent.

BERNE, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

Swiss Government informs me that German Uhlan Patrols have been making use of the road, which lies on Swiss territory, between Alsatian Liaottendorf [3] and Pfetterhausen. In answer to the protest of Swiss frontier authorities they are said to have replied that the road had been internationalized, which is said to be unquestionably false. Swiss Government urgently seeks redress.[4]

ROMBERG.

No. 682

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Brussels [5]

Telegram 44.

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[6]

The fears we expressed as to France's procedure in dispatch 87 [7] are strengthened by the fact that she has already today commenced hostilities against us (dropping bombs by aviators, crossing the frontier by cavalry patrols) in violation of international law.

Please bring this to the attention of the Belgian Government at once.[8]

JAGOW.

No. 683

Aide-de-Camp (on duty) von Mutius to the Foreign Office [9]

BERLIN, PALACE, *August 2, 1914.*[10]
9.15 p.m.

His Majesty commands that Ambassador von Wangenheim shall be informed, in reply to his inquiry of yesterday about the *Goeben*: [11] "THE CRUISER *Goeben* CAN NOT BE DISPENSED WITH AT PRESENT TIME." [12]

VON MUTIUS.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Berne at 7.25 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Communicated on the 2d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.
[3] Thus in the decodification.
[4] See No. 701.
[5] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting; see marginal instructions by the Emperor on No. 584.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.05 p.m.
[7] See No. 376.
[8] See No. 709. Cf. first Belgian Grey Book, No. 21.
[9] From the corrected copy.
[10] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 2, p.m.
[11] See No. 652.
[12] See Nos. 712 and 775.

No. 684

The Minister at Luxemburg to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 19. LUXEMBURG, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

His Excellency Fuchs has requested me to inform you that he is very doubtful, since having learned the contents of telegram 12,[3] as to whether he should execute the order he has received relating to the arrest of various high Luxemburg officials, and asks for a detailed reply.[4]

BUCH.

No. 685

The Senatorial Committee for Imperial and Foreign Affairs of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg to the Foreign Office

Telegram (unnumbered). HAMBURG, *August 2, 1914.*[5]

In continuation of today's telegram.[6]

Local Russian Minister left here with his entire Legation personnel at 7.10 this evening for Warnemunde, whence he is to leave for Russia by way of Denmark and Sweden.

SENATORIAL COMMITTEE FOR IMPERIAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

No. 686

The Central Telegraph Office to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[8]

London has recently commenced to forward telegrams to Berlin again.[9]

CENTRAL TELEGRAPH OFFICE.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Luxemburg at 7.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.36 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m.
[3] See No. 640.
[4] In the margin the note in Stumm's handwriting, dated August 2: "General Staff promises to remedy this."
[5] Uncoded telegram; filed at Hamburg at 8.35 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m. Copy submitted to the Emperor; returned to the Foreign Office August 3. Telegram was again repeated on August 3.
[6] See No. 679.
[7] From a copy.
[8] Filed at the Central Telegraph Office at 10 p.m., arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.27 p.m. Receipt stamp: August 2, p.m.
[9] See Nos. 680 and 720.

No. 687

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 225. LONDON, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

Sir Eyre Crowe stated in conversation that according to a communication received here a short time ago, Austria now appeared to be willing to agree to the fundamental discussion of the points at issue between herself and Serbia, by a Four-Power Conference at London. The communication had, however, arrived too late to be of any practical value now.[3]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 688

The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 58. SINAIA, *August 2, 1914.*[5]

Minister Resident at Galatz telegraphs on August 1: "Feverish activity on the fortifications. Yesterday forty-seven car-loads of barbed wire and other wire-stuff were purchased at the local factories for immediate delivery at the works at Galatz, Hanuconaki and Fokshani." Consul General at Jassy telegraphs: "The eastern border is overrun with Russian soldiery; please instruct in connection with this what is to be done about the code and the consulate personnel in the event that Russia occupies Jassy." According to the Austrian military attaché, 3000 cars are to be made ready to move troops, and the railroad warehouses of the Jassy district are to be prepared for the reception of the troops. Authorities at Burdujeni have informed Take Jonescu, who has returned from London, that troop movements against the Roumanian frontier are taking place in Bessarabia. Take Jonescu believes that under certain conditions England would land 140,000 men at Dunkirk.

Shall be received by the King Monday morning.

WALDTHAUSEN.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in London at 6.12 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.04 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 2, p.m.
[3] Cf. Austrian Red Book, No. 51, and English Blue Book No. 135.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Sinaia August 2 at 8 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.04 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, a.m. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

No. 689

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 224. LONDON, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

Sir Eyre Crowe has just informed me that a telegraphic report has been received by the Foreign Office, according to which German troops had crossed the French frontier in large bodies at various places in the vicinity of Nancy, although no declaration of war had preceded the act at Paris. He let it be understood that this news would make a bad impression upon the Cabinet Council, which was to assemble during the course of the evening for a renewal of its discussions, and might not be without its influence, perhaps, on the eventual decision to be made. I replied to Sir Eyre Crowe that we had received no information concerning this matter, and that it might be advisable to wait for definite corroboration from an independent source.[3]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 690

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome [4]

Telegram 166. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[5]

Metz reports on the second: Yesterday, a French physician, with the aid of two disguised officers, attempted to infect the wells of Montigny,[6] a suburb of Metz, with cholera bacilli. He was shot according to martial law. A French flour dealer poisoned his flour. I beg Your Excellency to make a point of spreading through the press there these acts of the French, perpetrated before any declaration of war, yes, even before the German mobilization.[7]

JAGOW.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in London August 2 at 6.12 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, a.m. On the margin the note by Jagow: "Has anything been done about this? For instance, has the report been denied at London? If it is necessary, inquire of the General Staff *at once* whether German soldiers have crossed the French frontier anywhere as yet, and wire London immediately. Jagow." Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] See Nos. 705, 713, 716, 717 and 725.

[4] From the original. Draft in Riezler's handwriting, with additions by Bergen and Langwerth von Simmern.

[5] To the Central Telegraph Office August 2 at 11.45 p.m.

[6] In the original "Montsigny."

[7] On the telegram the note by Langwerth von Simmern: "Communicated by First Lieutenant of Pioneers Schreiber, arrived here from Metz today. The physician was a respected inhabitant of Metz. He was caught by a sentry. v. L." See in connection with this Stumm's memorandum of August 3: "According to information from the General Staff, the news of the poisoning of the wells, as well as that of flour-poisoning, was a manufactured story. The General Staff earnestly requests not to publish or to make use of any such stories until the General Staff has investigated and confirmed them."

No. 691

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 222. LONDON, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

TO THE IMPERIAL NAVAL OFFICE AND THE ADMIRALTY STAFF:

With the Foreign Office cipher.

Boom barricades are fixed in the naval harbors. Straits of Dover occupied by torpedo-boats. According to reliable information, the first and second fleets are lying at the Forth,[3] at Cromarty and in Scapa Flow. Patrol flotilla is patrolling the whole east coast. Flying machines are on the way by sea to a station on the east coast. Mobilization of the navy has not been proclaimed, but has been completed in the active branches and on the east and south coasts.

NAVAL ATTACHÉ.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 692

The Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 39.
Secret. STOCKHOLM, *August 2, 1914.*[5]

According to a communication from Mr. Wallenberg, partial mobilization of the army and navy was ordered today, and, as a matter of fact, the fortresses and coast defense forces have been brought to full war strength by calling in the annual classes of the Landsturm from 1896 to 1903. The troops due to undergo a second training period in the fall have already been called into service, and the navy is being recruited. Gotland has been put in a state of defense, and, as a whole, the land forces have been raised by these measures to a strength of about 90,000 men. Mr. Wallenberg declared that his Norwegian colleague had said that he would agree that Norway would go with Sweden in so far as was possible, and that should their roads diverge, the two countries would under no circumstances turn their arms against each other. The Minister asserts that he has received information from Petersburg that the entire Russian army is estimated at about four million men, of which one million, nine hundred thousand are intended to be used against Germany and Austria. The army destined for use against Germany is being assembled eastward of the Grodno-Warsaw line. Uprisings are said to have broken out in the Caucasus. The *Andrei Pervozvannyi* is said to have run aground.

REICHENAU.

[1] From a copy of the decodification.

[2] Filed in London August 2 at 5.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 3 at 12.05 a.m. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] Abbreviation for "Firth of Forth."

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed at Stockholm August 2 at 7.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 3 at 12.05 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, a.m. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

No. 693

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [1]

Telegram 212. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

According to absolutely reliable reports,[3] France has been guilty of the following transgressions against us today:

1. Early this afternoon,[4] French cavalry patrols crossed the frontier at Altmünsterol in Alsace.

2. A French aviation officer was shot down from the air at Wesel.[5]

3. Two Frenchmen made an attempt to blow up the Cochem tunnel on the Moselle railroad, and were shot in the act.

4. French infantry crossed the frontier in Alsace, and opened fire.[6]

These transgressions have occurred, although the French Premier stated officially to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris that the mobilization of the French army represented no aggressive intentions of any kind toward Germany, and that the French troops were obliged to maintain a zone of ten kilometers between themselves and the German border.

Kindly notify the English Government of this matter at once, and present seriously to Sir Edward Grey the dangerous situation in which Germany is placed by such provocation, made against all good faith and honor, as well as the very serious decisions to which she may be driven. I hope Your Serene Highness may be successful in convincing England that Germany, although she has been advocating the maintenance of peace to the utmost limit, is being driven by her opponent to adopt the rôle of an injured party who must take to arms, for the preservation of her very existence.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] From the original in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor, with additions in the handwriting of Jagow.

[2] To the Central Telegraph Office August 3 at 12.25 a.m.

[3] In the margin, the annotation by the Chancelor: "To be noted: The reports made herein have just been brought to me by the Minister of War, personally."

[4] In the decodification in the records of the London Embassy, this reads "early today" instead of "early this afternoon."

[5] Wrongly decoded at London as "Toul."

[6] This paragraph, "French infantry . . . opened fire," added in the margin in Jagow's handwriting.

No. 694

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Rome [1]

Telegram 165. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

According to absolutely reliable reports [3] . . . notify the Italian Government of this at once, and use all your influence to convince the Italian Minister that these provocations, made against all good faith and honor, stamp the war thereby forced upon us as an aggression by our enemies which affords a *casus foederis.*[4]

v. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 695

The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 26.
Urgent. BRUSSELS, *August 2, 1914.*[6]

Have carried out directions in accordance with instructions received [7]—at eight o'clock, German time—and communicated the contents of dispatch 87 [8] absolutely in confidence to the Belgian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs could not conceal his pained surprise at the unexpected communication. The Minister for Foreign Affairs only answered that he would immediately inform His Majesty the King and the Cabinet of the communication, and would see that I received an answer within twelve hours.

BELOW.

No. 696

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [9]

Telegram 213. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[10]

Russia has mobilized all her armed forces while mediation negotiations were still pending, without giving us official notice of it, and without any additional notification that this measure was not directed against us, although we had previously pointed out, earnestly but amicably, that mobilization against us would force us to take serious counter-measures, and notwithstanding Russia had re-

[1] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office August 3d at 12.25 a.m.
[3] Here the corresponding passage in the telegram of the Chancelor to Lichnowsky on August 2 (No. 693) is inserted word for word.
[4] With regard to this and to the foregoing telegram to Lichnowsky (No. 693), the Chancelor noted: "If there is no objection to be made, please see that the accompanying telegrams are sent off at once, and give directions that any further provocations shall be communicated to both Embassies at once as continuations of these telegrams. The Minister of War feels certain that similar provocations will occur tonight to an increased extent." To this Jagow noted in the margin: "Telegrams will be sent off at once." See No. 745.
[5] From the decodification.
[6] Filed in Brussels August 2 at 9.48 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 3 at 12.25 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, a.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor August 3, returned by him to the Foreign Office through the General Staff on the 3d of August.
[7] See No. 648. [8] See No. 376.
[9] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.
[10] To the Central Telegraph Office August 3 at 12.55 a.m. See No. 676.

peatedly declared solemnly that she had no hostile intentions toward us. Only on the afternoon of the first day of the Russian mobilization did the Czar telegraph His Majesty[1] that he personally would guarantee that no hostile act should occur against us. The contradiction between the unmistakable declarations of the Czar and the action of his Government was so plain all through the period of the crisis, and the attitude of the Government was in fact so hostile, despite all assurances to the contrary, that, notwithstanding the Czar's guaranties, we could not help but feel seriously antagonized by the general mobilization. This was fully appreciated in the pro-German circles in the suite of the Czar, according to the reports from Chelius. The indignation of the German public at the Russian mobilization was so great that the refusal to demobilize had to be accepted as a hostile act, affording a ground for war, were we not prepared to sacrifice our national honor. Furthermore, the fact that Russian soldiers had already opened fire on our soldiers at the frontier before our last declaration had been presented, is proof that a so-called peaceful mobilization is an untenable condition of affairs.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 697

The Imperial Chancelor to the Minister at Sofia[2]

Telegram 45.
Secret.

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[3]

Agree to the proposal.[4] It would seem advisable that Bulgaria should conclude separate agreements with us and with Austria-Hungary, and that any possible later participants should join us by means of treaties of accession. Hence it should read "Germany" and "Austria-Hungary" respectively, in Articles 1 and 2, in place of "the Triple Alliance," and "that is not one of her allies" at the close of Article 2.

Since prior alliance negotiations are already under way with Turkey—which must be communicated at Sofia with a request that they be kept absolutely confidential—it must be agreed upon in a special note that the aspirations referred to in Article 2 shall not be directed against Turkey, in the event that the latter should enter upon an alliance with us, or so long as she should maintain an attitude of benevolent neutrality in the present conflict.

Term of the alliance, like that of the Triple Alliance, to be six years for the present.[5]

Please communicate this to the Government there only after receipt of instructions directing you to do so. Wire confirmation of receipt of this.[6]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] See No. 487.
[2] From the original; draft in Bergen's handwriting with alterations in the handwriting of Zimmermann and Jagow.
[3] To the Central Telegraph Office August 3d at 1.15 a.m.
[4] See No. 673. On the draft the instructions by Zimmermann in the margin: "Immediately after sending resubmit to the Imperial Chancelor for the purpose of reporting it to the Emperor." Resubmitted by the Central Bureau on the 3d of August.
[5] "Like that . . . six years for the present" an alteration by Zimmermann from Bergen's original: "Term of the alliance 'until 1920.'"
[6] Telegraphic confirmation of receipt filed at Sofia August 3; arrived at the Foreign Office August 4 at 3.46 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, a.m.

No. 698

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 227. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

The Imperial Minister at Sofia telegraphs: "Premier, after getting . . . understanding with Rome." [3]

Mr. Michahelles has received the following instructions, the execution of which, however, is dependent on further directions: "Agree to the proposal . . . six years for the present." [4]

Please advise Count Berchtold of the foregoing, and urge the early instruction of the Austro-Hungarian representative at Sofia with regard to the conclusion of the compact.[5] Italy and Roumania, and perhaps Turkey, also, could join in our treaties by treaties of accession, similar to that concluded with Roumania. Italian Government has not been informed.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 699

The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 59. SINAIA, *August 2, 1914.*[7]

Mr. Bratianu would like to gain time, since at the present moment the anti-Austrian feeling among the people is at its worst, and, because Austria had not notified Roumania in advance, so *there had been no opportunity to work up an opposite feeling. He said* he thought that Roumania might begin by announcing that Bulgaria would not attack her if she herself attacked Serbia. Thus just as many Austrian army corps would be left free for use against Russia as are contributed by the Roumanian army. In the meantime, local public opinion could be influenced. According to Mr. Bratianu, also, there are large troop movements going on in Bessarabia. He would prefer it, if Russia were to attack Roumania, as in that case public feeling would undergo a change. Crown Council Monday.[9]

WALDTHAUSEN.

Rot! . . . Bucharest.[8]

His Majesty must mobilize against Russia!

They'll take care not to do that!

[1] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting with alterations in the handwriting of Jagow.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.15 a.m., August 3.
[3] Here the telegram from Sofia of August 2 (No. 673) is inserted.
[4] Here the appropriate passage from the dispatch to Sofia (No. 697) is inserted.
[5] See No. 798.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed in Sinaia August 2 at 11.58 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 3 at 1.22 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, a.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office on the 3d of August at 7.10 a.m. Was submitted to the Emperor; returned to the Foreign Office on August 3.
[8] Word before "Bucharest" illegible.
[9] See No. 811.

No. 700

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 159. VIENNA, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

The King of Italy has replied to His Majesty the Emperor Franz Joseph's telegram [3] in the following manner:

Nothing!

Scoundrel! In spite of his written compact!

> J'ai reçu le télégramme de Votre Majesté. Je n'ai pas besoin d'assurer Votre Majesté que l'Italie qui a fait tous *les efforts possibles pour assurer le maintien de la paix et qui* fera tout ce qu'il pourra pour contribuer à la rétablir aussitôt que possible, gardera une attitude cordialement amicale envers ses alliés, conformément au traité de la Triple Alliance, à ses sentiments sincères et aux grands intérêts qu'elle doit sauvegarder.

I am told, nevertheless, that they intend to withdraw all the Austrian armed forces away from the Italian frontiers.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

Translation of the French portion

> I have received the telegram of Your Majesty. I do not have to assure Your Majesty that Italy, which has made *every possible effort to insure the maintenance of peace, and which* will do everything that she can to contribute towards its restoration at the earliest possible moment, will maintain toward her allies a cordially friendly attitude, in conformity with the treaty of the Triple Alliance, with her own sincere desires, and with the great interests which she has to protect.

No. 701

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Berne [4]

Telegram 29.
Urgent. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[5]

Please apologize for the occurrence and add that steps were taken at once to prevent any repetition of similar errors.[6]

ZIMMERMANN.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Vienna at 12.30 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.17 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, a.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 3d of August, from him to the General Staff, and was returned by the latter to the Foreign Office on August 4. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] See No. 601, final sentence.

[4] From the original. Draft in B. Wedel's handwriting.

[5] To the Central Telegraph Office August 3 at 2.35 a.m. Prepared on August 2 by B. Wedel and Stumm.

[6] See No. 681.

No. 702

The King of Greece to the Emperor [1]

Telegram 231. ATHENS, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

His Majesty the King has sent me the following telegram for His Majesty the Emperor and King, with the request to transmit it to the Emperor:

Cordial thanks for your telegram [3] and for the promise of your support in our agreement with Turkey. It never came into our minds to help the Serbians. *But it does not seem possible to me, however, for us to associate ourselves with their enemies and attack them*, since, after all, they are our allies. It seems to me that the interests of Greece demand her *absolute neutrality* and the preservation of the *status quo* in the Balkans, as created by the Treaty of Bucharest. If we should sacrifice this point of view, Bulgaria would become enlarged by the annexation of those portions of Macedonia lately won by Serbia, would surround our entire northern border as far as Albania, and would constitute an enormous danger for us.[4] I have no assurance that this would not happen. These considerations force us to neutrality and also, *in conjunction with Roumania, to prevent Bulgaria from taking a hand.* You know my opinion of the Slavs and of a Russian trusteeship in the Balkans. This opinion is shared by my whole people, and if Bulgaria should attain to such an accretion of power, the balance of power in our part of the world would be destroyed and the domination of the Slavs simply assured. Constantine.[5]

BASSEWITZ.

Tell Athens that I have made an alliance with Bulgaria and Turkey for the war against Russia and will treat Greece as an enemy in case she does not join us at once; have just told this myself, personally, to Theotoky, while informing him that we are allied with Turkey and Bulgaria.

You have got to march against Russia!

Impossible. That is no longer to be considered now! The Balkans are marching.

Rubbish!

If Greece does not at once join us, then she will lose her position as a Balkan Power and no longer enjoy our support in her desires but be treated as an enemy. It is not a question of the balance of power in the Balkans, but of cooperation on the part of the Balkan States to free the Balkans from Russia forever! W.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Athens August 2 at 2.03 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 3 at 3 a.m.; receipt stamp, August 3. Communicated on August 3 to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, returned by him on the 3d of August. See No. 504.

[3] See No. 466.

[4] Two exclamation-points by the Emperor in the margin.

[5] See No. 803.

No. 703

Circular dispatch from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ministers at Berne, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Christiania [1]

Telegrams 28, 36, 32, 16.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

Imperial Government is in possession of absolutely reliable information according to which French armed forces are preparing to deploy along the Givet-Namur line in the Meuse district and to advance through Belgium against Germany, notwithstanding the Parisian promises as to the preservation of Belgian neutrality. We fear that Belgium will be unable, no matter how good her intentions, to prevent the advance without assistance, and are [3] thus compelled in the interest of self-preservation also to enter Belgian territory in self-defense. Germany is planning no hostilities of any sort against Belgium, and will evacuate Belgian territory immediately upon the conclusion of peace. Belgian Government was notified of the foregoing yesterday evening.

Please communicate this to the Government there at once, confidentially.[4]

JAGOW.

No. 704

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 158.

VIENNA, *August 3, 1914.*[6]

Count Berchtold writes me:

> The Russian Ambassador looked me up yesterday in the most friendly fashion just to inquire, he told me, whether there was, perhaps, anything new. He said he still hoped that it might be possible to remove the cause of the quarrel by direct negotiations. In the present state of affairs it would probably be better to betake ourselves into neutral territory, for which purpose London seemed particularly well adapted. He said he regretted extremely that the people in Germany apparently wanted to force a war. That Russia had already given Berlin the most binding assurances that her military precautions were not of a character hostile either to the Monarchy or to Germany. Nevertheless, they would have to insist at Petersburg, now

[1] From the original. Draft in Rosenberg's handwriting. The circular dispatch was issued as a result of the following instructions from the Chancelor of the 2d of August, presented to the Foreign Office on the afternoon of the same day: "*Meo voto* a circular dispatch should at once be prepared, which should show our action in Belgium as a necessity and which should be sent out and published just as soon as we have accomplished our move against Liège."

[2] Drafted on August 2 by Rosenberg and Stumm, paraphrased on August 3 by Zimmermann and Jagow. To the Central Telegraph Office August 3 at 3.10 a.m. The original intention of sending the telegram also to the Ambassador at London, with this special addition: "and state distinctly in addition that we should under no circumstances annex any part of Belgian territory, particularly Antwerp and the mouth of the Scheldt", was not carried out.

[3] "were" written over "are".

[4] For Berne, there was added at the close: "and renew our promise of the most scrupulous respect for Swiss neutrality." Hereto the marginal annotation by Rosenberg on the 2d of August: "The Chief of the General Staff is agreed."

[5] From the decodification.

[6] Filed in Vienna at 12.30 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.32 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, a.m. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

as before, that we should not settle our conflict with Serbia without consulting Russia, whose interests were set at stake by this matter. I did not go any farther into these arguments with Mr. Schebeko, but did commence a friendly and unofficial conversation in the course of which I called the attention of the Russian Ambassador to the numerous follies of the Russian Balkan policy. There would be a much broader ground for an understanding between us, could they only make up their minds in Petersburg, just ONCE, not to make the fate of the Balkan states the pivot on which their attitude toward us always and exclusively hinged. Mr. Schebeko replied also in a friendly manner, discussed academically the numerous obligations of Russia as an orthodox and Slav nation, referred to certain sentimental tendencies of the Russian people, and left me with the remark that, really, the whole trouble between Russia and ourselves was a big misunderstanding. Immediately thereafter I received a visit from Dumaine, who talked in as peaceful a tone as had his Russian colleague, who referred with melancholy regret to the hostile procedure of the Emperor William, and who expressed his conviction that a formula must be found which would do justice to our righteous claims, satisfy Russia's Serbian interests, and open the way to peace.

Today the Russian Ambassador [1] Koudacheff sought out one of the younger gentlemen of the Ballhausplatz, Count Fery Kinsky, and asked him whether Austria was really bound to stand by Germany against Russia. On the Ballhausplatz they hold the whole thing to be an "infamous swindle," since Austria is unable to mobilize quickly, and Russia hopes that Austria will not attack her prematurely. Count Kinsky asked Koudacheff if the Russian mobilization was not perhaps directed against Mongolia.

It is beyond doubt, as Count Kageneck asserts also, that the Russians are attempting, by these artless inquiries and with their ostentatious non-provocation of the Monarchy even in the military field (the Russians have withdrawn their troops two kilometers from the frontier), to drive a wedge between Austria and us. Here, they see completely through the ruse.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 705

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 244. PARIS, *August 2, 1914.*[3]

French Government has made a protest to me about a *very serious* frontier violation on the part of our troops even over the French ten-kilometer zone, as well as about hostilities resulting in the death of a French soldier.[4]

I Patrol. The shameless pack wants to get ahead of us with a protest.

Feeling very much excited here as result of this and other reports.

Of no importance any longer.

SCHOEN.

[1] In the records of the Vienna Embassy correctly "Counselor of Embassy."

[2] From the corrected copy.

[3] Filed in Paris August 2 at 11.15 p. m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 3 at 3.55 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, a.m. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Decodification sent to the Emperor August 3, returned by him through the General Staff to the Foreign Office on August 4.

[4] See Nos. 689, 713, 716, 717, 725 and 869.

No. 706

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 226. LONDON, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

TO IMPERIAL NAVAL OFFICE AND ADMIRALTY STAFF:

With Foreign Office cipher.

Mobilization of the English fleet ordered this evening. All classes of reserves under fifty-five years of age have been called to the colors and are to report at once to their ships and their land stations.

NAVAL ATTACHÉ.
LICHNOWSKY.

No. 707

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 227. LONDON, *August 2, 1914.*[4]

After the close of the Cabinet meeting the Admiralty ordered the mobilization of the English naval reserves. This measure must not be taken as the final decision of the English Government to take an immediate part in the war. I believe that the attitude will be one of waiting for the present.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 708

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 228. LONDON, *August 3, 1914.*[6]

TO GENERAL STAFF, IMPERIAL NAVAL OFFICE AND ADMIRALTY STAFF:

With Foreign Office cipher.

Austrian military attaché has just brought the information that he knows from a reliable . . . ,[7] that today's English Cabinet meeting decided to declare war on Germany. Nothing known so far of mobilization of expeditionary corps.

MILITARY AND NAVAL ATTACHÉ.
LICHNOWSKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in London August 2 at 11.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 3 at 4.05 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, a.m. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in London August 2 at 11.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 3 at 4.05 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, a.m. Communicated on August 3 to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[5] From the decodification.

[6] Filed in London at 12.25 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.05 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, a.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, who noted on it: "4.15 p.m.;" returned to the Foreign Office through the General Staff on the 4th of August. Communicated August 3 to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[7] Cipher group lacking.

No. 709

The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 44. BRUSSELS, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

Both commissions executed,[3] do not believe, however, that this will have any influence on the Belgian reply, which, according to my impression, will probably be in the negative.

BELOW.

No. 710

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [4]

Telegram 214. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

Quite a number of Frenchmen, dressed as Prussian officers, attempted to cross our frontier from Holland in automobiles.

French physician and two other Frenchmen tried to infect wells at Metz with cholera bacilli. Physician shot under martial law.

JAGOW.

No. 711

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople [6]

Telegram 303.
Confidential.[7] BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[8]

Promising alliance negotiations in progress with Bulgaria.[9]

JAGOW.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Brussels at 3.05 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.30 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, a.m. On the 3d of August communicated by telephone to the General Staff and the Admiralty Staff.
[3] See Nos. 677 and 682.
[4] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.45 a.m. Jagow sent the same telegram, leaving out the sentence "French physician . . . martial law" to the Ambassador at Rome at the same time. See Nos. 693 and 694.
[6] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting. Paraphrased by Zimmermann on the 2d of August. (Bergen's paraphrase lacking.)
[7] "Confidential" added in Jagow's handwriting.
[8] To the Central Telegraph Office August 3 at 6.45 a.m. See No. 586.
[9] See Nos. 697 and 854.

No. 712

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople [1]

Telegram 304. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

Cruiser *Goeben* can not be dispensed with at present time.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 713

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at London and Rome [4]

Telegrams 215, 168.
Urgent. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

All French reports concerning crossing of the frontier by German troops wholly imaginary.[6]

JAGOW.

No. 714

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [7]

Telegram 216. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[8]

We can state definitely that there will be no threatening of the northern coast of France on our part so long as England remains neutral.[9]

JAGOW.

No. 715

The Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office to the Emperor [10]

Report. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[11]

Earnestly recommend that Imperial Chancelor telegraph to Lichnowsky: "No intention of proceeding against northern French coast as long as England remains neutral."

[1] From the original. Draft in B. Wedel's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.45 a.m., August 3. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. See No. 652.
[3] See Nos. 683 and 775.
[4] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.15 a.m.
[6] See Nos. 689, 705, 716, 717 and 725.
[7] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[8] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.30 a.m.
[9] See No. 669 and No. 676, No. 2; cf. No. 715.
[10] From the corrected copy.
[11] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 4, p.m. Turned over to the Imperial Chancelor by the Emperor on the 3d of August; latter's marginal annotation: "Has already been done. v. B. H. 3." Copy of von Tirpitz's report to the Emperor of August 3 forwarded to the Imperial Chancelor (receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 4), with the following addition: "I have the honor of reporting to Your Excellency most respectfully, that I am submitting the report herewith at the request of His Majesty the Emperor and King. v. Tirpitz."

German-English cables in operation.

Even if England declares war later, mobilization of the navy and economic mobilization will gain by delay.[1]

Most humbly,

v. TIRPITZ.

No. 716

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Paris[2]

Telegram 192. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[3]

According to the positive statements of the military authorities, no German troops have so far set foot across the French frontier anywhere; on the other hand, a rupture of diplomatic relations is imminent as the result of continued border violations by French troops.[4]

JAGOW.

No. 717

Draft of an unsent telegram from the Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassadors at London and Rome[5]

(BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*)

Up to the present hour no German soldier has crossed the frontier. On the other hand since last night three companies of French soldiers have been on Alsatian soil. Furthermore, French aviators in great numbers have crossed Belgian and Dutch territory into German territory, in violation of neutrality.[6]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 718

Information Division of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy to the Foreign Office[7]

Telegram (unnumbered). BRUSSELS, *August 2, 1914.*[8]

Belgian mobilization being completed with surprising rapidity. Proof of excellent preparation. Full war strength of 200,000 men will be reached. Published announcement on the part of the Government of the declarations of German and French Ministers that both Governments would respect Belgium's neutrality

[1] Cf. No. 714.

[2] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting.

[3] To the Central Telegraph Office August 3, at 10 a.m.

[4] See Nos. 689, 705, 713, 717 and 725; see also No. 722, which perhaps should be considered as earlier than No. 716. "This telegram arrived at Paris completely mutilated, and could not be deciphered." See Nos. 776 and 809, and the note in the records of Ambassador von Schoen of August 7, 1914.

[5] From the original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor. A marginal annotation of August 3 announces that, at Stumm's order, the telegram was not sent, but No. 725 instead.

[6] See No. 689 and the numbers referred to there.

[7] From a copy of a telegram that was sent as "urgent" to the *Berlin Abendzeitung*; filed at Brussels August 2 at 7 p.m. The copy was sent without address.

[8] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3. Communicated by telephone at 6.45 p.m., August 4, to the General Staff. A written copy communicated to the General Staff and the Ministry of War August 5.

had a somewhat quieting effect on the frightened population in all parts of the country. Stagnation of business and financial panic persist; the Government treasury is issuing newly printed and previously non-existent five-franc notes as substitutes for the withheld silver coins; scarcity of foodstuffs already noticeable in the retail trade, as the wholesale houses are holding back provisions in view of rapid price increases. News of the advance of German troops into Luxemburg caused consternation. Attitude of the clerical Government press strictly neutral, as well as that of the important respectable Liberal organs. As a result of a vicious and inciting stand taken for France, the *Petit Bleu*, the organ of the gambling concessionist Marquet, has been confiscated; the *Chronjvre* (?) is also taking a stand openly hostile to Germany. People here are awaiting with feverish expectancy England's decisive answer concerning the protection of the harbor of [1] Antwerp and the Scheldt. Government still refrains from migrating to Antwerp or transporting the archives there, nevertheless the National Bank has sent its gold supply there. Yesterday and today hundreds of German reservists left for Germany, many with their wives and children; numerous bodies of their remaining countrymen accompanied them to the North station to give them an enthusiastic farewell. Two drunken German workmen unfortunately insulted a Belgian officer, who had them arrested. It is reported from Stavelot that after breaking up the railroad between Stavelot and Malmedy, pioneers mined the tunnels, which are under military guard, and also blocked the highways with felled trees and barbed wire. Almost all the Belgian coal mines have been forced to reduce their output, and some have had to discontinue production, on account of the lack of labor and of horses. French flying squadron has been transferred from Douai to Rheims as headquarters depot, and has been supplied with fighting planes. Flying machines and dirigibles have been sighted at various places along the frontiers. Ostend steamers report meeting English cruisers in the Channel.

DUNTZ.

No. 719

Draft of an unsent telegram from the Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassadors at London and Rome [2]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[3]

The reports sent out from France to the effect that we have committed frontier violations, and even that we had invaded France, are absolutely untrue. Up until this morning no German soldier has set foot on French soil. On the other hand there are the numerous reports sent you concerning frontier violations by the French, and about the occupation of German villages in Alsace by several companies of French since last night.

v. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] In the copy, between "of" and "Antwerp" is the word "at."
[2] Original draft in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.
[3] In the margin, the note by Stumm, dated August 3: "At the order of His Excellency (the Secretary of State) stop."

No. 720

The English Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE:

I did not fail to ask my Government at once what was the meaning of the stoppage of all telegraphic communication by cable and otherwise on the English side.[3] I have just received the following answer from Sir Edward Grey:

> I am informed that delay has been due to extraordinary congestion. Even our own Government messages have been considerably delayed. I understand lines are now working satisfactorily.

I was as surprised as you must have been to hear the news that telegraphic communication had been stopped as I have heard nothing from England that could possibly warrant the belief that the stoppage was due to any Government measure. In fact during the last few days I have received nothing but "formulas" framed for the preservation of peace (which I read cursorily to Zimmermann this morning [4]) and for the continuation of *discussions*, between Russia and *Austria*. Alas! the day seems to have gone by for these excellent *formulas!*

Yours very sincerely,

W. E. GOSCHEN.

These formulas are meant to throw dust in the other peoples faces, ut aliquid fieri videatur! *If Grey wanted really to preserve peace he need only, as Prince Henry suggested on 29th July intimate to the two allies France and Russia—not to mobilize but to wait, until the pourparlers which I was directing had succeeded or otherwise, between Vienna and Russia. W.*

No. 721

Memorandum of Reporting Councilor Count Montgelas of the Foreign Office for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [5]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[6]

The Commander in Chief in the frontier districts has sent word that, in view of the authenticated frontier violations, he has been compelled to employ the same measures in connection with the French Legation and the French generally, as have already been made use of toward the Russian Legation and the Russians.

MONTGELAS.

[1] From the corrected copy [in English].

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3, a.m. Corrected copy submitted to the Emperor, who noted on it: "August 4, 1914. 8 a.m." It was returned to the Foreign Office on the 4th of August.

[3] See Nos. 654, 680 and 686.

[4] Cf. English Blue Book, No. 132.

[5] From the corrected copy.

[6] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3, a.m. In the margin a note of Jagow's, of August 3: "What sort of measures are those? We are not yet at war. Diplomats are therefore still accredited."

No. 722

The French Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

The French Ambassador has the honor of bringing to the attention of His Excellency the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the following communication which he has received from the Government of the Republic:

> The administrative and military authorities of the eastern districts reported yesterday to the Government of the Republic several violations of the French frontier committed by German troops.
>
> One of these occurrences took place at Delle [3] in the district of Belfort. The post of the French customs guard of this locality was twice fired upon by a detachment of German soldiers. North of Delle, two German patrols from the 5th Light Cavalry crossed the frontier on the morning of August 2 and advanced to the villages of Jonchery and Baron, more than ten kilometers from the frontier. The officer in command of the first patrol shot and killed a French soldier. The German cavalrymen drove off horses which the French mayor of Suarce was just attempting to assemble, and forced the inhabitants of the *commune* to lead away the horses.

The Ambassador of the Republic, in the name of his Government formally protests to the Imperial Government against these acts, which constitute a definite violation of the French frontier by armed German troops without any justification. He is instructed to state to His Excellency the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Government of the Republic is forced to hold the Imperial Government fully responsible for these acts.[4]

No. 723

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office [5]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[6]

Count Szapary telegraphs from Petersburg under date of July 31:

> The situation has become still more uncertain. The Italian Ambassador was told by Prince Troubetzkoi, in the absence of Messrs. Sazonoff and Neratoff, who are at the Crown Council at Peterhof, that the situation had been altered, since we had bombarded the "unfortified city" of Belgrade, and had done it on the very day on which we had offered the prospect of an application of the principles of the Hague Conference, which are supposed to forbid such action. Mr. Sazonoff had already made use of the same

[1] From the unsigned corrected copy [in French]. Cf. French Yellow Book, No. 139, under date of August 2.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3, a.m. In the margin the note in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor: "General von Moltke has personally assured me that up until 10 o'clock this morning no German soldier had been on French soil. Please have this matter cleared up through the General Staff. v. B. H. 3. 8."

[3] See No. 705.

[4] See No. 716, which perhaps ought to be established as later than No. 722; see also No. 869.

[5] From the unsigned corrected copy.

[6] Handed to the Foreign Office by Baron Haymerle on the 3d of August. Receipt stamp: August 3.

argument with me, when he received the news of the bombardment of Belgrade.

From what the German Ambassador has told me of his interviews with Sazonoff both before and after the Crown Council, I judge that even today's conference at Peterhof has failed to define the situation any more clearly, and that the question of taking sides remains undecided.

Today it is absolutely quiet around the Embassy; the demonstrations have ceased. The correspondent of the *Russkoje Slowo*, who is in very close touch with the Foreign Office, called at the Embassy and inquired whether the rumor of an Austro-Hungarian ultimatum relative to the Russian mobilization had been confirmed. This, he said, would be irreparable.

Among the citizens in general the fear of economic consequences is becoming evident.

In the Ministerial Council, Sazonoff and Krivoshein alleged to be opposed to war, also the Minister of Commerce. In addition to the military men, Premier Goremykin and the Minister of the Interior are for war.

Nothing is so far being said about a "*note explicative*" of the Russian mobilization.

Telegram from Count Szapary on August 1:

Russian Minister is said to have pointed out, in reply to statements of the German Ambassador, that suspension of the mobilization was, to be sure, impossible, but that, since the Czar had made a binding promise, there should, therefore, be no cause for disquiet. (!!)

No. 724

The Danish Legation to the Foreign Office [1]

BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

MEMORANDUM

The Royal Danish Embassy has the honor, in accordance with instructions received,[3] to inform the Imperial Foreign Office that, in view of information in possession of the Royal Danish Government on the first instant, which indicated that extensive preparations for war were in progress in Germany, the Royal Danish Government has determined to order the recruiting of the security forces.

These forces comprise in all 18,000 men, which go to complete the peace strength of the army.

The men summoned to service will be distributed among the different garrisons throughout the country.

[1] From the unsigned corrected copy.

[2] In the original the date is placed beneath the text. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3. Marginal annotation in Radowitz's handwriting, August 3: "Turned over by Count Moltke in confirmation of his telephone message of yesterday. Known by the military authorities."

[3] See No. 616.

No. 725

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at London and Rome [1]

Telegrams 217, 169. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

All of yesterday's reports concerning frontier violations are confirmed and amplified.

On the other hand, the French reports to the effect that German troops have crossed the frontier, are wholly imaginary. Yesterday French bodies of troops moved across our frontier in the passes of the Vosges west of Colmar. French fired first. Bombs dropped from airships over the Kaiser Bridge at Mainz. Still more French aircraft have been seen.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 726

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 408. THERAPIA, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

Treaty of alliance signed this afternoon at four o'clock. Text follows.[6]

WANGENHEIM.

No. 727

The Minister at The Hague to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 29. THE HAGUE, *August 3, 1914.*[8]

Estuary of the Waal blocked by mines. Report on the way.

MÜLLER.

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 10.15 a.m.
[3] See Nos. 689, 705, 713, 716 and 717.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Therapia August 2 at 6.02 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 3 at 11.31 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. This telegram was sent in continuation of a longer telegram, in which the various possibilities of military intervention on the part of Turkey were discussed, but which arrived at the Foreign Office later, at 5.56 p.m.
[6] See Nos. 733, 751 and 775.
[7] From the decodification.
[8] Filed at The Hague at 9.40 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.51 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff (twice) and the Imperial Naval Office.

No. 728

The Imperial Chancelor to the Minister at Sofia [1]

Telegram 47. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

Your Excellency is authorized to conduct the appropriate negotiations. Please wire before concluding them, what active obligations, especially from the military point of view, Bulgaria proposes to undertake.[3]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 729

The Imperial Chancelor to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest [4]

Telegram 71.
Urgent. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

Promising negotiations with Bulgaria relative to the formation of an alliance under way.[6] Please inform the King of this at once, and inquire whether Bulgaria's obligation, in accordance with the compact, to waive her claims to the Dobrudja, will be satisfactory to him and whether Roumania will now join us against Russia. Great haste is a necessity.[7]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 730

The Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg to the Imperial Chancelor and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [8]

Telegram (unnumbered). LUXEMBURG, *August 3, 1914.*[9]

I thank you for the telegram sent to me yesterday[10] relative to the occupation of Luxemburg by German troops. At this moment there is being distributed through the city of Luxemburg a proclamation by the general commanding the 8th Army Corps, Tulff von Tscheepe, which reads as follows:

> Since France, without regard to the neutrality of Luxemburg, has opened hostilities against Germany from Luxemburg territory, as has been unmistakably ascertained, His Majesty has ordered that German troops should move into Luxemburg, also.

[1] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.55 a.m. See No. 697.
[3] See No. 857. [4] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 12.05 p.m.
[6] See No. 697. [7] See No. 868. [8] From a copy.
[9] Both telegrams, identical, were filed at Luxemburg at 10.14 a.m.; received at the Berlin Central Telegraph Office at 11.38 a.m. The telegram to Jagow arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.05 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Copy submitted to the Emperor, given by him to the General Staff on the 3d of August; returned to the Foreign Office from the latter on the 4th of August. Eyschen's telegram communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.
[10] See No. 649.

Aviators came to us across Luxemburg. To fly across a neutral nation for war purposes is a breach of neutrality.

This statement is founded on error. There is absolutely not a single French soldier in Luxemburg territory, nor is there the least indication of a threat to her neutrality on the part of France. On the contrary, Saturday evening, the first of August, the railroad tracks were torn up at Mont Saint[1] Martin Longwy on French territory. That is evidence that it was already the intention at that time not to advance into Luxemburg by rail.

EYSCHEN,
The State Premier of the Government.

No. 731

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram 230. LONDON, *August 3, 1914.*[3]

Advance into France without war has had an ominous effect here and has seriously offended the English sense of justice.

Urgently request explanation I can use.[4]

Morning papers condemn our procedure and characterize us as the actual wreckers of peace.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 732

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office[5]

Telegram 229. LONDON, *August 3, 1914.*[6]

Papers report seizure of an English steamer in the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal, also movement of the German Fleet toward the west.

Urgently request explanation, so that I may set matters right.[7]

Local public opinion has taken a decided turn against us since yesterday.

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] In the copy "saine."
[2] From the decodification.
[3] Filed in London at 9.37 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m.
[4] See Nos. 742 and 744.
[5] From the decodification.
[6] Filed in London at 9.21 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.
[7] See No. 747.

No. 733

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 409. THERAPIA, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

FORMAL TEXT OF THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE

CONSTANTINOPLE, *August 2, 1914.*

1. The two contracting parties agree to observe strict neutrality in regard to the present conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

2. In case Russia should intervene with active military measures, and should thus bring about a *casus foederis* for Germany with relation to Austria-Hungary, this *casus foederis* would also come into existence for Turkey.

3. In case of war, Germany will leave her military mission at the disposal of Turkey.

The latter, for her part, assures the said military mission an effective influence on the general conduct of the army, in accordance with the understanding arrived at directly between His Excellency the Minister of War and His Excellency the Chief of the Military Mission.

4. Germany obligates herself, if necessary by force of arms [3] . . . Ottoman territory in case it should be threatened.

5. This agreement which has been concluded for the purpose of protecting both Empires from the international complications which may result from the present conflict goes into force as soon as it is signed by the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries, and shall remain valid, together with any similar mutual agreements, until December 31, 1918.

6. In case it shall not be denounced by one of the high contracting parties six months before the expiration of the term named above, this treaty shall remain in force for a further period of five years.

7. This present document shall be ratified by His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, and by His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within a period of one month from the date of its signing.

8. The present treaty shall remain secret and can only be made public as a result of an agreement arrived at between the two high contracting parties.

In testimony whereof, etc.

BARON V. WANGENHEIM.
SAID HALIM.

WITH REGARD TO 3: The Turks wished to use this phraseology in view of the fact that His Majesty the Sultan is the Commander in Chief of the Turkish army. General Liman, however, had officially informed me in advance that he had arranged a detailed agreement with Minister of War Enver which provided the

[1] From the decodification [in French].

[2] Filed in Therapia August 2 at 8.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 3 at 12.45 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. *Not* communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff or the Imperial Naval Office. See No. 726, also Nos. 751 and 775.

[3] Cipher group lacking.

Military Mission with the actual chief command—as required by your telegram 275.[1]

With regard to 7: The Grand Vizier expressly desires ratification of the compact by both sovereigns, in order that Turkey should be bound unconditionally, even if he should be turned out of office. Therefore I request that you forward as soon as possible the special authorization of the Emperor.

I will retain the original of the treaty here until the next opportunity offers to send it by Imperial messenger.

Wangenheim.

No. 734

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Paris[2]

Telegram 193.
Urgent.

Berlin, *August 3, 1914.*[3]

Up to the present time German troops have been ordered to absolutely respect the French frontier, and have implicitly obeyed this order everywhere. On the other hand, yesterday, in spite of the assurance of the ten-kilometer zone, French troops had already crossed the German frontier at Altmünsterol and by the mountain road in the Vosges, and are still on German territory.[4] A French aviator, who must have flown across Belgian territory, was shot down yesterday in an attempt to wreck the railroad at Wesel. Several other French airplanes were unquestionably placed over the Eifel district yesterday. These, also, must have flown over Belgian territory. Yesterday, French airmen dropped bombs on the railroads near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg.[5]

Thus France has forced us into a state of war. I request Your Excellency to communicate the foregoing to the French Government at six o'clock this afternoon, to demand your passports, and to leave, after turning over affairs to the American Embassy.[6]

Bethmann-Hollweg.

[1] See No. 320.

[2] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting, with alterations in Zimmerman's handwriting.

[3] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.05 p.m. The telegram reached Paris in a mutilated condition. On the 6th of August the Ambassador to Paris submitted to the Imperial Chancelor a copy of the mutilated decodification (see No. 734a) and a copy of the communication made by him to the French Government (see No. 734b). These copies were accompanied by an explanatory letter of Schoen's (receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 6, p.m.); with them a note by Jagow: "It seems necessary to me that this should be explained in the press and that our text of the declaration of war should be published." On the afternoon of the 7th of August the statement reproduced in No. 734c was sent to the Wolff Telegraphic Bureau.

[4] See Nos. 716 and 725; also, No. 739.

[5] See No. 664.

[6] "Thus France . . . American Embassy" added in Zimmermann's handwriting in place of the sentence as originally written by Jagow: "We are therefore forced to find that these facts establish a breaking of the peace on the part of France and the inauguration of a state of war, as well as a violation of Belgian neutrality, and to submit our protest."

No. 734A

Mutilated text of the declaration of war on France [1]

Telegram 193. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*

German restraints had kiln kel Italian Ambassador. We would have respected frontier most strictly and advised July to follow strictly. On the other hand in spite of bodily ten their zone French one another already Elena at old mü regard erol and mortgage mountain road, settlement iu ge sen ante Howard ultramontan and in view of relative territory. French aviators of the Belgian territory traité shortly to wait would by the attempt Bassora near Wesel to destroy. Yesterday already down mp. Several other French kts Nowoje Wremja were yesterday over the Eifel district free approach determined. These also must have founded Rénouard Belgian territory. Yesterday a French airman dropped bombs on railroad near Karlsruhe and Nüremberg. Thus France has transferred state of war Saragossa. Please crumbling field communicate to Government there this afternoon at six o'clock, demand your passports, and leave, after turning over affairs to American Embassy.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 734B

Text of the declaration of war presented at Paris [2]

PARIS, *August 3, 1914.*

MR. PREMIER:

The German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg.

I am instructed, and I have the honor to inform Your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

At the same time, I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that the German authorities will retain French mercantile vessels in German

[1] See No. 734, note 3. [The above is as close a translation of the mutilated dispatch as is possible, and represents its condition only approximately. The German text reads as follows: "Deutsche Erwehrungen hatten Brennerei kel italienischer Botschafter. Wir würden Grenze strengstens respektiert und avisiert Juli strikt befolgen. Dagegen haben trotz körperlich 10 Ihnen Zone französisch aneinander schon Elena bei alt mü ansehen erol und Hypothek Bebirge Strasse, Übereinkunft iu ge sen ante Howard ultramontan und angesichts noch auf relativ Gebiet. Französische Flieger der Belgien Gebiet traité begründet kurz zu warten wurde bei Versuch Bassora bei Wesel zu zerstören. Schon gestern herab mp. Mehrere andere französische kts Nowoje Wremja sind gestern über Eifel-Gebiet Zuzug frei festgestellt. Auch diese müssen Belgien Gebiet Renouard begründet haben. Gestern warf französischer Flieger Bombe auf Bahn bei Karlsruhe und Nürnberg. Frankreich hat Krieg sonach Saragossa Kriegszustand versetzt. Bitte Abbröcklung Acker heute nachmittag 6 Uhr dortiger Regierung mitteilen, Ihre Pässe fordern und nach Ubergabe der Geschäfte an amerikanischen Botschafter abreisen."]

[2] See No. 734, note 3.

ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only remains for me to request Your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris.

Be good enough, Mr. Premier, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect.[1]

v. SCHOEN.

To His Excellency Mr. Viviani, Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 734c

Announcement of the declaration of war on France through the Wolff Bureau[2]

The telegram of the Imperial Chancelor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris, sent August 3, at 1.05 p.m., in which Baron von Schoen was instructed, as a result of the invasion of German territory by French troops, to state to the French Government that Germany considered herself to be in a state of war by reason of the French attacks, arrived at Paris—presumably with intention—in a mutilated condition, so that at many places it was incomprehensible. Nevertheless, the Imperial Ambassador, with a thorough understanding of the situation, submitted a declaration consonant in all material points with his instructions. These instructions read as follows:

Telegram of the Imperial Chancelor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris.

BERLIN, *August 3, 1.05 p.m.*

"Up to the present time German troops . . . affairs to the American Embassy."[3]

[1] Cf. French Yellow Book, No. 147.
[2] See No. 734, note 2.
[3] Here to be inserted No. 734.

PART IV

FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR ON FRANCE TO THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA

No. 735

The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 28. BRUSSELS, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

Belgian Government assumes an attitude of non-compliance toward our proposals,[3] and will oppose by force any violation of her [4] neutrality.

Text follows.[5] Simultaneously to Aix by military *attaché* in automobile. Press has made the move public.

Telegraphic communication uncertain.

BELOW.

No. 736

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 231. LONDON, *August 3, 1914.*[7]

TO THE IMPERIAL NAVAL OFFICE AND ADMIRALTY STAFF:

With the Foreign Office cipher.

The Ambassador makes the urgent request that, without prejudice to any necessary precautions, the fleet avoid anything that might be regarded as a challenge to England or even as an unfriendly act. Hope that England may remain neutral has by no means disappeared.

NAVAL ATTACHÉ.
LICHNOWSKY.

No. 737

The Consul at Hongkong to the Foreign Office [8]

Telegram 10. HONGKONG (UNDATED).[9]

Governor here, has informed me that as the result of conferences with local General he will, in the unexpected event of a war between Germany and England, permit all Germans here to go on about their business, if they will give him their word of honor, through me, that they will undertake nothing against England;

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Brussels at 10.55 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor August 3d. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] See No. 376.

[4] Thus in the decodification.

[5] See No. 779.

[6] From the decodification.

[7] Filed in London at 6 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.37 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[8] From the decodification.

[9] Time of filing in Hongkong not given; arrived at the Foreign Office August 3d at 1.37 p.m. Submitted to the Emperor on the 3d of August. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office August 3.

also that I, myself, may remain here and conduct the affairs of my office on the same condition. Governor has also spoken in a manner friendly to Germany in other ways, especially in relation to permission for coal shipments, in spite of the state of preparedness for war. Tsingtau has made inquiry and been informed.

VORETZSCH.

No. 738

The Minister at The Hague to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 30. THE HAGUE, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

Telegram 25 [3] received. Minister Loudon informed in accordance therewith at nine o'clock this morning. Minister thanked me for the communication, without making any comment on my announcement for the present. Mr. Loudon is going to make investigations immediately with regard to the violations of neutrality on the part of France referred to in telegram 27.[4]

MÜLLER.

No. 739

The Grand General Staff to the Foreign Office [5]

Telephone message.[6]

1. Report from the 15th Army Corps (General Headquarters): Frontier violations by the French on the evening of the 1st of August at Metzeral and the gorge pass confirmed as unquestionable. German posts were fired upon. No losses. From Strassburg, August 2, 9.30 p.m.

2. Report from the 15th Army Corps (General Headquarters): Frontier violation by French infantry took place during the night of August 1 opposite Markirch. French opened fire first. No losses. From Strassburg, August 2, 5.55 p.m.

3. 58th Infantry Brigade reports from Mühlhausen, August 2, 12.10 p.m.: Enemy patrols crossed the frontier at Altmünsterol and in the vicinity of Rette, but crossed back again.

4. Report from Line Headquarters at Cologne, August 2, 11.45 p.m.: Lively aviation traffic of the enemy over the frontier from the direction of Treves toward Jünkerath and from that of Dahlheim toward Rheydt, and on the right bank of the Rhine near Cologne. Over Rheydt they signaled with white, red and green lights.

5. Telephonic report from the Chief of Staff of the 21st Army Corps, August 3, 9.40 p.m.: Three airplanes and one airship (broad in front, quite pointed behind) fired on from machine guns early this morning while above the railroad station

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in The Hague at 11 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.37 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m.
[3] See No. 674.
[4] See Nos. 677 and 797.
[5] From a copy taken down in Rosenberg's handwriting.
[6] Received August 3 at 1.45 p.m.; receipt stamp, August 3, p.m. Cf. No. 734.

at Saarburg (Lorraine). The aircraft did not give the prescribed signals of recognition.

6. Report from Line Headquarters at Ludwigshafen on the Rhine, August 2, in the evening: Two enemy aircraft reported today (August 2), about 10 p.m., near Neustadt on the Hardt.

7. Report from Line Headquarters at Wesel (received on the evening of the 2d of August): Enemy aircraft shot down by fire near Wesel.

No. 740

The Prussian Minister at Munich to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 29. MUNICH, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

Local French Minister Allizé stated yesterday that they were in doubt at Paris as to whether a *casus foederis* existed or not. The small number of persons who are familiar with the treaty appear to interpret it differently.

TREUTLER.

No. 741

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Madrid and to the Minister at Lisbon [3]

Telegrams 33, 55. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[4]

Please wire in code any information gained from the newspapers there or otherwise concerning army and navy movements in Russia, France or England, as well as any political events affecting these countries.

ZIMMERMANN.

No. 742

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [5]

Telegram 218. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[6]

All the reports about the alleged German invasion of France are the invention of prejudice. Up to the present time no single German soldier has crossed the French frontier.[7]

JAGOW.

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in Munich at 11.50 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 2.05 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Decodification given to the Emperor August 3. Returned to the Foreign Office the same day.
[3] From the original. Draft in the handwriting of Langwerth von Simmern.
[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 2.10 p.m.
[5] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 2.20 p.m.
[7] See Nos. 731 and 744.

No. 743

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia and to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest [1]

Telegrams 48, 72. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

For confidential use.

The Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople reports the signing of the treaty of alliance with Turkey.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 744

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [4]

Telegram 219.
Urgent. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

Kindly have published at once a statement in the English press, emphasizing its official character, to the effect that the French reports about a German invasion are false. Up to noon today not one German soldier had set foot on French soil. On the other hand, bodies of French troops pressed into the Imperial provinces yesterday.[6]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 745

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 172.
Urgent. ROME, *August 3, 1914.*[8]

Marquis di San Giuliano takes the position that these acts of France do not constitute a *casus foederis*, since they are nothing but the consequences of Austria's first aggressive act.[9] My discussion of the subject with him reached a point of such acrimony that its continuance seems doubtful. He accuses us of having planned the whole matter with Austria in advance, in order to place Italy before a *fait accompli*. But it is impossible to involve a Great Power in such a conflict, without consulting with it in advance. We should now have to bear the consequences of Italy's unwillingness to allow herself to be caught napping. She was not even allowed the time, he says, to make the necessary military preparations. The country could not allow itself to be exposed to the attacks of England and France in such manner. And then there was also the great peril of the internal situation.[10] We should see, he said, what would become

[1] From the original draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 2.40 p.m. [3] See No. 726.
[4] From the original. Draft in Hammann's handwriting with alterations by Jagow. Marginal annotation in Riezler's handwriting: "Telegram to this effect given to Reuter."
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 2.48 p.m.
[6] See Nos. 731 and 742. [7] From the decodification.
[8] Filed in Rome at 2 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.20 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 3d of August.
[9] See Nos. 664 and 694. [10] See Nos. 614, 748 and 840.

of Austria in this struggle; she would emerge from it a corpse, incapable of further existence. She would be utterly destroyed.

The declaration of neutrality is to appear officially today.

Mr. von Kleist reports that His Majesty the King expressed the best of intentions, but stated that he could not act in opposition to his ministers. Austria's chief mistake was, he said, that she did not make an offer of compensation in time.[1]

Marquis di San Giuliano replied to the Austrian Ambassador with reference to the communication concerning Article 7, that Austria-Hungary's conditional declaration about Article 7 was insufficient, and did not actually contain any offer of compensation at all.[2] Report on this subject by von Kleist follows. In his discussions with Marquis di San Giuliano, the arguments of the Austrian Ambassador, with whom I am cooperating throughout, have already reached a point of extreme sharpness. It is his opinion also, that the internal situation, England and the compensation question are the causes of the determination arrived at here.

The *Agenzia Stefani* and several newspapers are willing to circulate war information. I have also made it plain through the press that the Imperial Government considers the proceedings of Russia and of France to constitute a *casus foederis* for Italy.

FLOTOW.

No. 746

The Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [3]

Telegram (unnumbered). LUXEMBURG, *August 3, 1914.*[4]

I learn that a German agent has reported to Berlin that on the evening of Saturday, the first of August, 650 French cyclists rode through Luxemburg territory. According to the *Gendarmerie*, there is not one word of this report that is true.

EYSCHEN.

No. 747

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [5]

Telegram 220. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[6]

Newspaper reports untrue.[7]

JAGOW.

[1] Cf. also No. 771. [2] See No. 594.
[3] From the copy made at the Central Telegraph Office. Uncoded telegram.
[4] Filed in Luxemburg at 12.20 p.m.; received at the Berlin Central Telegraph Office at 2.35 p.m.; submitted to the Secretary of State at 3.37 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Copy submitted to the Emperor, returned to the Foreign Office on the 3d of August. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.
[5] From the original in Jagow's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.45 p.m. [7] See No. 732.

No. 748

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 171. ROME, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

I am told on every side that the compelling reason for Italy's neutrality is to be found in her fear of internal disturbances in the event of her participation in the war. As stated, the Marquis di San Giuliano himself gave me to understand this, though with reluctance.[3] The consular reports also proclaim the same sort of thing.[4]

Although both the Austrian Ambassador and I have fought for Italian participation in the sharpest possible manner, and with the application of every argument, I anticipate no success for the time being with the Ministerial Council. On the other hand, both Baron von Mérey and I have come to the opinion, as the result of certain striking articles in papers close to the Administration, such as the *Popolo Romano*, the *Giornale d'Italia*, etc., which criticize the attitude of the Government and of neutrality, that it is Marquis Giuliano's plan to allow himself to be forced by public opinion to take our part later. In agreement with this idea is his statement, first, "that he hoped that he would perhaps be able to take this step for us later," and secondly, "that he would continue to try to influence the press toward an attitude favorable to us."

Under these circumstances, I should think that it might be better to avoid an open break here for a while; and for the present, and in the absence of other instructions, will adapt my attitude, which has now reached a point of extreme bluntness, toward this end.

To judge from some of Marquis San Giuliano's hints, it must also be considered that in the final event it is not impossible that Italy might align herself against Austria.

FLOTOW.

No. 749

Memorandum of the Cipher Bureau of the Foreign Office

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*

In telegram 245 from Paris (pr. at 3.45 p.m.), the various cipher groups are apparently intentionally all mixed up. For the repetition requested by the Telegraph Office agreed absolutely with the earlier telegram, and an identical mix-up would hardly be accidentally repeated.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Rome at 11.40 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.45 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 3d of August.

[3] Cf. Nos. 614, 745 and 840.

[4] Marginal annotation by the Imperial Chancelor on the 3d of August: "Correct."

No. 750

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 229.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

Please URGENTLY request the Government there to keep secret for the present the alliance concluded with the Porte yesterday, on account of our shipping afloat in the Mediterranean.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 751

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople [4]

Telegram 305.
Urgent.
Secret.

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

Please request the Government there to keep the alliance secret for the present on account of our shipping afloat in the Mediterranean. As England's entry into the war against us is a thing that must be counted on, please do what is necessary in order that the English Naval Mission may be able to make no improper use of the Turkish fleet; and see that the Mohammedan watchword is passed on to the English colonies, particularly to India. It would be desirable to revolutionize the Caucasus.[6]

JAGOW.

No. 752

Memorandum of Count Mirbach, Reporting Councilor at the Foreign Office [7]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[8]

Grand General Staff telephones that French aviators were sighted at 10.50 this morning flying in the direction of Mühlhausen-Napoleon Island, and that they later flew back to France.

MIRBACH.

[1] From the original. Draft in Rosenberg's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.50 p.m.
[3] See Nos. 726 and 733.
[4] From the original. Draft in Rosenberg's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.55 p.m.
[6] See Nos. 726, 733 and 750.
[7] From the copy in Mirbach's handwriting.
[8] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3.

No. 753

Memorandum of Count B. Wedel, Reporting Councilor at the Foreign Office [1]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

The telegram from Lichnowsky [3] regarding the alleged frontier violations by German troops was referred to the four authoritative quarters.[4] The General Staff had so far had no information, but promised to investigate and report; has now reported that positively no frontier violations on our part have taken place. Denial now going to London. The General Staff adds that it is now preparing to give the order to cross the border.

WEDEL.

No. 754

The Italian Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [5]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[6]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE:

I have the honor of transmitting to Your Excellency herewith a telegram which His Majesty the King of Italy, my august Sovereign, has addressed to His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia.[7] I should be very much obliged to you if you would forward it to its exalted destination.

Accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

R. BOLLATI.

No. 755

The King of Italy to the Emperor [8]

Telegram (unnumbered).

TO HIS MAJESTY THE GERMAN EMPEROR:

I have just received Your telegram.[9] I deeply regret that all Your noble efforts—to which our own have also been joined—to avert the serious international consequences of the initiative of Austria-Hungary, have been in vain. My Government has *from the beginning made it plain* to Your Government and to that of Austria-Hungary,[10] that, as it was unable to find that the *casus*

A lie.

[1] From the copy in B. Wedel's handwriting.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office lacking.
[3] See No. 731.
[4] i. e., the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.
[5] From the corrected copy [in French].
[6] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3, p.m. Was submitted to the Emperor, and was returned by him to the Foreign Office on the 3d of August. Sent to the General Staff for the latter's cognizance on the 3d of August, and returned by the Staff to the Foreign Office on the same day.
[7] See No. 755.
[8] From a copy [in French] made at the Italian Embassy. Forwarded with the accompanying note as given above (No. 754).
[9] See No. 530.
[10] Question-mark in the margin by the Emperor; "beginning" twice underscored by the Emperor.

foederis provided for in the treaty of the Triple Alliance *applied at the present time*, it would direct all its diplomatic activities toward the maintenance of the just interests of our allies and ourselves, and toward the cause of peace.

I send You the sincere expression of my most cordial wishes for the good of Yourself and that of Germany.

Scoundrel!

Insolence!

W.

Your brother and ally,[1]

(Signed) VITTORIO EMANUELE.

No. 756

The Italian Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[3]

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE:

I believe it; he doesn't want to be the bearer of such treachery.

As *I am suffering very much*, it is impossible for me to come to the Department today. Your Ambassador at Rome will doubtless already have telegraphed you what our Minister for Foreign Affairs told him yesterday: that the Italian Government intends to remain neutral [4] during the present conflict—for the present, at any rate—inasmuch as it considers that the *casus foederis*, which would obligate it to cooperate with its allies, has not yet arisen. I am sending you under cover with this the official declaration of neutrality.[5]

Kindly accept, my dear Secretary of State, the assurances of my most cordial devotion.

R. BOLLATI.

No. 757

The Italian Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [6]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[7]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE:

Under instructions from my Government, I have the honor of informing Your Excellency that the Italian Government has decided to remain neutral in the present conflict.

Accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

R. BOLLATI.

[1] "Ally" twice underscored by the Emperor, who also placed two exclamation-points beneath it.
[2] From the corrected copy [in French].
[3] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3, p.m. Submitted to the Emperor, returned by him to the Foreign Office through the General Staff on August 3.
[4] See No. 675.
[5] See No. 757.
[6] From the corrected copy [in French].
[7] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3, p.m. Submitted to the Emperor, returned by him to the Foreign Office through the General Staff on August 3.

No. 758

The Prussian Minister at Munich to the Minister for Foreign Affairs (The Imperial Chancelor) [1]

MUNICH, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

The military report, circulated also by the *Süddeutsches Korrespondenzbureau*, to the effect that French aviators had dropped bombs in the vicinity of Nuremberg today, has so far not been verified. Simply, some unknown aircraft were seen, which were apparently not military planes. There is no evidence of the dropping of bombs, and still less, naturally, that the aviators were French.[3]

TREUTLER.

No. 759

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office [4]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

Mr. von Mérey telegraphs from Rome under date of August 1, 1914:

At today's Ministerial Conference there was a disposition to remain neutral in a European conflict. The feeling was that there was neither obligation nor interest to induce Italy to take part in the war. The Triple Alliance was an alliance for defense, while we had provoked a war without previous understanding with Italy.

Marquis di San Giuliano, who gave me this information, complained also about our "policy of chicane" in Albania, and finally stated that no formal decision had been arrived at, however, and it was possible that Italy might take part in the war at a later time . . .[6] at which the word Compensation was again mentioned.

No. 760

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office [7]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[8]

In a telegram to Count Berchtold dated the first instant, the Imperial and Royal Ambassador at Rome says among other things:

> It might be thought worth considering, perhaps, that Austria-Hungary and Germany should announce to Italy that, in case Italy were to remain neutral and did not fulfil the obligations of her alliance up to the last man, we should consider Italy as having withdrawn from the Triple Alliance, and should consider ourselves equally free of the obligations of the alliance.

[1] From the corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3, p.m.
[3] See Nos. 664 and 734.
[4] From the corrected copy; without signature.
[5] Transmitted to the Foreign Office through Baron Haymerle, August 3; receipt stamp: August 3.
[6] Three dots in the corrected copy.
[7] From the corrected copy; without signature.
[8] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3, p.m.

Now while, in the event of Italy's neutrality, I should be willing to advocate the separation of Italy from the Triple Alliance after the conclusion of the war, I wonder whether the threat of this at the present moment would not incur the risk of Italy's going over at once into the camp of the enemy.[1]

No. 761

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

NOTIFICATION

According to a telegram from the Imperial and Royal Minister at Bucharest under date of August 1, Mr. Bratianu has recently solemnly avowed that the neutrality of Roumania will be absolutely certain. Roumania will, however, if it is possible in any way, take the field against Russia with two army corps. In case Russia should violate her neutrality, Roumania would at once declare war on her.

Nevertheless, Count Czernin appears to have doubts as to Roumania's active intervention in our behalf.

No. 762

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Belgrade (Temporarily at Nish)[3]

Telegram 37. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[4]

Reports about Serbian military preparations, troop movements, etc., desired. Please send these direct or through the Legation at Athens, which uses the same cipher.[5]

ZIMMERMANN.

[1] To this Bergen and Zimmermann made the following annotations. Bergen: "A reply to the Austro-Hungarian Embassy . . . may it be given to the effect that at the present time a threat does not (last word twice underscored) appear the proper thing? B. August 3." Hereupon Zimmermann: "Yes, absolutely. Z. August 3." Then, later, Bergen: "Attended to, today, orally. B. August 4."

[2] From the corrected copy; without signature; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3, p.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office on the 3d of August.

[3] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting.

[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 4.05 p.m.

[5] See No. 763.

No. 763

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé d'Affaires at Athens [1]

Telegram 109. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

Baron von Griesinger has been authorized to put certain reports for the Foreign Office through your Legation.[3]

Please wire here information given out there—even in the press—about military preparations, fleet and troop movements, of England, France and Russia.

ZIMMERMANN.

No. 764

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 234. LONDON, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

Have just given Sir E. Grey the information requested.[6] The Minister seemed to be very much disturbed, and pointed out that England would not be able to take so calmly the violation of Belgian neutrality, which she had expressly guaranteed. So far as concerned any assembling of French troops on the Belgian frontier, France had declared that she would cross the Belgian frontier only on condition that French troops were called on for assistance.

The Minister told me that he intended to make a statement this afternoon in which he would lay down the conditions upon which his country would remain neutral. He spoke of a conditional rupture.

I urgently requested him not to bring in Belgium's neutrality as a condition *sine qua non*, as that would lead to disastrous consequences. He gave me no assurance, but I have the distinct impression that, if it should be at all possible, he *would like*[7] *to* continue to remain neutral. I bound myself to him in the terms of the following declaration:

It isn't a question of might and would like! It is one of honorable intention! That is lacking!

1. That even in the event of an armed conflict with Belgium, we would maintain the inviolability of the Belgian domain.

2. That in the event of England's remaining neutral, we would not approach the Channel or the northern coast of France with our fleet.

[1] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting.

[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 4.05 p.m. Paragraph "please wire . . . France and Russia" telegraphed by Zimmermann at the same time to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest.

[3] See No. 762.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in London at 1.02 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.33 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Submitted to the Imperial Chancelor at 9 o'clock in the evening (see No. 790). Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 3d of August, who ordered by marginal instructions its communication to the Chief of the General Staff. Transmitted by the latter to the General Staff on the 3d of August; returned by the Staff to the Foreign Office on the 7th of August. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[6] See No. 667.

[7] "would like to" twice underscored by the Emperor.

This last promise I made after conferring with the local naval attaché. I still hope that it will be possible to reach an agreement on this basis, as it is felt here that neither France nor Belgium would gain any advantage from a clash between England and ourselves. Whether this last can be avoided depends in great measure upon the feeling in the Cabinet as well as upon local public opinion, which might, perhaps, be roused into too stormy an excitement by our proceedings in Belgium.

I repeat, that they would like to remain neutral, and are counting on our support in order to be able to do so.

A son of a German woman, who lies so! A German who writes such lies! An absolute lie.

Sir *W. Tyrrell* gave me to *understand* that, from the telegrams of Mr. *de Bunsen* in Austria, the opinion was growing that, as we were the aggressors and were not being attacked, the terms of the Triple Alliance *did not oblige Austria to cooperate.*[1]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 765

The King of the Belgians to the Emperor [2]

BRUSSELS, *August 1, 1914.*[3]

YOUR MAJESTY AND DEAR COUSIN:

The war which threatens to break out between the two Powers who are my neighbors, gives me, as You can easily understand, cause for great uneasiness.

For more than eighty years, during which Belgium has been independent, our country has conscientiously observed its international obligations, often under the most difficult circumstances, and the Imperial Chancelor admitted in terms of glowing recognition Belgium's correct and non-partisan attitude in the year 1870.

Your Majesty and Your Government have repeatedly given us valuable proofs of Your friendship and sympathy, and fully authorized personages have assured us that in the event of a new war, Belgium's neutrality would be respected.

We fully understand the reasons which, from a political standpoint, prohibit at this time the publication of this declaration, but we do not doubt that the feelings for and the intentions toward us of that mighty imperial realm whose destinies are guided by Your Majesty, have remained unchanged.

The ties of relationship and friendship which so closely bind our families have decided me to write You today and to request You to be gracious enough to repeat to me at so serious a moment as the present the expression of these sentiments toward my country.

[1] On the margin to the left three exclamation points by the Emperor.

[2] From the corrected copy written in his own hand by the King of the Belgians; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3; forwarded to the Emperor by the latter.

[3] On the letter the annotation by the Emperor: "August 3, 5 p.m., W."; and his marginal instructions: "Submit telegraphic reply at once. W." On the envelope belonging to the letter of the King of the Belgians the Imperial annotation: "In haste to His Excellency the Imperial Chancelor." In the same place the notation of receipt in the hand of the Imperial Chancelor: "*accepi*, 6, 24." Sent on the 3d of August by the aide-de-camp on duty, von Mutius, to the Chief of the General Staff, and returned by the latter to the Foreign Office.

I should be heartily grateful to You for such kindly beneficence.
In this confidence, I remain as always,

Your faithfully devoted Cousin,

ALBERT.[1]

No. 766

The Emperor to the Emperor of Austria [2]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[3]

I thank You most sincerely, my dear friend, for the words which went to my heart when transmitted to me just now through Count Szögyeny.[4]

I know that our Armies will give us of their best in the struggle that has been forced upon us, and I join my prayers with Yours that God may stand by us. At the same time that I telegraphed to You,[5] I also [6] telegraphed to the King of Italy. But he has shamefully betrayed our trust and has failed to fulfil the obligations of his alliance.[7]

WILHELM.

No. 767

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [8]

Telegram 415. THERAPIA, *August 3, 1914.*[9]

From the Military Mission.
Reports from Turkish consuls on July 30:

KARS: In the event of war, *the party leaders have decided that a general revolution is to be brought about* also in the Caucasus. No signs of a Russian attack on us.

Sweden reported it had already broken out?

BAKU: Big strike been going on here for a month. Mohammedans very much pleased at the hope of a world war.

SEBASTOPOL: No mutiny in the Black Sea fleet, which is mobilized.

TIFLIS: *No intention* of Russian hostilities against *Turkey.*

[1] See Nos. 778 and 783.
[2] From the original. Draft in Rosenberg's handwriting, paraphrased by him, as well as by Stumm, Zimmermann and the Chancelor. Corrected copy of the original draft, together with a Report to the Throne by Jagow, drafted by Rosenberg, sent by messenger on the 2d of August at 2.30 p.m. to the Emperor, who noted on the Report to the Throne: "August 3, '14. W.," and added the last sentence to the draft.
[3] Marginal annotation by the Emperor on the corrected copy of the draft: "After forwarding by telegraph return to the Foreign Office. W." Telegram sent from the palace to the Telegraph Office August 3d at 5.10 p.m. Corrected copy and Report to the Throne returned to the Foreign Office on the 3d of August.
[4] See No. 601.
[5] Thus in the draft.
[6] See No. 530.
[7] "But he has . . . of his alliance." added by the Emperor. See No. 755.
[8] From the decodification.
[9] Filed in Therapia at 3.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.12 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, returned by him to the Foreign Office on the 3d of August. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

ODESSA, JULY 31: The troops from Kiev and Bessarabia are going to Volhynia on the Austrian frontier. The line Kiev-Schmerinka being considered as a line of operations.

As the military attaché at Petersburg, considered reliable, has reported again in the last few days, the Russian troops are *not ready and are not capable* of taking the offensive.

WANGENHEIM.

No. 768

The Governor at Düsseldorf to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). DÜSSELDORF, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

The Magistrate of Geldern telegraphed yesterday [3] that the local battalion had reported early yesterday morning that eighty French officers in the uniform of Prussian officers, in twelve automobiles had made a vain attempt to cross the frontier at Walbeck in this direction. The Magistrate gave the further information, in answer to inquiries, that the Adjutant of the local battalion reported subsequently that the report relative to the eighty French officers had in the main been corroborated. The automobiles had been left behind on Dutch territory. One officer, who preceded the rest, had retired before armed opposition. The Magistrate further reports that, this morning at two o'clock, he had received from the General Headquarters of the 7th Army Corps the following instruction: A large shipment of money for Russia was to be brought into Germany across the Dutch frontier during the night, according to certain information. He was to prevent the shipment under all circumstances. Great caution was advised. Since yesterday noon all crossings on the frontier in the district of Geldern had been barred by *abatis* as well as by customs guards or military sentries. According to reports from the customs officials in the district of Geldern, the money shipments did not get through.

GOVERNOR.

[1] From the copy made at the Central Telegraph Office. Uncoded telegram.
[2] Filed at Düsseldorf at 4.45 p.m.; received at the Berlin Central Telegraph Office at 5.15 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Telegram of the same tenor from the Governor of Düsseldorf to the Minister of the Interior, forwarded by the latter to the Foreign Office on the afternoon of August 3.
[3] See Nos. 670 and 677.

No. 769

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 237. LONDON, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

Rumor spread here of alleged clash between British and German warships in the North Sea. Please inform me at once of facts, and above all, recommend great caution to the Navy in order that no accidents shall happen.[3]

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 770

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 238. LONDON, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

I hear in well-informed financial circles that the King of the Belgians has turned here for advice.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 771

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 287. ROME, *August 3, 1914.*[7]

Mr. von Kleist sends the following telegram for His Majesty:

To HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR, PALACE, BERLIN:

Today, Monday, at 9 a.m., I handed to the King of Italy Your Majesty's commission, in which the immediate mobilization of the army and navy as well as the assurance of his assistance as an ally according to the terms of the treaty was demanded.

The King replied that personally he was whole-heartedly with us, and a few weeks ago had not doubted for a moment that Italy would lend her allies her faithful assistance in the event of war. The incredible awkwardness of Austria during the past few weeks however had acted upon Italian sensibilities and so turned public opinion against Austria that to take the part of Austria actively at the present time would precipitate a storm. The Ministry did not want to risk a rebellion. He, the King, had, unfortunately, merely influence, but no power. Should he dissolve the present Ministry, he would

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in London at 2.12 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.33 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Marginal annotation of Riezler's on August 3: "Denied through Reuter's."

[3] See No. 777.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in London at 3.36 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.28 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor and returned to the Foreign Office August 3.

[6] From the decodification.

[7] Filed in Rome at 3.50 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.28 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor and communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office on the 3d of August. Telegram communicated by Jagow to the Ambassador at Vienna on the 4th of August, strictly confidential, as telegram 232, preceded by the sentence: "Aide-de-Camp von Kleist, sent by His Majesty the Emperor to the King of Italy, reports as follows from Rome under date of August 3." To the Central Telegraph Office August 4 at 3.15 a.m.

be able to find no other to take the responsibility. All of this, principally for the reason that Austria had so far been unwilling to make *any sort of a definite* promise for the future,[1] by which a reversal of public feeling might possibly have been attained; whether this might still be hoped for, was very doubtful.

As the people were unable to differentiate, Italy's refusal on account of Austria's stupidity was also a refusal as far as regarded Germany, a fact that pained him, the King, deeply. He would again try to exercise his influence on the Ministry and inform me as to the result. Kleist.

Mr. von Kleist requests that a copy be sent to the Chief of the General Staff.

FLOTOW.

No. 772

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram 162. VIENNA, *August 3, 1914.*[3]

As Your Excellency knows, they have postponed the declaration of war on Russia here up to the present time, in order that the advance through Galicia might proceed undisturbed as long as possible.

They wish to avoid incurring the odium of an attack on Russia by a spontaneous declaration of war, and are wondering whether Austria could not consider the Russian attack on Germany, which has already occurred, a ground of war for the Monarchy also, in view of the treaty of alliance.

Yes.

As the declaration of war could probably only be postponed for a few days longer, they would be grateful for the enunciation of the views at Berlin on this question.[4]

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 773

Official communication published through the Wolff Telegraph Bureau[5]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[6]

Up to the present time German troops, in obedience to orders as announced, have not crossed the French frontier. On the other hand, French troops have been attacking our frontier pickets in the absence of a declaration of war since

[1] See No. 745. [2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed in Vienna at 5.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.17 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, returned by him to the Foreign Office August 4. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[4] Marginal annotation by Zimmermann on the 4th of August: "The Austro-Hungarian Embassy Counselor informs me that his Government will probably declare war on Russia tomorrow at St. Petersburg. The (. . .) idea is to be utilized as a reason for the declaration of war. The long delay is explained by the desire to prevent a surprise attack by Russia during the preliminary movement of troops to the frontier." The parenthesis refers to the words in the decodification put in parentheses by Zimmermann: "consider the Russian attack . . . treaty of alliance." See No. 814.

[5] From an unparaphrased memorandum, with alterations and additions by Wahnschaffe and the Imperial Chancelor. [6] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3, p.m.

yesterday. In spite of the fact that the French Government promised us only a few days ago to respect an unoccupied zone of ten kilometers in depth, they have crossed the German frontier at various points. Companies of French troops have occupied German localities during the night; and bomb-dropping aviators have been coming into Baden, Bavaria and—violating Belgian neutrality by crossing Belgian territory—into the Rhine provinces, making attempts to destroy our railroads.

By so doing, France has opened her attack on us and brought about a state of war. The security of the Empire compels us to adopt measures of self-defense. His Majesty the Emperor has issued the necessary orders.

The German Ambassador at Paris has been instructed to demand his passports.[1]

No. 774

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome[2]

Telegram 170. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[3]

Wolff publishes this evening the following: "Up to the present time . . . demand his passports."[4]

JAGOW.

No. 775

The Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs[5]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[6]

Please inform the Ambassador at Constantinople of the following as soon as possible:

> Upon the official announcement of the treaty of alliance, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* have been ordered at once to Constantinople. Suggestion to place Admiral Souchon at disposal of government to command Turkish fleet. Request answer by wire whether we can assist Turkish fleet by offer of German personnel.

v. TIRPITZ.

[1] See Nos. 734 and 734*c*.
[2] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[3] To the Central Telegraph Office at 7.25 p.m.
[4] Here is inserted the Official Announcement published by the Wolff Telegraph Bureau (No. 773).
[5] From the corrected copy.
[6] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3, p.m. Paragraph "Upon the official . . . German personnel" communicated by wire to the Ambassador at Constantinople; to the Central Telegraph Office at 7.30 p.m. See Nos. 712, 726 and 733.

No. 776

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). PARIS, *August 3, 1914.*

Telegram number one hundred and ninety-two [2] incomprehensible. Please repeat.

GERMAN AMBASSADOR SCHOEN.

No. 777

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [3]

Telegram 221. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[4]

Deny the news there also, immediately.

JAGOW.

No. 778

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Emperor [5]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[6]

I venture most humbly to submit to Your Majesty the draft [7] of a telegraphic reply to His Majesty the King of the Belgians, as commanded.

I have just found out, that it is doubtful whether any more telegrams will get through to Brussels.

JAGOW.

No. 779

The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office [8]

Telegram 29. BRUSSELS, *August 3, 1914.*[9]

Brussels, August 3, 1914.[10]

The German Government states in its note of August 2, 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intend to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions,

[1] As received [in French] at the Central Telegraph Office; sent from Paris at 3.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Noted on it by the Cipher Bureau at 10.40 p.m.: "The Central Telegraph Bureau has been requested to repeat Telegram 192 to Paris."

[2] See Nos. 716 and 809.

[3] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting.

[4] To the Central Telegraph Office at 7.45 p.m. See No. 769.

[5] From the corrected copy in Jagow's handwriting.

[6] Marginal annotation by the Emperor on the corrected copy: "7.45 p.m." Returned to the Foreign Office on the 3d of August. See No. 765.

[7] See No. 783.

[8] From the decodification. See No. 735.

[9] Filed in Brussels at 12.35 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.58 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor and returned to the Foreign Office on the 4th of August. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[10] See also the first Belgian Gray Book, No. 22, which was used as the basis of the German text and therefore as the basis of this English translation.

would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops.

The German Government would consider itself compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposes to the Royal Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertakes, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note adds that if Belgium puts difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms.

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Royal Government.

The intentions which it attributes to France are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the Government of the Republic.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium would fulfil her international obligations and her army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guaranty of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations; she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she has left nothing undone to maintain or enforce respect for her neutrality.

The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threatens her would constitute a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if it were to accept the proposals submitted to it, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and at the same time betray its duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, it refuses to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government is firmly resolved to repel by all the means in its power, every attack upon its rights.

As a result of the interruption of telegraphic communication, this telegram could only be forwarded now. The Government informs me that further telegraphic communication with Berlin will only be permitted me in case Belgian representative there is allowed the same favor.

Feeling against Germany strong. It is reported that the Court and Government are to migrate to Antwerp, which has been put in a state of siege and where the German colony has been bidden to leave the city.

BELOW.

No. 780

The Emperor to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

His Excellency the Imperial Chancelor:

In connection with the conversation we have just had, I would request to be informed immediately by telephone whether, in informing London of the summary demand made on Belgium by us, it was added that Germany, even in the event of a hostile collision with Belgium, would solemnly make the declaration to England that Germany would even then guarantee the integrity of the Belgian nation. Should this have been neglected, in spite of the written request of the Chief of the General Staff, it must be remedied at once.

Wilhelm I. R.

No. 781

An article by the Foreign Office concerning the Proceedings against Belgium, intended for the Press, but not published [2]

The German Government was in possession, even as early as the evening of the first of August, of reliable information to the effect that French armed forces were assembling on the line Givet-Maubeuge. This information, the reliability of which is confirmed, leave it open to no doubt that France intends to make a drive on Germany through Belgian territory. Even during the night of August 1, French aviators flew across Belgian territory in the direction of the Rhine provinces. As they signalled to their rear, there can be no doubt as to the nationality of these aviators. During the night of August 1 news reached the Dutch frontier that French troops had crossed the Belgian frontier. These movements comprise the preliminaries of the drive through Belgium as planned.

The Imperial Government, as a result of this information, communicated the facts to the Royal Belgian Government at eight o'clock on the evening of August second, and added that it could not help but fear that without assistance, Belgium, in spite of the best of intentions, would be unable to resist a French drive through her territory with sufficient prospect of success to guarantee German security against the menace. Thus, that it would fill the German Government with the greatest regret if Belgium should consider it an act of hostility towards her for Germany, compelled by the measures of her opponents, to also invade Belgian territory in her own defense. In order to exclude the possibility of any misunder-

[1] From the undated corrected copy in the Emperor's handwriting; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3, p.m. On the corrected copy the note in Jagow's handwriting: "His Majesty has received the reply that this communication has already been made to England." See in this regard No. 667.

[2] From the typewritten copy with additions in the handwriting of Stumm and Riezler in the archives. Marginal annotation by Col. Tappen of the Grand General Staff on the 3d of August: "By order of His Excellency the Chief, not to be published." On an attached sheet (receipt stamp: August 4, p.m.), the note in the handwriting of Radowitz:

> From Major von Redern, Grand General Staff:
> His Excellency the Chief of the Grand General Staff desires that the proposed publication be omitted for the present. There might yet take place a change in our relations with Belgium. Then the pacifying article would fail of its purpose.
> As soon as actual facts are reported from Belgium, the General Staff will again take up with the Foreign Office the question of its publication.

standing, the Imperial Government further made to the Royal Belgian Government the following declaration:

1. Germany has absolutely no hostile intentions of any sort against Belgium. If Belgium decides to maintain toward Germany in the impending war an attitude of benevolent neutrality, then the German Government will obligate itself, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and the independence of the Kingdom to the fullest extent.

2. Germany obligates herself, under the above conditions, to evacuate the territory of the Kingdom as soon as peace shall have been concluded.

3. In the event of a friendly attitude on the part of Belgium, Germany is willing, according to agreement with the Belgian authorities, to buy for cash all the necessities required by her troops, and to make compensation for all damages that might possibly be caused by German troops.

The Royal Belgian Government has replied, without waiting for the expiration of the twelve-hour respite offered, that its attitude toward our proposals was one of refusal, and that it would oppose with force [1] any violation of her [2] neutrality.

The German Government faces this development of affairs with the greatest regret. The whole German people will share this regret. But the seriousness of the occasion and the procedure of France demand speedy and decisive action.

No. 782

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 241. LONDON, *August 3, 1914.*[4]

Foreign Office informs me that the French Ambassador has officially stated, on the strength of telegraphic information from Paris, that report that eighty French officers in German uniforms had attempted to cross the Dutch-German frontier at Geldern in automobiles is an absolute invention.[5]

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] Thus in the copy.

[2] "it would oppose with force" an interpolation in pencil in Stumm's handwriting in the space left open for it in the draft.

[3] From the corrected copy of the Central Telegraph Office.

[4] Filed in London at 6 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Copy sent to the Emperor on the 4th of August. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[5] See Nos. 677 and 710.

No. 783

The Emperor to the King of the Belgians [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE BELGIANS, BRUSSELS.

I wish to express my warmest thanks for Your Majesty's letter [3] and for the sentiments it contains.

Although, I was compelled to put a serious question to Your Majesty's Government, it was with the friendliest intentions toward Belgium, but under the compulsion of the decisive moment at which Germany's fate is at stake.

It is still in the power of Your Majesty to shape the relations between us in the friendly manner offered and under the conditions as communicated.

My sentiments toward Your Majesty and Your Majesty's country remain unaltered.

WILHELM.

No. 784

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 240. LONDON, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

Sir Edward Grey has just stated in the House that, with relation to the European War, the Government has entered upon no other agreements than those of diplomatic support. Should a foreign fleet, however, which was involved in a war which France had not sought and in which she was not the aggressor, invade the English Channel and bombard the unprotected coast of France, the act would be a cause of war for England, but only in case of such an event had the latter promised her armed support to France.

He said he had stated to the French Ambassador that, in the event that the German Fleet entered the Channel or came through the North Sea in order to proceed to hostile acts against the French coast or French marine traffic, England would support France by every means lying within their [6] power.[7]

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] From the original in Jagow's handwriting, which, with Jagow's Report to the Throne (see No. 778) was sent to the Emperor and completed by him and returned to the Foreign Office on the 3d of August.

[2] At the foot of the draft, the note by Aide-de-Camp von Hirschfeld: "This telegram has, at His Majesty's order, already been dispatched from the palace." From there to the Central Telegraph Office at 8.20 p.m.

[3] See No. 765.

[4] From the copy of the Central Telegraph Office. Uncoded telegram.

[5] Paragraph "Sir Edward Grey . . . support to France" filed in London at 5.28 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.48 p.m. Paragraph "He said he . . . their power" filed in London at 5.35 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.30 p.m.; receipt stamp to both sections of the telegram: August 3, p.m. Submitted to the Emperor on the 4th of August. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office on the 4th of August.

[6] Thus in the decodification.

[7] See Nos. 714, 801 and 820.

No. 785

The Ambassador at Tokyo to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 40. TOKYO [2]

During a conversation along the lines suggested in telegram 24,[3] I could perceive that the Foreign Minister viewed the relations with Russia as very friendly and does not anticipate their being disturbed. To my question as to what he thought Japan's attitude toward a European war would be, he replied that Japan desired to remain neutral as long as possible; that naturally Japan's ultimate decision depended on England. Should England lay claim to Japan's assistance in eastern Asia or in India, then she would have to take part. The Minister said that he did not believe that collisions on the open sea would cause Japan's entrance into the war, but this might easily happen in case of a German attack on British territory, Hongkong, for instance. Should the war be confined to Europe, however, then Japan would presumably remain neutral.

Apparently Russia is persistently striving to pacify Japan by means of concessions.

REX.

No. 786

The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 61. SINAIA, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

Made the declaration to the King and the Premier as instructed, without delay.[6] The King said that military measures preparatory to mobilization had been taken as early as Friday, that the Crown Council was to be held today, to which the party leaders and the presidents of the Senate and the Chamber had been invited and that the treaty and all other matters were to be laid before it, as the question of mobilization was to be decided. The King will take a very energetic and, if necessary, threatening stand for mobilization. His Majesty says that the harbor of Constantza and consequently the Dobrudja lie wide open to the enemy, so that it would be desirable that the Russian fleet should be threatened by Turkey. He desires that Turkey shall be made secure against attack by Greece, and also that Turkey shall be active in Asia Minor. I believe the King to be loyal throughout. Premier declares that he is willing to support German activities and to see how best the Government as well as general public

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Time of filing at Tokyo not given; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.14 p.m., August 3; receipt stamp, August 3, p.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office on the 3d of August. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, returned by him to the Foreign Office on the 4th of August. Telegram was communicated by wire, after minor alterations had been effected, to the Ambassador at Vienna and the Minister at Peking on the 4th of August. To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.25 p.m., August 4.

[3] See No. 545.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in Sinaia at 4 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.45 p.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office; receipt stamp, August 4, a.m. Copy of the decodification was sent to the Emperor.

[6] See No. 646; No. 729 had probably not reached Sinaia at this time.

opinion can accomplish this. The country, he says, has been taken by surprise by events and is unprepared from a military standpoint. Mr. Bratianu is afraid of a Russian invasion of Moldavia, if Russia is snubbed at once.

Shall wire result of Crown Council as soon as possible.

King's and Premier's intentions are unquestionably good. It may be necessary to grant Roumania a little time for quiet mobilization and for influencing public opinion, in view of her unpreparedness. It will probably be necessary to avoid letting Russia—which is said to have concentrated large bodies of troops in Bessarabia already—find out too soon the attitude Roumania is adopting and attack a Roumania which is unprepared. In Count Czernin's opinion, also, publication of the treaty on our part is not advisable at present.

WALDTHAUSEN.

No. 787

The 16th Infantry Division to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). LUXEMBURG, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

How is the Division Command to act toward the local French Minister with relation to his sending information to his Government? State Ministry has already appealed to its rights as a neutral nation in argument with the Division Commander several times today.[3]

16TH DIVISION.

No. 788

The Chief of the General Staff of the Army to the Foreign Office [4]

Secret. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

The Belgian Government must be informed on Tuesday, August 4, at 6 a.m., that, to our regret, we shall be forced by the Royal Belgian Government's attitude of refusal toward our well-meant proposals, to put into execution the measures of self-protection against the French menace which we have already described as unavoidably necessary, even if we have to do it by force of arms.

This communication is a necessity, inasmuch as our troops will already be entering upon Belgian territory early tomorrow morning. I think this declaration

[1] From the corrected copy of the Central Telegraph Office at Berlin.

[2] Filed in Luxemburg at 8 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.49 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 3, p.m. Communicated on the 3d of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff, and the Imperial Naval Office. Copy of the telegram sent to the Chief of the General Staff with the accompanying note from Jagow:

> With R(equest) for R(eturn). BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*
> To His Excellency the Chief of the General Staff with a request for an expression of his opinion. If no particular value is laid by the staff on interrupting the communication, its maintenance should, from my point of view, be advocated.
>
> v. JAGOW.

[3] See Nos. 807 and 842.

[4] From the corrected copy.

[5] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 3, p.m.; entry by the Under-Secretary of State, August 3, 1914, 10 p.m. See No. 791.

will suffice, as Belgium has stated to us that she will oppose with force of arms any invasion. I consider a declaration of war undesirable, as I am still counting on the possibility of being able to come to an understanding when the Belgian Government realizes the seriousness of the situation.[1]

v. MOLTKE.

No. 789

The Minister at Christiania to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 24. CHRISTIANIA, *August 3, 1914.*[3]

Norwegian Government has mobilized entire navy and has called in troops to reinforce fortresses. Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that there is no immediate intention of general mobilization. Norway is expected, in cooperation with Denmark and Sweden, to proclaim a new declaration of neutrality with regard to German-Russian war. Storthing summoned for the eighth of August.

OBERNDORFF.

No. 790

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at London [4]

Telegram 223. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

Please state to Sir Edward Grey that if we should take the step of violating Belgian neutrality, we would do so compelled by the duty of self-preservation. We found ourselves in a position of military constraint. While France had also before that time made strong military preparations and while we had up until then confined ourselves in a military way to only the most urgent measures of military preparation for self-defense, the unfortunate Russian mobilization had suddenly exposed us to the danger of being swallowed up by the floods from east and west. The preliminaries of the French mobilization had demonstrated that mobilization is fated to bring war in its train. Then, wedged in between east and west, we had to make use of every means to save ourselves. It is not by any means a case of intentional violation of international law, but the act of a man fighting for his life. I had devoted all my efforts as Imperial Chancelor toward gradually bringing about, in partnership with England, a state of affairs which would make the madness of self-destruction on the part of Europe's civilized nations impossible. Russia, by treacherously playing with fire, has brought these intentions to naught. Say that I firmly hope that England, by her attitude in this world crisis, will lay a foundation on which, after it has come to an end, we may bring to realization all that Russia's policy has for the present destroyed.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

[1] Cf. No. 849, final sentence.

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed in Christiania August 3 at 7.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, a.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Submitted to the Emperor, returned to the Foreign Office August 4.

[4] From the original in the handwriting of the Imperial Chancelor.

[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 10.25 p.m. See No. 764. In the margin the annotation by the Imperial Chancelor: "I regret that No. 234 has only just now reached me, at 9 o'clock."

No. 791

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Brussels [1]

Telegram 48.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

Your Excellency will inform the Belgian Government tomorrow, Tuesday, August 4, at six a.m., that, to our regret, we shall be forced by its attitude of refusal toward our well-meant proposals, to put into execution the measures of self-protection against the French menace which we have already described as unavoidably necessary, even if we have to do it by force of arms.

JAGOW.

No. 792

The Minister at The Hague to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 31.

THE HAGUE, *August 3, 1914.*[4]

Italian Chargé d'Affaires has informed Austrian Minister today that according to a telegram from Rome the determination of the question of Italy's neutrality was imminent. Baron Giskra plainly but politely expressed to the Chargé d'Affaires his amazement and indignation at the possibility of a declaration of neutrality on the part of Italy.

English Chargé d'Affaires considers as not well-founded, but not improbable, the current rumor that the English Government will send an ultimatum to Germany as the result of our procedure in Belgium.

MÜLLER.

No. 793

The Grand General Staff to the Foreign Office [5]

BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[6]

Numerous French aviators coming from the west toward Cologne and to the south through Eifel, consequently across Belgian territory. Certainly not Germans. Giving light signals to the rear.

According to *Gendarmerie* reports the news has reached the Dutch frontier that French troops have crossed the Belgian frontier.

Magistrate of Erkelenz reports: According to report of a reserve officer who traveled through, the garrison of Nancy is being evacuated. They say there that the French intend to cross Belgium with three A(rmy) C(orps).

[1] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting. Cf. Moltke's communication, No. 788.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 10.35 p.m. [3] From the decodification.
[4] Filed at The Hague at 9.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.35 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, a.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.
[5] From a copy of a telephonic communication.
[6] Communication was submitted on August 3 to the Secretary of State, returned by Stumm, August 4th; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 4.

No. 794

The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 62. SINAIA, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

Bulgaria has already turned Russia down according to rep(ort) of my Minister.

Mr. Bratianu has informed Count Czernin that Russia has *proposed to Bulgaria* to take sides with her, and that she *would receive Macedonia* for doing so.[3] Serbia, *on the other hand, would* be compensated by Bosnia and Herzegovina. What Bulgaria's answer is, Mr. Bratianu does not yet know. Bulgarian Minister is said to have gone to Rustchuk.

WALDTHAUSEN.

No. 795

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 416. THERAPIA, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

Enver and Liman would like to declare war on Russia immediately, in order to be able to seize three valuable Russian steamers with wireless equipment that are lying here. Grand Vizier and . . .[6] are against it, because—

Work to hasten the conclusion of the treaty at Sofia. Communicate final clause referring to Bessarabia. Communicate likewise to Stamboul our concluded treaty as well as that with Sofia.

1. The Turkish mobilization, which was energetically commenced, has not been completed;

2. Because Bulgaria's attitude has not yet been determined; and without Bulgaria, a direct attack on Russia is not possible, and

3. Because we fear that upon a declaration of war, the *Osmane* might be seized by England.

I have persuaded General Liman to wait for the present until we know something more definite about Bulgaria's decision. According to a telegram received by the Austrian Embassy, the local Bulgarian Minister is to take up again the alliance negotiations with the Porte, with the backing of Margrave Pallavicini and myself. We have no knowledge that the Bulgarian Minister has received any such instructions.[7] Everything depends now

W.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Sinaia August 3 at 7 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.01 a.m., August 4; receipt stamp: August 4, a.m. Was communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Decodification sent, on the 4th of August, to the Emperor, who, by marginal instructions, ordered its immediate communication to Vienna and Athens; it was returned to the Foreign Office the same day. Waldthausen's telegram was communicated by Zimmermann by wire on the 4th of August to the Ambassador at Vienna and the Minister at Sofia; to the Central Telegraph Office at 5.07 p.m.

[3] See No. 832.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in Therapia August 3 at 2.35 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 4 at 12.26 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, a.m. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Decodification sent on the 4th of August to the Emperor, who noted in the margin: "11.15 p.m."; returned to the Foreign Office August 4.

[6] Cipher group incomprehensible.

[7] See Nos. 816 and 854.

on the speed of the Bulgarian decisions and transactions. It might possibly be held out as a prospect to Roumania that Turkey and Bulgaria would assist in conquering Bessarabia for Roumania. *Good.*

It would be desirable if General Liman could receive directions from our General Staff as soon as possible.[1]

WANGENHEIM.

No. 796

The Chargé d'Affaires at Peking to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 54. PEKING.[3]

Yuan-Shi-Kai had me confidentially informed of his intention to apply to the Powers for the neutralization of the three leased territories of Kiaochow, Weihaiwei and Kuangchowwan.

A member of the Foreign Office asked me officially for Germany's views. I replied that I believed Germany would entertain more closely Yuan-Shi-Kai's proposition only if all the Powers interested would agree upon and give a guaranty for the effective execution of the neutralization. Tsingtao has been informed.

Have discussed with the English Minister the question of the neutralization of the concessions, Tientsin, Shanghai, Hankow. Sir John will recommend the neutralization of the concessions to London by telegraph. I intend to advocate this last measure among the diplomatic corps without further question, in view of its urgency.

MALTZAHN.

No. 797

The Minister at The Hague to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 32. THE HAGUE, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

In reply to the communication that I made him this afternoon,[6] the Minister for Foreign Affairs had me informed this afternoon that the Netherlands would systematically maintain their neutrality in every direction. The Government of the Netherlands trusted absolutely that Germany, for her part, would in no wise *violate the neutrality of the Netherlands.* *We won't.*

With regard to the incident reported in telegram 27,[7] the information in possession of the Netherland Government goes to

[1] See No. 836.

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed at Peking at 1.50 p.m., date not given; arrived at the Foreign Office August 4 at 1.17 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, a.m. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed at The Hague August 3 at 10.55 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 4 at 1.17 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, a.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, returned to the Foreign Office on the 4th of August. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[6] See No. 674; according to No. 738, the communication was made as early as 9 p.m.

[7] See No. 677.

show that along the whole Nymwegen-Maestricht stretch nothing at all is known of any such violation of neutrality on the part of France. All the country roads are barred, all automobiles are being stopped and examined, and of those so far held up none but Dutch vehicles with Dutch occupants have been encountered.

MÜLLER.

No. 798

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 163. VIENNA, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

Count Tarnowsky will be empowered today, in case his German colleague receives similar instructions, to notify the Bulgarian Government that the Imperial and Royal Government is willing to accept in principle the two fundamentals drawn up by Bulgaria. The Austro-Hungarian representative will receive exact instructions as to the text of the final compact, and will be told to keep in constant touch with his German colleague.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 799

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 243. LONDON, *August 3, 1914.*[4]

Sir W. Tyrrell told me in conversation that the Belgian Minister had handed over this afternoon the text of the German ultimatum and the Belgian reply to it. The Cabinet was now discussing it. The Lower House was likely to be informed of it. With reference to Sir E. Grey's speech of today [5] the diplomat stated that the question whether or not the crossing of Belgium by German troops would influence England to emerge from her neutrality could not *be answered for the present either with a yes or a no*. Final decision would only be arrived at when they had become clear as to the attitude of the Lower House.

Just as every time before.

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Vienna at 12.30 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.41 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, a.m. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. See No. 698.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in London at 10 p.m., August 3; arrived at the Foreign Office August 4 at 2.12 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, a.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 4th of August, returned to the Foreign Office on the same day. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[5] See Nos. 784, 801 and 820.

No. 800

The Consul General at Copenhagen to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram (unnumbered). COPENHAGEN, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

Consul at Antwerp wires that state of siege was declared there this morning. Telegrams for Germany are no longer accepted.

MARTENS.

No. 801

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office[3]

Telegram 244. LONDON, *August 3, 1914.*[4]

Even if a decided depression is voiced in Sir E. Grey's speech of today, and if it is not free from a deep distrust of our political intentions, nevertheless, one can certainly gather from it that the local Government has no immediate intention of taking part in the struggle or of deserting its previous neutral stand. So far as concerns Sir E. Grey's statement about England's undertaking the protection of the northern coast of France, this obligation, assumed on behalf of my French colleague, is rendered unnecessary by the assurances which I was in a position to give him.[5]

With regard to the neutrality of Belgium, the Minister says that if the facts which have so far become public are found to be correct, it would be England's duty to do her utmost to prevent the consequences of such action. This statement is not very clear, but he probably means that England would absolutely oppose any delimitation of Belgian territory or sovereignty.

According to my views, we can regard the speech as satisfactory, and can consider it to be a great victory that England does not at once enter the fight at the side of her Entente Allies. I should like to repeat on this occasion that I am convinced that the local Government will strive to remain neutral.[6] The maintenance of this attitude would be greatly facilitated if the territory of Belgium could be evacuated within a short time and without any great engagements. It is not surprising, moreover, that our policy has had an extremely irritating effect here, and that Sir E. Grey found himself compelled to give expression to this irritation. For here in England the belief is growing more and more that we wished the war for some unknown reason, and urged our neighbor on to it, and that it would have been easy, had our intentions been of the right sort, to avoid it. Furthermore, the sense of justice of the English has been offended by the double breach of treaty obligations, and I believe that we should feel well satisfied if the

[1] From the copy made at the Central Telegraph Office. Uncoded telegram.

[2] Filed in Copenhagen August 3 at 10.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 4 at 3.40 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, a.m. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office; also telephoned to the General Staff and the Admiralty Staff, August 4 at 9.15 a.m.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in London August 3, at 10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 4, at 4 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, a.m. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[5] See No. 714; cf. with No. 784.

[6] See No. 820.

local Government will confine itself to a platonic protest and remain in the main content with the two conditions named—the protection of the French coast and the integrity and independence of Belgium. Whether this will prove a possibility will, of course, depend on the attitude of Parliament and, likewise, on public opinion's not becoming too excited.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 802

The Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 44. STOCKHOLM, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

I pass on, although the source seems somewhat questionable to me, the . . .[3] news that the English Minister is reported to have said that in all probability England will declare war on Germany tomorrow.

REICHENAU.

No. 803

The Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 234. ATHENS, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

Minister for Foreign Affairs described the attitude of Greece to me in the same fashion as His Majesty the King represented it to His Majesty the Emperor.[6]

Greece will remain neutral, and will only take a hand if Bulgaria moves. Her military . . . ,[7] however, would only have the object of keeping Bulgaria in check. Even then, Greece would endeavor to remain neutral toward the other Powers.

BASSEWITZ.

No. 804

The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army to the Foreign Office [8]

BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[9]

1. For the purpose of carrying through the war that has broken out, it is of the very greatest importance—an importance that cannot be over emphasized—that the importation of foodstuffs into Germany through Italy remain unimpeded.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Stockholm August 3 at 11.55 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 4 at 4.12 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, a.m. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] Cipher group incomprehensible. [4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in Athens August 3 at 8.15 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 4 at 5.45 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, a.m. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[6] See No. 702. [7] Cipher group lacking. [8] From the corrected copy.

[9] Date stamp of the sending office: "August 4, 1914, 6 a.m." No. 3, "Note to the Foreign Office," was cut off after arrival at the Foreign Office, and was given the special receipt stamp: August 4, a.m., while the rest of the communication was provided with the receipt stamp: August 4, p.m.

Since Italy has not been willing to observe the obligations of her alliance, but has promised to observe a benevolent neutrality, the least she can do to prove this benevolence is to put no difficulties in our way in this connection.

I request that activities toward this end be undertaken at Rome at once. It is a question of life or death for us.[1]

2. I request that the following be transmitted at once to London:

Germany wishes again to emphasize the fact that in her procedure in Belgium she was not guided by the intention of taking possession of Belgian territory on some frivolous pretext, even in the event of a hostile clash with Belgium. Germany's declaration to the Netherlands that she would not set foot on Dutch territory during this war, but, on the other hand, was determined to observe the strictest neutrality with regard to the Netherlands, is the best substantiation of the assurance just given. The English Government is able to see for itself that if Germany were cherishing any intention of acquiring Belgian territory, such an acquisition could only be of value if the same intention were being cherished toward Holland. It is here emphasized once again, that Germany's procedure in Belgium was compelled, and could not help but be compelled, by the knowledge, acquired from reliable sources, of France's intended military operations. Germany could not afford to expose herself to the danger of attack by strong French forces in the direction of the Lower Rhine. Germany was forced to act on the principle that the offensive is the best defensive, which England, always ready to take the most energetic steps in time of war, should certainly understand better than anybody else. In this war it is a question for Germany, not only of her whole national existence and of the continuation of the German Empire, created through so many bloody sacrifices, but also of the preservation and maintenance of German civilization and principles as against uncivilized Slavdom.

Germany is unable to believe that England will be willing to assist, by becoming an enemy of Germany, in destroying this civilization—a civilization in which English spiritual culture has for ages had so large a share. The decision as to this lies in England's hands.

NOTE

I would ask that this dispatch be sent to London UNCODED, and that the Ambassador be advised to read it to Sir Edward Grey. It will not do us any harm if this note, by reason of its uncoded form, should also become known elsewhere.[2]

3. Note to the Foreign Office: It is necessary to continually maintain toward the Belgian Government, even after the German invasion has taken place, the stand that Germany is ready at any moment to hold out to Belgium the hand of a brother, and is ever willing to enter upon negotiations concerning an acceptable *modus vivendi*, subject to the prosecution of the war forced upon us by France's procedure.

The indispensable basis of these negotiations, however, would have to remain the opening of Liège to the passage of German troops, and Belgium's assurance that she would not undertake the destruction of any railroads, bridges or artificial structures.[3] Other demands than these would not be required from a military point of view.

v. MOLTKE.

[1] See No. 806.
[2] See No. 810; cf. with No. 667.
[3] See No. 805.

No. 805

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Brussels [1]

Telegram 49.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

Even after the invasion has taken place, Your Excellency will continue to maintain the stand that Germany is ready at any time to hold out to Belgium the hand of a brother and to negotiate concerning an acceptable *modus vivendi.*

Basis of the negotiations would have to be, however, opening of Liège to the passage of German troops and cessation of the destruction of railroads, bridges and artificial structures.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 806

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome [4]

Telegram 172.

BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[5]

Although Italy leaves us in the lurch with regard to active assistance, we fully expect that her promised benevolent neutrality will at least include the importation of foodstuffs through Italy to the utmost degree.[6]

JAGOW.

No. 807

The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army to the Foreign Office [7]

BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[8]

Breaking off communication between the French Minister at Luxemburg and his Government would be advantageous from the military point of view.[8] Division has been instructed from this end to deal forbearingly with Luxemburg authorities, so far as is compatible with our interests.

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY.

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.20 a.m.
[3] See No. 804, fig. 3.
[4] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.55 a.m.
[6] See No. 804, fig. 1, and No. 859.
[7] From the corrected copy. Original written reply to the inquiry of the Foreign Office (No. 787, note 2). Time of receipt lacking.
[8] See No. 842.

No. 808

The Admiralty Staff of the Navy to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

Absolutely secret. BERLIN, *August 3, 1914.*[2]

Long distance telephone to Fleet Commander, 8.50 p.m.

As a neutral attitude on the part of England is still possible and is being striven for with all the means of German policy, it is necessary, as has been repeatedly emphasized, to avoid all movements or actions that might be construed by England as directed against herself. Auxiliary cruisers not to be allowed to run out, therefore.[3]

ADMIRALTY STAFF.
BEHNCKE,
Representative.

No. 809

The Ambassador at Paris to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 246. PARIS, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

Telegram 192 [6] mutilated, incomprehensible. Please repeat.[7]

SCHOEN.

No. 810

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [8]

Telegram 226. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[9]

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretense whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to

[1] From the corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 4, a.m. The Admiralty Staff had also sent the same communication to the Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office, the Chief of the Naval Cabinet and the Chief of the General Staff.
[3] See No. 821.
[4] From the corrected copy of the Central Telegraph Office. Uncoded telegram.
[5] From Paris, August 3 (14.45=2.45) p.m.; received by the Central Telegraph Office at 9.44 a.m., August 4; by the Foreign Office at 10.06 a.m., August 4.
[6] See Nos. 716 and 776.
[7] Note by the Cipher Bureau: "Repetition impossible."
[8] From the original [English]. Draft in Stumm's handwriting. Telegram sent uncoded. Was printed as No. 157 of the English Blue Book.
[9] To the Central Telegraph Office at 10.20 a.m. Marginal annotation by Stumm: "Sent at General von Moltke's urgent request."

absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.[1]

JAGOW,
Foreign Secretary.

No. 811

The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 63.
Strictly confidential. SINAIA, *August 4, 1914.*[3]

Mr. Bratianu has informed my Austrian colleague and myself of the result of the Crown Council as follows:

After a heated appeal from the King to put the treaty into effect, the Crown Council declared, by a unanimous vote, with one exception, that no party could take the responsibility for such action. The Crown Council decided that, since Roumania had neither been advised nor taken into consultation concerning the Austro-Hungarian *démarche* at Belgrade, no *casus foederis* existed. The Crown Council further decided that military precautions for the security of the frontier should be undertaken, which would be of advantage to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy since its frontiers for several hundred miles would thereby be protected.

Our allies are already before the war falling away from us like rotten apples!
A total collapse of both German and Austrian foreign diplomacy. This should and could have been avoided. W.

After the Crown Council, the Ministers alone continued to deliberate, and determined, in order to assure their White Book [4] of a speedier effect, to dispense with the requirements of the Treaty of Bucharest, and to permit Bulgarian intervention in Serbia, a measure which would make it possible for Austria-Hungary to withdraw at once from the Serbian theater of war as many army corps as Roumania could send to the Pruth. This would, furthermore, be the only way of making sure of Bulgaria, the Russian influence there otherwise permitting no security. It is of course understood that all this would be done only if the two Empires should consider this attitude on the part of Roumania as one corresponding to a state of friendly relations.[5] To demand more from the King's knightly feelings would be to overstep the bounds of possibility.

Premier added that he had already ordered the reinforcement of the strength of the army, which would very soon [6] be followed by a gradual general mobilization.

[1] See No. 804, cf. No. 667.
[2] From the decodification.
[3] Filed in Sinaia at 3.50 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.52 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Decodification was sent to the Emperor on the 4th of August, and returned to the Foreign Office the same day. Telegram was communicated on the 5th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. See No. 699.
[4] In going through the decodification for the second time, the words "their White Book" were replaced by Bergen by "their action" according to the sense of the whole.
[5] See Nos. 847 and 864.
[6] According to a telegram from the German Chargé d'Affaires from Sinaia on the 4th of August (filed at 6.03 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4), the words "very soon" should be eliminated.

Bratianu intends to make public nothing but a brief notification of the military measures to be taken for the security of the frontier. He advises that in no case should the treaty be made public, in order not to make the situation any more unfavorable for us. Perhaps at a later stage of the war it might become possible for Roumania to proceed against Russia.[1]

WALDTHAUSEN.

No. 812

Memorandum of Count Mirbach, Reporting Councilor at the Foreign Office[2]

BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*

Luxemburg Chargé d'Affaires has urgently requested that the undisturbed continuation of the harvest work on both banks of the Moselle be permitted. For most part only women and children; Foreign Office and S(ecretary of) S(tate) both approve the plea; hope for the same from the General Staff.[3]

v. MIRBACH.

No. 813

The Grand General Staff to the Foreign Office[4]

BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[5]

General Staff has just sent the information:[6]

There are no difficulties about provisioning in Luxemburg; as far as it is done by the country itself, it is done exclusively for payment in cash, and only to the extent to which it can be carried without making trouble. For further provisioning, provision trains have arrived yesterday and today; and extensive measures, such as storehouses, etc., have been taken for future supply, so that the provisioning of the troops can be accomplished wholly independent of the country.

There is so little hardship in connection with provisioning that yesterday, for instance, large supplies of fresh meat were being offered for sale.

The General Staff is absolutely favorable toward the idea of completing all the harvesting labors.

[1] See No. 841, the first part of which agrees with this almost word for word.

[2] In Mirbach's handwriting. The Luxemburg Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, Count von Villers, had also handed over to the Foreign Office the following telegram from the Luxemburg Minister of State Eyschen; filed in Luxemburg August 3 at 5.16 p.m.; arrived in Berlin August 3 at 6.45 p.m.: "Most urgently request that you will make arrangements to facilitate and further the import of foodstuffs into Luxemburg. Situation will lead to famine. Minister of State Eyschen."

[3] On the 4th of August at 11 a.m.; Attaché von Thermann of the Foreign Office noted in regard to this: "Communicated to the General Staff by telephone. The Chief of the General Staff is to be informed of it." Underneath this the note by Thermann: "Have talked with His Excellency von Villers." See Nos. 813 and 822.

[4] From a memorandum by von Thermann, attaché of the Foreign Office.

[5] First section set down by von Thermann at 11.15 a.m., last section at 3 p.m. In the archives is still another note by Mirbach under date of August 4: "The General Staff is considering putting on a food-supply train to Luxemburg."

[6] See Nos. 812 and 822.

Continuation. General Staff offers the information that orders concerning the sparing use of foodstuff provisions and the promoting of the harvest work will go to the Commander in Chief at Luxemburg.

So far no information relating to an extension of the export embargo.

No. 814

The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Vienna [1]

Telegram 234. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

We have been compelled to go to war on account of Austria's procedure, and have a right to expect that Austria should not seek to hide this fact, but will openly announce that the threat of interference (mobilization against Austria) in the Serbian conflict is forcing Austria to go to war.[3]

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 815

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 417.
Secret. THERAPIA, *August 3, 1914.*[5]

When I took Marquis Garroni sharply to task today on account of Italy's attitude, my colleague attempted at first, as its Ambassador, to make excuses for his Government, but then told me in his private capacity that he most strongly disapproved of San Giuliano's conduct and had already told him so by telegraph. Italy's refusal, he said, might become a blot on Italy's national honor that could never be wiped out. He, himself, had been at odds with San Giuliano for two months past, and had twice already—the last time only a few days ago—offered his resignation, which had not been accepted. He would at once telegraph my condemnation to Rome, but urgently requested that Berlin would bring its weight to bear on San Giuliano as heavily as possible; the latter would bear very rough handling. He himself firmly believed that Italy would finally take the field with us.

WANGENHEIM.

[1] From the original. Draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.40 a.m.
[3] See No. 772.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Therapia August 3 at 2.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 4 at 11.45 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office on the 4th of August. Communicated by Jagow on the 4th of August, with a few abbreviations, to the Ambassador at Rome, by telegraph; to the Central Telegraph Office at 8.35 p.m.

No. 816

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia [1]

Telegram 51. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

Baron von Wangenheim reports: [3]

> According to instructions received by local Austro-Hungarian Embassy, the local Bulgarian Minister is to take up again the alliance negotiations with the Porte, with the backing of Margrave Pallavicini and myself. We have no knowledge that the Bulgarian Minister has received any such instructions. Everything depends on the speed of the Bulgarian decisions and transactions.

Please urge the speedy conclusion of our negotiations and those between Bulgaria and Turkey. Russia is apparently trying to win over Bulgaria by the most far-reaching promises.

JAGOW.

No. 817

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [4]

Telegram 235. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[5]

I am telegraphing Sofia: "Baron von Wangenheim . . . most far-reaching promises." [6]

Urgently request that you get Vienna to issue like instructions.[7]

JAGOW.

No. 818

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [8]

Telegram 164. VIENNA, *August 4, 1914.*[9]

Is telegram 232,[10] report of Aide-de-Camp von Kleist, intended to be communicated to Count Berchtold? [11]

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.50 a.m.
[3] See No. 795, next to the last paragraph.
[4] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 11.50 a.m.
[6] See No. 795, next to the last paragraph.
[7] See No. 861.
[8] From the decodification.
[9] Filed in Vienna at 11 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 12.55 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m.
[10] See No. 771 and Note 7 to it.
[11] To this, the reply to the Ambassador at Vienna, from a draft in Bergen's handwriting and signed by Zimmermann, "Please communicate it confidentially." To the Central Telegraph Office August 4, at 7.10 p.m.

No. 819

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram 247. LONDON, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

For Admiralty Staff and Imperial Naval Office and General Staff.

Since yesterday's statement by Sir E. Grey in Parliament,[3] England's permanent neutrality is no longer to be counted on. Time of breaking off relations can not yet be foreseen. In the opinion of the Ambassador, every day that England remains neutral is a day gained. Therefore every provocation in the shape of any activities of our Fleet in opposition to England should be avoided, if possible.

NAVAL ATTACHÉ.
LICHNOWSKY.

No. 820

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office[4]

Telegram 245. LONDON, *August 4, 1914.*[5]

Yesterday I was not yet acquainted with the complete text of Sir E. Grey's speech, of which only a short parliamentary report was available, since today's publication of its content in full, however, I must correct my impressions of yesterday by saying that I do not believe that we shall be able to count much longer on England's neutrality.[6]

As I have repeatedly reported to Your Excellency, the question of the violation of Belgian neutrality constituted one of the most important factors in England's self-restraint. Mr. Asquith as well as Sir E. Grey had called this to my attention, and, as reported, I was able to convince myself before the session,[7] that Sir E. Grey was in a state of intense excitement as the result of the violation of Belgian territory by our army.

What form British intervention will take, and whether it will take place at once, I am not able to judge. But I do not anticipate that, as I thought yesterday, from my knowledge gained only from extracts of the speech, the local Government will keep out, unless we are in a position to evacuate Belgian territory in the very shortest possible time. Hence we shall probably have to reckon on England's early hostility. The reception which met Sir E. Grey's speech in the House can be interpreted to mean that, outside of the left wing of its own party, the Government will have behind it the overwhelming majority of Parlia-

[1] From the decodification.
[2] Filed in London at 10.47 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.21 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 4th of August. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.
[3] See Nos. 820 and 835.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in London at 10.02 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 1.37 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 4th of August.
[6] See Nos. 801 and 835.
[7] According to a telegraphic correction by Lichnowsky (filed in London at 12.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.59 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m.), this should read "before the session" instead of "in the newspaper" as originally wired.

ment in any active policy the purpose of which is the protection of France and Belgium.

The news that reached here yesterday concerning the invasion of Belgium by German troops brought about a complete reversal of public opinion, to our disadvantage. The appeal of the King of the Belgians, made in moving language, has materially strengthened this impression.

LICHNOWSKY.

No. 821

The Admiralty Staff of the Navy to the Imperial Chancelor [1]

Absolutely secret. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[2]

The following telegram was sent today at 11.10 a.m. to the Commander of the Fleet, the North Sea Station, the Commander in Chief of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces and the Baltic Sea Station:

> Outbreak of hostilities against France presumably August 3. Hostile intervention of England is then to be expected at once. As England has not yet come to a decision, unfriendly measures against England must be avoided for the present at all events.[3]

Maintenance of secrecy still commanded.

By order of the Admiralty Staff,

BEHNCKE.

No. 822

The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army to the Foreign Office [4]

BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[5]

The German Army in Luxemburg has been instructed to take sustenance supplies from the country only in return for immediate cash payments, and when such supplies are to be found on sale. That no hardship exists in this connection as yet can be seen from the fact that offers of cattle were made to the troops last evening.

In addition, in order to exclude the occurrence of any possible hardship, a storage warehouse has been established in Grevenmacher. Two provision trains have been arranged for, which will arrive today and tomorrow.

The state of industry in Luxemburg—and particularly the harvest labors—will not suffer the slightest disturbance from the German troops.

By order,

V. STEIN.

[1] From the corrected copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 4, p.m. The same communication was made by the Admiralty Staff to the Chief of the Naval Cabinet, the Secretary of State of the Foreign Office and the Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] See No. 808.

[4] From the corrected copy.

[5] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 4, p.m. According to a marginal annotation by Mirbach of the 5th of August at 10.30 (time of day not given), it was communicated to the Luxemburg Chargé d'Affaires. See Nos. 812 and 813.

No. 823

The English Ambassador to the Foreign Office [1]

(BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[2])

AIDE MÉMOIRE

Sir Edward Goschen has been informed by Sir Edward Grey that His Majesty the King of the Belgians has addressed to His Majesty King George an appeal for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium.

His Majesty's Government are also informed that a Note has been delivered to the Belgian Government by the German Government proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain at the conclusion of peace the independence and integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions, threatening to treat Belgium as an enemy in case of refusal. It was requested that an answer might be returned within twelve hours.

His Majesty's Government also understand that this request has been categorically refused by Belgium as a flagrant violation of the Law of Nations.

Sir Edward Grey states that His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and that they must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that Germany will respect the neutrality of Belgium.

Sir Edward Goschen is instructed to ask for an immediate reply.[3]

No. 824

The English Ambassador to the Foreign Office [4]

(BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[5])

AIDE MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government continue to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven and other German ports. His Majesty's Government consider that this action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of International Law and of the assurances given to Sir Edward Goschen by the Imperial Chancelor.

Sir Edward Goschen is instructed to demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.[5]

[1] From the unsigned corrected copy [in English].

[2] Date beneath the text in the original. Marginal annotation by Jagow on the 4th of August: "Handed over this afternoon by Sir Edward Goschen." Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 4, p.m. Submitted on the 4th of August to the Emperor, who noted on it: "7 o'clock, p.m.," and by marginal instructions ordered its transmission to the Chief of the General Staff for the purpose of his information. The corrected copy came back to the Foreign Office on the 5th of August through the General Staff. Jagow noted on the corrected copy: "I replied to Sir Edward Goschen that we had been driven by necessity to violate Belgian neutrality, that I had explained in full all the reasons by which we had been compelled, and had again repeated at London all the assurances we had given. Jagow."

[3] Cf. English Blue Book, Nos. 153 and 160. See also No. 839.

[4] From the unsigned corrected copy [in English]. Cf. English Blue Book, No. 156.

[5] Dated in the original underneath the text. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 4, p.m.

No. 825

The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army to the Foreign Office [1]

BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

Telegram from Vienna, received at 8 a.m.

On the strength of the decision of the Emperor it has been determined: to carry on the war against Serbia; to mobilize the rest of the Army and assemble it in Galicia. First day of mobilization, August 4. Order for mobilization to be issued today, July 31. Request notification of first day of mobilization there.

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF.

No. 826

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office [3]

BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[4]

NOTIFICATION

Count Czernin reports from Bucharest that under date of the second instant His Majesty King Carol showed him the telegram from His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, and said, in addition, that THE SHORTEST TIME IN WHICH HE COULD GIVE A DEFINITE ANSWER would be AFTER TOMORROW'S MEETING OF THE CROWN COUNCIL, now strengthened by members of the Opposition. He would insist emphatically on living up to the treaty. He was whole-heartedly on our side.

His Majesty King Carol read and approved Count Czernin's telegram in regard to the matter.[5]

No. 827

Memorandum of Counselor of Legation Esternaux, Assistant in the Foreign Office

Not published by Wolff. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[6]

Havas reports from Copenhagen: Italy has given official notification of her neutrality at Paris.[7] The French Government received the news with emotional gratitude.

[1] From the corrected copy, sent to the Central Division of the Grand General Staff by Section 3b of the Grand General Staff.

[2] Date of the memorandum of the General Staff, to which the telegram was handed July 31, at 10.45 a.m. Marginal annotation in Moltke's handwriting: "Communication from the Austrian Chief of the General Staff to the Chief of the Prussian General Staff. To be treated in strict confidence. v. Moltke." Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 4, p.m.

[3] From the unsigned corrected copy.

[4] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 4, p.m.

[5] See No. 841 in connection with this.

[6] In Esternaux's handwriting; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 4, p.m.

[7] Cf. No. 757.

No. 828

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office [1]

Strictly secret. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

NOTIFICATION

The Imperial and Royal Ambassador at Constantinople has been empowered by Count Berchtold to notify the Turkish Government of Austria-Hungary's accession to the German-Turkish Treaty [3] immediately upon its being perfected.

No. 829

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [4]

Telegram 229. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[5]

DECLARATIONS BETHMANN REICHSTAG TODAY

We are in self-defense and needs must. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps already have entered Belgian territory. This is an infraction to international law. Though the French Government have declared in Brussels to be willing to respect Belgium's neutrality as long as the adversary would respect it, we knew that France was ready for invasion. France was able to wait, we were not. A French aggression into our flank on the lower Rhine would have been disastrous. We were therefore compelled to overrule the legitimate protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments.

We shall repair the wrong which we are doing, as soon as our military aims have been reached. Anybody threatened as we are and fighting for his most sacred goods must only think of pulling through.

As to the attitude of England, the statement made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons has clearly laid down the point of view taken by the British Government [6] that as long as England will keep neutral our Fleet would [7] not attack the northern coast of France and that we would not touch the territorial integrity and the independence of Belgium. I herewith repeat this declaration publicly before the whole world and I may add that as long as England keeps neutral we would be willing, in case of reciprocity, not to undertake any hostile operations against the French commercial navigation.

JAGOW.

[1] From the unsigned corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 4, p.m.
[3] See No. 733.
[4] From the typewritten [English] draft at hand, compared with the records of the German Embassy at London. Title, "Declarations . . . today" added by the hand of Counselor of Legation Heilbron.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 4.05 p.m. Telegram was sent uncoded.
[6] In a second open telegram (230) of Jagow's (draft in Radowitz's handwriting) sent to the Central Telegraph Office August 4 at 7 p.m., there was added, in accordance with the actual statement by the Imperial Chancelor, and as beginning a new sentence, the words: "We have declared to the British Government," between "British Government" and "that."
[7] "would," on the margin in blue pencil "will."

No. 830

The Foreign Office to the Minister at Bucharest[1]

Telegram 76.
For strictly confidential use. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

According to our information, it can certainly be counted on that Turkey and Bulgaria would assist Roumania in the conquest of Bessarabia should the opportunity arise.[3]

No. 831

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office[4]

Telegram 249. LONDON, *August 4, 1914.*[5]

FOR THE ADMIRALTY STAFF:

English ships and destroyers ran out of Dover last evening.

NAVAL ATTACHÉ.
LICHNOWSKY.

No. 832

The Foreign Office to the Minister at Athens[6]

Telegram 111.
Urgent.
For strictly confidential use. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[7]

The Imperial Minister at Bucharest has learned that Russia has offered the whole of Macedonia to the Bulgarian Government.[8]

No. 833

The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office[9]

Telegram 65.
Secret. SINAIA, *August 4, 1914.*[10]

According to my information, if Austria should promise the Trentino and the line of the Isonzo to Italy, Italy would rise as one man in defense of Austria. This would suit the conception both of public opinion and of the Government in Italy.

[1] From the draft in Rosenberg's handwriting. Telegram was sent at Zimmermann's order "without any further signature."
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 4.10 p.m.
[3] See No. 795, next to the last paragraph. [4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in London at 1.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Admiralty Staff also notified by telephone on the 4th of August.
[6] From the original draft in Rosenberg's handwriting. Was sent off by Zimmermann's order without any further signature.
[7] To the Central Telegraph Office at 4.25 p.m.
[8] See No. 794. [9] From the decodification.
[10] Filed in Sinaia at 12 noon, arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.37 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m.

Please mention to nobody, particularly to Rome, that this idea came from Bucharest.

Following my audience of yesterday with the King, and before the Crown Council,[1] Italy officially declared her neutrality here. A very loyal manifesto from the Roumanians of Transylvania came to the King as the result of local instigation.

WALDTHAUSEN.

No. 834

The Senatorial Committee for Imperial and Foreign Affairs of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram (unnumbered). HAMBURG, *August 4, 1914.*[3]

French Consul General Claudel with the entire personnel of the Consulate General left today at four minutes after twelve noon for Vamdrup by way of Neumünster. Time and route were prescribed by the Headquarters at Altona after inquiry here.

SENATORIAL COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

No. 835

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office[4]

Telegram 250. LONDON, *August 4, 1914.*[5]

I have just learned that the Belgian Minister has notified the Foreign Office of advance of German troops into Belgium.

So now he is willing to believe it at last! poor Lichnowsky.

Conversation with Sir W. Tyrrell confirms my impression that after receiving news of serious German-Belgian clashes, continuance of English neutrality can no longer be counted on and that a rupture of relations is imminent.[6]

LICHNOWSKY.

[1] See No. 811.

[2] From the copy made at the Central Telegraph Office. Uncoded telegram.

[3] Filed in Hamburg at 3.18 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4.56 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in London at 2.23 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.29 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor August 4, returned to the Foreign Office the same day. Lichnowsky's telegram communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[6] See Nos. 819 and 820.

No. 836

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Constantinople [1]

Telegram 313.
Urgent.
Secret. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

It is possible that England will declare war on us as early as today or tomorrow. In order to prevent the Porte from escaping us at the last moment under the influence of England's action, the declaration of war on Russia by Turkey, today, if possible,[3] would appear to be of the greatest importance.

JAGOW.

No. 837

The King of the Belgians to the Emperor [4]

Telegram (unnumbered). BRUSSELS, *August 4, 1914.*[5]

TO HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR, BERLIN.

The feelings of friendship which I have expressed to Your Majesty and those of which you have so often assured me, the most cordial relations between our two Governments, the constantly correct attitude of Belgium against which Germany has never been able to formulate the least reproach, did not permit me to assume for a single moment that Your Majesty would force us, in the face of all Europe, to the cruel choice between war and dishonor, between fidelity to treaties and faithlessness to our international obligations.

ALBERT.

No. 838

The Minister at Christiania to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 29. CHRISTIANIA, *August 4, 1914.*[7]

Italian neutrality notified orally to local Government, today, by the Minister.[8]

OBERNDORFF.

[1] From the original draft in Rosenberg's handwriting with corrections in Zimmermann's handwriting. See No. 795.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 6.08 p.m.
[3] "Today, if possible" inserted in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[4] From the [French] copy made at the Berlin Palace Telegraph Office. Uncoded telegram.
[5] Filed in Brussels August 4 at 4.15 p.m.; received at the Berlin Palace Telegraph Office at 6.20 p.m. Forwarded by the Emperor to the Foreign Office on the 4th of August. Receipt stamp: August 4, p.m.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed in Christiania at 3 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 6.55 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.
[8] Cf. No. 757.

No. 839

The English Ambassador to the Foreign Office [1]

BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

AIDE MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government hear that Germany has addressed a note to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, measures which they consider indispensable.

His Majesty's Government are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmerich.[3]

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined [4] to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week to the request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, His Majesty's Government must repeat that request and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to the communication made by Sir Edward Goschen earlier in the afternoon be received in London by twelve o'clock tonight. If not, Sir Edward Goschen is instructed to ask for his passports and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as His Majesty's Government.[5]

No. 840

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 166. VIENNA, *August 4, 1914.*[7]

According to a telegram received today from Baron von Mérey, Marquis di San Giuliano has admitted to the former that the chief reasons for the neutrality of Italy were the very unprepared state of the army, and, particularly, the fact that according to all reports received by the Ministry of the Interior, it was feared that revolutionary manifestations would take place in the event of mobilization.[8]

[1] From the unsigned corrected copy [in English].

[2] Place and date follow the text in the original. Note by the Secretary of State: "Handed over by Sir Edward Goschen at 7 o'clock in the evening. Jagow." Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 4, p.m. Corrected copy submitted to the Emperor on the 4th of August, who noted on it: "7.45 p.m., W."; and, by marginal instructions, ordered a "Copy to the Chief of Staff." It came back to the Foreign Office August 4 at 8.28 p.m. Copy was sent to the Chief of Staff by messenger August 5 at 10.30 p.m., and copies were forwarded to the Minister of War, the Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office and the Chief of the Admiralty Staff at 8 p.m.

[3] Thus in the corrected copy for Gemmenich.

[4] See No. 823, note 2.

[5] See No. 863. Cf. also English Blue Book, 1914, Nos. 159 and 160.

[6] From the decodification.

[7] Filed in Vienna at 4.04 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 5th of August, returned to the Foreign Office on the same day. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[8] Cf. Nos. 614, 745 and 748.

Baron von Mérey remarks further that a respectable portion of the press, even the *Popolo Romano*, was still taking a stand for the present AGAINST the policy of neutrality.

Nonsense!! but she is acting in agreement with England.

It was being announced officially that Italy, by her neutrality, was striving to insure *a like attitude on the part of England.*

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 841

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 167. VIENNA, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

Count Czernin telegraphs from Bucharest:

After a heated appeal from the King to the Crown Council to put the treaty into effect, the Crown Council declared, by a unanimous vote with one exception, that no party could take the responsibility for such action. Crown Council decided that, since Roumania had neither been advised of nor taken into consultation concerning the Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade, no *casus foederis* existed. Crown Council further decided that military precautions for the security of the frontier should be undertaken, which would be of advantage to the Monarchy, since its frontiers for several hundred miles would thereby be protected. AFTER the Crown Council, the ministers ALONE continued to deliberate, and determined, in order to assure their action of a speedier effect, to dispense with the requirements of the Treaty of Bucharest and to permit Bulgarian intervention in Serbia, a measure which would make it possible for Austria-Hungary to withdraw at once several army corps from Serbia. This would, furthermore, be the only way of making sure of Bulgaria, the Russian influence there otherwise permitting no security.

It is, of course, understood that all this would be done only if the two Empires should consider this attitude on the part of Roumania as one corresponding to a state of friendly relations.[3]

To demand more from the King's knightly feelings would be impossible. This was to be followed in a short time by general mobilization.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Vienna at 4.04 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. See No. 811, the first part of which is almost identical.

[3] See Nos. 847 and 864.

No. 842

The Commander of the 16th Infantry Division to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram (unnumbered). LUXEMBURG, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

No reply received to yesterday's inquiry.[3] After informing the Luxemburg Government, I requested the French Minister, today, to leave Luxemburg. Minister will be taken to the frontier in an automobile accompanied by a military guard.

FUCHS,
Lieutenant General.

No. 843

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Stockholm [4]

Telegram 36. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[5]

English Ambassador has just demanded his passports.[6] Inform Government immediately.

JAGOW.

No. 844

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [7]

Telegram 168.
Confidential. VIENNA, *August 4, 1914.*[8]

Duke d'Avarna leaves this evening for Rome in order to confer with the Marquis di San Giuliano. He will do everything he can to restrain Italy at the last moment from what is, in his opinion, the harmful policy of neutrality, which will *deprive the nation of all its moral credit* and will have a lasting effect on Italy's relations with the Central Powers in the future.

Right.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] From the corrected copy made at the Central Telegraph Office. Uncoded telegram.
[2] Filed in Luxemburg at 4.15 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.47 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.
[3] See No. 787. Cf. also No. 807.
[4] From the original. Draft in Stumm's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 8 p.m.
[6] Cf. No. 839.
[7] From the decodification.
[8] Filed in Vienna at 5 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor on the 5th of August, returned to the Foreign Office August 5.

No. 845

The Minister at Brussels to the Foreign Office[1]

Telegram (unnumbered). BRUSSELS, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

Diplomatic relations broken off, have received passports, leave Brussels with personnel of the Legation and Consul Kempff this evening via Holland.

BELOW.

No. 846

The Minister at Copenhagen to the Foreign Office[3]

Telegram 48. COPENHAGEN, *August 4, 1914.*[4]

Contradicting rumors in circulation here to the effect that Denmark has been making promises to England in the event of war against Germany, Mr. Scavenius tells me, definitely, that so far neither England nor Russia has made a move in this direction.

RANTZAU.

No. 847

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Bucharest[5]

Telegram 77.
Urgent. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[6]

Please tell Mr. Bratianu, while thanking him for the information, that we regard attitude there as in agreement with our friendly relations, and hope for Roumania's active cooperation later.[7]

Confirm receipt by telegraph.[8]

JAGOW.

[1] From the corrected copy made at the Central Telegraph Office. Uncoded telegram.
[2] Filed in Brussels at 4.58 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Copy submitted to the Emperor, returned by him to the Foreign Office on the 5th of August.
[3] From the decodification.
[4] Filed in Copenhagen at 5 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.21 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 5th of August. In accordance with marginal instructions by Zimmermann, the telegram was communicated on the 5th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office (sent by messengers at 1.05 p.m.).
[5] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 8.30 p.m.
[7] See Nos. 811, 841 and 864.
[8] Telegraphic confirmation of receipt by Waldthausen filed at Sinaia, August 5 at 2.20 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.43 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 5, p.m.

No. 848

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London [1]

Telegram 231.
Urgent. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

English Ambassador just demanded his passports shortly after seven o'clock declaring war.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 849

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the German Federated Governments [4]

Telegram (unnumbered). BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[5]

The General Staff was in possession of absolutely reliable information according to which French armed forces are preparing to muster along the Givet-Namur line on the Meuse and advance on Germany through Belgium in spite of the Parisian promises to respect Belgian neutrality. Various proceedings during the last few days indicate that the execution of this plan has already commenced. We could not help but fear that Belgium, despite the best of intentions, would be unable to prevent the French advance without assistance, and were, therefore, for our part, also, compelled, in the interest of our own self-preservation, to enter Belgian territory. Germany is planning no hostilities of any sort against Belgium, and will evacuate Belgian territory immediately upon the conclusion of peace.

The Belgian Government was informed of the foregoing in friendly fashion and was requested to maintain an attitude of good-will, but made a protest instead, and announces that she will oppose any violation of her [6] neutrality with force.

But we are still hoping that things will not come to the point of collisions between our Army and the Belgian troops.[7]

JAGOW.

[1] From the original [English]. Draft in Rosenberg's handwriting; the words "declaring war" added in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.05 p.m. Telegram was sent uncoded.
[3] Cf. No. 839.
[4] From the draft which is at hand in typewritten form. Draft first paraphrased by Rosenberg.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 9.10 p.m.
[6] Thus in the original.
[7] See No. 788, concluding sentence.

No. 850

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 174.
Urgent.

ROME, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

Lieutenant Colonel von Kleist sends the following telegram for His Majesty the Emperor:

TO HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR, PALACE, BERLIN.

His Majesty the King received me this morning and told me that in spite of his numerous efforts of yesterday, the Government stood fast by its determination to remain neutral. Any rendering of active assistance to the allies would be regarded by the nation now only *an aid to Austria's plans for self-aggrandizement in the Balkans*, since Austria had so far not even definitely obligated herself to refrain from such action. *The people would continue to confuse*[3] *Germany with Austria*, so that the Government would risk rebellion[3] at the present moment even by lending active assistance to Germany. He, the King, was forced to repeat that, unfortunately, he was powerless, as the view of the Government was shared by a majority of the deputies. Even Giolitti, *a friend*[4] *to the Triple Alliance*,[5] who had just returned, was of the opinion that *a "casus foederis" did not exist, that the country needed peace* and would have to remain neutral, inasmuch as no *obligation* to render active assistance existed.

Our fight against France has nothing to do with this. It would be fighting on our and not on Austria's side.

If the Government does nothing to prevent it, naturally, but foolishly, just the same. An absolute lie!

Unparalleled scoundrel!

The death of (Pol)lio[6] was much to be regretted, as he was *of a quite different opinion* and *possessed a very great deal of influence.*

And Cadorna?

(Three)[7] annual drafts of reservists now called to the colors, so that cavalry and artillery as well as the navy are of full war strength, 150 men to the company. Three further annual drafts would suffice measurably to fill up the ranks of the active army. Government intends to be equipped for "any eventuality," he said. To my reply that as the eventuality of lending assistance was excluded, an active threat to Austria must be under consideration, inasmuch as there was no other eventuality. The King said that one never knew *what the men in the Government* would do; *at present*,[3] he, the King, was not FIGURING on anything of the sort being done.

So he withdraws entirely!

My impression from the audience is that Italy has been irritated by Austria, and credits the latter with plans for self-aggrandizement *in the* BALKANS, which Austria has not up to the present BOUND HERSELF to refrain from. If this

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Rome at 5.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, and returned to the Foreign Office on the 5th of August. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Kleist's report was telegraphed on the 5th of August to the Ambassador at Vienna for "confidential communication"; to the Central Telegraph Office at 1.40 a.m.

[3] This word twice underscored by the Emperor.

[4] "a friend" twice underscored by the Emperor.

[5] In the margin two exclamation points by the Emperor.

[6] The "Pol" lacking in the decodification supplied by the Foreign Office.

[7] The word "three" lacking in the decodification, added at the Foreign Office.

Vienna must under all circumstances make binding promises and offer big compensation, which will be so alluring that they will work. Should have been done long ago.[1]

distrust of Italy's is *strengthened* by *evasion* on the part of Austria, or *if it is confirmed*, Italy will consider that her *interests have been violated*, and will prepare to show that she will not tolerate it.

I intend to leave this evening.

von Kleist.

Von Kleist requests that a copy be sent to the Chief of the General Staff.

Flotow.

No. 851

The Ambassador at Madrid to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram 23. San Sebastián, *August 4, 1914.*[3]

Spanish newspapers report that France has summoned 50,000 men back from Morocco, and that England will transport 100,000 men under General French across to Boulogne. From trustworthy quarters in close touch with English officers I hear that the *English Guard Division, sixteen battalions of about 1400 men each, as well as the 16th Lancers, and the 60th Rifles*, which will be ready to march in a few days, are to go to Belgium.

Ratibor.

No. 852

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office[4]

Telegram 426. Constantinople, *August 4, 1914.*[5]

Enver lets me know that the military authorities of the Dardanelles have been instructed to let German and Austrian war-ships enter the Straits without hindrance. Grand Vizier fears, however, that if use is made of this privilege *before the relations with Bulgaria have been settled*, an acceleration of developments not desired at the present time by Germany or Turkey might be the result.

Wangenheim.

[1] The marginal annotation of the Emperor, "Vienna must . . . long ago," also telegraphed by Jagow to the Ambassador at Vienna on the 5th of August "for confidential use." Draft in Bergen's handwriting. Telegram to the Central Telegraph Office at 9.50 p.m.

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed in San Sebastián at 4.55 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 5th of August, returned to the Foreign Office on the same day. Telegram communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in Constantinople at 6 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 9.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Decodification submitted to the Emperor, returned by him to the Foreign Office on the 5th of August. Telegram communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

No. 853

The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 253. LONDON, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

TO THE ADMIRALTY STAFF AND THE IMPERIAL NAVAL OFFICE:

With the cipher of the Foreign Office.

English ultimatum expires tonight at twelve o'clock. After that time the possibility of an attack by the English fleet on our Fleet and coasts must be reckoned on. I have no new information as to the whereabouts of the English battle-fleet.

NAVAL ATTACHÉ.
LICHNOWSKY.

No. 854

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 423. THERAPIA, *August 4, 1914.*[4]

Grand Vizier told me that Bulgarian Minister had as yet said nothing to him concerning an eventual Entente.[6] He was under the impression that Bulgaria would make her attitude dependent on that of Roumania. Everything depended on getting Roumania and Bulgaria together as quickly as possible. He said that von Giers still appeared to believe in Turkish neutrality, which was facilitating for Turkey, the use of the Black Sea in mobilizing. *Stir up Sofia, Bucharest.*[5]

Bompard, who was in a very depressed state of mind, had asked him yesterday how Turkey was going to reconcile the continuance of the German Mission with her neutrality. He, the Grand Vizier, had replied that the Turks saw no reason for dismissing the Mission, which was particularly useful to them just now.

WANGENHEIM.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in London at 4.22 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Communicated to the Admiralty Staff, the General Staff, the Imperial Naval Office and the Ministry of War. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 5th of August, returned to the Foreign Office on the same day.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in Therapia at 11 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 5th of August, returned to the Foreign Office the same day. See Nos. 711 and 697.

[5] *Re* communication to Sofia, see No. 865. Section "Grand Vizier . . . quickly as possible" telegraphed by Jagow on the 5th of August to the Ambassador at Vienna and the Minister at Sofia "for communication"; to the Central Telegraph Office at 1.05 a.m. Communication to Bucharest was omitted.

[6] See No. 795.

No. 855

The Minister at Copenhagen to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 49. COPENHAGEN, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

Denmark's declaration of neutrality in connection with the Russo-German and Franco-German War will be made today. General mobilization which was expected here, is still being blocked by the Government, in spite of the strong tide of public feeling which is demanding it, on the ground of the protection of the nation and the maintenance of neutrality.

RANTZAU.

No. 856

The Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 424. THERAPIA, *August 4, 1914.*[4]

According to information in possession of the Military Mission, the Serbian army will *not be concentrated for a general battle*, but will be *distributed* about the country. Margrave Pallavicini concludes from that, that Serbia means to conduct a *wearisome guerrilla warfare*, until Russia takes a hand; in the meantime, Austria is expected to get tied up in Serbia as tightly as possible. According to the opinion of my colleague, *Austria should entirely ignore Serbia for the present*, until the struggle with Russia *has been decided, on the result of which the fate of Serbia alone* depends.

Right. Kageneck must tell that to Hötzendorf as coming from me.

WANGENHEIM.

No. 857

The Minister at Sofia to the Foreign Office [5]

Telegram 46. SOFIA, *August 4, 1914.*[6]

My Austrian colleague has as yet no instructions for concluding a treaty of alliance with Bulgaria; I am therefore waiting until he has, so that the treaties can be written on analogous lines. In the meantime, I have had a talk with the Bulgarian Premier concerning the active obligations that Bulgaria will have to

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Copenhagen at 7 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.10 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 5, a.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 5th of August, returned to the Foreign Office on the same day.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in Therapia at 11.55 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.45 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 5th of August, returned to the Foreign Office the same day.

[5] From the decodification.

[6] Filed in Sofia August 4 at 5.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.45 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 5, a.m. Communicated to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. See No. 728.

assume in the compact of alliance, and have proposed the following agreement to him:

> Bulgaria obligates herself for the present European conflict to march her army in full force at the demand of Germany against any one of her national neighbors who may be on the side of the enemies of Germany.[1]

As Turkey, and, according to reports received here, Roumania, also, are counted among our friends, Bulgaria's only remaining national neighbors are Greece and Serbia, of whom Serbia is on the side of our enemies. Provided Austria should agree, we could send Bulgaria into the field against Serbia, in order that the Bulgarian army might be used to our advantage and that Austria might send against Russia a portion of her troops now being used against Serbia.

MICHAHELLES.

No. 858

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [2]

Telegram 171. VIENNA, *August 4, 1914.*[3]

Mr. Radoslavoff has told Count Tarnowsky confidentially that the Italian representative at Sofia, he hears, and also other Italian representatives are talking in a manner which would rather lead one to conclude that Italy was operating jointly with Russia.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 859

The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 176. ROME, *August 4, 1914.*[5]

Will direct my endeavors as prescribed. Local Government is already putting obstacles in the way of the more important Austrian grain traffic. There is a shortage of grain here in this country.

FLOTOW.

[1] In the margin Zimmermann's note: "Entirely agreed. Urgent, to Vienna, Sofia." (See Nos. 872 and 873.)

[2] From the decodification.

[3] Filed in Vienna at 9 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 10.50 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. Communicated on the 5th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Communicated on the 5th of August by Jagow by telegraph to the Ambassador at Rome; to the Central Telegraph Office at 3.10 a.m.

[4] From the decodification.

[5] Filed in Rome at 5.10 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.06 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 4, p.m. See No. 806.

No. 860

Memorandum of Reporting Councilor von Bergen of the Foreign Office [1]

BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

Baron Haymerle informed us that the declaration of war against Russia would be made tomorrow morning—with regard to those against France and England, the Government would gladly do as we wished at once, though the General Staff held a delay of a few days to be very important, on account of the still incompleted mobilization of the Fleet.[3]

No. 861

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [4]

Telegram 169. VIENNA, *August 4, 1914.*[5]

Count Tarnowsky is to receive appropriate instructions at once.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 862

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office [6]

Telegram 170.
Secret. VIENNA, *August 4, 1914.*[7]

The local General Staff inquired of General Cadorna a short time ago whether the execution of the secret military and naval agreements made with Italy could be begun. The reply received was to the effect that, at this time, the agreements were of no practical value, since Italy was to remain neutral. The Italian letter of reply further contained the statement that Italy would undertake no action against Austria-Hungary, in case the latter did not occupy the Lowtschen or upset the balance of power in the Balkans to the disadvantage of Italy.

After conferring with General Conrad Baron von Hötzendorf, Count Berchtold, today, gave Duke d'Avarna formal assurance that even if Montenegro took up arms against the Monarchy, Austria-Hungary would leave the Lowtschen wholly undisturbed, and that Austria-Hungary was far from having any intention of upsetting the balance of power in the Balkans to the disadvantage of Italy.

[1] In Bergen's handwriting.
[2] Memorandum of Bergen written on the afternoon of August 4; received from the Under-Secretary of State on the 5th.
[3] See Nos. 870, 871, 874, 875, 877 to 879.
[4] From the decodification.
[5] Filed in Vienna at 8 p.m., August 4; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.09 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 5, a.m. See No. 817.
[6] From the decodification.
[7] Filed in Vienna at 9 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 11.30 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 5, a.m. Communicated on the 4th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Decodification submitted to the Emperor on the 5th of August, returned by him to the Foreign Office on the same day. A draft in Bergen's handwriting of the telegraphic communication of the Tschirschky telegram to the Ambassador at Rome was prepared, but not sent, however.

Mr. von Mérey will receive corresponding instructions. Count Kageneck, from definite reports received from the General Staff, confirms to me the statement referred to above concerning the Lowtschen.

Count Berchtold stated that every effort must be made to make sure that Italy at least continues to remain neutral.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 863

The English Ambassador to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that as the Imperial Government have not found it possible to return a reply satisfactory to His Majesty's Government to the request which I had been instructed to address (sic) to them on the subject of the neutrality of Belgium,[3] I have received instructions from His Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to withdraw His Majesty's Embassy and Consulates as soon as possible, and to request that passports, insuring safe conduct, may for this purpose be delivered to me, for myself and staff (of whom a list is enclosed herein [4]) as well as for the Acting British Consul General at Berlin, and also to the several British consular officers in Germany, who will similarly apply for their passports to the local authorities.

I am further to state that His Majesty's Government have requested the Government of the United States of America to take charge of British interests during the War, throughout the German Empire, and that pending the definite reply of the United States Government, the protection of British subjects, property and interests has been confided provisionally to my United States colleague and to the United States consular officers.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

No. 864

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [5]

Telegram 242.
For further action. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[6]

The Imperial Minister at Bucharest has been instructed to make the desired declaration to the Roumanian Government and to express our expectation of Roumania's early active cooperation.

JAGOW.

[1] From the corrected [English] copy. Cf. English Blue Book, 1914, No. 160.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 5, a.m.
[3] See No. 839.
[4] The list contains 20 persons in all.
[5] From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting.
[6] To the Central Telegraph Office at 12.25 a.m., August 5th. See Nos. 811, 841 and 847.

No. 865

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia [1]

Telegram 54. BERLIN, *August 5, 1914.*[2]

Baron von Wangenheim reports:

Grand Vizier told me . . . dependent on that of Roumania.[3]

Please strive earnestly for the early conclusion of the treaty of alliance. Emperor's authorization to sign and ratify goes to you today.[4] Roumania has given assurances of benevolent neutrality, secures the frontier against Russia, and leaves Bulgaria a free hand against Serbia.[5] The adherence of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance will probably also bring about an active intervention against Russia on the part of Roumania.

JAGOW.

No. 866

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia [6]

BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[7]

In anticipation of the event that our negotiations with Bulgaria should lead to the desired result, I have the honor of enclosing to Your Excellency herewith full authority, subscribed by His Majesty, and the Emperor's documentary ratification.[8] A copy of the text of the treaty, in case it is put through, should there be attached to the document of ratification by cord and seal. Should formal alterations of any kind prove necessary in either document, I beg Your Excellency to have them made at once. In such a case I should expect to receive a copy of the final text. Your Excellency will proceed to the exchange of the documents of ratification only upon special telegraphic authorization.

Please confirm to me by telegraph the receipt of this dispatch.

JAGOW.

[1] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 1.15 a.m.
[3] Here the first two sentences of Wangenheim's telegram of the 4th of August (No. 854) are inserted. See also note 6 to No. 854.
[4] See No. 866.
[5] See No. 811.
[6] From the original. Draft by Secretary of Legation von Tiedemann, with alterations and additions by Rosenberg.
[7] Dispatched on the 5th of August by Imperial messenger.
[8] The warrant of full authority and documentary ratification signed by the Emperor on the 5th of August were enclosed. On the warrant of full authority, the marginal annotation: "Authority also good for the treaty of September 6, 1915." See also No. 865.

No. 867

The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office [1]

Telegram 70. SINAIA, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

Mr. Bratianu requests that the orders for war material placed with Krupp and other German firms shall not be held up by us, as otherwise Roumania will be unable to make her military preparations.

Mr. Bratianu is going to advise the Greek Minister, who wanted to make arrangements with him concerning a joint procedure in the Balkans, to come to some agreement with Turkey. Mr. Bratianu hopes that Germany will use her influence simultaneously with Greece and Turkey, in order that the former shall not be crushed.

Mr. Bratianu has telegraphed to Mr. Beldiman concerning both these matters.

WALDTHAUSEN.

No. 868

The Minister at Bucharest to the Foreign Office [3]

Telegram 68. SINAIA, *August 4, 1914.*[4]

Instructions carried out.[5] The King, after a patriotic speech to the Crown Council, which moved every one deeply and which he read to me afterward, was deserted by the statesmen of all parties, with the exception of Carp, who stood by him with great energy, but who no longer possesses any political influence, and who found no support even among the fellow-members of his own party. The King defended the procedure involving the Triple Alliance right to the end with great determination and declared, in vain, that, if he broke his word, he would no longer be respected and could no longer be of any use to Roumania. He told me, in detail, the whole story of the really tragic proceedings, and was finally so overcome by spiritual and bodily anguish that he could no longer think, had to go to bed and was unable to receive me again yesterday. His Majesty stated that without the support of a [his] Government, he could not lead his people, who did not want to go with Austria, into a war with Russia; he referred, in connection with the Bulgarian matter, to the decision of the Crown Council and of the Ministers, as a result of which that matter was settled. In the Crown Council it was argued, against the reacquiring of Bessarabia, that it would mean for Roumania nothing but a second Alsace-Lorraine.

[1] From the decodification.

[2] Filed in Sinaia August 4 at 7.30 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office August 5 at 1.16 a.m.; receipt stamp: August 5, a.m. Communicated on the 5th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office.

[3] From the decodification.

[4] Filed in Sinaia August 4th at 7 p.m., arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.21 a.m., August 5th; receipt stamp: August 5, a.m. Decodification sent to the Emperor on the 5th of August; returned to the Foreign Office on the same day. Telegram communicated on the 5th of August to the General Staff, the Ministry of War, the Admiralty Staff and the Imperial Naval Office. Communicated on the 5th of August by Jagow over the wire, with minor omissions, to the Ambassador at Vienna; to the Central Telegraph Office at 1.10 a.m.

[5] See No. 729.

The Italian declaration of neutrality, announced before the meeting of the Crown Council, made a great impression, he said; but for that, he would have been able to put through a union with the Triple Alliance.

On the question of Roumania's going in with Russia, the Crown Council was unanimous in deciding that it could not be done.

For Roumania to take action against Austria was an absolute impossibility so long as he was King. Austria could withdraw her garrisons from the Roumanian border.

The assembling of Austrian troops along that border had caused much ill feeling here. That the Crown Council included the Hungarian border among the frontiers held to require military protection, was only a formality, according to the King and Mr. Porumbaro.

WALDTHAUSEN.

No. 869

The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

Great haste. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

Of the complaints of the French Government [3] relating to frontier violations on the part of Germany, only a single one can be admitted to be justifiable.

Against express orders, a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, apparently led by one officer, crossed the border on the second of August. Probably it was shot to pieces. Only one man returned. That this patrol brought back horses, is, therefore, impossible.

But long before this one minor transgression of the frontier took place, French aviators were dropping bombs in the center of Bavaria, near Nuremberg, on our railroads, and French troops were attacking our frontier guards at the Gorge Pass. The first shot was fired from the French side.

According to their orders, our troops confined themselves at first entirely to the defensive. Only when the French violations of the frontier were accumulating, was permission given, on the morning of the third of August, to move scouts forward over the border.

The granting of this permission was purely a measure of security, for we could not take the responsibility of leaving our troops unprotected, and thus exposing them to surprise attacks by skirmishers and inevitable losses.

V. MOLTKE.

[1] From the corrected copy.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 5. See, also the speech of the Imperial Chancelor made on the 4th of August at 3.15 p.m. (Stenographic Reports of the Proceedings of the Reichstag, Vol. 306, p. 6.)

[3] See Nos. 705 and 722.

No. 870

The Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1]

Absolutely secret. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*[2]

I believe it to be imperatively necessary that we should demand of Austria that Austria also at once declare war against France, Russia and England.[3]

As the case stands in the Mediterranean, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* are already being pressed by English naval superiority, and urgently require the support of the Austrian Fleet, which would present formal difficulties for Austria without a declaration of war.

v. TIRPITZ.

No. 871

Memorandum of Reporting Councilor von Bergen of the Foreign Office [4]

BERLIN, *August 5, 1914.*[5]

Baron Haymerle this morning brought the information that the Austro-Hungarian Government was being prevented from making declarations of war by the two General Staffs, but that probably it would make them today against Russia and France, and would act in accordance with our wishes in regard to that against England.[6]

No. 872

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [7]

Telegram 248. BERLIN, *August 5, 1914.*[8]

Michahelles reports that Austro-Hungarian Minister is still without instructions regarding the treaty of alliance. Please urgently request Vienna to empower its representative at Sofia to close with Bulgaria without delay, by arrangement with Michahelles, who has received [9] detailed instructions.

JAGOW.

[1] From the corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp: August 5, a.m.
[3] See Nos. 860, 871, 874, 875, and 877 to 879.
[4] In Bergen's handwriting.
[5] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 5, p.m. The communication was made, according to the text itself, during the morning.
[6] See Nos. 860, 870, 874, 875, and 877 to 879.
[7] From the original in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[8] To the Central Telegraph Office at 10.45 a.m.
[9] See Nos. 857 and 873.

No. 873

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia [1]

Telegram 57.
Urgent.

BERLIN, *August 5, 1914.*[2]

Agree to formula. Also agree to Bulgaria's taking the field against Serbia.[3]

JAGOW.

No. 874

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna [4]

Telegram 250.

BERLIN, *August 5, 1914.*[5]

Please urgently advocate there that Austria-Hungary make declarations of war at once on France, Russia and England. Wire answer.[6]

JAGOW.

No. 875

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office [7]

BERLIN, *August 5, 1914.*[8]

To your respected communication of the fourth instant.[9] The Imperial Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed by telegraph to make an urgent demand on the Austro-Hungarian Government that it issue declarations of war on France, Russia and England at once.

JAGOW.

No. 876

The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army to the Foreign Office [10]

BERLIN, *August 5, 1914.*[11]

England's declaration of war, which, according to reliable information, was planned from the very beginning of the conflict, compels us to exhaust every means that may contibute to victory. The grave situation in which the Fatherland finds itself makes it our duty to adopt every means calculated to injure the enemy. The unscrupulous policy directed against us by our opponents justifies us in proceeding ruthlessly.

[1] From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting.
[2] To the Central Telegraph Office at 10.45 a. m. [3] See Nos. 857 and 872.
[4] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[5] To the Central Telegraph Office at 12.20 p.m.
[6] See Nos. 877 and 878; cf. Nos. 860, 870, 871, 875 and 879.
[7] From the original. Draft in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[8] Dispatched by messenger at 2.30 p.m.
[9] See No. 870 and the numbers referred to there in note 3. [10] From the corrected copy.
[11] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 5, p.m.

An insurrection has been initiated in Poland. This seed has fallen on fruitful ground, for already our troops are being greeted by the Poles almost like friends. At Wlozlawek, for instance, they were received with bread and salt.

The feeling in America is friendly to Germany. American public opinion is indignant at the shameful manner in which we have been treated. Every effort must be made to take advantage of this feeling. Important personalities in the German colony must be urged to influence the press still more in our favor. Perhaps the United States can be persuaded to undertake a naval war against England, in return for which Canada beckons to them as the prize of victory.

It is of the greatest importance, as I have already pointed out in my communication of the second instant, No. 1 P,[1] to start insurrections in India and Egypt, also in the Caucasus. By means of the treaty with Turkey, the Foreign Office will be in a position to bring this idea to realization and to excite the fanaticism of Islam.

v. MOLTKE.

No. 877

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[2]

Telegram 174. VIENNA, *August 5, 1914.*[3]

Count Forgach tells me that in the matter of the declaration of war on England by Austria-Hungary, they wish here to be guided by Germany's intentions.[4]

TSCHIRSCHKY.

No. 878

The Ambassador at Vienna to the Foreign Office[5]

Telegram 178. VIENNA, *August 5, 1914.*[6]

Declaration of war on Russia will be made this evening.

Regarding declaration of war on France and England,[7] Count Forgach is now going to talk with the Foreign Office over the telephone. Scruples emanate from General von Conrad, whom I am trying to influence through the military and naval attachés.

In any case, the French and English vessels entering the Adriatic will be treated as enemies.

TSCHIRSCHKY.

[1] See No. 662.
[2] From the decodification.
[3] Filed in Vienna at 1.40 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 4 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 5, p.m. Communicated at Zimmermann's order to the Imperial Naval Office on the 5th of August; sent by messenger at 9.45 p.m.
[4] See No. 874 and the numbers referred to there in note 6.
[5] From the decodification.
[6] Filed in Vienna at 5.10 p.m., August 5; arrived at the Foreign Office at 7.40 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 5, p.m.
[7] See No. 874 and the numbers referred to there in note 6.

No. 879

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy to the Foreign Office [1]

BERLIN, *August 5, 1914.*[2]

NOTIFICATION

Count Szapary was instructed by Count Berchtold yesterday to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the war that has broken out between Germany and Russia as a result of Russian aggression, as well as in view of Russia's threatening attitude toward our conflict with Serbia, we consider ourselves to be at war with Russia.[3]

[1] From the unsigned corrected copy.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 6, a.m. Was submitted to the Emperor, who noted on it: "12.30 a.m., August 6, 1914."
[3] See No. 874 and the numbers referred to there in note 6.

SUPPLEMENTS

SUPPLEMENT I

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO SERBIA

The Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Belgrade[1]

VIENNA, *July 22, 1914.*

Your Excellency will present the following note to the Royal Government on the afternoon of Thursday, July 23:

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister at the Court of Vienna made, in the name of his Government, the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:

> Serbia recognizes that her rights were not affected by the state of affairs created in Bosnia, and states that she will accordingly accommodate herself to the decisions to be reached by the Powers in connection with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. Serbia, in accepting the advice of the Great Powers, binds herself to desist from the attitude of protest and opposition which she has assumed with regard to the annexation since October last, and she furthermore binds herself to alter the tendency of her present policy toward Austria-Hungary, and to live on the footing of friendly and neighborly relations with the latter in the future.

Now the history of the past few years, and particularly the painful events of the 28th of June, have proved the existence of a subversive movement in Serbia, whose object it is to separate certain portions of its territory from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This movement, which came into being under the very eyes of the Serbian Government, subsequently found expression outside of the territory of the Kingdom in acts of terrorism, in a number of attempts at assassination, and in murders.

Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in its declaration of the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. It has tolerated the criminal activities of the various unions and associations directed against the Monarchy, the unchecked utterances of the press, the glorification of the authors of assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in subversive intrigues; it has tolerated an unhealthy propaganda in its public instruction; and it has tolerated, finally, every manifestation which could betray the people of Serbia into hatred of the Monarchy and contempt for its institutions.

This toleration of which the Royal Serbian Government was guilty, was still in evidence at that moment when the events of the twenty-eighth of June exhibited to the whole world the dreadful consequences of such tolerance.

It is clear from the statements and confessions of the criminal authors of the assassination of the twenty-eighth of June, that the murder at Serajevo was conceived at Belgrade, that the murderers received the weapons and the bombs with which they were equipped from Serbian officers and officials who belonged to the *Narodna Odbrana*, and, finally, that the dispatch of the criminals and of

[1] From the Austro-Hungarian Red Book, I, No. 7 (Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl at Belgrade).

their weapons to Bosnia was arranged and effected under the conduct of Serbian frontier authorities.

The results brought out by the inquiry no longer permit the Imperial and Royal Government to maintain the attitude of patient tolerance which it has observed for years toward those agitations which center at Belgrade and are spread thence into the territories of the Monarchy. Instead, these results impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the obligation to put an end to those intrigues, which constitute a standing menace to the peace of the Monarchy.

In order to attain this end, the Imperial and Royal Government finds itself compelled to demand that the Serbian Government give official assurance that it will condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, the whole body of the efforts whose ultimate object it is to separate from the Monarchy territories that belong to it; and that it will obligate itself to suppress with all the means at its command this criminal and terroristic propaganda.

In order to give these assurances a character of solemnity, the Royal Serbian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ of July 26/13, the following declaration:

> The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, the whole body of the efforts whose ultimate object it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories that belong to it, and it most sincerely regrets the dreadful consequences of these criminal transactions.
>
> The Royal Serbian Government regrets that Serbian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus have endangered the friendly and neighborly relations, to the cultivation of which the Royal Government had most solemnly pledged itself by its declaration of March 31, 1909.
>
> The Royal Government, which disapproves and repels every idea and every attempt to interfere in the destinies of the population of whatever portion of Austria-Hungary, regards it as its duty most expressly to call the attention of the officers, officials and the whole population of the Kingdom to the fact that for the future it will proceed with the utmost rigor against any persons who shall become guilty of any such activities, activities to prevent and to suppress which, the Government will bend every effort.

This declaration shall be brought to the attention of the Royal army simultaneously by an order of the day from His Majesty the King, and by publication in the official organ of the army.

The Royal Serbian Government will furthermore pledge itself:

1. to suppress every publication which shall incite to hatred and contempt of the Monarchy, and the general tendency of which shall be directed against the territorial integrity of the latter;

2. to proceed at once to the dissolution of the *Narodna Odbrana*, to confiscate all of its means of propaganda, and in the same manner to proceed against the other unions and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves with propaganda against Austria-Hungary; the Royal Government will take such measures as are necessary to make sure that the dissolved associations may not continue their activities under other names or in other forms;

3. to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, everything,

whether connected with the teaching corps or with the methods of teaching, that serves or may serve to nourish the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. to remove from the military and administrative service in general all officers and officials who have been guilty of carrying on the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whose names the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to make known to the Royal Government when communicating the material evidence now in its possession;

5. to agree to the cooperation in Serbia of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the integrity of the Monarchy;

6. to institute a judicial inquiry against every participant in the conspiracy of the twenty-eighth of June who may be found in Serbian territory; the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government delegated for this purpose will take part in the proceedings held for this purpose;

7. to undertake with all haste the arrest of Major Voislav Tankositch and of one Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian official, who have been compromised by the results of the inquiry;

8. by efficient measures to prevent the participation of Serbian authorities in the smuggling of weapons and explosives across the frontier; to dismiss from the service and to punish severely those members of the Frontier Service at Schabats and Losnitza who assisted the authors of the crime of Serajevo to cross the frontier;

9. to make explanations to the Imperial and Royal Government concerning the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian functionaries in Serbia and abroad, who, without regard for their official position, have not hesitated to express themselves in a manner hostile toward Austria-Hungary since the assassination of the twenty-eighth of June;

10. to inform the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised in the foregoing points.

The Imperial and Royal Government awaits the reply of the Royal Government by Saturday, the twenty-fifth instant, at 6 p.m., at the latest.

A mémoire concerning the results of the inquiry at Serajevo, as far as they concern the functionaries referred to in Points 7 and 8, is appended to this note.

APPENDIX

The criminal inquiry held by the court at Serajevo in the case of Gavrilo Princip and his associates on the charge of assassination, and of complicity in assassination committed on June 28 of this year, has so far resulted in the establishment of the following facts:

1. The plan to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his sojourn at Serajevo was evolved at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovitch, one Milan Ciganovitch and Trifko Grabech, with the cooperation and assistance of Major Voislav Tankositch.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols together with the ammunition, which served the criminals as their implements, were procured and presented to Princip, Cabrinovitch and Grabech at Belgrade by one Milan Ciganovitch and said Major Voislav Tankositch.

3. The bombs were hand-grenades which came from the arsenal of the Serbian army at Kraguyevatz.

4. In order to assure the success of the attempt at assassination, Ciganovitch instructed Princip, Cabrinovitch and Grabech in the handling of the grenades, and gave instruction in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip and Cabrinovitch in a wood near the rifle-range of Topschider.

5. In order to make possible for Princip, Cabrinovitch and Grabech the crossing of the Bosnia-Herzegovinian frontier and the smuggling across of their weapons, a whole secret transportation system was organized by Ciganovitch. The entrance of the criminals, together with their weapons, into Bosnia and Herzegovina was engineered by the chief frontier officials at Schabats (Rade Popovitch) and Losnitza, as well as by the customs official Budivoi Grbitch of Losnitza, with the aid and cooperation of several other people.

In connection with the presentation of the foregoing note, Your Excellency will add orally that you are instructed—in case you should fail to receive in the meantime a reply of consent without any reservations, from the Royal Government—to leave Belgrade with the personnel of the Imperial and Royal Legation at the expiration of the forty-eight-hour respite provided for in the note, to be reckoned from the day and from the hour on which you make the communication.

SUPPLEMENT II

THE TREATY OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

In Its Form of December 5, 1912[1]

Their Majesties the German Emperor and King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary, and the King of Italy, firmly resolved to assure to their realms the continuance of the benefits guaranteed to them, both from the political as well as from the monarchical and social point of view, by the maintenance of the Triple Alliance, and desirous for this purpose of prolonging the continuation of this alliance, concluded the 20th of May, 1882, renewed for the first time by the treaties of February 20, 1887, for the second time by the treaty of May 6, 1891, and for the third time by the treaty of June 28, 1902, have to this end named their plenipotentiaries, to wit:

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary:

the Count Leopold Berchtold von und zu Ungarschitz, his Minister of the Imperial and Royal Household and for Foreign Affairs, President of the Joint Ministerial Council;

His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia:

the Sieur Heinrich von Tschirschky und Bögendorff, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc. and Apostolic King of Hungary;

His Majesty the King of Italy:

the Duke Giuseppe d'Avarna, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary, who, having exchanged their brevets of full authority, which were found to be in good and due form, agreed upon the following articles:

Article 1

The high contracting parties pledge to each other mutual peace and friendship, and will not enter upon any alliance or engagement directed against one of their States.

They pledge themselves to proceed to an exchange of opinions upon political and economic questions of a general nature which might present themselves, and pledge to each other besides their mutual support within the limits of their own interests.

Article 2

In case Italy, without direct provocation on her own part, should be attacked by France for any kind of a reason, the other two contracting parties are bound to render to the party attacked assistance and support to the extent of their power.

This same obligation will be incumbent upon Italy in the case of an attack by France on Germany which is not directly provoked.

[1] From one of the original engrossed copies in the archives of the Foreign Office.

ARTICLE 3

If one or two of the high contracting parties should be attacked, without direct provocation on their own part, and should find themselves involved in a war with two or more Great Powers who are not signatories to the present treaty, the *casus foederis* shall be deemed to exist simultaneously for all the high contracting parties.

ARTICLE 4

In the case that a Great Power, which is not a signatory to the present treaty, should threaten the security of the State of one of the high contracting parties, and that the threatened party should thereby find itself compelled to wage war against this Great Power, the other two bind themselves to observe a benevolent neutrality toward their ally. Each party reserves to itself in such a case the right to take part in the war, if it should deem it expedient to make common cause with its ally.

ARTICLE 5

If the peace of one of the high contracting parties should be threatened under circumstances as provided in the foregoing articles, the high contracting parties will concert in seasonable time upon the military measures to be taken with a view to eventual cooperation.

They obligate themselves from the present time on, in all cases of joint participation in a war, not to conclude an armistice, or peace, or a treaty, except by joint agreement among themselves.

ARTICLE 6

Germany and Italy having in view only the maintenance, as far as is possible, of the territorial *status quo* in the east, bind themselves to use their influence to prevent any territorial modification in the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic Sea and in the Aegean Sea which might be injurious to one or to another of the Powers signatory to the present treaty. To this end they will communicate to each other all information adapted to a mutual enlightenment as to their own intentions as well as to those of other Powers.

ARTICLE 7

Austria-Hungary and Italy, having in view only the maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial *status quo* in the east, bind themselves to use their influence to prevent any territorial modification which might be injurious to one or another of the Powers signatory to the present treaty. To this end they will communicate to each other all information adapted to a mutual enlightenment as to their own intentions as well as to those of other Powers. In the case, however, that, by reason of the course of events, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the region of the Balkans or on the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic and in the Aegean Sea should become impossible, and that, whether in consequence of the action of a third Power, or otherwise, Austria-Hungary or Italy should find themselves compelled to modify it by a temporary or a permanent occupation on their part, such occupation shall not take place until after a previous agreement between the two Powers; this agreement shall be based on the principle of mutual

compensation for every territorial or other advantage which each of the Powers might derive over and above the present *status quo* and which shall satisfy the interests and the well-grounded pretensions of both parties.

ARTICLE 8

The stipulations of Articles 6 and 7 shall in no wise apply to the Egyptian question, with regard to which the high contracting parties preserve respectively their liberty of action, having regard always for the principles on which the present Treaty is based.

ARTICLE 9

Germany and Italy obligate themselves to be responsible for the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* in the region of northern Africa along the Mediterranean, to wit: Cyrenaica, Tripoli, and Tunisia. The representatives of the two Powers in these regions shall be instructed to maintain the closest intimacy of mutual intercommunication and assistance.

If, unfortunately, as a result of a mature investigation of the situation, Germany and Italy should jointly recognize that the maintenance of the *status quo* had become impossible, Germany obligates herself, after previous formal agreement, to support Italy in any action in the form of an occupation or other indemnification that the latter might undertake in these same regions in view of the interest of an equilibrium and of justifiable compensation.

It is understood that in such a case both Powers shall attempt to place themselves in agreement with England also.

ARTICLE 10

If it should happen that France should take measures to extend her occupation or her protectorate or her sovereignty in any shape or form in the territory of northern Africa, and that as a result of such action Italy should consider that, in order to safeguard her position in the Mediterranean, she were compelled to undertake activities herself in the said territory of northern Africa, or to proceed to extreme measures on French territory in Europe, the state of war arising between Italy and France therefrom would *ipso facto*, upon the application of Italy, and at equal cost to Germany and Italy, constitute the *casus foederis* as provided in Articles 2 and 5 of the present treaty, as if such a possibility had been expressly provided for therein.

ARTICLE 11

If the chances of any war jointly undertaken by the two Powers against France should lead Italy to seek territorial guaranties with respect to France, either for the security of the frontiers of the Kingdom and its maritime status, or in the interest of stability and peace, Germany shall oppose no obstacle thereto, and, in case of need shall, in a measure proportionate to the circumstances, strive to facilitate the means of attaining such an object.

ARTICLE 12

The high contracting parties agree to keep secret the contents of the present treaty.

ARTICLE 13

The signatory Powers reserve the right to introduce later, in the form of protocols and by mutual accord, modifications, the utility of which, shall have been demonstrated by circumstances.

ARTICLE 14

The present treaty shall remain in force for the period of six years from the termination of the existing treaty; but if it shall not then have been denounced a year in advance by one or other of the high contracting parties, it shall remain in force for a similar period of six years more.

ARTICLE 15

The ratifications of the present treaty shall be exchanged at Vienna within a period of fourteen days, or sooner, if possible.[1]

In witness whereof the several plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed the present treaty.

Done at Vienna in threefold original on the fifth day of the month of December, one thousand nine hundred and twelve.

(SEAL) VON TSCHIRSCHKY.
(SEAL) BERCHTOLD.
(SEAL) AVARNA.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOLS OF DECEMBER 5, 1912

PROTOCOL

At the moment of proceeding to the signature of the Treaty of this day between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries of those three Powers, being duly authorized thereto, make mutual declaration as follows:

1. Under reservation of parliamentary approval of the actual agreements which would result from this present declaration of principles, the high contracting parties promise each other, from this time on, as to economic matters (finance, customs duties, railroads), except for treatment on the most favored nation plan, all the facilities and all the particular advantages which may prove compatible with the exigencies of each of the three nations and with their respective obligations toward third Powers.

2. As the accession of England has already in principle been acquired to the stipulations of the treaty of this day concerning the East, properly speaking, to wit: the territory of the Ottoman Empire, the high contracting parties will, at an opportune moment and as far as circumstances will permit, address themselves toward bringing about a similar accession with regard to the northern African territories along the central and western portions of the Mediterranean, inclusive of Morocco. This accession might be realized through the acceptance on the

[1] The exchange of the documents of ratification took place at Vienna on the 19th of December, 1912. Copies forwarded from the Embassy at Vienna to the Foreign Office on the 19th of December. Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: December 20, a.m.

part of England of the program established by Articles 9 and 10 of the treaty of this day.

In witness whereof the three plenipotentiaries have signed the present protocol in threefold original.

Done at Vienna the fifth day of the month of December, one thousand nine hundred and twelve.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.
BERCHTOLD.
AVARNA.

PROTOCOL

At the moment of proceeding to the signature of the treaty of this day between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of those three Powers, being duly authorized thereto, make mutual declaration as follows:

1. It is agreed that the territorial *status quo* in the regions of northern Africa along the Mediterranean referred to in Article 9 of the treaty of June 28,[1] 1902, implies the sovereignty of Italy over Tripoli and the Cyrenaica.

2. It is likewise agreed that Article 10 of the same treaty has for a foundation the *status quo* existing in the regions of northern Africa at the moment of the signing of the treaty.

3. It is agreed that the special arrangements concerning Albania and the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar agreed upon between Austria-Hungary and Italy on December 20, 1900/February 9, 1901 and November 20/December 15, 1909, are not modified by the renewal of the treaty of alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.

In witness whereof the three plenipotentiaries have signed the present protocol in threefold original.

Done at Vienna the fifth day of the month of December, one thousand nine hundred and twelve.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.
BERCHTOLD.
AVARNA.

[1] [This date given as July 25 in the German translation for the Kautsky Documents.]

SUPPLEMENT III

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN-ROUMANIAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE IN ITS FORM OF FEBRUARY 5, 1913, WITH THE GERMAN DECLARATION OF ACCESSION OF FEBRUARY 26, 1913[1]

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia and Apostolic King of Hungary, and His Majesty the King of Roumania, who, on the 5th of the current month, concluded at Bucharest the following treaty of friendship and alliance:

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia and Apostolic King of Hungary, and His Majesty the King of Roumania, inspired by the mutual desire to maintain the general peace in conformity with the object pursued by the Austro-Hungarian-German alliance, to secure political order, and to guarantee the complete friendship by which they are bound against all hazards,

after consideration of the stipulations of the treaty toward these ends signed by Austria-Hungary and Roumania on the 25th of July, 1892, a treaty which, owing to its essentially conservative and defensive character, pursues only the object of preserving them from those dangers which might threaten the peace of their realms,

and with the desire of confirming once again the agreement arrived at between their majesties in anticipation of certain possibilities mentioned in the treaty of the 25th of July, 1892, of which the duration was extended until the 25th of July, 1903, by the protocol signed at Sinaia on the 30th of September, 1896, and which was renewed by the treaty signed at Bucharest on the 17th of April, 1902,

have resolved to renew and to confirm by a new agreement the obligations contained in the treaty referred to above.

For this purpose their said majesties have nominated as their plenipotentiaries, to wit:

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia and Apostolic King of Hungary:

the Sieur Karl Emil von Fürstenberg, his Chamberlain, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of Roumania, Knight, etc.,

His Majesty the King of Roumania:

the Sieur Titus Majoresco, Premier, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Grand Cross, etc.,

who, after having made known to each other their plenipotentiary powers, which were found to be in good and due form, came to an agreement on the following articles:

Article 1

By common consent, Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, as contained in the treaty between Austria-Hungary and Roumania signed on the 25th of July, 1892, and reading as follows, are renewed and confirmed:

[1] From the original engrossed copy in the archives of the Foreign Office. The minor titles of the plenipotentiaries are replaced by an "etc." The exchange of the ratifications took place at Bucharest on February 23/March 8, 1913. Forwarded by the Legation at Bucharest; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: March 11, 1913, p.m.

ART. 1. The high contracting parties promise each other peace and friendship, and will enter upon no alliance or compact directed against either of their realms. They bind themselves to pursue an amicable policy and to lend each other mutual support within the limits of their own interests.

ART. 2. Should Roumania, without any kind of provocation on her part, be attacked, Austria-Hungary is bound to render her timely assistance and support against the aggressor. If Austria-Hungary should under similar circumstances be attacked in any part of her territories bordering on Roumania, then that fact shall at once constitute a *casus foederis* for the latter.

ART. 3. Should either of the high contracting parties find itself threatened by an attack under the conditions mentioned above, then the two Governments shall come to an agreement respecting the measures to be taken toward the cooperation of their armies. These military questions, particularly those relating to operations and to passage through their respective territories, shall be determined by a military convention.

ART. 4. If, against their desire and expectation, the high contracting parties should be forced into a joint war under the circumstances provided for in the foregoing articles, they bind themselves neither to negotiate nor to conclude peace separately.

ART. 6. The high contracting parties mutually agree between themselves to keep secret the contents of the present treaty.

ARTICLE 2

The articles repeated above shall remain in force until the 8th of July, 1920. If the present treaty shall not be denounced or if its revision shall not be demanded by one of the high contracting parties one year before its expiration, it shall be deemed to have been extended for the period of six years, and so on for consecutive periods of six years each, in default of denunciation.

ARTICLE 3

The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged within a period of three weeks, or sooner, if possible.

have invited His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, to accede to the provisions of the treaty named above.

In consequence whereof, His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, has endowed with plenipotentiary powers his representative at Bucharest, the undersigned Julius von Waldthausen, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, in order to accede formally to the provisions of the treaty referred to above. By virtue of this act of accession, the German Emperor, King of Prussia, assumes, in the name of the German Empire toward their majesties the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia and Apostolic King of Hungary and also the King of Roumania, and simultaneously their majesties the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia and Apostolic King of Hungary, and the King of Roumania, assume toward His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, through the undersigned, duly authorized for this purpose, the Prince Karl Emil von Fürstenberg, his Chamberlain, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of Roumania, and the Sieur Titus Majoresco, Premier, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, the same obligations to which the high contracting parties have mutually pledged themselves by the provisions of the treaty referred to and herein-above inserted.

The present act of accession shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within a period of three weeks, or earlier, if possible.

In testimony whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present act of accession and impressed the seal of their arms.

Done at Bucharest on the thirteenth/twenty-sixth day of the month of February in the year of Grace one thousand nine hundred and thirteen.

WALDTHAUSEN.
PRINCE KARL EMIL ZU FÜRSTENBERG.
T. MAJORESCO.

SUPPLEMENT IV

REPORTS, TELEGRAMS AND TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS OF THE BAVARIAN LEGATION AT BERLIN

1. The reports and telegrams are reproduced from the original copies, the telephone conversations from the memoranda in the records of the legation. The formalities of courtesy customary in Bavarian diplomatic transactions have been omitted at the beginning and the end of documents. Abbreviated words have been printed in full.

2. In the records of the legation the reports are numbered, but the telegrams not. The reports, the numbers of which are lacking, either do not belong at all to the reports relative to the Serbian affair, etc., or relate to quite immaterial matters such as the handing over of passports and the like.

3. As a rule, the reports were sent on the night train from Berlin to Munich, where they arrived on the morning of the following day.

4. The time of the receipt and filing of the telegrams it was possible to supply, when lacking, from copies in the archives of the Ministry at Munich.

No. 1

The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Report 364. BERLIN, *July 2, 1914.*

His Majesty the Emperor has given up the journey to Vienna for the burial because of a slight indisposition, it was officially reported. But the real reason, according to my information, was that the Emperor William was requested to put off his visit, in order to spare the Emperor Franz Joseph. Why, after declining the visits of all other exalted personalities, the people in Vienna did not at the same time decline a visit from the Emperor, but even joined in agreeing on all the details of the journey, I do not know.

Yesterday's alarming report to the effect that Austria-Hungary had laid claim to the conduct of the inquiry in Serbia and that Serbia had refused this interference, has since been denied. At the local Foreign Office they even hope that Serbia will now neglect nothing in order to call to account those persons guilty of the conspiracy. Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann even immediately and seriously called the attention of the local Serbian Chargé d'Affaires to the consequences to which Serbian refusal in this direction might lead, and, furthermore, suggested to the local Russian Ambassador that he get his Government to give the same advice at Belgrade. Mr. Zimmermann, as he informed me, offered this counsel on the ground that no one could tell what would happen should the Serbian Government fail to fulfil its obligations, considering the wrath which the deed of Serajevo had aroused in Austria-Hungary. He told the Ambassador that he did not need to explain that a conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary might set Bulgaria immediately in motion against Greece, and that its further

consequences were not to be disregarded, and that therefore, he, Zimmermann, hoped that the Russian Government, guided by the desire to maintain the peace of the world, would be willing to let its voice be heard at Belgrade in the interest of an honorable conciliatory attitude.

Your Excellency will accept, etc.,

G. H. LERCHENFELD.

No. 2

The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Report 386. BERLIN, *July 18, 1914.*

I have the honor most respectfully to report as follows to Your Excellency concerning the prospective settlement between the Austro-Hungarian Government and Serbia, on the basis of conversations I have had with Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann, and further with the Foreign Office reporter for the Balkans and the Triple Alliance, and with the counselor of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy.

The step which the Vienna Cabinet has decided to undertake at Belgrade, and which will consist in the presentation of a note, will take place on the twenty-fifth instant. The reason for the postponement of the action to that date is that they wish to await the departure of Messrs. Poincaré and Viviani from Petersburg, in order not to facilitate an agreement between the Dual Alliance Powers on any possible counter-action. Until then, by the granting of leave of absence simultaneously to the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff, the Vienna authorities will have the appearance of being peacefully inclined; and they have not failed of success in their attempts to influence the press and the exchange. It is recognized here that the Vienna Cabinet has been proceeding quite cleverly in this matter, and it is only regretted that Count Tisza, who at first is said to have been against any severe action, has somewhat raised the veil of secrecy by his statement in the Hungarian House of Deputies.

As Mr. Zimmermann told me, the note, so far as has yet been determined, will contain the following demands:

1. The issuing of a proclamation by the King of Serbia which shall state that the Serbian Government has nothing to do with the Greater-Serbia movement, and fully disapproves of it.

2. The initiation of an inquiry to discover those implicated in the murder of Serajevo, and the participation of Austrian officials in this inquiry.

3. Proceedings against all who have participated in the Greater-Serbia movement.

A respite of forty-eight hours is to be granted for the acceptance of these demands.

It is perfectly plain that Serbia can not accept any such demands, which are incompatible with her dignity as a sovereign state. Thus the result would be war.

Here they are absolutely willing that Austria should take advantage of this favorable opportunity, even at the risk of further complications. But whether they will actually rise to the occasion in Vienna, still seems doubtful to Mr. von

Jagow, as it does to Mr. Zimmermann. The Under-Secretary of State made the statement that Austria-Hungary, thanks to her indecision and her desultoriness, had really become the Sick Man of Europe, as Turkey had once been, upon the partition of which, the Russians, Italians, Roumanians, Serbians and Montenegrins were now waiting. A powerful and successful move against Serbia would make it possible for the Austrians and Hungarians to feel themselves once more to be a national power, would again revive the country's collapsed economic life, and would set foreign aspirations back for years. To judge from the indignation at the bloody deed that was now dominant over the entire Monarchy, it looked as if they could even be sure of the Slav troops. In a few years, with the continuance of the operation of the Slavic propaganda, this would no longer be the case, as even General Conrad von Hötzendorf himself had admitted.

So they are of the opinion here that Austria is face to face with an hour of fate, and for this reason they declared here without hesitation, in reply to an inquiry from Vienna, that we would agree to any method of procedure which they might determine on there, even at the risk of a war with Russia. The blank power of full authority that was given to Count Berchtold's Chief of the Cabinet, Count Hoyos, who came here to deliver a personal letter from the Emperor together with a detailed memorial, went so far that the Austro-Hungarian Government was empowered to deal with Bulgaria concerning her entrance into the Triple Alliance.

In Vienna they do not seem to have expected such an unconditional support of the Danube Monarchy by Germany, and Mr. Zimmermann has the impression that it is almost embarrassing to the always timid and undecided authorities at Vienna not to be admonished by Germany to caution and self-restraint. To what extent they waver in their decisions at Vienna is shown by the circumstance that Count Berchtold, three days after he had had inquiries made here concerning the alliance with Bulgaria, telegraphed that he still had scruples about closing with Bulgaria.

So it would have been liked even better here, if they had not waited so long with their action against Serbia, and the Serbian Government had not been given time to make an offer of satisfaction on its own account, perhaps acting under Russo-French pressure.

What attitude the other Powers will take toward an armed conflict between Austria and Serbia will chiefly depend, according to the opinion here, on whether Austria will content herself with a chastisement of Serbia, or will demand territorial compensation for herself. In the first case, it might be possible to localize the war; in the other case, on the other hand, more serious complications would probably be inevitable.

The administration will, immediately upon the presentation of the Austrian note at Belgrade, initiate diplomatic action with the Powers, in the interest of the localization of the war. It will claim that the Austrian action has been just as much of a surprise to it as to the other Powers, pointing out the fact that the Emperor is on his northern journey and that the Prussian Minister of War, as well as the Chief of the Grand General Staff are away on leave of absence. (As I take the liberty to insert here, not even the Italian Government has been taken into confidence.) It will lay stress upon the fact that it is a matter of interest for all the monarchical Governments that "the Belgrade nest of anarchists" be once and

for all rooted out; and it will make use of its influence to get all the Powers to take the view that the settlement between Austria and Serbia is a matter concerning those two nations alone. The mobilization of the German Army is to be refrained from, and they are also going to work through the military authorities to prevent Austria from mobilizing her entire Army, and especially not those troops stationed in Galicia, in order to avoid bringing about automatically a counter-mobilization on the part of Russia, which would force, first ourselves, and then France, to take similar measures and thereby conjure up a European war.

The attitude of RUSSIA will, above all else, determine the question whether the attempt to localize the war will succeed.

If Russia is not determined on war against Austria and Germany, in any case, she can, in that event—and that is the most favorable factor in the present situation—very well remain inactive, and justify herself toward the Serbs by announcing that she approves of the kind of fighting that goes to work with the throwing of bombs and with revolver shots just as little as any of the other civilized nations; this, especially, so long as Austria does not render doubtful Serbia's national independence. Mr. Zimmermann assumes that both England and France, to neither of whom a war would be acceptable at the present moment, will try to exert a pacifying influence on Russia; besides that, he is counting on the fact that "bluffing" constitutes one of the most favored requisites of Russian policy, and that while the Russian likes to threaten with the sword, he still does not like so very much to draw it in behalf of others at the critical moment.

ENGLAND will not prevent Austria from calling Serbia to account; it is only the destruction of the nation that she would scarcely permit, being far more likely—true to her traditions—presumably to take a stand, even in this case, for the principles of nationality. A war between the Dual Alliance and the Triple Alliance would be unwelcome to England at the present time, if only in consideration of the situation in Ireland. Should it, however, come to that, according to all opinion here, we should find our English cousins on the side of our enemies, inasmuch as England fears that France, in the event of a new defeat, would sink to the level of a Power of the second class, and that the "balance of power," the maintenance of which England considers to be necessary for her own interests, would be upset thereby.

Italy would take very little pleasure in the correction of Serbia by Austria, the strengthening of whose influence in the Balkans she would in no wise favor. As I was told by Minister von Bergen, reporter for Triple Alliance affairs at the Foreign Office, the relations between Vienna and Rome are anything but friendly again. At Vienna they are said to be in a very bad humor with Aliotti, the Italian Minister in Albania, who appears to have been conducting serious intrigues against Austria; and for this reason Ambassador von Mérey was instructed a few days ago to demand of Italy that she alter her whole policy, as otherwise the continuation of the agreement would be rendered impossible. The instructions were so sharply worded that San Giuliano was quite indignant, and this tension between Austria and Italy constitutes a very serious factor in the situation. Italy would not tolerate, without demanding compensation therefor, the partition of Serbia or even the annexation of the Mount of Lowtschen, which dominates the Bight of

Cattaro. It does not seem entirely unlikely that Italy will undertake to call in her reserves, justifying the action by the state of her internal political affairs, for the purpose of occupying Valona, should the occasion offer. Mr. Zimmermann is of the opinion that Austria should not offer any opposition to that, as Valona would constitute for Italy another heel of Achilles, and as the distance between Brindisi and Valona is too great to make it possible for the Italians to close the Adriatic completely.

Perhaps it may be assumed from a statement made by the Counselor of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, according to which, in his personal opinion, Valona might well be given to the Italians, that in Vienna they are already beginning to familiarize themselves with the idea of Italy's establishing herself firmly in southern Albania.

As I have been told quite confidentially, Prince Stolberg, Counselor of the Embassy at Vienna, who was here a few days ago, was instructed to discuss with Count Berchtold the question of the compensation of Italy, and in so doing to insinuate, in unofficial form, the suggestion that Italy might be permanently won over, once more, if Austria, in the event of her making major extensions to her territory, would agree to the cession to Italy of the southern part of the Trentino, i.e., that portion of the Archbishopric of Trent which had never belonged to the old German Empire. It is, of course, scarcely expected here that the Vienna Cabinet would seriously consider this idea, and it was with intention that the Counselor of the Embassy, and not the Ambassador himself, who is likewise in Vienna, was instructed to bring the Trentino into the conversation, in order to avoid any bad feeling by an official suggestion of that nature.

So far as Bulgaria is concerned, the local Austro-Hungarian Embassy assumes that King Ferdinand would take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the outbreak of a war between Austria and Serbia, also, to attack Serbia, for the purpose of regaining the territory lost under the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest. As the danger would exist that in such an event Roumania, as in the second Balkan war, would turn against Bulgaria—and presumably influences directed toward this end by Russia, which would undertake nothing against Bulgaria directly, would not be lacking this time either,—they have let King Carol, with whose attitude of late they have been far from satisfied, know from here and in no uncertain manner that Germany would place herself at the side of Bulgaria, in case Roumania were unwilling to let Serbia drop. From the answer of the King it is assumed here that Roumania will keep the peace if compensation should be held in prospect for her. The territory around Vidin, the population of which is chiefly composed of Roumanians, would come under consideration as such compensation. Roumania would probably be won over by such action alone to the Triple Alliance, which would thus show itself to be stronger and more useful than the Dual Alliance.

Greece, which would not regard a partition of Serbia with any displeasure, could be compensated in Epirus, and would have to cede Kavala to the Bulgarians in return.

Finally, so far as concerns Montenegro, it is hoped here that the intelligent King Nicholas will find it advantageous to let the Serbs fight alone against Austria. Montenegro could be compensated in northern Albania for the cession of the

Lowtschen, which Austria would probably lay claim to for herself on the occasion of so extensive an alteration of the map of the Balkans.

What the fate of the Principality of Albania would be under all these circumstances, can hardly be foreseen today. In the first place, there would be a continuation of the hopeless situation which has been characterized at Paris in the words: "*les caisses sont vides, le thrône est Wied, tout est vide,*" and which has fastened on the Prince the nickname "*Prince du Vide.*"

Your Excellency will accept, etc.,

v. SCHOEN.

No. 3

The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Telegram. BERLIN, *July 23, 1914.*[1]

Delivery of the Austrian note to Serbia will take place this afternoon. Termination of the respite Saturday afternoon at five o'clock.

SCHOEN.

No. 4

The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Report 394. BERLIN, *July 23, 1914.*

As I learned at a late hour last night and have already reported to Your Excellency by a dispatch in cipher,[2] according to a new decision of the Vienna Cabinet, the delivery of the Austrian note to Serbia is not to be made on the twenty-fifth, but as early as today, toward evening, and, if feasible, so late that its contents can not be made known to Petersburg before the departure of Mr. Poincaré to Stockholm, which is to take place this evening at eleven o'clock.

Then the note is to be officially brought to the knowledge of the Great Powers by the representatives of Austria-Hungary tomorrow morning. The note is to be accompanied by a supplement in which the results of the inquiry at Serajevo are to be set down, and in which the complicity even of official Serbian circles is to be shown.

The report published in a few papers to the effect that no respite has been set within the term of which the Serbian Government must accept the Austrian demands is incorrect; on the other hand, as I have already had the honor of reporting to Your Excellency a respite of only forty-eight hours has been stipulated.

The long delay of the Vienna Cabinet has affected the local official authorities unpleasantly, and it would have been their desire that the demand for atonement for the murder of the Archduke should have followed upon the deed as closely as possible. But the hesitation of the Austrian authorities, more apparent than real, has had a good effect, too, for in Serbia they have allowed themselves to be deceived into the belief that once again Austria will not let matters go to extremes.

[1] To the Telegraph Office July 23 at 9.30 a.m. [2] See No. 3.

Acting on this belief, however, the Serbian press, and even the Serbian Premier, have been using language in relation to Austria that constitutes for Austria the best justification of her procedure before the world.

A reliable prediction as to the further development of matters can not be made today. There is always the possibility that Serbia will crawl to the cross and subject herself to the demands of Austria. To judge from her previous attitude, the probability of this, it is true, is a very small one. If she should refuse the Austrian demands, then the question comes up whether they will first put through mobilization in Austria—which would take from twelve to sixteen days—or whether they will march into Serbia at once to compel the execution of their demands.

Nor is the Foreign Office instructed, either, as yet, concerning the attitude that the Austrian Government intends to assume after the overthrow of Serbia. As my confidential agent has informed me, the conference between the Counselor of the Embassy, Prince Stolberg, and Count Berchtold, about which I respectfully reported to Your Excellency in my report of the eighteenth of the current month, No. 386,[1] only took place "in part." Count Berchtold is, as a matter of fact, said to have stated that "a lasting occupation of Serbian territory on the part of Austria was not intended, and that therefore any compensation for a third party (Italy) could not come under consideration."

It is plain that the Vienna Cabinet does not want to tie its hands prematurely, but intends to await the further developments of the settlement which is now commencing.

In connection with this it will be of decisive significance whether or not it will be possible to localize the conflict.

Your Excellency will accept, etc.,

V. SCHOEN.

No. 5

The President of the Ministerial Council at Munich to the Legation at Berlin[2]

Telegram. MUNICH, *July 23, 1914.*

I would ask you to inquire at the Foreign Office whether there would be any objection to the serving of the Austrian military draft order, through the medium of Bavarian officials, on Austrians liable to military service who are living in Bavaria.

This is not a matter of a formal request.[3]

HERTLING.

[1] See No. 2.

[2] Filed in Munich at 7.55 p.m.; arrived at Berlin at 8.38 p.m.

[3] The Chargé d'Affaires replied by telegraph on the 24th of July, "Administration has no objection."

No. 6

The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Telegram. BERLIN, *July 25, 1914.*[1]

Following my telegram of yesterday.[2]

For the benefit of unity of procedure throughout the Empire, the administration requests that the employment of Bavarian officials to serve Austrian military draft orders or to give notification of the Austrian order for mobilization be abstained from, so long as Germany is not also mobilizing. On the other hand, the tender of railroad facilities for sending home those Austrians subject to military service would be agreeable.

More in detail on this subject direct from the Imperial Railroad Administration.

SCHOEN.

No. 7

The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Telegram. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[3]

Addition to yesterday's telegram.[4]

Administration and Chancelor personally request most urgently that all cooperation of Bavarian authorities in serving or giving notification of the Austrian order for mobilization be refrained from, as this would appear to be a breach of neutrality.

Austrian Embassy here in full agreement. Austrian Government has notified consulates to this effect.

Strictest secrecy as to railroad facilities is requisite.

SCHOEN.

No. 8

The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Report by telephone. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*[5]

After inquiry of Mr. von Stumm, reply by telephone to the effect that His Majesty the Emperor is returning to Potsdam tonight, but that, in connection with the possibility of a speedy return to Munich, it is not requisite, and, in order to avoid unnecessary alarm, not even advisable, for POLITICAL reasons, that His Majesty the King should give up the intended journey into the country.

The inquiry of the Saxon Government whether the return of His Majesty the King of Saxony, who is staying in the Tyrol at the present time, would seem to be necessary, is said to have been replied to after the manner of the above, i.e., in the negative.

SCHOEN.

[1] To the Telegraph Office at 3.20 p.m.
[2] See No. 5, note 3.
[3] To the Telegraph Office at 1.50 p.m.
[4] See No. 6.
[5] Telephoned at 7 p.m. in answer to the telegraph inquiry of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on July 26 at 12.45 p.m. as to whether "the Imperial journey was to be broken off," and whether "the King (should) call off his eight-day trip into the interior, commencing with Bayreuth."

No. 9

The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Report 400. BERLIN, *July 26, 1914.*

The news of the refusal of the Austrian demands by Serbia, which was learned here late yesterday evening, was received by the population of Berlin with hearty sympathy for the allied Danube Monarchy. Everywhere there gathered groups of people who joined themselves into great processions and made demonstrations in front of the Imperial Palace, the palace of the Imperial Chancelor and the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, while singing patriotic songs and cheering for the allied Houses of Hohenzollern and Hapsburg. What makes these demonstrations, which are still going on today, particularly significant, is the fact that the participants are not, as is otherwise usually the case here, composed of the lower elements of the population, but belong overwhelmingly to the educated classes—an evidence of how fully the public understands that the struggle upon which the Danube Monarchy is entering, is fundamentally one of defense against a Slav assault on Germanic life, and that for that reason the fight is being waged in our behalf, also.

Unfortunately, the demonstrators, instead of contenting themselves with the announcement of their sympathy for Austria, allowed themselves to be led into several, though not very important, unfriendly demonstrations in front of the Russian Embassy and the Serbian Legation. This circumstance gave rise to an article entitled "Keep Cool," which is published in an extra edition of the *Berliner Lokalanzeiger* which has just appeared, and which is plainly, officially inspired, reads:

> Demonstrations against the representatives of the participating and non-participating Powers, who are representing the interests of their countries with the same dignity as are our own in foreign countries, are senseless and purposeless—are an evil in the capital of the German Empire. This should be the guiding sentiment of every one of our citizens without exception, for the days to come!

The Foreign Office, where I have been going for information repeatedly today, has in the shape of positive news only that of the refusal of the Austrian demands by Serbia, with that of the consequent rupture of diplomatic relations and the partial mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Army.

With the exception of a telegram from the military plenipotentiary, there is a complete dearth of official reports from Russia up to the present hour. And General von Chelius reports only, that the Austrian note aroused great excitement at Russian Headquarters, and that there was talk of the intention of mobilizing. The agents of the Grand General Staff, also, are sending in reports of measures which seem to point to the commencement of mobilization in Russia.

That Serbia did not adopt her attitude of refusal without Russia's having a hand in it, is considered a certainty by the Foreign Office. For this reason, the situation is regarded here in authoritative circles as "extremely critical." Nevertheless, they are holding fast to the hope that England and France, to both of whom a European war would at the present time be unwelcome to the highest degree, will try to make use of a pacificatory influence on Russia.

The statements of some of the Paris papers that Germany has made a *démarche* in the direction of the French Government which approaches the character of a threat, is absolutely incorrect. To the contrary, the administration, as I had the honor eight days ago of reporting to Your Excellency to be its intention,[1] has begun a series of similar moves in Paris, Petersburg and London ALIKE with a view to persuade the Powers to regard the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia as an occasion which concerns these two nations alone, and which therefore should remain localized. Neither the Foreign Office nor the Austro-Hungarian Embassy has any news from Belgrade, where, according to newspaper reports, firing is said to be already going on. As no projectiles have been perceived to fall on the Austrian bank of the Danube, it would appear to be, according to these very improbable rumors, a case of internal disturbances that have broken out in Belgrade. Whether any military action has been commenced on the part of Austria is likewise unknown here.

The protection of Austro-Hungarian subjects in Old Serbia has been taken over by Germany. In the New Serbia territory, where Germany maintains no consulates, but Italy does, the duty of such protection is to be turned over to the Italian authorities.

In this serious situation, in which quick decisions may prove themselves to be a necessity for us also, the return of His Majesty appeared to be desirable to the Emperor himself as well as to the administration. His Majesty will arrive at Potsdam tonight.

Your Excellency will accept, etc.,

v. SCHOEN.

No. 10

The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Telegram. BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*[2]

Situation meeting with calm judgment for present according to reports from Petersburg.

SCHOEN.

No. 11

The Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Report 402. BERLIN, *July 27, 1914.*

As I have already respectfully reported to Your Excellency by telegraph,[3] the situation is being regarded by the Foreign Office as less critical today than was the case yesterday. One reason is that it has been proved in the meantime that the reports concerning Russian mobilization [4] which were spread abroad yesterday, are, to say the least, running ahead of the facts.

[1] See No. 2. (Report No. 386 of the 18th of July.)
[2] To the Telegraph Office at 1.45 p.m. [3] See No. 10.
[4] See No. 9, fifth paragraph, beginning "With the exception of a telegram."

Both Mr. Sazonoff and the Russian Minister of War, the latter even on his word of honor, have assured Count Pourtalès that no order for mobilization has been issued, even for a partial one. According to a report from the German Military Attaché, it is true that measures preparatory to an eventual mobilization, even to quite a considerable extent, have been taken, but the Russian Government is still plainly hesitating to issue the order for mobilization, in view of the knowledge of the consequences that such a step would have. Perhaps they are beginning to realize at Petersburg that Germany would not look calmly on, in such a case, if only, not to lose the advantage offered to us by our ability to prepare more quickly for war.

So for the next few days they will try first, at Petersburg, to save Serbia from the worst by diplomatic means. The situation will only become critical, as Mr. von Stumm told me today, at the moment when the Austro-Hungarian Army moves into Serbia. But, according to a statement said to have been made to Ambassador Baron von Tschirschky by General Conrad von Hötzendorf, this can not take place before the tenth, perhaps the twelfth of August.

That France will do everything possible to keep Russia from any hostile procedure, is shown by the attitude of the French press. How great the consternation in Paris was, is shown by the fact that French bonds reached, day before yesterday on the Exchange, a lower level than any that has been noted since the year 1870, and one that made necessary the closing of the bond market.

So far as concerns the news of a mediatory action by the Powers, as reported in the newspapers, I have learned from Minister Count Mirbach that Sir Edward Grey, it is true, has suggested a *démarche à quatre* (Germany, England, Italy, France). But such a *démarche* could not concern itself with mediation between Austria and Serbia, as Austria would regard that as unfriendly interference, but only with efforts having for their aim the localization of the conflict.

The Italian Government, as has also been officially announced today, has had the Vienna Cabinet informed that in any case of an armed conflict between Austria and Serbia, it would adopt a friendly attitude corresponding to its relations as an ally. But, as I have learned very confidentially from Austrian quarters, it has also announced in connection with the above, that, even in case of a mere provisional occupation of Serbian territory by Austria, it would lay a claim for compensation for itself based on Article VII of the treaty of alliance.

In Vienna they are not willing to admit so extensive an interpretation of this article, and have accordingly replied to Rome that there could be no question of compensation, as a permanent occupation of Serbian territory by Austria was not being contemplated. At the Foreign Office they deplore the arising of this controversy between Vienna and Rome, and would have considered it advisable, in order to hold Italy "to the line" in any event, for Count Berchtold to have shown a sympathetic attitude toward the Italian claims, which have been brought forward up to the present time merely as a precaution.

How successful the transactions between Vienna and Sofia have been, is unknown here. All that is at hand is a somewhat confused declaration by the Bulgarian Government, according to which it will remain neutral during the conflict.

Therefore the Foreign Office telegraphed today to Sofia in order to have the Bulgarian attitude clarified.

The attitude assumed by Turkey is also a favorable one for Austria. According to a telegram from Count Pallavicini to Count Berchtold, the Grand Vizier has assured the Ambassador of Turkey's sympathy, and wished him luck in the Austrian procedure against Serbia.

As I was told by the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires, whom I met today, the Serbian Government would have been willing to accede to all of the Austrian demands with the exception of those relating to the official proceedings in Serbia to be undertaken by Austrian authorities. The Government had even consented to the proclamation that was demanded, and to the promulgation of the order of the day to the Serbian army, and had already undertaken to arrest the accused Major Tankositch actually before the expiration of the forty-eight-hour respite.

The Chargé d'Affaires believes that the Serbian army will withdraw from Belgrade at the beginning, in order that the city may not be bombarded. That they would then continue to confine themselves to the defensive, and thus perhaps permit the possibility of further diplomatic negotiations.

The journey of the President of the French Republic has been prematurely broken off as a result of events, and even the visits at Petersburg and Stockholm do not seem to have been very successful.

As I have learned very confidentially, the attitude that Sweden has declared she will adopt in the event of a war between the Dual Alliance and the Triple Alliance, is one which will prove a bitter disappointment to all those at Petersburg and Paris who have fastened any hopes favorable to the Dual Alliance on Mr. Poincaré's visit to Stockholm.

Your Excellency will accept, etc.,

V. SCHOEN.

No. 12

The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council [1]

Report 406. BERLIN, *July 28, 1914.*

I received Your Excellency's telegram of the day before yesterday, just before my departure. It had been lying at St. Gila, where they wrongly thought that I had already been informed of its contents by telephone.

I tried to see the Imperial Chancelor today, unfortunately, in vain, as he had been called to the Emperor at Potsdam. I learned from Under-Secretary of State Wahnschäffe, however, that the Imperial Chancelor was intending to explain the situation to His Majesty the King by letter, and for that reason wishes to talk with me again.

In the meantime, as a result of conversations with other persons in authority, I can report as follows upon the general status of affairs:

Grey's conference proposal is looked upon here as extremely inopportune, as it is unacceptable to Austria because of the demand that in the interim hostilities should be pretermitted. They are blaming the German Ambassador at London for having failed to make the attempt to keep Sir Edward Grey from taking the step.

[1] This was preceded by a brief telephonic communication of its contents to Munich.

I confess that the proposal impresses even me with surprise. For if the English Minister states that he does not wish to interfere in the quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, then he can not ask of Austria that she refrain from attacking Serbia until the conference has come to a decision.

They are counting here with certainty on the supposition that Vienna will refuse to give the required assurance, and that thus the conference, at least in the proposed form, will not come into being.

They are displeased here that Austria-Hungary states that it will be impossible for her to commence an attack before the expiration of fourteen, or, at the least, ten days. This precaution may be justified from a military standpoint, but, according to the local point of view, it is not justified from a political standpoint, because they fear that the enthusiasm aroused both there and in Germany by the determined procedure of the Empire will die down to a certain extent.

So far I have met no one here who has expressed a definite opinion as to the further development of affairs. There is no doubt that none of the Great Powers wants a European war, or that France, and England especially, are taking a decided stand at Petersburg for the localization of the struggle between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Thus the question of peace or war will alone depend on whether the Russian Government desires and is able to withstand the pressure of the Panslavists in behalf of intervention. Here as well as at Vienna, the military men are of the opinion that the Russian army is not prepared. But it is well known that on other occasions the Russians have not let themselves be deterred from commencing a war by that fact.

While I am writing to Your Excellency, I learn that Germany has refused the conference proposal of Grey.

G. H. LERCHENFELD.

No. 13

The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Report 407. BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*

My Baden colleague has just informed me that Minister von Dusch and Mr. von Weizsäcker have agreed to take part, personally, in the session of the Federal Council which will probably be called for the consideration of resolutions that may have to be made as a result of the foreign situation. Mr. von Dusch instructed Count Berckheim to suggest to Mr. Delbrück that the principal plenipotentiaries be invited to the session.

As a result of this I took occasion to request Mr. Delbrück to set a timely date for the session of the Federal Council, and to inform the principal plenipotentiaries by telegraph, so that the ministers will have time to come to Berlin for the session. Special invitations are not necessary for this purpose.

I have further to report that Minister of State Delbrück has urged the Burgomaster of Berlin to take care to see that Berlin is sufficiently provisioned for any event. Furthermore, that the Empire is in the act of making sure of as much grain as possible, in order to provision the mustering districts and the fortresses.

With regard to this, Mr. Delbrück remarked that even if the Empire took the

ground that the provisioning of the people was a matter for the individual states, he still believed that it was necessary in the interest of the whole Empire for it also to take precautions, within prescribed limits. With this was involved the difficulty that everything must be avoided that would make it appear abroad as if Germany were forcing a war. This point of view must not be lost sight of by the federated governments when taking their measures, as long as the question of peace or war had not been decided.

Minister of State Delbrück believes, as a matter of fact, that grain-provisioning will offer no difficulties, thanks to the standing harvest and the large quantity of stored provisions.

G. H. LERCHENFELD.

No. 14

The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council [1]

Report 408. BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*

The situation looks a little more peaceful today than it did yesterday evening. It was to be expected that Austria's declaration of war on Serbia would have been the cause of Russia's taking a decisive step. That such a step has not been reported thus far may be taken as evidence that for the time being they have not yet decided to go to extremes at St. Petersburg. There is, however, news to the effect that Russia has accepted in principle Grey's conference proposal, although reserving the right to continue to negotiate directly with Vienna; and finally, according to a communication from the Foreign Office, Minister Sazonoff has told Count Pourtalès that Russia desires to preserve the peace of the world, and is seeking for the means to attain this end. It is reported from London that Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky that England would go with Germany in the future, if the latter would do her share now in order to avoid war.

But it appears to me that all these reports should be credited only with a symptomatic value. No clarification of the situation is at hand.

The policy of the German Empire is directed toward the end that its ally shall come out of the affair with a gain in prestige, but that the peace of the world shall be preserved.

As I reported to Your Excellency yesterday, the situation is greatly hampered by the fact that Austria-Hungary still insists that she will have to postpone the advance into Serbia until the twelfth of August. How it is going to be possible to permit the present tension to continue so long without something breaking, is very difficult for me to see.

Your Excellency will have read the Wolff dispatch of yesterday, which contains Serbia's reply to the ultimatum. According to that, it will be hard to deny that Serbia was ready to agree to the demands of Austria-Hungary in almost every point. That Austria-Hungary should have doubts that Serbia would have kept the promises she gave, is certainly justifiable, but on the other hand, Serbia's great compliance must make it very difficult for Russia to leave this Slav sister in the lurch.

[1] Preceded at 2.01 p.m. by a telephonic communication.

I shall probably see the Imperial Chancelor today, and then report again.

Yesterday's Social-Democrat gatherings and demonstrations against the war went fairly quietly. The general feeling of the local population is one of moderation. The people did not want the war, but they are getting used to the idea of it.

Your Excellency will accept, etc.,

G. H. LERCHENFELD.

No. 15

The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Telegram. BERLIN, *July 29, 1914.*[1]

Situation very tense this evening as a result of the Russian and French war preparation measures. German Grand General Staff is for counter-measures to correspond, but decision in the matter is still outstanding. My conference with the Imperial Chancelor can not take place before tomorrow.[2]

LERCHENFELD.

No. 16

The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Telegram. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[3]

Imperial Chancelor informs me that Germany is making an attempt at mediation in Vienna on the basis of Austria's having repeated, at Petersburg, her declaration that she intends to make no lasting territorial acquisitions and will not infringe on Serbia's territorial integrity, but wants simply to insure, by means of a temporary occupation, the receipt of guaranties that Serbia will accede to the Austrian desires; in connection with this there is a mediation proposal by Sir Edward Grey on a like basis, which has been forwarded by the Imperial Chancelor to Vienna for serious consideration. Imperial Chancelor has requested a consenting reply immediately. Until the Austrian answer arrives, the "state of threatening danger of war," which would be followed by mobilization, will be postponed. Imperial Chancelor does not quite give up hope, although his mediation action is being very much embarrassed by Russian mobilization.[4]

LERCHENFELD.

No. 17

The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Telegram. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[5]

Report in the *Lokalanzeiger* that German mobilization has been ordered is false.

LERCHENFELD.

[1] To the Telegraph Office at 11 p.m. [2] See No. 18.
[3] To the Telegraph Office at 1.05 p.m.; arrived at Munich at 3.50 p.m.
[4] Reported earlier to Munich by telephone. [5] To the Telegraph Office at 4 p.m.

No. 18

The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council [1]

Report 410. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*

I have at last seen the Imperial Chancelor today. He had already several times given orders to have me summoned, but up to the present had been prevented each time from receiving me.

He instructed me to report to His Majesty the King that during the past two days he had commenced several letters and telegrams in order to present the situation to His Majesty, but that each time, before their completion, an alteration in the situation had taken place which had entirely superseded the report as commenced.

With regard to today's situation he could give me the following information:

Germany had taken upon herself negotiations for mediation. He, the Chancelor, had advised the Vienna Cabinet to state at Petersburg that, by her action against Serbia, Austria-Hungary had no intention of seeking any territorial acquisitions, nor did she intend to infringe on Serbia's territorial integrity; that, on the contrary, it was merely a question of a temporary occupation of portions of Serbian territory for the purpose of forcing from Serbia guaranties for future good behavior, as there was no reliance to be placed on mere oral or written declarations by the Serbian Government.

He had strongly insisted at Vienna that everything depended on putting Russia in the wrong.

Sir Edward Grey had attempted to influence Austria-Hungary through him, the Imperial Chancelor, along the same lines, and had promised that, if Austria-Hungary would make this declaration at Petersburg, he would bring Russia to moderation.

Besides this, an exchange of telegrams between the German Emperor and the Czar was taking place. The first dispatches, in which the Czar characterized the procedure of Austria as unjustifiable, and the Emperor explained it, had crossed.

So far, he said, no reply had been received from Vienna. The Chancelor, however, had announced this evening to the Vienna Cabinet in the most determined manner that Germany could not place herself in the noose of Austria's Balkan policy. In case Austria should send a consenting reply, the Imperial Chancelor would not give up the hope of maintaining peace. This would not be certain, however, as the already accomplished Russian mobilization would render retirement on the part of Russia very difficult. Germany's procedure was rendered very difficult by the fact that no one knew whether the measures taken in Russia and France were meant as a bluff or were serious.

As long as the Austrian reply remained outstanding, Germany would not proceed to declare a "state of threatening danger of war," which, as things stood in Germany, would have to be followed by mobilization, and, as a matter of fact, according to our military constitution, by the mobilization of the entire Army. The decision could not be long postponed in Germany, as otherwise we should be beaten out in the race with Russia and France.

[1] Transmitted in part by telephone to Munich from the Munich Reports.

For the present, in Germany the authorities had gone so far as to order military protection of certain artificial structures (bridges, tunnels, long-distance apparatus,[1] etc.) after their protection by the police had already been arranged for.

Russia had not yet mobilized against Germany.

Italy was standing by the Triple Alliance, and had only announced certain modifications in her method of rendering assistance.

The attitude of Bulgaria and Roumania was uncertain.

England had left no doubt that, if the war should break out, she would not be in a position to look quietly on. England would go with the Entente Powers.

The Imperial Chancelor said, in conclusion, that it was sad to have to say that a war that was desired by no nation was possibly being unchained, to a certain extent by elemental forces and by the long and lasting stirring up of strife between the Cabinets.

Your Excellency will accept, etc.,

G. H. LERCHENFELD.

No. 19

The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Report 414.
Addition to yesterday's telegram. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[2]

I have the honor of respectfully reporting to Your Excellency the following in continuation of yesterday's telegraphic report:

The Foreign Office takes the ground that no occasion has arisen for taking special measures for bringing home from France, Germans without means.

So long as Germany is represented by consuls there, it is for the German consular authorities to provide for bringing the Germans home. This obligation is naturally extended to cover also Bavarian subjects.

From the moment at which the German representatives are recalled from France, those foreign missions, to whom the protection of German subjects shall have been handed over become active.

Archives and funds will be turned over to the missions selected, and it will then be their duty to provide for sending German subjects home, just as it was that of the German representatives beforehand.

Under these circumstances, the Imperial Government does not consider that there is any reason for taking special measures for Bavarian subjects.

In the view of the administration, the measures suggested by the Royal Minister Resident at Paris would be subject to certain criticism, inasmuch as it would mean exposing ready cash to the eager fingers of the French Government.[3]

G. H. LERCHENFELD.

[1] Perhaps it should be read "wireless apparatus" (in the German, "Fernspruchanlagen" probably should be "Funkspruchanlagen").
[2] Telephonic communication preceded this at 7.15 p.m.
[3] This report was the result of an inquiry as to whether the Bavarian representative at Paris should receive moneys intended for the sending home of Bavarian subjects.

No. 20

The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Telegram. BERLIN, *July 30, 1914.*[1]

Grey has proposed at Vienna:

Austria is to occupy Belgrade and other places. Then the Powers as a body are to exercise pressure on Serbia to persuade her to accept the Austrian demands. Emperor William has just requested, by telegraph, agreement to the mediation proposal from Emperor Franz Joseph.

LERCHENFELD.

No. 21

The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Telegram. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[2]

Answer from Vienna not yet received, as Tisza's arrival at Vienna is first being awaited, however it is expected this afternoon. Should Austria agree to the German and English mediation proposals, it will be telegraphed to the Czar, going over Sazonoff's head, and at the same time an ultimatum concerning the suspension of mobilization will be submitted. England is working with us, and it is not impossible that even at the last moment she may bring activities to a stop; situation remains critical, as Russia's attitude toward the mediation proposal is doubtful; General Staff here is pressing for a decision.[3]

LERCHENFELD.

No. 22

The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Telegram. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[4]

In Prussia, Russian agricultural laborers will not be sent out of the country in case of war.

LERCHENFELD.

No. 23

The Legation at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Telephone communication. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[5]

It was just announced at the session of the Federal Council that the whole Russian army has been mobilized, and that, thereupon, His Majesty the Emperor ordered a "state of threatening danger of war," which will be followed by mobili-

[1] To the Telegraph Office at 7.35 p.m.
[2] To the Telegraph Office at 12.04 p.m.; arrived at the Ministry at Munich at 2 p.m.
[3] Previously communicated to Munich by telephone, at 11.15 a.m.
[4] To the Telegraph Office at 1 p.m.
[5] The session took place at 3 p.m.

zation within twenty-four to forty-eight hours. The legislative proposals announced today, which the Federal Council will have to decide on tomorrow at one o'clock, are under way. The Reichstag will be summoned simultaneously with the issuance of the mobilization order.

No. 24

The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Telegram. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*[1]

Emperor Franz Joseph has turned down mediation proposals with reference to Russian mobilization. Germany has demanded of Russia to suspend mobilization within twelve hours, otherwise Germany will mobilize. France is requested to answer within eighteen hours whether she will remain neutral. There is no doubt that replies from Russia and France will be refusals. England has again been offered a treaty of neutrality, which Sir Edward Grey has refused.[2] Attitude of Italy and Roumania still not clear, but there is hope that Italy will stand by Triple Alliance, and Roumania remain neutral.

LERCHENFELD.

No. 25

The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Report 417.
Addition to yesterday's telegram. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*

I have the honor of respectfully reporting to Your Excellency as follows, in carrying out the telegraphic instructions of yesterday:

The regular foreign consuls of enemy Powers are, upon the outbreak of war, ordered to leave for foreign parts, but receive no passports.

Native consular agents may stay in the country, but can no longer exercise their functions.

The passports of foreign diplomats, who all (not only the chiefs) receive Imperial passports, are not limited by days of grace.

Chancelors of Embassies may remain in the country under the following two conditions:

1. That they are attached to that foreign mission which takes over the protection of the subjects of the country in question.
2. That reciprocity is granted.

If they do NOT remain, the chiefs of the chancelries receive Imperial passports, the rest of the personnel Foreign Office passports.

G. H. LERCHENFELD.

[1] To the Telegraph Office at 7 p.m.; arrived at the Ministry at Munich at 10 p.m.
[2] At 10.45 p.m. there followed a telephonic communication to the effect that England "has refused neutrality on the ground that she must retain a free hand."

No. 26

The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Report 418. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*

I have reported the situation of today to Your Excellency in cipher.

As I was informed at the Foreign Office, the dice were set rolling by the fact that the Russian Ambassador Swerbejew reported to Petersburg the false statement of the *Lokalanzeiger* to the effect that Germany was mobilizing, without assuring himself of its correctness. They assume that the denial with which he followed up his report was insufficient, as the Ambassador did not wish to make a frank confession of his error.

They regret here that Emperor Franz Joseph rejected the mediation proposals, as their acceptance would have put Russia still more in the wrong.

Still, the dominating opinion is that, after Russia had gone as far as partial mobilization, the World War was no longer to be prevented. The Emperor Nicholas could hardly have been powerful enough to put through demobilization without getting satisfaction from Austria-Hungary, which, as things stand, was not to be had.

Your Excellency will accept, etc.,

G. H. LERCHENFELD.

No. 27

The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Private letter. BERLIN, *July 31, 1914.*

MOST RESPECTED FRIEND.

I believe that, by making use of the three means of modern intercourse, telephone, telegraph and post, I have reported everything that there has been to report. Nevertheless, I will try to complete somewhat the picture I have drawn, with the following lines.

I would say first of all that I agree thoroughly that Your Excellency should not come here. You are more needed in Bavaria than you are here, and, to say the least, your return would be difficult. That is Delbrück's conviction, also. He has telegraphed to this effect to Dusch and Weizsäcker.

The German-English mediation proposal, which did still offer a certain hope for the maintenance of peace, has been put to an end by the mobilization of all Russia. Sazonoff demanded a few days ago that Austria-Hungary should dispense with the fulfilment of certain points of her ultimatum. That was for Austria an impossibility. The English-German proposal would have been acceptable to Vienna.

England's attitude is mysterious. Only a short time ago, the King had assured the Prussian Prince Henry at London that England would, for a while, remain neutral. Even the article from the *Westminster Gazette* reprinted in our papers today permits the assumption of such an intention. As the editor of this paper is an intimate friend of Sir Edward Grey, the utterances of the *Westminster Gazette* have a certain significance. Against this is the fact that Sir Edward Grey

has stated to Prince Lichnowsky that England could not view events inactively. Whether the purpose of this was to cause us to exert pressure on Austria, or whether England has already determined on intervening for the other Entente Powers, remains to be seen.

Even as I write this, it is seen, England goes with the Entente.[1]

Of Italy, it is believed that she will stick to the Triple Alliance, but that she hopes to acquire something from this occasion. Not Valona, however, that she refuses.

Roumania, according to the opinion of the Foreign Office, should at least remain neutral. It is believed that there are enough means of pressure to determine her to maintain this attitude.

The spirits of the local military circles are of the best. Months ago, even, the Chief of the General Staff, Mr. von Moltke, made the statement that, from a military point of view, times were more favorable than they might be for an extremely long period to come. The reasons that he adduced were:

1. Superiority of the German artillery. France and Russia possess no howitzers, and are therefore unable to fight off any troops in protected positions by a plunging fire.

2. Superiority of the German infantry rifle.

3. Wholly insufficient training of the French army as a result of the two-year service period in the cavalry, and of the simultaneous call to the colors of two annual classes, in all branches of the service, as a result of the restoration of the three-year service period, under which conditions training must have suffered.

The feeling among the body of the people also, is one of quiet and confidence. The Social Democrats made dutiful demonstrations in favor of peace, but are now keeping very quiet. A delegate, of revisionist leanings, it is true, who had a talk with the Imperial Chancelor, assured him that no one in the Social Democratic Party had any thought of rebellion or of a general strike.

So far as the Emperor is concerned, I know that, despite some changes of mood during the commencement of the crisis, he is now very serious and very quiet.

Prince Oscar is to be wedded today in the Ministry of the Household. All the Prussian princes will go to the front. The Crown Prince received the 1st Division of the Infantry of the Guards.

It is understood that Headquarters will remain at Berlin for the present. As in the year 1870, there will be two staffs formed. On the first, the Emperor; on the second, the other Federal Princes who desire to serve in the war.

With best greetings,

Yours,

LERCHENFELD.

[1] Cf. No. 24, note 2.

No. 28

The President of the Ministerial Council at Munich to the Legation at Berlin

Telephone communication. MUNICH, *August 1, 1914.*[1]

The resolution in accordance with Article II, Paragraph 2, of the Constitution of the Empire, which is held to be necessary by His Majesty the Emperor, is agreed to, by the supreme authority of His Majesty the King.

HERTLING.

No. 29

The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Report 420.[2] BERLIN, *August 1, 1914.*

At six o'clock today the situation was as follows: Russian has so far not replied to the German ultimatum demanding suspension of all war preparations against Germany and Austria. On the strength of that, according to the resolution of the Federal Council, a declaration of war is to be made on Russia in case she does not comply with the requirements of the ultimatum. It is doubted whether Russia will answer hereafter at all.

France has been granted an extension of the respite until one o'clock today. The answer was not yet here at six, which may, however, be due to delay in the dispatch of telegrams. The Imperial Chancelor's statement, in his speech of today, to the effect that the answer was here, was founded on an error.

Italy has separated herself from the Triple Alliance by announcing that Austria had attacked Russia, *de facto*, by her attack on Serbia. Consequently a *casus foederis* did not exist. As information has come from Vienna that Austria has complied with all the Italian demands, perhaps this attitude on Italy's part is not her final one. There exist some indications of this.

The order for mobilization was signed at five-thirty this afternoon by the Emperor, after a conference at the Palace.

Accept, etc.,

G. H. LERCHENFELD.

No. 30

The Legation at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Telephone communication. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[3]

Ultimatum delivered at Petersburg. Conditional declaration of war probably suppressed by Russia and not received at the Embassy. Neither reply nor confirmation of receipt has reached here. As hostilities have commenced on the border, state of war is accepted here and Russian Ambassador has been handed his passports.

[1] Telephone conversation about 9.30 a.m. Communicated by Councilor of State v. Lössl of the Bavarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

[2] Report 419 is a report of the session of the Federal Council on August 1. See Pt. III, No. 553, p. 438.

[3] Communication made about 12 noon.

No. 31

The Minister at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Telegram. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*[1]

France replied to the ultimatum at one o'clock yesterday, that she would have to reserve the right to protect her interests, and began mobilizing about five o'clock. Declaration of war against France still withheld, as the latter's attitude is not quite plain. Italy neutral for the time being. England giving evasive answers, indicating the possibility of neutrality in case we respect Belgian neutrality. Nevertheless, it is assumed here, that she will decide to make an attack on us. Denmark making eyes toward England.

LERCHENFELD.

No. 32

The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Report 423. BERLIN, *August 2, 1914.*

I have already made a report on the situation to Your Excellency, partly by telephone, partly by telegram in cipher.[2] According to that, the hope that England will remain neutral, and Italy continue on the side of the Triple Alliance has just about disappeared. In England, everything will probably depend upon whether they become convinced there, that the English business world will lose more by the existing uncertainty than it would lose by a war. It also appears to me that England's requirement that Germany should respect the neutrality of Belgium, can hardly be considered, from a military point of view. It is true that I am not initiated into the secrets of the General Staff, but I should judge that a quick settlement with France on another line would hardly be possible.

Withal, Italy has commenced to demand the fulfilment of Article 7 of the Triple Alliance Treaty, which she interprets to mean that she has a right to compensation in case of any territorial alterations in the Balkans. Austria, it is true, contested this right in the beginning, but two days ago she recognized the Italian claim. As a result, it is being hoped in Vienna that Italy will now fulfil her obligations toward her allies. But it would appear that the fear of England has won the upper hand at Rome. Italy takes the stand, already described to Your Excellency—that a *casus foederis* does not exist because Austria was the aggressor—and reserves all her rights. This shameful attitude is even affecting sentiment in Italy. The Italian Ambassador here, wept when calling on Mr. von Jagow two days ago, when he was compelled to make such suggestions.

It can be said today that, in the war that is impending, Germany and Austria will be facing the whole world. Notwithstanding that, the feeling in local military circles is one of utter confidence.

Until today, the determinations concerning the Army and the Navy were dependent on the status of the diplomatic transactions. They wanted here, as I reported in cipher today, to leave the rôle of aggressor to France, and, above all,

[1] To the Telegraph Office at 12.30 p.m.

[2] See Nos. 30 and 31.

to England. The bombs dropped at Nuremburg by a French aviator have altered the situation, and it may be assumed that military considerations will, from now on, be the only ones. Beginning tomorrow, the French advance will be reconnoitered by balloons and aviators, and, its said, the German Fleet, too, will probably be given a free hand.

I assume that then the French Ambassador will also be handed his passports.

I refrain, at this time, from making a report on what are actually military matters. The Royal Ministry of War is informed of everything, and is therefore in a better position to give information to Your Excellency.

Your Excellency will, etc.,

G. H. LERCHENFELD.

P. S. The passports will not be handed over yet, as they wish to wait for further aggressions. As mobilization is in progress, no time will be lost by this.

No. 33

The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Report 427. BERLIN, *August 4, 1914.*

I have only to report that Turkey joins Germany[1] and is mobilizing a few corps. Bulgaria, too, seems to have decided to make common cause with Austria. The treaty has not yet been concluded. This might materially lighten Austria's military burdens. Holland's neutrality has been guaranteed by us. Germany will not be able to respect Belgian neutrality. The Chief of the General Staff has announced that even English neutrality would be too dearly bought at the price of respecting that of Belgium, as a war of aggression against France is only possible on the Belgian line.

The opening of the Reichstag in the White Hall, and the Reichstag session were inspiring to the highest degree. Even in the year 1870, the enthusiasm for fighting for the right did not show itself in so elemental and unanimous a form.

The execution of the mobilization and the mustering of the troops is going on excellently well. Neither the General Staff nor the Ministry of War have so far received a single inquiry from anywhere. Everybody knows just what he has to do.

I am forced to assume that our attitude toward Belgium will result in a break with England.

Accept, etc.,

G. H. LERCHENFELD.

[1] Signing of the treaty of alliance with Turkey on the 4th of August was reported by telegraph to Munich at 3 p.m.

No. 34

The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Report 431. BERLIN, *August 5, 1914.*

After the Imperial Chancelor had announced our attitude toward Belgium in the Reichstag session at three o'clock, the English Ambassador appeared at the Reichstag building to inform Secretary of State Jagow that England could not submit to the violation of Belgian neutrality. Mr. von Jagow explained to Sir Edward Goschen, in detail, that military considerations made it impossible for Germany to agree to the English demand, and gave him, moreover, the assurance that Germany would not infringe on the integrity of Belgium. One hour later the Ambassador appeared at the Foreign Office to demand his passports.[1] So the break with England is an accomplished fact. Moreover, Grey's speech had left no further doubt as to England's intentions.

Unfortunately, the *Berliner Tageblatt* made these occurrences known to the public by an extra edition. The crowd that now collects every evening *Unter den Linden* and that yesterday, thickly packed the *Pariser Platz* on the occasion of the departure of the French Ambassador, gathered in front of the British Embassy to make a demonstration, broke all the windows and wanted to storm the building. This was prevented in time by rapidly collected details of police. That the tumult could not be quelled in the beginning was due to the fact that the police had at first only a few squads of men in front of the British Embassy, as they were not expecting any trouble there. The *Pariser Platz* before the French Embassy had been well guarded. No excesses occurred there upon the departure of the Ambassador.

When the Foreign Office learned of the tumult in front of the British Embassy, Mr. von Jagow hastened there at once in order to make apologies to the Ambassador. That the members of the Embassy had assumed a provocative attitude, as some newspapers reported, is not true.

No information has been made public here concerning the advance into Belgium. But the Belgian Minister will, however, without any doubt, demand and receive his passports.

Holland, as I have already reported, has given assurance of her neutrality in reply to the German assurances of respect for her neutrality. Denmark, too, has declared that she will remain neutral.

Furthermore, I have also learned the following at the Foreign Office:

The muster of the Austrian troops on the Russian frontier is almost completed. The Austrian declaration of war on Russia is expected to occur today. Austria has informed Berlin that she is fully able to cope with any Russian attack on her frontier, and is even numerically superior to the army gathered against Galicia.

The question whether Austria is to declare war against France and England also is still being deliberated.

From a military point of view, it seems of little importance. The only inconvenient thing would be to have the representatives of those nations remaining in Vienna.

[1] Previously communicated by telephone on August 4, p.m.

So far as concerns the pro-German attitude of Bulgaria and Turkey,[1] already announced yesterday, I am told today that the negotiations relating to these matters have not yet been concluded.

This report, as well as all future written communications, Your Excellency will receive forty-seven hours after they are sent, as, until further notice, only a single train, and that one at 8.57 p.m., is to be permitted to go to Munich, and it will arrive the day after the next, at 7.28 p.m.

Your Excellency's most obedient servant,

G. H. LERCHENFELD.

No. 35

The Minister at Berlin to the President of the Ministerial Council

Private letter. BERLIN, *August 5, 1914.*

MOST HONORED FRIEND.

I have just learned that the Chief of the General Staff, Commander-in-Chief von Moltke, has expressed himself today on the situation as follows:

He knows with absolute certainty that a war of aggression against Germany was planned and prepared for between Russia, France and England for the year 1917. Moltke considers Russia to be the head of the conspiracy. It can be regarded as a very fortunate happening that the mine laid by the three Powers was exploded by the murder at Serajevo at a time when Russia was not ready and when the French army chanced to be in a state of transition. Germany would have had a very difficult stand to make against the three fully equipped nations.

Germany is strong enough, unless some special misfortune should occur, to carry on such a war against Russia and France as we may have to at present. The accession of England to the cause of our opponents makes our position more difficult, without doubt, as the provisioning of the civil population, if the struggle should be extended, might become hard. This particular point was the cause of some worry to him. Nevertheless, he had decisively advised against purchasing the neutrality of England at the expense of sparing the territory of Belgium, even if this had been possible, which he did not believe. An attack through the Imperial Provinces would have cost the Army fully three months, and would have given Russia such a start that, in that case, a success on both fronts could not have been counted upon. We would have to advance on Paris at once, across Belgium with all our forces, in order to make a quick settlement with France. That was the only road to victory.

Commander-in-Chief Moltke then gave the information that up to date only insignificant skirmishes had taken place in Belgium. Tomorrow, however, Liège was to be invested; and Liège was fortified and would cause losses. A portion of the German Army had already advanced into France.

Concerning the situation in the eastern theater of war, I learn from another source that the expectation that Russia would advance at once with great masses

[1] See No. 33.

of cavalry has not been fulfilled. At a few places cavalry, even a cavalry division, has crossed the border, but was easily beaten back. The other fights, too, at Kalisz and Tcshenstochau, resulted well for us. But all this is without significance. The decision will be reached, probably at not too distant a period, in northern France.

G. H. LERCHENFELD.

ANNEX

The two telephone conversations following can only be given from copies of the records at Munich:

1 (*Received at Munich July 31, 7.45 a.m.*).

No answer has been received from Vienna, up to twelve o'clock tonight, to the joint *démarche* of England and Germany. In administrative circles in Berlin they do not expect that the *démarche* will be successful; on the contrary, they are rather convinced that Grey's unquestionably honest efforts to effect the maintenance of peace will not succeed in checking the march of events.

Yesterday evening, as always, these days, we dined at the Bristol, which at the present time constitutes a sort of diplomatic exchange. We found the Austrians even more serious than during the past few days. They were absolutely silent.

There is little advantage promised in the journey here, of the ministers of the federated states; in addition there is the danger that the gentlemen will be unable to get home again.

2 (*Received at Munich July 31, at 8 p.m.*).

At the present time there are two ultimata running out:

Petersburg, twelve hours; Paris, eighteen hours. Petersburg, inquiry into reasons for the mobilization; Paris, inquiry whether France will remain neutral.

Both of them will naturally be answered with refusals.

Mobilization by Saturday, August first, at midnight, at the latest.

Prussian General Staff looks forward to war with France with great confidence, counts on being able to conquer France in four weeks; no effective spirit in the French army, few guns fit for plunging fire, and poor small arms.

SUPPLEMENT V

CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW OF THE CLOSING EVENTS, AS CONSTRUCTED BY THE EMBASSY AT PETERSBURG, TOGETHER WITH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE [1]

Friday, July 24

Count Szapary informs Mr. Sazonoff of the Austrian note of the twenty-third.

First Ministerial Council.

Conference of the Ambassador with Mr. Sazonoff in the evening.

Saturday, July 25

Ministerial Council at Krasnoje at noon; withdrawal of troops from the camp and evident extensive military preparations.

Sunday, July 26

Journey of the Ambassador from Zarskoye to Petersburg in company with Mr. Sazonoff; reference by the Ambassador to the conciliatory language of Count Szapary, and urgent advice of the Ambassador to the Minister to discuss the matter quietly with Count Szapary, with whom, up to that time, only a brief and excited conversation had taken place upon the communication of the note.

Suggestion by some of the higher officers in the suite of the Czar for a telegram from the Emperor direct to the Czar.

In the afternoon, the conference as advised by the Ambassador between Mr. Sazonoff and Count Szapary, the latter having already put in a request for this conference on his own account.

Both parties express themselves as satisfied with the result.

Mr. Sazonoff thanked the Ambassador warmly for his advice to confer with Count Szapary. Telegram from the Imperial Chancelor, in which it is pointed out that, since Austria had declared that she wished to make no territorial acquisitions, the maintenance of the peace of Europe depended alone upon Russia (No. 126 from Berlin).[2]

In consideration of a current rumor among the circles of the military attachés to the effect that an order for mobilization had been issued to several Russian army corps on the western border, came the first warning of the Ambassador with reference to the great dangers involved by such measures, which might easily call forth counter-measures (No. 164 from Petersburg).[3]

Communication from the Embassy, according to which Germany had not incited Austria and had not known of the note in advance, sent to the Bureau of Information and to Peterhof. Its publication followed early the next day. Conference between the Military Attaché, von Eggeling, and the Minister of War. Latter states that Russia wants peace with Germany. The Minister of War gives his word of honor that so far no mobilization order has been issued, that only preparatory measures have been commanded. As soon as Austria had

[1] From a copy in the archives of the Foreign Office; receipt stamp: August 5, 1914, p.m.
[2] See No. 198.
[3] See No. 230.

crossed the Serbian boundary, the mobilization order for the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kasan would follow, but not for the military districts on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna, Petersburg.

Monday, July 27

Telegram 128 [1] from the Imperial Chancelor: new warning against the mobilization with reference to its inevitable consequences. Mobilization on our part would mean war against Russia and France at the same time. The Imperial Chancelor expresses the expectation that Russia, in view of Austria's territorial disinterestedness, will assume an attitude of waiting on events. Germany would be all the more able to support Russia in her desire to see the status of the Kingdom of Serbia kept secure from question, inasmuch as Austria had declared that she had no wish to put this status in question.

Telegram 167 [2] of the Ambassador on the same day concerning the execution of the instructions contained in telegrams 126 [3] and 128; [4] conference between the Ambassador and Mr. Sazonoff, at which the Minister showed himself to be in a materially quieter mood.

Report on public state of mind; lack of interest by public.

Detailed report by the Military Attaché concerning his conference with the Minister of War on the twenty-sixth, with his estimate of the military situation appended.

News arrives of the laying of mine-fields in the Dünamünde, as well as of the preparing of railroad cars for service in the Riga district.

Tuesday, July 28

Receipt of a telegram of the twenty-seventh from the General Staff to the effect that on account of Sazonoff's declaration—that no mobilization against us was intended—no military measures were being planned in Germany, either.

Telegram 130 [5] from Berlin: thanks for communication from Sazonoff and for its conciliatory spirit. Further hope that, considering the territorial disinterestedness of Austria, a basis for an understanding might be found.

Arrival of the Serbian note in reply.

Telegram 177 [6] of the Ambassador: attempt of Mr. Sazonoff to convince the Ambassador that Serbia's note fundamentally fulfilled all of Austria's justifiable requirements. The Ambassador calls the Minister's attention to the fact of reports received by us, according to which the Russian military preparations were extending far beyond the limits announced to the Military Attaché. Renewal of urgent warning by the Ambassador against military measures.

Telegram of Lieutenant General von Chelius [7] about his conference with the General of the Suite, Prince Troubetzkoi, according to which it was the opinion at Headquarters that Serbia would have to reject the Austrian note. Should it come to a war between Serbia and Austria, Russia would never be able to leave Serbia in the lurch. Once again the advice that Emperor William should counsel Austria to forbearance.

[1] See No. 219.
[2] See No. 282.
[3] See No. 198.
[4] See No. 219.
[5] See No. 300.
[6] See No. 338.
[7] See No. 337.

Wednesday, July 29

Communication on the part of the Foreign Office of a telegram from His Majesty to the Czar (No. 132 of the Foreign Office).[1]

Announcement of the declaration of war by Austria on Serbia.

Telegram of Lieutenant General Chelius [2] on the feeling among the entourage of the Emperor, which since the declaration of war, considers a general war almost inevitable. Austria desiring war and determined to have it.

Telegram 131 [3] from the Imperial Chancelor: Germany is constantly striving to persuade Austria to have a frank discussion with Petersburg, with the object of making plain to Russia, in an unobjectionable and, it is to be hoped, satisfactory manner, the purpose and extent of the Austrian procedure in Serbia. It is stated that the declaration of war that has been made in the meantime would make no difference.

Telegram 183 [4] from the Ambassador: Mr. Sazonoff asserts that Austria categorically declines a direct conference. Thus a return to the Grey proposal is indicated. As against this, the Ambassador points out that the order for mobilization of Russian troops in the military districts along the Austrian border, if it is really immediately impending, as is asserted, is a serious mistake. Mr. Sazonoff does not deny that mobilization is immediately impending.

Telegram 134 [5] from the Imperial Chancelor: very earnest warning against further continuation of Russian mobilization measures, as they would force us to mobilize, and, in that case, a European war could hardly be prevented.

Telegram 187 [6] from the Ambassador: carrying out instructions of Imperial Chancelor's telegram 134.[7] Mr. Sazonoff accepted the communication very seriously and was going to make a report to the Czar about it.

Mr. Sazonoff again admits mobilization in talking with Count Szapary, but explains it by saying that it by no means signifies war, but is only intended to represent a state of armed neutrality. Announcement of the closing of the Schären Islands straits. On the afternoon of the twenty-ninth, the Chief of the General Staff sends for the Military Attaché and confirms to him, on his word of honor, the assurance given by the Minister of War on the twenty-sixth, that up to the present no mobilization of any sort had been ordered; mobilization on the German front (military districts of Warsaw, Vilna, Petersburg) was not being planned for the present.[8]

Telegram 183 [9] of the Ambassador about utilization of telegrams 130 [10] and 131 [11] from Berlin; both telegrams had made a good impression on Mr. Sazonoff, who, however, pointed out that Austria was evidently as much opposed as ever to enter into direct conferences. Therefore the mobilization of the army corps districts on the Austrian border had become necessary. Ambassador made his very earnest protest against these measures. Mr. Sazonoff replies that mobilization in Russia did not imply as much as it did in western Europe. Ambassador answers that this statement is not sufficient to satisfy him, in view of the countermeasures that were to be expected, and points out that, although the idea of a

[1] See Nos. 334 and 335.
[2] See No. 344.
[3] See No. 315.
[4] See No. 343.
[5] See No. 342.
[6] See No. 378.
[7] See No. 342.
[8] See No. 370.
[9] See No. 343.
[10] See No. 300.
[11] See No. 315.

threat is far from his mind, yet he can not help calling attention to the generally known obligations of our alliance.

Thursday, July 30

At midnight, July 29, Mr. Sazonoff sends for the Ambassador; one and a half hours' conference: Mr. Sazonoff wants absolutely to get Germany to participate in a Conference of four. Ambassador replies that such a conference appears to him to be a very difficult if not an impossible matter, since Russia had taken the fateful step of mobilization (telegram 189).[1]

Telegram 190:[2] supplement to the telegram concerning the midnight conversation. Mr. Sazonoff wished Germany to exercise pressure on Austria. Ambassador's reply was, that this was impossible on the part of a Great Power toward an ally who had taken up arms in a just cause. By doing so we ourselves would be undermining Austria's position as a Great Power, which was of great value to[3] us.

Morning papers publish the order calling in the reserves in the military districts of Moscow, Odessa, Kiev, Kasan, and the Cossack armies of the Don, Kuban, Terek, Astrakhan, Orenburg, Ural, as well as those for the fleet in portions of the northern districts (No. 191 from the Military Attaché).[4]

Telegram 139:[5] from the Imperial Chancelor, calling attention to the fact that Russian mobilization on Austrian border will be followed by an Austrian mobilization. In order to avert the catastrophe, if possible, Germany is going to use pressure at Vienna to get them to make once more a formal declaration as to Austria's territorial disinterestedness in Serbia, as well as concerning the fact that her military measures only contemplate a temporary occupation. Should Austria be willing to make such a declaration, then Russia will have obtained all she desires.

Telegram 192[6] of the Ambassador: in reply to telegram 139 Mr. Sazonoff states that a declaration as to Austria's territorial disinterestedness would not satisfy him. He was unable to adopt any other policy without endangering the life of the Czar. In order to show his good intentions, the Ambassador begs the Minister to formulate in writing the Russian requirements, although there would seem to be no prospect of their fulfilment. Mr. Sazonoff complies with this wish.

Telegram 141[7] from the Foreign Office: communication of the Czar's reply to the telegram from His Majesty.

Telegram 142[8] from the Imperial Chancelor, with the instruction to tell Mr. Sazonoff that Germany is continuing to mediate, on condition, however, of the suspension for the time being of all hostilities against Austria on the part of Russia.

Telegram 143[9] from the Imperial Chancelor in reply to telegram 185 from the Embassy: Vienna's refusal to enter into conferences must have occurred before the last German *démarche* at Vienna, a report concerning the result of which was yet lacking at Berlin.

Telegram 140[10] from the Imperial Chancelor: communication of a telegram

[1] See No. 401.
[2] See No. 412.
[3] "of" in the original instead of "to."
[4] See No. 410.
[5] See No. 380.
[6] See No. 421.
[7] See No. 391.
[8] See No. 392.
[9] See No. 397; reply to telegram 185 from the Embassy (No. 365).
[10] See No. 387.

from the Czar to His Majesty, which must have crossed the first telegram of the Emperor.

Telegram 195 [1] of Lieutenant General von Chelius: Prince Troubetzkoi states that unfortunately the telegram of the Czar could no longer effect any changes, as mobilization against Austria had been ordered.

Telegram 196 [2] of the Ambassador: the Minister of Marine had informed Sazonoff that the mobilized German Fleet was lying off Danzig.

Telegram 197 [3] of the Ambassador: use of telegrams 142 and 143 from the Imperial Chancelor with Sazonoff. Latter agrees that Russia will abstain from hostilities against Austria in case she receives no provocation from Austria. For the rest, Sazonoff maintains his well-known position.

Telegram 146 from the Imperial Chancelor (cf. No. 413): communication of a telegram from the Czar to His Majesty that arrived during the night.

Friday, July 31

Telegram 150 [4] from the Foreign Office: denial of the report that the German Fleet was lying mobilized off Danzig.

Telegram 199 [5] of the Ambassador and Military Plenipotentiary: general mobilization of the Army and Navy ordered; first day of mobilization, July 31.

Ambassador goes to see Neratoff, as Sazonoff is at Peterhof, informs him of the denial of the report concerning the German Fleet at Danzig, and expresses his most serious fears about the mobilization of the entire Russian army, which may already have had consequences that are beyond recall.

Neratoff very much dismayed. Ambassador hands him a résumé of his more recent conferences with Sazonoff, so that, in consideration of imminent decisions of serious importance, the German point of view, too, may be established in written form. Telegram 206 [6] of the Ambassador on this subject.

Telegram 148 [7] from the Imperial Chancelor: communication of a telegram from His Majesty to the Czar.

Ambassador calls Minister Sazonoff, who is at Peterhof, on the telephone and talks with him along the same lines as with Mr. Neratoff about his serious concern as to the result of the order for the mobilization of the entire Russian army.

Telegram 149 [8] from the Imperial Chancelor, according to which, Count Berchtold is willing to take up direct conferences with St. Petersburg, and even to make explanations to Mr. Sazonoff about the note to Serbia. At twelve-fifty the Ambassador goes to Peterhof and explains the extreme seriousness of the situation to the Czar. The Czar hopes that the telegram to His Majesty which has been sent in the meantime, and in which the Czar binds himself not to open hostilities so long as negotiations with Vienna are still pending, will quiet the feeling in Berlin. Ambassador expresses the fear that the telegram may arrive too late. He says that there is but one way left, namely, the immediate suspension of the preparations for war. The Czar declares that this is a technical impossibility.

After the audience, a visit by the Ambassador to the Minister of the Household, Count Fredericks, to whom he likewise expresses his great anxiety. Telegram 204 [9] on this matter.

[1] See No. 445. In the next line "Czar" should probably read "Emperor."
[2] See No. 459.
[3] See No. 449.
[4] See No. 462.
[5] See No. 473.
[6] See No. 527.
[7] See No. 420, note 2.
[8] See No. 444, note 3.
[9] See No. 535.

Telegram 153 [1] from the Imperial Chancelor, arrived at 11.10 p.m. In case Russia does not announce within twelve hours that she will suspend her war preparations against Germany and Austria, Germany will have to mobilize. Up to the present only the "state of threatening danger of war" has been declared in Germany. The Ambassador executes this commission at midnight of July 31. Mr. Sazonoff points out the technical impossibility of putting a stop to the mobilization,[2] and refers, as well, to the Czar's word of honor to refrain from hostilities as long as negotiations with Vienna are pending. Ambassador asks Sazonoff if he can assure him that Russia would even be willing to keep the peace if the negotiations should not lead to satisfactory results. Sazonoff replies that he is unable to give such assurance. Hereupon the Ambassador replies that Germany can not be blamed if she no longer delays mobilization.

Saturday, August 1

Ambassador sends a letter by Attaché von Bülow to Count Fredericks in which the serious situation that has arisen as the result of the German ultimatum is set forth. The letter asserts that only immediate retraction of the mobilization can now be of any use. Even if this should be technically difficult, everything is possible to the Czar of Russia in this line.

Mr. von Bülow arrives at Peterhof fifteen minutes before Count Fredericks goes for his personal attendance on the Czar. Ambassador sends Counselor von Mutius of the Embassy to the influential Minister of Agriculture Krivoshein, charging him to communicate to the latter all that is material in the letter to Count Fredericks.[3]

Telegram 159 [4] from the Imperial Chancelor: Imperial Chancelor's instructions to the Ambassador are that in case Sazonoff refuses to make the definite declaration demanded this evening, the Ambassador is to present to him the prearranged note included in the same telegram in the form of a declaration of war.

Telegram 214 [5] of the Ambassador: Mr. Sazonoff refuses to make the declaration. The note prescribed was therefore presented about 7 p.m.

Night of August 1

During the night of August first, Mr. Sazonoff informs the Ambassador about four o'clock in the morning, that a telegram has reached the Czar from His Majesty the Emperor, the closing sentence of which contains an urgent request not to cross the border for the present in any case. Sazonoff requests enlightenment as to the explanation of this telegram, since it was filed at ten forty-five o'clock in the evening, after the Ambassador had presented the declaration of war at seven o'clock in the evening. Ambassador is unable to give any other explanation than that probably the telegram was dispatched at ten forty-five p.m. of the previous day. Ambassador declares his willingness to request an explanation from Berlin in a telegram *en clair* to be approved by Mr. Sazonoff. On this subject, see telegram 215.[6]

Sunday, August 2

Departure of the Embassy, the Consulate General and the Royal Bavarian Minister for Stockholm by way of Åbo on the second of August at 8.30 a.m.

[1] See No. 490.
[2] See No. 536.
[3] See No. 539.
[4] See No. 542.
[5] See No. 588.
[6] See No. 666.

SUPPLEMENT VI

MEMORANDUM OF THE AMBASSADOR AT PETERSBURG ON THE RUSSIAN POLICY FROM JULY 29 TO 31, 1914.[1]

BERLIN, *August 13, 1915.*

According to Mr. Ballin's report, the Czar has told Councilor of State Andersen that he had had the intention of proposing to His Majesty our Emperor, a meeting at one of the Baltic seaports for an oral discussion of the menacing political complications, when the German ultimatum with its twelve-hour respite limitation arrived, making this move impossible for him.

In connection herewith, I take the liberty of respectfully making the following statement:

It is well known that on the twenty-ninth of July, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Januskevitch, repeated to our Military Attaché the solemn assurance made, three days before, by the Minister of War, to the effect that no mobilization was to be put through against Germany. Mr. Sazonoff had likewise, and on the same day, given me the same assurance in most solemn form, when I expressed to him my grave anxiety concerning the Russian mobilization on the Galician frontier. The thirtieth of July, so far as Petersburg was concerned, brought about no material alteration in the situation. So long as the Russian Government agreed to refrain from arming against us, and stated that it desired to undertake no hostile action against Austria-Hungary, there still existed a faint prospect of a peaceful solution. But Mr. Sazonoff knew, from the very serious representations against Russia's armed preparations that I had made at noon on the twenty-ninth of my own initative, and again in the evening of the same day, at the express direction of His Excellency the Imperial Chancelor, that any further continuation of these armed preparations would bring about measures of military preparation on our part as their consequence. Nor was it concealed from him, in connection with this, that in that event it would scarcely be possible to prevent war.

Thus the great danger of the situation must have been known to the Czar on the thirtieth of July. If he had wanted to make a serious move to bring about a peaceful solution of the quarrel, it was certainly high time to do this on the thirtieth of July. He could still have done it at this time without having to give way to pressure from us.

Early on the thirty-first of July, I received the information from Berlin that we had been able to persuade the Vienna Cabinet to resume direct conferences with Petersburg. I was just getting ready to transmit personally to Mr. Sazonoff this most important news, which was of a character to relieve the situation materially, when the Military Attaché reported to me that during the night of the thirtieth of July, the mobilization of the entire Russian army had been ordered. I could see for myself from the window that the order for mobilization was already being posted on the street corners. I betook myself at once to the Ministry, where I found nobody but Mr. Neratoff, as Mr. Sazonoff had already gone to Peterhof.

[1] From the original written in Pourtalès' own handwriting on August 13, 1915.

I told Mr. Neratoff in person, and Mr. Sazonoff over the telephone, that I regarded the situation as lost unless the fatal move of mobilization was undone at once. To put an end to the mobilization seemed to me all the more possible and proper, inasmuch as our mediation had succeeded in bringing about the resumption of the direct conferences between Vienna and Petersburg. At noon I determined to go myself to the Czar at Peterhof and lay the state of affairs frankly before him. By so doing, the Czar heard, from my own mouth, that the general Russian mobilization, after the pacifying assurances made to us only a few days before, would be regarded throughout all Germany as a most unheard-of provocation and threat, and that now there was left but one means of preserving peace, which was to issue an immediate order to put an end to the mobilization. Thus, at this very moment, the Czar had it in his power to check the rolling stone. The presentation of our ultimatum, in which we demanded the suspension of the mobilization, did not take place before midnight of the night following. Thus, it is not correct, if the Czar now asserts, that it was the German ultimatum that made it impossible for him to undertake the friendly move he had planned, by which the war might have been prevented.

F. Pourtalès.

SUPPLEMENT VII

SECRETARY OF STATE ZIMMERMANN, RETIRED, TO UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BARON VON DEM BUSSCHE[1]

Private letter. (BERLIN), *Saturday* (*August 11, 1917*).[2]

DEAR BUSSCHE:

Actually the statement of the *Evening News* agrees with the facts to this extent, that it is true that we received the Serbian ultimatum about twelve hours before it was presented. On the other hand, I absolutely can not remember that I blabbed this fact to an American diplomat. Accordingly, a denial can be issued, but whether it would appear to be of any advantage in view of the fact of our knowledge, which, after all, can not be kept secret forever, I should think would be open to doubt.

Best wishes from

Yours,

ZIMMERMANN.

[1] From the corrected copy in Zimmermann's handwriting.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 11, 1917.

SUPPLEMENT VIII

MEMORANDUM OF THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BARON VON DEM BUSSCHE[1]

(BERLIN, *August 30, 1917.*)[2]

On the same day, after the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had presented to His Majesty the Emperor the letter of the Emperor Franz Joseph brought by Count Hoyos, in the month of July, 1914, and after the Imperial Chancelor von Bethmann-Hollweg and Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann had been received in Potsdam, a conference of military authorities took place at Potsdam with His Majesty. There took part: His Excellency Capelle for Tirpitz, Captain Zenker for the Admiralty Staff, representatives of the Ministry of War and of the General Staff. It was decided in any case to take preparatory measures for a war. Appropriate orders were thereupon issued. Source absolutely reliable.[3]

BUSSCHE.

August 30.

[1] From the corrected copy in the handwriting of the then Under-Secretary of State of the Foreign Office von dem Bussche. Abbreviated words are printed in full.

[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 30, 1917.

[3] Cf. with this memorandum the statement by the two editors in the Preliminary Remarks, p. 42.

SUPPLEMENT IX

COUNT B. WEDEL, AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA, TO THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BARON VON DEM BUSSCHE[1]

Private letter. VIENNA, *September 5, 1917.*[2]

DEAR BUSSCHE:

Stumm wrote me shortly before he went on his leave of absence that Czernin had stated in Berlin, that Tschirschky had told Berchtold in July, 1914, that if Austria-Hungary would not decide to proceed energetically against Serbia, we should have to look about in another direction. I should like to try to establish the facts as to this matter. The records contain nothing about it. Stolberg considers it absolutely impossible that the cautious Tschirschky should have made such an announcement. In order to be sure, I asked Berchtold. The latter replied to my question in the negative, and told me that Tschirschky had stated to him that Berlin considered an energetic procedure against Serbia to be desirable. To my question as to whether Tschirschky had used any means of pressure, in order to force the Imperial and Royal Government to this action, he said: "No, no pressure was applied by T." Such a thing would be incomprehensible, anyway, as Vienna was urging this sort of procedure itself, and wanted to assure itself of our support. I shall not fail to call Czernin's attention to his error. There are people right here in the Ballplatz, also, who would be glad to load the guilt of the war on to us, and who invent fairy tales of this kind. The note to Serbia was first made known to Berlin on the same day on which it was presented at Belgrade. The reason was that Tschirschky did not communicate it by wire but by mail. Jagow told Szögyeny at the time, that the note was at fault in that it burned all bridges; that a note might be ever so severe, but it must always leave a way open in case the other party should be willing to yield.

With best wishes,

Yours,

WEDEL.

[1] From the corrected copy in B. Wedel's handwriting.
[2] Receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: September 7, 1917, a.m.

INDEXES

INDEX OF PERSONS REFERRED TO IN DOCUMENTS

1. This Index includes all persons referred to in the documents, including Supplements I–IX, in the *addresses*, the *text*, or the *signatures*—

either by *name*
or by *official positions* only (for instance, as the German "Naval Attaché at London").

2. In the case of persons, however, who wrote and signed or received a very great number of documents—like the German Imperial Chancelor, the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, and furthermore, the German Ambassadors, etc.—the numbers of the documents with which they are connected as senders or receivers, are *not* appended, but only the numbers of those in which the persons under consideration are mentioned in the *text*. For this purpose the reader is referred to the Contents and to the Index of Persons Sending Documents immediately following this Index.

3. The appended figures refer to the numbers of the documents, and not to pages.

4. Persons who are referred to *only in the notes* are included in the Index only when they are the authors of the final drafts of the documents. As a rule, the Reporters of the Foreign Office are *not* included, for which reason a list of the officials of the Political Division of the Foreign Office is hereto next appended.

LIST OF OFFICIALS OF THE POLITICAL DIVISION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE IN JULY AND AUGUST, 1914

Director

Stumm, Wilhelm von, Privy Counselor of Embassy with title and rank of Minister Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Reporting Counselors

Hammann, Dr. Privy Counselor of Embassy.

Wedel, Dr. Botho, Count von, with title and rank of Minister Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Bergen, Dr. von, Privy Counselor of Embassy with title and rank of Minister Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Montgelas, Adolf, Count von, Privy Counselor of Embassy.

Mirbach-Harff, Count von, Privy Counselor of Embassy.

Langwerth von Simmern, Dr. Baron von, Privy Counselor of Embassy.

Radowitz, von, Counselor of Embassy.

Rosenberg, Dr. von, Counselor of Embassy.

Permanent Assistants

Esternaux, Counselor of Embassy.

Heilbron, Counselor of Embassy.

Riezler, Dr. Counselor of Embassy.

Name and position	Document number
Adlerberg, Count von, Governor of Petersburg	291
Albania, Prince William of	see Wied
Albert, King of the Belgians	540, 695, 765, 770, 778, 783, 820, 823, 837
Alexander, Crown Prince (Crown Prince Regent) of Serbia	158, 159, 220, 271
Aliotti, Italian Minister at Durazzo (Albania)	11, 41, Supp. IV (2)
Allizé, French Minister at Munich	740
Alsace-Lorraine, German Secretary of State for	see Roedern
Andersen, Danish Councilor of State	Supp. VI
Andrian-Werburg, Leopold, Baron von, Austro-Hungarian Consul General at Warsaw	348
Asquith, H. H., English Premier	454, 576, 611, 661, 669, 676, 820
Austrian Premier	see Stürgkh
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin	see Szögyeny-Marich
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople	see Pallavicini
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London	see Mensdorff
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Madrid	see Fürstenberg
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris	see Szécsen
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Petersburg	see Szapary
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome (Quirinal)	see Mérey
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Tokyo	659
Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia	see Storck
Austro-Hungarian Commander in Chief of the Fleet	see Haus
Austro-Hungarian Consul General at Warsaw	see Andrian
Austro-Hungarian Consul General at Odessa	327
Austro-Hungarian Consul General at Kiev	330
Austro-Hungarian Counselor of Embassy at Berlin	see Haymerle
Austro-Hungarian Counselor of Embassy at Rome	136, 156, 187
Austro-Hungarian General Staff, Chief of the	see Conrad von Hötzendorf
Austro-Hungarian Heir to the Throne	337
Austro-Hungarian Military Attaché at Berlin	601, *n.* 1
Austro-Hungarian Military Attaché at London	708
Austro-Hungarian Military Attaché at Petersburg	331, 427
Austro-Hungarian Military Attaché at Rome	557, 609
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade	see Giesl
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bucharest	see Czernin
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bucharest (1913)	Supp. III
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Cairo	592
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Cetinje	284, 358, 394
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Sofia	see Tarnowsky
Austro-Hungarian Minister of Finance	see Bilinski
Austro-Hungarian Minister of War	29, Supp. IV (2)
Austro-Hungarian Premier	see Berchtold

Name and position	Document number
Avarna, Giuseppe, Duke d', Italian Ambassador at Vienna	42, 78, 155, 211, 212, 269, 326, 328, 428, 443, 510, 541, 556, 573, 577, 594, 668, 844, 862, Supp. II
Bacquehem, O., Marquis von, Austro-Hungarian Minister (retired), Member of the Austrian House of Lords	87
Baden Minister at Berlin	see Berckheim
Baden Minister of the Interior	303
Baden Premier	see Dusch
Ballin, General Manager of the Hapag (Hamburg-American Line)	56, 57, 80, 90, 254, 572, Supp. VI
Barrère, Camille, French Ambassador at Rome	614
Bartenwerffer, von, Major on the Prussian Grand General Staff	424, 524, 609
Bassewitz, R., Count von, Secretary of Embassy of the German Embassy at Athens, temporarily Chargé d'Affaires	68, 243, 466
Bavaria, King of	see Ludwig
Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin	see Schoen
Bavarian Minister at Berlin	see Lerchenfeld
Bavarian Minister at Stockholm	Supp. V
Bavarian Premier	see Hertling
Behncke, Paul, Naval Captain, Division Chief on the Admiralty Staff of the German Navy	82, 96, 111, 655, 808, 821
Beldiman, Dr. Alex., Roumanian Minister at Berlin	193, 208, 209, 210, 227, 281, 299, 316, 321, 351, 867
Belgian General Staff, Chief of the	see Selliers
Belgian Minister at Berlin	495
Belgian Minister at London	799, 835
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs	see Davignon
Belgian Premier and Minister of War	540, 650
Belgian Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	see Elst
Belgians, King of the	see Albert
Below-Rutzau, von, Prussian Minister at Stuttgart	558
Below-Saleske, von, German Minister at Brussels	403, 540, 565, 581, 584, 648, 695, 709, 718, 735, 779, 845
Benckendorff, A., Count von, Russian Ambassador at London	5, 62, 72, 85, 152, 435, 439, 460
Benedikt, Moritz, Editor in Chief of the *Neue Freie Presse*	27
Berchtold, Leopold, Count, Baron von und zu Ungarschitz, Fratting u. Pullitz, Minister of the Imperial and Royal Household and of Foreign Affairs, President of the Austro-Hungarian Ministerial Council	4, 7, 11, 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 28, 29, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41, 41*a*, 45, 46, 49, 50, 59, 61, 62, 64, 65, 68, 71, 77, 87, 88, 92, 94, 95, 104, 120, 121, 129, 131, 138, 151, 155, 161, 164, 171, 172, 176, 178, 198, 210, 212, 213, 234, 244, 259, 267, 269,

Name and position	Document number
Berchtold, Leopold, Count,—*Continued*	277, 278, 281, 283, 290, 291, 301, 305, 306, 307, 309, 312, 313, 316, 323, 324, 325, 326, 328, 337, 346, 352, 356, 357, 361, 363, 384, 388, 396, 400, 407, 423, 425, 427, 428, 429, 432, 433, 434, 441, 444, 447, 448, 464, 465, 469, 476, 489, 510, 541, 544, 555, 563, 573, 577, 585, 594, 668, 672, 698, 704, 760, 818, 828, 862, Supp. II, IV (2, 4, 11), V, IX
Berckheim, Count von, Baden Minister at Berlin	Supp. IV (13)
Bergen, Dr. von, Reporting Councilor in the Foreign Office	351, 556, 563, 594, 760, 860, 871
Berlin, Burgomaster of	Supp. IV (13)
Berthelot, Deputy Political Director of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs	241, 292
Bertie, Sir Francis L., English Ambassador at Paris	329
Bertrab, von, Prussian Lieutenant General, Chief Quartermaster of the Grand General Staff and Chief of the Topographical Division	Supp. to the Preliminary Remarks
Beseler, Dr., Prussian Minister of Justice	456
Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. Th. von, Imperial Chancelor, Prussian Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs	6, 6*b*, 11, 23, 72, 105, 163, 182, 207, 229, 254, 282, 301, 320, 328, 353, 371, 374, 398, 421, 440, 456, 477, 497, 530, 553, 608, 694, 703, 715, 722, 734*c*, 765, 790, 824, 829, Supp. IV (7, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 27, 29, 34), V, VI, VIII
Bienvenu-Martin, French Minister of Justice and a Senator, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs while the latter was visiting at Petersburg	154, 170, 235, 292, 310, 345, 350
Bilinski, Dr. K. von, Joint Minister of Finance for Austria-Hungary	301
Böhm, Prussian Major on the General Staff and German Military Attaché at Belgrade	32, 416
Böhm-Ermolli, E. von, General of Cavalry and Corps Commander of the 1st Austro-Hungarian Army Corps (Cracow)	524
Bojanovitch (Bojowitsch), Serbian General	416, 524
Bollati, Italian Senator and Ambassador to Berlin	150, 167, 168, 211, 261, 326, 446, 734*a*, 754, 756, 757, Supp. IV (32)
Böltz, von, Austrian General, Chief of the General Staff of the 3d Army, scheduled to move against Serbia	524
Bompard, Louis Maurice, French Ambassador at Constantinople	854
Boris, Vladimirovitch, Russian Grand Duke	53
Bratianu, I. I. C., Roumanian Premier and Minister of War	39, 66, 208, 210, 227, 259, 305, 316, 321, 506, 561, 582, 699, 761, 786, 794, 811, 847, 867
Breitenbach, Paul, von, Prussian Minister of Public Works	456
British	see English
Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dr. Ulrich, Count von, German Minister at Copenhagen	532, 560, 846, 855

Name and position	Document number
Bronewsky, A. de, Counselor at the Russian Embassy at Berlin, temporarily Chargé d' Affaires	172
Brück, August Baron von, German Consul General at Warsaw	276, 335*a*, 422
Buch, K. von, German Minister at Luxemburg	602, 606, 619, 637, 684
Buchanan, Sir George W., English Ambassador at Petersburg	5, 338, 357, 439, 460
Buchholz, Professor, Posen	84
Bulgaria, King of	see Ferdinand
Bulgarian Minister at Athens	336, 381, 436, 538, 609
Bulgarian Minister at Belgrade	306, 372
Bulgarian Minister at Bucharest	548, 597, 794
Bulgarian Minister at Constantinople	102, 795, 816, 854
Bulgarian Premier	see Radoslavoff
Bülow, Dr. D. C. von, Attaché at the German Embassy at Petersburg	Supp. V
Bülow, von, Naval Captain on the German Admiralty Staff	175
Bülow, von, Administrator of the German Consulate at Kovno	264, 404
Bunsen, de, Sir M. W. S., English Ambassador at Vienna	118, 121, 346, 357, 432, 493, 764
Burian, Stefan von Rajecz, Hungarian Minister *à latere*	49
Bussche-Haddenhausen, Dr. Baron von dem, German Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from November 27, 1916 to January 1, 1919	Supp. VII, IX and Supp. to the Preliminary Remarks
Cabrinovitch, Nedeljko	10, Supp. I
Cadorna, L., Count, Lieutenant General, Senator and Chief of the Italian General Staff	850, 862
Cambon, Jules, French Ambassador at Berlin	153, 415, 722, Supp. IV (32, 34)
Cambon, Paul, French Ambassador at London	180, 304, 435, 438, 782, 784, 801
Capelle, von, in July, 1914, Acting Secretary of State in the Imperial Naval Office, at the time on leave of absence, Admiral and Director of a Department in the Imperial Naval Office	634, Supp. VIII and Supp. to the Preliminary Remarks
Carlotti di Riparbella, A., Marquis, Italian Ambassador at Petersburg	34, 120, 190, 253, 297, 338, 666, 723
Carol, Crown Prince of Roumania	209
Carol, King of Roumania	11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 21, 26, 28, 33, 35, 39, 41, 63, 66, 129, 135, 193, 208, 209, 210, 211, 224, 298, 305, 316, 352, 379, 389, 463, 471, 472, 506, 507, 519, 548, 561, 582, 609, 646, 688, 729, 786, 811, 826, 833, 841, 868, Supp. III, IV (2)
Carp, Roumanian statesman	868
Chelius, von, Prussian Lieutenant General, German Military Plenipotentiary at the Russian Court	194, 197, 229, 291, 337, 344, 445, 505, 696, Supp. IV (9), V
Chinese General at Hongkong	737

Name and position	Document number
Chinese Governor at Hongkong	737
Chinese Minister at Tokyo	659
Churchill, Winston L. Spencer, First Lord of the English Admiralty	254, 382
Ciganovitch (Ciganowitsch), Milan	271, Supp. I
Claudel, Paul, French Consul General at Hamburg	591, 636, 834
Commander in Chief in the Marches	721
Conrad von Hötzendorf, F., Baron von, General of Infantry and Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff	19, 29, 49, 74, 212, 213, 281, 326, 352, 465, 498, 672, 825, 856, 862, 878, Supp. IV (2, 11)
Constantine, King of Greece	189, 243, 354, 466, 504, 702, 803
Crackanthorpe, D., English Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade	186, 191*a*
Crowe, Sir Eyre, Assistant Secretary in the English Foreign Office	687, 689
Crown Prince of the German Empire	see William, Crown Prince
Crown Prince (Crown Prince Regent) of Serbia	see Alexander
Csicserics, Austrian General, Chief of the General Staff of the 1st Army, scheduled to move against Serbia	524
Czar Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia	see Nicholas
Czernin u. zu Chudenitz, Ottokar, Count von, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bucharest	14, 16, 39, 41, 59, 66, 128, 224, 305, 352, 761, 786, 794, 811, 826, 841, Supp. IX
Danish Minister at Berlin	see Moltke, Count G.
Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs	see Scavenius
Davignon, J., Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs	403, 584, 656, 695, 839
Delbrück, Dr., German Secretary of State of the Imperial Department of the Interior	456, Supp. IV (13, 27)
Delcassé, Th., before 1914 French Minister of Marine, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador at Petersburg	430
Derussi, G. C., Roumanian Minister at Sofia	251, 259
Dieckhoff, Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier	423, 618, 665
Dillon, Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*	43, 81
Dumaine, A. Chilhaud, French Ambassador at Vienna	131, 386, 415, 704
Duntz, Correspondent of the *Abendzeitung*	718
Dupont, Lieutenant Colonel, Chief of the 2d Division of the French General Staff	372, 424
Dusch, Baron von, Premier of Baden	Supp. IV (13, 27)
Düsseldorf, Governor of	670, 768
Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs	see Loudon
Eggeling, von, Major on the General Staff, Military Attaché with the German Embassy at Petersburg	216, 242, 274, 282, 338, 339, 352, 370, 478, 521, 531, 551, 564, Supp. IV (11), V, VI
Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs	592

Name and position	Document number
Eisendecher, Prussian Minister at Karlsruhe	303
Eiswaldt, Dr., German Consul General at Serajevo	6*a*, 6*b*
Elst, L., Baron van der, Secretary General at the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs	581, 584, 656
Emmich, General von	648
Emperor of Austria	see Franz Joseph I
Emperor Nicholas II of Russia	see Nicholas II
Emperor William II	see William II
England, King of	see George V
English Admiralty, First Lord of the	see Churchill
English Ambassador at Berlin	see Goschen
English Ambassador at Paris	see Bertie
English Ambassador at Petersburg	see Buchanan
English Ambassador at Rome	see Rodd
English Ambassador at Vienna	see Bunsen
English Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade	see Crackanthorpe
English Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin	see Rumbold
English Chargé d'Affaires at The Hague	792
English Consul General at Berlin	863
Englis Mihnister at Peking	see Jordan
English Minister at Stockholm	802
English Premier	see Asquith
English Premier, Private Secretary to	537
English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	see Grey
Enver Pasha, Turkish Minister of War	99, 117, 149, 733, 795, 852
Erkelenz, Government District of Aix, Magistrate of	793
Esternaux, Permanent Assistant in the German Foreign Office	70, 827
Eyschen, Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg	486, 511, 602, 606, 619, 637, 644, 647, 730, 746, 812
Fabeck, von, Lieutenant Colonel and Chief of Division on the Prussian Grand General Staff	663
Falkenhayn, von, Lieutenant General, Prussian Minister of War	456, 499, 554, 693, 694, Supp. IV (2)
Fasciotti, Ch., Baron, Italian Minister at Bucharest	63, 135, 177, 211, 227, 239, 261, 582
Ferdinand, King of Bulgaria	11, 15, 28, 38, 162, 673, Supp. IV (2)
Ferdinand, Prince of Roumania (Crown Prince)	41
Ferry, Under-Secretary of State in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs	310
Flotow, Dr. H. von, German Ambassador at Rome	46, 59, 63, 68, 168, 326, 628, 756
Forgach von Ghymes u. Gács, Dr. J. Count von, Chief of Division in the Vienna Ministry for Foreign Affairs	35, 95, 106, 120, 128, 137, 326, 328, 433, 465, 577, 672, 877, 878
France, President of the Republic of	see Poincaré

Name and position	Document number
Frank, L., Ritter von, Austrian General of Infantry, Inspector General and leader of the 1st Army scheduled to move against Serbia	524
Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Este, Archduke, Heir to the Austro-Hungarian Throne	4, 7, 13, 14*a*, 16, 20, 38, 39, 41*a*, 43, 53, 62, 64, 100, 120, 233, 307, 335, 423, 471, 553, Supp. I, IV (4)
Franz Joseph I, Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., Apostolic King of Hungary	6*b*, 9, 11, 15, 16, 19, 23, 25, 29, 33, 40, 49, 50, 53, 63, 65, 66, 77, 88, 113, 120, 121, 151, 332, 337, 379, 434, 437, 441, 464, 465, 471, 472, 482, 502, 503, 553, 594, 601, 672, 700, 766, 825, 826, Supp. II, III, IV (1, 20, 24, 26), VIII
Fredericks, W. B., Count, Russian General of Cavalry, Adjutant General, Minister of the Household	197, 291, 535, 539, Supp. V
French, Sir John, English General, Inspector General	851
French Ambassador at Berlin	see Cambon, Jules
French Ambassador at London	see Cambon, Paul
French Ambassador at Petersburg	see Paléologue
French Ambassador at Rome	see Barrère
French Ambassador at Vienna	see Dumaine
French Consul General at Hamburg	see Claudel
French Minister at Brussels	584, 606, 718
French Minister at Luxemburg	787, 807, 842
French Minister for Foreign Affairs to August 3, 1914 from August 4, 1914 Deputy during the visit to Petersburg	see Viviani see Doumergue [*sic*] see Bienvenu-Martin
French Minister of Justice and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs	see Bienvenu-Martin
French Minister of War	665
French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Political Director	see Berthelot
French Premier	see Viviani
French Resident General in Morocco	618, 665
Friedrich, Archduke, Austro-Hungarian General of Infantry, Inspector General	372
Friedrich August, King of Saxony	Supp. IV (8)
Frobenius, Lieutenant Colonel, writer	84
Fuchs, Prussian Lieutenant General and Commander of the 16th Division of Infantry	684, 787, 813, 842
Fürstenberg, K. E., Prince zu, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Madrid, previously Minister at Bucharest	11, 615, Supp. III
Fusinato, Italian Minister of State	42, 64
Garroni, C., Marquis, Italian Ambassador at Constantinople	815
Geldern, Government District of Düsseldorf, Magistrate of	768
George V, King of England	201, 207, 238, 332, 368, 374, 401, 402, 417, 452, 464, 466, 474, 477, 537, 574, 575, 596, 612, 823, Supp. IV (27)

Name and position	Document number
German Administrator of the Consulate at Kovno	see Bülow
German Administrator of the Consulate at Moscow	see Hauschild
German Admiralty Staff, Chief of the	see Pohl
German Ambassador at Constantinople	see Wangenheim
German Ambassador at London	see Lichnowsky
German Ambassador at Madrid	see Ratibor
German Ambassador at Paris	see Schoen, W., Baron v.
German Ambassador at Petersburg	see Pourtalès
German Ambassador at Rome	see Flotow
German Ambassador at Tokyo	see Rex
German Ambassador at Vienna	see Tschirschky
German Chargé d'Affaires at Athens	see Bassewitz
German Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest	see Waldburg
German Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo	see Richthofen
German Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje	see Zech
German Chargé d'Affaires at Peking	see Maltzahn
German Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier	see Dieckhoff
German Commander in Chief of the Baltic Sea Forces	655, 821
German Consul at Brussels	see Kempff
German Consul at Hongkong	see Voretzsch
German Consul at Kiev	see Haering
German Consul at Milan	59
German Consul at Riga	294
German Consulate at Kovno, Administrator of	see Bülow
German Consulate at Moscow, Administrator of	see Hauschild
German Consul General at Antwerp	see Schnitzler
German Consul General at Basel	see Wunderlich
German Consul General at Copenhagen	see Martens
German Consul General at Genoa	see Herff
German Consul General at Jassy	688
German Consul General at Serajevo	see Eiswaldt
German Consul General at Warsaw	see Brück
German Counselor of Embassy at Vienna	see Stolberg-Wernigerode
German Crown Prince	see William, Crown Prince.
German Emperor	see William II
German Foreign Office, Director of the Political Division	see Stumm
German Foreign Office, Under-Secretary of State	see Bussche and Zimmermann
German High Seas Fleet, Chief of the	808
German Imperial Chancelor	see Bethmann-Hollweg
German Imperial Chancelry, Under-Secretary of State of	see Wahnschaffe
German Military Attaché at Belgrade	see Böhm
German Military Attaché at Brussels	see Klüber

Name and position	Document number
German Military Attaché at London	402, 669, 708
German Military Attaché at Paris	see Griesheim
German Military Attaché at Petersburg	see Eggeling
German Military Attaché at Rome	see Kleist
German Military Attaché at Stockholm	520
German Military Attaché at Vienna	see Kageneck
German Military Plenipotentiary at the Russian Court	see Chelius
German Minister at Athens	see Quadt
German Minister at Belgrade	see Griesinger
German Minister at Berne	see Romberg
German Minister at Brussels	see Below-Saleske
German Minister at Bucharest	see Waldthausen
German Minister at Christiania	see Oberndorff
German Minister at Copenhagen	see Brockdorff-Rantzau
German Minister at The Hague	see Müller, F. von
German Minister at Lisbon	see Rosen
German Minister at Luxemburg	see Buch
German Minister at Sofia	see Michahelles
German Minister at Stockholm	see Reichenau
German Minister in the Imperial Suite	see Wedel, Count G. von
German Minister Resident (Consul with the title of Minister Resident) at Galatz	688
German Naval Attaché at London	174, 182, 207, 221, 407, 474, 691, 706, 708, 736, 764, 819, 831, 853
German Naval Attaché at Vienna	328
German Naval Attaché for the Northern Countries with residence at Petersburg	203
German Naval Cabinet, Chief of the	see Müller, Admiral von
German Secretary of State for Alsace-Lorraine	see Roedern
German Secretary of State for the Imperial Department of the Interior	see Delbrück
German Secretary of State of the Foreign Office	see Jagow
German Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office	see Tirpitz
Giers, N. von, Russian Ambassador at Constantinople	184, 854
Giesl von Gieslingen, W., Baron, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade	110, 114, 127, 137, 138, 139, 176, 188, 191, 271, 307, 423, Supp. I
Giolitti, former Italian Premier	75, 244, 850
Giskra, Dr. K., Baron von, Austro-Hungarian Minister at The Hague	792
Goremykin, Russian Premier	723
Goschen, Sir Edward, English Ambassador at Berlin	304, 353, 373, 497, 596, 720, 823, 824, 839, 843, 848, 863, Supp. IV (34)
Grabech, Trifko	Supp. I
Grand Duchess of Luxemburg	see Marie Adelaide

Name and position	Document number
Grbitch, Budivoi, Serbian Customs Official	Supp. I
Great Britain	see England
Greece, King of	see Constantine
Greek Minister at Bucharest	867
Greek Minister at Constantinople	263, 405
Greek Minister at Sofia	318
Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs	see Streit
Greek Premier	see Venizelos
Grey, Sir Edward, English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	3, 5, 6, 11, 20, 30, 52, 56, 62, 68, 72, 76, 92, 100, 118, 121, 140, 152, 157, 164, 165, 171, 179, 180, 182, 186, 191*a*, 192, 199, 218, 225, 236, 248, 249, 254, 258, 265, 266, 277, 278, 279, 282, 283, 301, 304, 310, 314, 338, 345, 353, 355, 357, 365, 368, 382, 384, 393, 395, 400, 401, 402, 407, 409, 418, 435, 438, 439, 441, 454, 456, 457, 474, 482, 484, 489, 496, 497, 562, 570, 571, 579, 587, 595, 596, 598, 607, 610, 612, 631, 641, 661, 669, 693, 720, 764, 784, 790, 799, 801, 804, 810, 819, 820, 823, 829, 863, Supp. IV (11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 24, 27, 34), V
Griesheim, von, Major on the Prussian Grand General Staff and Military Attaché at the German Embassy at Paris	424
Griesinger, Baron von, German Minister at Belgrade	138, 304, 762, 763
Grigorjew, Russian Commander of the Fortress of Kovno	404
Grouitch, Secretary General of the Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs	12
Grünwald, A. A. von, Chief Imperial Equerry at the Russian Court, General of Cavalry, Adjutant General to the Czar	291
Haase, Hugo, German Socialist Leader	559
Haering, German Consul at Kiev	275
Haldane, Hon. C., Viscount, English Lord High Chancelor and Keeper of the Great Seal	56, 254, 401
Halil Bey, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and President of the National Council	117
Hammann, Dr., Reporting Councilor in the German Foreign Office	572
Hansi, Alsatian caricaturist, active politically in Alsace	232
Hapag (Hamburg-American Line), Director General of the	see Ballin
Hardie, James Keir, English Socialist Leader	559
Hartwig, N. von, former Russian Minister at Belgrade	9, 10, 11, 29, 120, 140
Haus, Austro-Hungarian Admiral, Commander of the Imperial and Royal Navy	328
Hauschild, Vice Consul, Administrator of the German Consulate General at Moscow	295, 333, 369

Name and position	Document number
Haymerle, Dr. Baron von, Counselor of Embassy to the Austro-Hungarian Embassy at Berlin	306, 563, 594, 759, 772, 860, 871, Supp. IV (2)
Haynau, Austro-Hungarian General	62
Heilbron, Counselor of Legation and Permanent Assistant at the Foreign Office	829
Heinrichs, Under-Secretary of State in the Prussian State Ministry	456
Henry, Prince of Prussia	201, 207, 368, 374, 402, 417, 452, 464, 474, 720
Herff, von, German Consul General at Genoa	533
Hertling, G., Count von, Bavarian Minister of the Royal Household and for Foreign Affairs, President of the Bavarian Ministerial Council	Supp. IV (5, 28)
Hirst, Francis W., Editor of the *Daily Chronicle*	382
Höfer, F. von Feldsturm, Austro-Hungarian Major General	74
Hoffman, Dr. A., Vice President of the Swiss Federal Council, Chief of the Political Department	589
Hohenberg, Sophie Duchess of (b. Countess Chotek von Chotkowa und Wognin) wife of the Heir to the Austro-Hungarian Throne	14*a*, 100, 307, 423, 553
Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Gottfried, Prince zu, Prince zu Ratibor u. Corvey, considered as Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Berlin	11, 64, 324
Holland, Queen of	see Queen of Holland
Hötzendorf, Conrad von	see Conrad von Hötzendorf
Hoyos, Alexander, Count von, Chief of the Cabinet of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs	18, 23, 61, 87, 176, 301, 326, 361, 465, Supp. IV (2), VIII
Hungarian Premier	see Tisza
Hutten-Czapski, B., Count von, Royal Prussian Governor of the Castle at Posen	298
Imperial Chancelor of Germany	see Bethmann-Hollweg
Isendahl, Commander on the Admiralty Staff of the German Navy	255
Iswolski, Russian Ambassador at Paris	50, 485, 558
Italian Ambassador at Berlin	see Bollati
Italian Ambassador at Constantinople	see Garroni
Italian Ambassador at London	124, 304, 368
Italian Ambassador at Petersburg	see Carlotti
Italian Ambassador at Vienna	see Avarna
Italian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade	158
Italian Chargé d'Affaires at The Hague	792
Italian General Staff, Chief of the	see Cadorna
Italian Minister at Athens	34, 253
Italian Minister at Belgrade	38
Italian Minister at Bucharest	see Fasciotti

Name and position	Document number
Italian Minister at Cetinje	394
Italian Minister at Christiania	838
Italian Minister at Durazzo	see Aliotti
Italian Minister at Sofia	38, 673, 858
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs	see San Giuliano, Marquis di
Italian Premier and Minister of the Interior	see Salandra
Italy, King of	see Victor Emmanuel III
Ivanoff, Russian General, Commanding General of the 22d Russian Army Corps	521, 552
Jagow, Gottlieb von, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	74, 80, 82, 161, 179, 211, 256, 304, 305, 326, 332, 443, 456, 532, 534, 560, 568, 721, 734, 771, 823, 839, Supp. IV (2, 32, 34), IX
Janensch, Prussian Captain, assigned to the Grand General Staff, ordered for service with the German Military Attaché at Paris	424
Jankovitch, Bosidar, Serbian General, retired	19*a*
Januskevitch, Russian Lieutenant General and Chief of the General Staff	291, 370, Supp. V, VI
Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs	785
Jaurès, Jean, French Deputy and Leader of the Socialist Party, murdered July 31, 1914	559
Johnston, Sir Harry	382
Jonescu, Take, former Roumanian Minister of the Interior	39, 129, 688
Jordan, Sir John, English Minister at Peking	796
Jovanovitch	see Yovanovitch
Kageneck, Count, Prussian Major and Aide-de-camp, Military Attaché of the German Embassy at Vienna	74, 281, 672, 704, 862
Keir Hardie	see Hardie
Kempff, Counselor of Legation, German Consul at Brussels	845
King of Bavaria	Supp. IV (8, 12, 18, 28)
King of the Belgians	see Albert
King of Bulgaria	see Ferdinand
King of Denmark	616
King of England	see George V
King of Greece	see Constantine
King of Italy	see Victor Emmanuel III
King of Montenegro	see Nicholas
King of Roumania	see Carol
King of Saxony	Supp. IV (8)
King of Serbia	see Peter
Kinsky, Count Fery	704
Kleist, Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-camp to the Emperor, Military Attaché to German Embassy in Rome	745, 771, 818, 850

Name and position	Document number
Klüber, von, Major on General Staff, Military Attaché to German Embassy at Brussels and The Hague	590, 648, 735
Körber, Ernest von, former Austrian Premier	87
Koudacheff, N., Prince, Counselor of Embassy at the Russian Embassy at Vienna	155, 172, 178, 290, 309, 704
Kriege, Dr., Acting Privy Counselor of Legation and Director of the Legal Department in the German Foreign Office	593, 625, 626
Krivoshein, A. W., Russian Minister of Agriculture	723, Supp. V
Krupp	243, 867
Kruse, I. C. W., commissioned as Chief of Section in the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs	532
Kühn, German Secretary of State of the Imperial Treasury Department	456
La Fontaine, President of the Bureau of International Peace	583
Lammasch, Professor Heinrich, Professor of International Law, Member of the Austrian House of Lords	128
Lansdowne, Lord	85
Lentze, Dr., Prussian Minister of Finance	456
Lerchenfeld, Hugo, Count von, Bavarian Minister at Berlin and Plenipotentiary to the Federal Council	Supp. IV (1, 12 to 27, 29, 31 to 35)
Lermontoff, S. von, Russian Minister at Stuttgart	558
Lichnowsky, Karl Max, Prince, German Ambassador at London	2, 6, 56, 72, 118, 121, 171, 182, 236, 237, 273, 277, 282, 283, 304, 361, 368, 374, 382, 384, 395, 402, 407, 441, 460, 474, 496, 587, 596, 607, 612, 613, 633, 669, 694, 715, 753, 804, 820, 835, Supp. IV (12, 14, 27)
Liman von Sanders, Pasha, Prussian General, Chief of the German Military Mission in Turkey	62, 72, 256, 411, 517, 547, 733, 795
Loebell, von, Prussian Minister of the Interior	332, 456
Loudon, Dr. Jkhr. J., Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs	738, 797
Lützow, Dr. Franz, Count von	128
Luxemburg, Grand Duchess of	see Marie-Adelaide
Luxemburg Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin	812, 822
Luxemburg Minister of State and President of the Government	see Eyschen
Luzzati, former Italian Premier	78
Macchio, K., Baron von, Chief of the First Division in the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs	138, 178, 187, 188, 212, 280, 326
Mahmud Muchtar Pasha, Turkish Ambassador at Berlin	285
Majoresco, Titus, Roumanian Premier (1913)	Supp. III
Maltzahn, von, Baron zu Wartenberg u. Penzlin, Secretary at the German Legation at Peking, temporarily Chargé d'Affaires	796

Name and position	Document number
Marghiloman, A., Roumanian Minister of Finance up to January 17, 1914	39
Marie-Adelaide, Grand Duchess of Luxemburg	638
Marquet, Editor of the *Petit Bleu*	718
Martens, H., German Consul General at Copenhagen	800
Mecenseffi, Austro-Hungarian General and Chief of the 2d Army intended for service in Serbia	524
Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein, A., Count von, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London	59, 118, 121, 128, 163, 180, 301, 361, 418, 447
Mérey von Kapos-Mére, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome	42, 59, 75, 94, 104, 119, 128, 136, 150, 156, 167, 187, 211, 326, 328, 361, 363, 419, 427, 428, 594, 601, 614, 745, 748, 759, 760, 840, 862, Supp. IV (2)
Meshtchersky, Prince, Publisher of the Russian paper *Grashdanin*	291
Michahelles, Dr. G., German Minister at Sofia	15, 26, 305, 306, 316, 321, 698, 798, 872
Mirbach-Harff, Count von, Reporting Councilor at the German Foreign Office	376, 495, 752, 812, 813, Supp. IV (2, 11)
Misitch, Serbian General	416, 524
Moltke, G., Count von, Danish Minister at Berlin	494, 532, 616, 724
Moltke, von, Prussian Commander in Chief and Adjutant General, Chief of the General Staff of the Army	74, 197, 202, 293, 299, 376, 426, 486, 498, 662, 663, 672, 703, 722, 739, 781, 788, 804, 807, 810, 822, 869, 876, Supp. IV (2, 27, 33, 35)
Montenegrin Representative at Belgrade	306, 322
Montenegrin Minister for Foreign Affairs	195, 394, 476
Montenegrin Premier	195
Montenegro, King of	see Nicholas
Montgelas, A., Count von, Reporting Councilor of the German Foreign Office	721
Morgari, Italian Socialist Leader	559
Morley, Viscount, Lord President of the Privy Council of the King of England	382
Müller, F. von, German Minister at The Hague	516, 727, 738, 792, 797
Müller, von, Admiral and Reporting Adjutant General to the Emperor, Chief of the German Naval Cabinet	67, 82, 125, 174, 175, 182, 474, Supp. to the Preliminary Remarks
Munch, Dr. P., Danish Minister of Defense (War and Marine)	616
Mutius, Gerhard von, German Counselor of Embassy at Petersburg	531, Supp. V
Mutius, von, Aide-de-camp to the German Emperor	629, 638, 683
Neratoff, A., Master of the Imperial Household, Assistant to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs	723, Supp. V, VI
Netherlands	see Holland
Nicholas, Michaelovitch, Russian Grand Duke	50, 445, 505, 581

Name and position	Document number
Nicholas Nicholaievitch, Russian Grand Duke	50, 53, 291
Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia, Czar	2, 5, 14, 27, 41, 53, 62, 203, 229, 288, 290, 291, 298, 308, 332, 334, 337, 344, 352, 366, 368, 370, 378, 379, 383, 387, 389, 390, 391, 399, 401, 402, 408, 413, 417, 421, 433, 437, 441, 445, 452, 456, 457, 463, 466, 469, 474, 477, 480, 482, 487, 502, 513, 515, 521, 529, 530, 535, 536, 537, 542, 546, 548, 553, 558, 574, 599, 600, 608, 666, 676, 696, 723, Supp. IV (18, 21, 26), V, VI
Nicholas, King of Montenegro	43, 146, 195, 284, 306, 322, 372, Supp. IV (2)
Nicolson, Sir Arthur, Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the English Foreign Office	236, 355
North German Lloyd, Director of the	see Plettenberg
North German Lloyd, Directors General of the	80
Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs	692, 789
Norwegian Premier	692
Oberndorff, Alfred Count, von, German Minister at Christiania	789, 838
Oscar, Prince of Prussia	Supp. IV (27)
Paléologue, French Ambassador at Petersburg	215, 289, 290
Pallavicini, J., Margrave von, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople	45, 71, 98, 99, 129, 149, 183, 320, 398, 431, 586, 652, 795, 816, 828, 856, Supp. IV (11)
Pantaleoni, Italian Nationalist Leader	658
Pashitch, Nikola P., Serbian Premier	9, 32, 53, 72, 87, 110, 137, 139, 176, 609
Patchou, Dr. L., Serbian Minister of Finance	139, 176
Peter, King of Serbia	30*a*, 159, 191, 271, Supp. I, IV (2)
Pichon, Stephen, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1913–1914	223
Pless, Princess of, Wife of Prince Hans-Heinrich XV (b. Mary Theresa Olivia West, of the House of the Earls of Delawar)	470
Plessen, von, Prussian Commander in Chief, Acting Adjutant General	293
Plettenberg, von, Director of the North German Lloyd	80, 90
Pohl, von, Admiral, Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the German Navy	182, 474, 821
Poincaré, Raymond, President of the French Republic	40, 49, 50, 56, 65, 85, 93, 96, 108, 112, 125, 130, 131, 134, 170, 181, 191, 203, 250, 286, 291, 374, 402, 415, Supp. IV (2, 4, 11)
Pollio, Alb., former Chief of the Italian General Staff	11, 662, 850
Popovitch, Rade, Serbian Captain in the Customs Guards	Supp. I
Popovitch, Serbian General	416, 524
Portuguese Premier	617
Porumbaro, Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs	14, 135, 185, 262, 868

Name and position	Document number
Potiorek, O., Austrian Master of the Ordnance, Inspector General, Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina	524
Pourtalès, Friedrich, Count von, German Ambassador at Petersburg	1, 52, 100, 112, 128, 148, 304, 308, 309, 323, 366, 396, 399, 408, 420, 425, 427, 429, 437, 439, 469, 513, 539, 600, 627, 628, 723, Supp. IV (11, 14), V
Pribicevitch, Milan, Serbian Major	19*a*
Pribicevitch, Svetosar, Deputy in the Serbian Diet	19*a*
Prince of Roumania (Crown Prince)	see Ferdinand
Princip, Gavrilo, Trade School Student	10, Supp. I
Prussian General Staff, Chief of the General Staff of the Army	see Moltke, von
Prussian General Staff, Chief Quartermaster General	see Waldersee
Prussian Minister at Hamburg	80
Prussian Minister at Karlsruhe	see Eisendecher
Prussian Minister at Munich	see Treutler
Prussian Minister at Stuttgart	see Below-Rutzau
Prussian Minister of War	see Falkenhayn
Prussian Premier, Minister for Foreign Affairs	see Bethmann-Hollweg
Quadt-Wykradt-Isny, A., Count von, German Minister at Athens	24, 34, 41, 243, 253
Queen of Greece	see Sophie
Queen of Holland	516
Queen of Italy	158
Radoslavoff, Dr., Bulgarian Premier, Minister for Foreign Affairs and of the Interior	162, 183, 251, 306, 318, 548, 673, 698, 857, 858
Radowitz, von, Recording Councilor of the German Foreign Office	36
Rantzau	see Brockdorff-Rantzau
Ratibor u. Corvey, Maximilian, Prince von, German Ambassador at Madrid	615, 741, 851
Redern, von, Major on the Prussian Grand General Staff	781
Redlich, Professor, Author	128
Reichenau, Baron von, German Minister at Stockholm	515, 520, 525, 526, 692, 802
Rex, A., Count von, German Ambassador at Tokyo	785
Richthofen, Baron von, Secretary of Legation at the Diplomatic Agency at Cairo, temporarily Chargé d'Affaires	592
Rodd, Sir J. Renell, English Ambassador at Rome	355
Roedern, Count von, German Secretary of State for Alsace-Lorraine	58, 232
Romberg, Baron von, German Minister at Berne	509, 681
Rosen, Dr., German Minister at Lisbon	617, 741
Rothschild, Lord Alfred de	580

Name and position	Document number
Roumania, King of	see Carol
Roumania, Prince of	see Ferdinand
Roumanian Minister at Berlin	see Beldiman
Roumanian Minister at Paris	298
Roumanian Minister at Petersburg	41, 298
Roumanian Minister at Rome	227
Roumanian Minister at Sofia	see Derussi
Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs	see Porumbaro
Roumanian Minister of the Interior, former	see Jonescu
Roumanian Premier and Minister of War	see Bratianu
Rubanovitch, Russian Socialist Leader	559
Rumbold, Sir Horace, Counselor at British Embassy at Berlin, temporarily Chargé d'Affaires	180, 186
Russian Ambassador at Berlin	see Swerbejew
Russian Ambassador at Constantinople	see Giers
Russian Ambassador at London	see Benckendorff
Russian Ambassador at Paris	see Iswolski
Russian Ambassador at Vienna	see Schebeko
Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin	see Bronewsky
Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna	see Koudacheff
Russian Commanding Officer at Petersburg	531
Russian Counselor of Embassy at Vienna	see Koudacheff
Russian 11th Cavalry Division, Commander of	275
Russian General Staff, Chief of the	see Januskevitch
Russian Military Plenipotentiary at Berlin	see Tatistcheff
Russian Minister at Belgrade, former	see Hartwig
Russian Minister at Bucharest	298, 582
Russian Minister at Hamburg	591, 636, 679, 685
Russian Minister at Sofia	318
Russian Minister at Stuttgart	see Lermontoff
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs	see Sazonoff
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Assistant	see Neratoff
Russian Minister of Agriculture	see Krivoshein
Russian Minister of Commerce	723
Russian Minister of Marine	459, Supp. V
Russian Minister of the Imperial Household	see Fredericks
Russian Minister of the Interior	535, 723
Russian Minister of War	see Suchomlinoff
Russian Naval Attaché at Berlin	203
Saïd Halim Pasha, Turkish Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs	81, 99, 102, 117, 149, 184, 243, 256, 263, 285, 320, 398, 405, 411, 431, 508, 517, 652, 733, 795, 852, 854, 865, Supp. IV (11)

Name and position	Document number
Salandra, A., Italian Premier and Minister of the Interior	75, 109, 119, 136, 156, 167, 168, 244, 566
San Giuliano, A., Marquis di, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs	11, 33, 38, 42, 46, 51, 60, 63, 64, 68, 73, 75, 78, 94, 104, 109, 119, 136, 145, 155, 156, 167, 168, 187, 211, 225, 244, 249, 261, 269, 326, 357, 363, 414, 419, 428, 446, 458, 481, 534, 541, 550, 566, 594, 614, 675, 694, 745, 748, 756, 759, 815, 840, 844, Supp. IV (2)
Sazonoff, S. D., Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs	5, 30, 41, 53, 72, 85, 100, 120, 121, 129, 131, 134, 148, 155, 160, 203, 204, 217, 219, 222, 230, 235, 238, 242, 277, 278, 282, 291, 298, 300, 308, 309, 323, 338, 339, 342, 343, 352, 356, 357, 365, 366, 368, 378, 380, 391, 392, 395, 396, 399, 401, 412, 421, 425, 427, 433, 439, 445, 447, 448, 449, 459, 460, 469, 490, 527, 536, 539, 588, 666, 723, Supp. IV (11, 14, 21, 27), V, VI
Scavenius, E. I. C. von, Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs	532, 616, 846
Schebeko, von, Russian Ambassador at Vienna	27, 120, 131, 343, 356, 385, 386, 396, 425, 427, 433, 448, 704
Schnitzler, Dr. von, German Consul General at Antwerp	467, 800
Schoen, Wilhelm, Baron von, German Ambassador at Paris	424, 427, 429, 693, 716, 734*a*, 734*b*, 773
Schön, Dr. H. von, Counselor of Legation at the Bavarian Legation at Berlin, temporarily Chargé d'Affaires	Supp. IV (2 to 4, 6 to 11)
Schorlemer, Dr., Baron von, Prussian Minister of Agriculture, Domains and Forests	456
Selliers, de, Belgian Lieutenant General and Chief of the General Staff	650
Serbia, Crown Prince of	see Alexander
Serbia, King of	see Peter
Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin	91, 95, 270, 277, Supp. IV (1, 11)
Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest	185
Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople	41*a*
Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at London	258
Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Rome	357
Serbian General Staff, Chief of the	372
Serbian Minister at Athens	660
Serbian Minister at Sofia	318
Serbian Minister at Vienna	110
Serbian Minister at Vienna (1909)	Supp. I
Serbian Minister of Education	32
Serbian Minister of Finance	see Patchou
Serbian Minister of the Interior	12
Serbian Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs	see Pashitch

Name and position	Document number
Serbian Secretary General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs	12, 176
Serbian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	191*a*
Sophie, Queen of Greece	374
Souchon, German Rear Admiral, Chief of the Mediterranean Squadron	775
Spanish Premier	615
Spender, Harold, publisher of the *Westminster Gazette*	76
Steed, representative of the *Times* at Vienna	128
Stein, von, Prussian Lieutenant General and Quartermaster General of the German Field Army	822
Stephanovitch, Stephan, Serbian General	416, 524
Stolberg-Wernigerode, Wilhelm, Prince zu, Counselor to the German Embassy at Vienna	65, 87, 89, 326, Supp. IV (2, 4), IX
Storck, W., Ritter von, Secretary of the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade, temporarily Chargé d'Affaires	12
Streit, Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs	11, 24, 41, 189, 336, 360, 381, 538, 660, 803
Stumm, Wilhelm von, Privy Counselor of Legation and Director of the Political Division of the German Foreign Office	57, 441, 465, 468, 610, 684, 690, 810, Supp. IV (8 and 11)
Stürgkh, K., Count von, Austrian Premier	302
Suchomlinoff, W. A., Russian Minister of War	2, 3, 282, 288, 290, 291, 331, 338, 339, 352, 535, Supp. IV (11), V
Südekum, Delegate to the Reichstag	456
Swedish Consul at Riga	274
Swedish Minister at Petersburg	515
Swerbejew, S. N., Russian Ambassador at Berlin	385, 399, 490, 629, Supp. IV (1, 26, 30)
Swetschin, Aide-de-Camp to the Czar	369
Swiss General Staff, Chief of the	509
Sydow, Dr., Prussian Minister for Commerce and Industry	456
Szapary, Count von, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Petersburg	128, 131, 134, 143, 148, 222, 238, 281, 299, 339, 343, 356, 357, 378, 385, 425, 427, 429, 433, 448, 482, 723, 879, Supp. V
Szécsen de Temerin, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris	223, 329, 427, 429
Szögyeny-Marich, L., Count von, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin	15, 18, 23, 29, 39, 45, 68, 213, 324, 326, 328, 425, 429, 442, 443, 482, 498, 594, 601, 766, Supp. VIII, IX
Talaat Bey, Turkish Minister of the Interior	14, 81, 99, 117, 405
Tankositch, Voislav (Voija), Serbian Major	271, Supp. I, IV (11)
Tarnow-Tarnowsky, Dr. A., Count von, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Sofia	15, 17, 26, 183, 549, 597, 673, 698, 798, 857, 858, 861, 872

Name and position	Document number
Tatistcheff, von, Russian Military Plenipotentiary at Berlin, Major General in the Emperor's Suite	390, 399
Theotoky, N. G., Greek Minister at Berlin	702
Tirpitz, von, Grand Admiral and Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office	456, 658, 715, 775, 870, Supp. VIII
Tisza, Boros-Jenö u. Szeged Stephan, Count von, Hungarian Premier	4, 18, 19, 29, 40, 41*a*, 49, 50, 61, 65, 66, 86, 87, 94, 104, 120, 128, 440, 441 465, Supp. IV (2, 21)
Tontschew, Bulgarian politician	548
Treutler, von, Prussian Minister at Munich	740, 758
Troelstra, Dutch Socialist Leader	559
Trott zu Solz, Dr. von, Prussian Minister of Religious and Educational Affairs	456
Troubetzkoi, Prince, Russian Major General in the Suite of the Czar	337, 445, 723, Supp. V
Tschabrinowitsch	see Cabrinovitch
Tschirschky u. Bögendorff, Heinrich von, German Ambassador at Vienna	6*b*, 7, 21, 22, 26, 57, 87, 104, 172, 244, 304, 321, 325, 407, 427, 444, 468, 503, 541, 594, 875, Supp. II, IV (11), IX
Tulff von Tscheepe, Prussian General of Infantry and Commanding General of the 8th Army Corps	730
Turkhan Pasha, Albanian Premier	11
Turkish Ambassador at Rome	364
Turkish Consul at Baku	767
Turkish Consul at Batoum	365*a*
Turkish Consul at Kars	767
Turkish Consul at Odessa	767
Turkish Consul at Rostow	365*a*
Turkish Consul at Sebastopol	767
Turkish Consul at Tiflis	767
Turkish Grand Vizier	see Saïd Halim
Turkish Military Attaché at Paris	365*a*
Turkish Military Attaché at Petersburg	365*a*, 767
Turkish Minister at Athens	189
Turkish Minister of the Interior	see Talaat Bey
Turkish Minister of War	see Enver Pasha
Turkish Sultan	285, 733
Turkish-German Military Mission, Chief of the	see Liman
Tyrrell, Sir W., Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Senior Clerk in the English Foreign Office	236, 301, 355, 518, 537, 562, 570, 764, 799, 835
Vandervelde, Belgian Socialist Leader	559
Venizelos, Eleutherios, Greek Premier	11, 41, 81, 102, 117, 149, 189, 243, 263, 405, 517
Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy	220, 238, 244, 290, 530, 601, 614, 700, 745, 754, 755, 766, 771, 850, Supp. II

Name and position	Document number
Viviani, René, French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs until August 3, 1914, Premier without portfolio from August 4, 1914, on	154, 169, 235, 241, 292, 367, 424, 528, 571, 598, 693, 722, 734*b*, Supp. IV (2)
Voretzsch, Dr. E. A., German Consul at Hongkong	737
Wahnschaffe, Under-Secretary of State of the Imperial German Chancelry	456, Supp. IV (12)
Waldburg zu Wolfegg und Waldsee, Heinrich, Count von, Secretary of Legation to the German Legation at Bucharest, temporarily Chargé d'Affaires	26, 35, 60, 507, 519
Waldersee, Count von, Major General, First Chief Quartermaster on the Grand General Staff	74, 161, 500, Supp. to the Preliminary Remarks
Waldthausen, Dr. von, German Minister at Bucharest	352, 688, 786, 811, 832, 833, 864, 867, 868, Supp. III
Wallenberg, K. A., Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs	525, 692
Wangenheim, Hans, Baron von, German Ambassador at Constantinople	141, 149, 683, 733, 743, 775, 816, 817, 865
Wedel, Georg, Count von, Prussian Minister at Weimar, during the Northland journey in the Imperial Suite	84, 101, 116, 125, 141, 144, 173, 600
Wedel, Dr. Botho, Count von, Reporting Councilor in the German Foreign Office	753, Supp. IX
Weizsäcker, von, Dr. Jur. und Med., Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Württemberg	558, Supp. IV (13, 27)
Wied, Wilhelm, Prince zu, Prince of Albania	11, 41, 129, Supp. IV (2)
William, Crown Prince of the German Empire and of Prussia	84, 105, 132, 133, Supp. IV (27)
William II, German Emperor, King of Prussia	2, 3, 4, 6*a*, 6*b*, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30*a*, 33, 41, 62, 67, 80, 82, 84, 101, 116, 125, 132, 133, 140, 141, 144, 163, 173, 174, 175, 182, 197, 221, 229, 236, 242, 244, 267, 270, 283, 285, 288, 308, 320, 332, 334, 337, 344, 354, 374, 383, 387, 389, 390, 391, 399, 401, 402, 408, 412, 413, 417, 437, 441, 445, 452, 456, 457, 466, 469, 470, 471, 472, 474, 477, 480, 482, 487, 502, 503, 504, 513, 529, 530, 535, 536, 539, 540*a*, 542, 553, 572, 574, 575, 580, 583, 594, 599, 600, 601, 608, 620, 628, 638, 666, 672, 676, 683, 696, 702, 704, 715, 720, 733, 754, 755, 765, 766, 771, 773, 778, 779, 780, 783, 803, 837, 850, 866, Supp. II, III, IV (1, 8, 9, 12, 18, 20, 23, 27, 28, 29), V, VI, VIII
William, Prince of Albania, Prince zu Wied	see Wied
Wolchow or Wolckow, Russian Editor	564
Wolff, Theodor	56, 774
Wunderlich, K., German Consul General at Basel	645, 678
Württemberg, Premier of	see Weizsäcker

Name and position	Document number
Wurtzbacher, Colonel, in the Ministry for Imperial Defense	Supp. to the Preliminary Remarks
Yovanovitch, Dr. M., Second Secretary of the Serbian Legation at Berlin, temporarily Chargé d'Affaires	271
Yuan Shih-kai, President of the Free Republic of China	796
Zech-Burkersroda, Julius, Count von, German Chargé d'Affaires at Cetinje	195, 284, 306, 394, 476, 622
Zenker, Naval Captain on the Admiralty Staff of the German Navy	Supp. VIII and Supp. to the Preliminary Remarks
Zimmermann, German Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to November 22, 1916, then Secretary of State to August 6, 1917	6, 11, 17, 18, 41, 61, 153, 174, 324, 411, 425, 443, 451, 498, 634, 720, 741, 760, 772, 818, 857, Supp. IV (1, 2), VII, VIII

INDEX OF PERSONS SENDING DOCUMENTS

1. The figures refer to the numbers of the documents, not to the pages.
2. Only the numbers of those documents of which the complete text is printed, are given. The documents which are only referred to in the notes, are *not* considered.
3. Numbers enclosed in parentheses, i.e., (115), show that document was not sent directly from the person named to the recipient indicated, but that it constitutes a communication from the former to the latter only in so far as the substance is concerned.

A. Correspondence of the Emperor with Foreign Sovereigns

The Emperor to the Emperor of AUSTRIA. Nos. 26, 437, 502 (draft), 503, 766.

The Emperor of AUSTRIA to the Emperor. Nos. 13, 482, 601.

The Emperor to the King of the BELGIANS. No. 783.

The King of the BELGIANS to the Emperor. Nos. 765, 837.

The Emperor and Prince Henry of Prussia to the King of ENGLAND. Nos. 417, 477, 575.

The King of ENGLAND to the Emperor and Prince Henry of Prussia. Nos. 452, 574, 612.

The Emperor to the King of GREECE. Nos. 466, 504.

The King of GREECE to the Emperor. Nos. 243, 702.

The Emperor to the King of ITALY. No. 530.

The King of ITALY to the Emperor. No. 755.

The Grand Duchess of LUXEMBURG to the Emperor. No. 638.

The Emperor to the King of ROUMANIA. Nos. 471 (draft), 472.

The Emperor to the Emperor of RUSSIA. Nos. 233 (draft), 335, 359, 420, 480, 600.

The Emperor of RUSSIA to the Emperor. Nos. 332, 366, 390, 487, 546.

B. Correspondence of the Emperor with Other High Personages

The Emperor to the CROWN PRINCE of the German Empire and of Prussia. No. 105.

Prince HENRY of Prussia to the Emperor. No. 374.

LA FONTAINE, President of the Bureau of International Peace to the Emperor. No. 583.

The MILITARY PLENIPOTENTIARY at the Russian Court to the Emperor. No. 291.

The Princess of PLESS to the Emperor. No. 470.

Lord ROTHSCHILD to the Emperor. No. 580.

C. Correspondence of the Foreign Office

The Foreign Office to the ADMIRALTY STAFF of the Navy. (No. 101).

The ADMIRALTY STAFF of the Navy to the Foreign Office. Nos. 82, 96, 111, (115), 175, 255, 655, 718, 808, 821.

The Foreign Office to the Secretary of State for ALSACE-LORRAINE. No. 58.

The Secretary of State for ALSACE-LORRAINE to the Foreign Office. No. 232.

The Consulate General at ANTWERP to the Foreign Office. No. 467.

The Foreign Office to the Legation at ATHENS. Nos. 122, 453, 504, 763, 832.

The Legation at ATHENS to the Foreign Office. Nos. 24, 34, 189, 243, 336, 360, 381, 436, 512, 538, 660, 702, 803.

The AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Embassy to the Foreign Office. Nos. (23), 268, 305, 306, 352, (425), 427, 428, (429), (498), (556), 557, 594, 659, 723, 759, 760, 761, 826, 828, (860), (871), 879.

The Foreign Office to Director General BALLIN of the Hapag. Nos. 56, 572.

Director General BALLIN of the Hapag to the Foreign Office. No. 254.

The Consulate at BASEL to the Foreign Office. Nos. 645, 678.

The BELGIAN Legation to the Foreign Office. Nos. (495), 656.

The Foreign Office to the Legation at BELGRADE. Nos. 114, 762.

The Legation at BELGRADE to the Foreign Office. Nos. 10, 12, 19*a*, 32, 137, 139, 158, 159, 416, 523.

The Foreign Office to the Legation at BERNE. Nos. 514, 701, 703.

The Legation at BERNE to the Foreign Office. Nos. 509, 681.

The Foreign Office to the Legation at BRUSSELS. Nos. 375, 376, 505, 648, 677, 682, 791, 805.

The Legation at BRUSSELS to the Foreign Office. Nos. 403, 540, 559, 565, 581, 584, 650, 695, 709, 735, 779, 845.

The Foreign Office to the Legation at BUCHAREST. Nos. 16, 21, 39, 44, 63, 214, 298, 316, 317, 321, 389, 472, 475, 506, 563, 646, 729, 743, 830, 847.

The Legation at BUCHAREST to the Foreign Office. Nos. 28, 41, 66, 135, 177, 185, 262, 298, 379, 463, 582, 604, 688, 699, 786, 794, 811, 833, 867, 868.

The Legation at CAIRO to the Foreign Office. No. 592.

The CENTRAL TELEGRAPH OFFICE at Berlin to the Foreign Office. Nos. 680, 686.

The Foreign Office to the Chargé d'Affaires at CETINJE. No. 322.

The Chargé d'Affaires at CETINJE to the Foreign Office. Nos. 195, 284, 358, 394, 476, 622.

The Foreign Office to the Legation at CHRISTIANIA. No. 703.

The Legation at CHRISTIANIA to the Foreign Office. Nos. 286, 653, 789, 838.

The COMMANDER IN CHIEF in the Marches to the Foreign Office. No. (721).

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at CONSTANTINOPLE. Nos. 45, 144, 320, 354, 431, 508, 547, 586, 711, 712, 751, 836.

The Embassy at CONSTANTINOPLE to the Foreign Office. Nos. 71, 81, 98, 99, 102, 117, 147, 149, 183, 184, 256, 263, 285, 364, 365*a*, 398, 405, 411, 517, 652, 726, 733, 767, 795, 815, 852, 854, 856.

The Foreign Office to the Legation at COPENHAGEN. Nos. 181, 371, 703.

The Legation and the Consulate General at COPENHAGEN to the Foreign Office. Nos. 250, 532, 616, 800, 846, 855.

The CROWN PRINCE of the German Empire and of Prussia to the Foreign Office. No. 132.

The Foreign Office to the DANISH Legation. No. (494).

The DANISH Legation to the Foreign Office. Nos. 560, 724.

The Governor of DÜSSELDORF to the Foreign Office. No. 768.

The Foreign Office to the EMPEROR and the Minister in the EMPEROR'S Suite. No. 25, 32*a*, 67, 69, 84, 90, (116), 121, 125, 168, 182, 191, 197, 221, 245, 270, 283, 308, 399, 407, 408, 440, 466, 599, 629, 778.

The EMPEROR and the Minister in the EMPEROR'S Suite to the Foreign Office. Nos. 30*a*, 79, 80, 133, 141, 173, (174), 231, 293, (540*a*), 683, 780.

The Foreign Office to the ENGLISH Embassy. No. 373.

The ENGLISH Embassy to the Foreign Office. Nos. 304, 353, 497, (522), 595, 610, 720, 823, 824, 839, 863.

The FRENCH Embassy to the Foreign Office. No. 722.

The Grand GENERAL STAFF to the Foreign Office. Nos. 74, 349, 372, 424, 500, 524, 609, 639, 662, 663, 670, 739, (752), 788, 793, 804, 807, 813, 822, 825, 869, 876.

The Consulate General at GENOA to the Foreign Office. No. 533.

The Foreign Office to GERMAN Diplomatic Representatives abroad. Nos. 423, 703.

The Foreign Office to the Federated GERMAN Governments. Nos. 307, 553 (Session of the Federal Council), 849.

The FOREIGN OFFICE (internal transactions). Nos. 6, 23, 57, 101, 115, 116, 174, 340, 351, 425, 429, 468, 494, 495, 496, 498, 522, 540*a*, 556, 749, 752, 753, 781, 812, 827, 860, 871, Supp. VII, VIII.

The Foreign Office to the Legation at The HAGUE. Nos. 426, 671, 674, 677.

The Legation at The HAGUE to the Foreign Office. Nos. 516, 727, 738, 792, 797.

The Foreign Office to the Prussian Legation at HAMBURG. No. 107.

The Foreign Office to the Senatorial Committee for Imperial and Foreign Affairs of the Free and Hanseatic City of HAMBURG. No. 636.

The Senatorial Committee for Imperial and Foreign Affairs of the Free and Hanseatic City of HAMBURG to the Foreign Office. Nos. 591, 679, 685, 834.

The Consulate at HONGKONG to the Foreign Office. No. 737.

The Foreign Office to the IMPERIAL NAVAL OFFICE. Nos. 623, 657, 875.

The IMPERIAL NAVAL OFFICE to the Foreign Office. Nos. 621, 634, 654, 775, 870.

The ITALIAN Embassy to the Foreign Office. Nos. 754, 756, 757.

The Prussian Legation at KARLSRUHE to the Foreign Office. No. 303.

The Consulate at KOVNO to the Foreign Office. Nos. 264, 404.

The Foreign Office to the Legation at LISBON. Nos. 651, 741.

The Legation at LISBON to the Foreign Office. No. 617.

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at LONDON. Nos. 3, 36, 48, 72, 126, 140, 153, 164,

192, 199, 234, 248, 272, 278, 279, 314, 393, 409, 444, 488, 513, 529, 578, 579, 605, 626, 635, 643, 667, 677, 693, 696, 710, 713, 714, 717, 719, 725, 742, 744, 747, 777, 790, 810, 829, 848.

The Embassy at LONDON to the Foreign Office. Nos. 5, 20, 30, 43, 52, 55, 62, 76, 85, 92, 118, 124, 129, 152, 157, 161, 163, 165, 179, 180, 186, 191*a*, 201, 218, 236, 237, 258, 265, 266, 301, 355, 357, 362, 368, 418, 435, 438, 439, 447, 454, 460, 469, 484, 489, 518, 537, 562, 570, 576, 596, 603, 611, 630, 631, 641, 669, 676, 687, 689, 691, 706, 707, 708, 731, 732, 736, 764, 769, 770, 782, 784, 799, 801, 819, 820, 831, 835, 853.

The Foreign Office to the Grand Ducal Government of and the Legation at LUXEMBURG. Nos. 640, 649.

The Grand Ducal Government of and the Legation at LUXEMBURG to the Foreign Office. Nos. 486, 511, 602, 606, 619, 637, 644, 647, 684, 730, 746, 787 (16th. Inf. Div.), (812), 842 (16th. Inf. Div.).

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at MADRID. No. 741.

The Embassy at MADRID to the Foreign Office. Nos. 615, 851.

The MINISTRY OF WAR to the Foreign Office. Nos. 499, 554.

The Consulate General at MOSCOW to the Foreign Office. Nos. 295, 333, 369.

The Prussian Legation at MUNICH to the Foreign Office. Nos. 740, 758.

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at PARIS. Nos. 153, 200, 234, 247, 341, 461, 491, 543, 587, 608, 625, 632, 633, 642, 716, 734, 734*a*, 734*b*, 734*c*.

The Embassy at PARIS to the Foreign Office. Nos. 154, 166, 169, 170, 235, 240, 241, 252, 292, 310, 345, 350, 367, 430, 455, 483, 485, 528, 571, 590, 598, 705, 776, 809.

The Legation at PEKING to the Foreign Office. No. 796.

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at PETERSBURG. Nos. 93, 100, 143, 153, 198, 219, 234, 300, 315, 334, 342, 380, 387, 391, 392, 397, 413, 462, 490, 539 (Petersburg-Fredericks), 542, 593, 624.

The Embassy and the Military Plenipotentiary at PETERSBURG to the Foreign Office. Nos. 1, 53, 108, 120, 130, 134, 148, 160, 190, 194, 203, 204, 205, 215, 216, 217, 229, 230, 238, 242, 253, 274, 275, 282, 288, 289, 290, 296, 297, 337, 338, 339, 343, 344, 365, 370, 376*a*, 378, 401, 410, 412, 421, 445, 449, 459, 473, 478, 521, 527, 531, 535, 536, 551, 564, 588, 666, Supp. V, VI.

The Consulate at RIGA to the Foreign Office. No. 294.

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at ROME. Nos. 33, 44, 47, 145, 193, 209, 227, 239, 273, 287, 325, 457, 492, 501, 519, 541, 607, 613, 628, 664, 690, 694, 713, 717, 719, 725, 774, 806.

The Embassy at ROME to the Foreign Office. Nos. 38, 42, 51, 54, 59, 60, 64, 73, 75, 78, 109, 119, 136, 156, 167, 196, 211, 220, 225, 244, 249, 260, 261, 363, 414, 419, 446, 458, 481, 534, 550, 566, 568, 614, 658, 675, 745, 748, 771, 850, 859.

The ROUMANIAN Legation to the Foreign Office. Nos. 208, (351).

The RUSSIAN Embassy to the Foreign Office. No. 172.

The Consulate at SERAJEVO to the Foreign Office. No. 6*a*.

The SERBIAN Legation to the Foreign Office. Nos. 86, 271.

The Foreign Office to the Legation at SOFIA. Nos. 17, 22, 549, 697, 728, 743, 816, 865, 866, 873.

The Legation at SOFIA to the Foreign Office. Nos. 162, 251, 318, 548, 673, 857.

The Foreign Office to the Legation at STOCKHOLM. Nos. 123, 319, 406, 552, 703, 843.

The Legation at STOCKHOLM to the Foreign Office. Nos. 515, 520, 525, 526, 692, 802.

The Prussian Legation at STUTTGART to the Foreign Office. No. 558.

The SWISS Legation to the Foreign Office. No. 589.

The Legation at TANGIER to the Foreign Office. Nos. 618, 665.

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at TOKYO. No. 545.

The Embassy at TOKYO to the Foreign Office. No. 785.

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at VIENNA. Nos. 6*b*, 15, (26), 31, 37, 39, 45, 46, 61, 68, 70, 77, 83, 89, 91, 97, 112, 142, 150, 171, 193, 202, 209, 210, 226, 228, 246, 267, 269, 277, 299, 309, 323, (340), 361, 377, 383, 384, 385, 395, 396, 441, 442, 450, 451, 464, 479, 501, 507, 544, 555, 607, 613, 620, 627, 698, 750, 814, 817, 864, 872, 874.

The Embassy at VIENNA to the Foreign Office. Nos. 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, (14), 14*a*, 18, 19, 27, 29, 35, 40, 41*a*, 49, 50, 65, 87, 88, 94, 95, 103, 104, 106, 110, 113, 127, 128, 131, 138, 146, 151, 155, 176, 178, 187, 188, 206, 212, 213, 222, 223, 224, 257, 259, 280, 281, 302, 311, 312, 313, 324, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 346, 347, 356, 386, 388, 400, 415, 432, 433, 434, 443, 448, 465, (468), 493, 510, 561, 567, 569, 573, 577, 585, 597, 668, 672, 700, 704, 772, 798, 818, 840, 841, 844, 858, 861, 862, 877, 878, Supp. IX.

The Consulate General at WARSAW to the Foreign Office. Nos. 276, 335*a*, 422.

D. Other Correspondence

The BAVARIAN Legation at Berlin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Munich. Supp. IV (1–4, 6–27, 29–35).

The BAVARIAN Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Munich to the Bavarian Legation at Berlin. Supp. IV (5, 28).

The Headquarters of the EIGHTH ARMY CORPS to the Grand GENERAL STAFF. No. 670.

The EMPEROR to the Admiralty Staff, General Staff, Ministry of War and Imperial Naval Office. No. 474.

The IMPERIAL NAVAL OFFICE to the Emperor. No. 715.

The Naval Attaché at LONDON to the IMPERIAL NAVAL OFFICE. No. 207.

The PRESS, as far as not covered by the other numbers. Nos. 2, 382, 402, 661, 773.

Session of the PRUSSIAN Government. No. 456.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs at VIENNA to the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade. Supp. I.

The Austro-Hungarian Consulate General at WARSAW to the Foreign Office at Vienna. No. 348.

INDEX OF TELEGRAM NUMBERS

1. This index contains, as well as the telegrams given in full in the text, also those telegrams from which extracts are given in the notes, and which are provided with numbers. Documents sent by mail are not included, and naturally the unnumbered telegrams are also left out.

2. In the case of telegrams only to be found in the notes, the number is not given, as a rule. With the help of this index the reader can easily supply it.

The Foreign Office to the Legation at ATHENS

Telegram	99,	No.	122
"	101,	"	251, *n.* 6
"	102,	"	453
"	104,	"	504
"	109,	"	763
"	111,	"	832

The Legation at ATHENS to the Foreign Office.

Telegram	195,	No.	24
"	213,	"	189
"	218,	"	243
"	220,	"	336
"	221,	"	360
"	222,	"	381
"	223,	"	436
"	227,	"	512
"	228,	"	538
"	231,	"	702
"	234,	"	803

The Consulate at BASEL to the Foreign Office.

Telegram	3,	No.	645
"	4,	"	678

The Foreign Office to the Legation at BELGRADE.

Telegram	25,	No.	8, *n.* 4
"	26,	"	114
"	34,	"	436, *n.* 5
"	37,	"	762

The Legation at BELGRADE to the Foreign Office.[1]

Telegram	7,	No.	416
"	14,	"	523
"	30,	"	139
"	31,	"	159
"	32,	"	158

The Foreign Office to the Legation at BERNE.

Telegram	21,	No.	514
"	28,	"	703
"	29,	"	701

The Legation at BERNE to the Foreign Office.

Telegram	12,	No.	341, *n.* 3
"	17,	"	509
"	22,	"	681

The Foreign Office to the Legation at BRUSSELS.

Telegram	25,	No.	648, *n.* 2
"	39,	"	505
"	42,	"	648
"	43,	"	677
"	44,	"	682
"	48,	"	791
"	49,	"	805
"	87,	"	376
"	88,	"	375

The Legation at BRUSSELS to the Foreign Office.

Telegram	19,	No.	565
"	20,	"	581
"	21,	"	584
"	22,	"	650
"	26,	"	695
"	28,	"	735
"	29,	"	779
"	44,	"	709

The Foreign Office to the Legation at BUCHAREST.

Telegram	31,	No.	8, *n.* 4
"	33,	"	16
"	34,	"	21
"	36,	"	44
"	38,	"	63 and 60, *n.* 4
"	42,	"	214
"	43,	"	259, *n.* 3
"	44,	"	317
"	45,	"	316
"	46,	"	321
"	47,	"	318, *n.* 7
"	48,	"	336, *n.* 9
"	50,	"	261, *n.* 5
"	51,	"	389
"	52,	"	604, *n.* 9
"	53,	"	436, *n.* 5
"	54,	"	472, *n.* 2
"	55,	"	475
"	58,	"	506
"	63,	"	563
"	64,	"	569, *n.* 4
"	65,	"	548, *n.* 9
"	66,	"	436, *n.* 5 (Repetition of Tel. 53)
"	67,	"	597, *n.* 3
"	68,	"	646
"	71,	"	729
"	72,	"	743
"	73,	"	763, *n.* 2
"	76,	"	830
"	77,	"	847

The Legation at BUCHAREST to the Foreign Office.

Telegram	37,	No.	28
"	41,	"	135
"	42,	"	185
"	43,	"	262
"	44,	"	298
"	49,	"	379
"	50,	"	519, *n.* 5
"	52,	"	463
"	53,	"	506, *n.* 4
"	54,	"	582
"	55,	"	604

[1] The change in numbers is explained by the fact that the Minister moved from Belgrade to Nish, and began numbering his telegrams from Nish anew.

Telegram 58, No. 688
" 59, " 699
" 60, " 646, *n.* 4
" 61, " 786
" 62, " 794
" 63, " 811
" 65, " 833
" 67, " 811, *n.* 5
" 68, " 868
" 70, " 867
" 72, " 847, *n.* 8

The Legation at CAIRO to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 31, No. 592

The Foreign Office to the Chargé d'Affaires at CETINJE.
Telegram 15, No. 322
" 18, " 567, *n.* 6

The Chargé d'Affaires at CETINJE to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 17, No. 195
" 18, " 284
" 19, " 358
" 20, " 394
" 22, " 476
" 24, " 622

The Foreign Office to the Legation at CHRISTIANIA.
Telegram 16, No. 703

The Legation at CHRISTIANIA to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 17, No. 286
" 22, " 653
" 24, " 789
" 29, " 838

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at CONSTANTINOPLE.
Telegram 268, No. 144
" 270, " 149, *n.* 2
" 273, " 259, *n.* 3
" 275, " 320
" 276, " 318, *n.* 7
" 280, " 251, *n.* 6
" 284, " 431
" 290, " 508
" 296, " 547
" 298, " 586
" 303, " 711
" 304, " 712
" 305, " 751
" 306, " 775, *n.* 6
" 313, " 836

The Embassy at CONSTANTINOPLE to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 349, No. 71
" 352, " 81
" 354, " 99
" 355, " 102
" 356, " 98
" 362, " 117
" 364, " 149
" 365, " 147
" 367, " 184
" 368, " 183
" 370, " 285
" 371, " 256
Telegram 373, No. 263
" 379, " 364
" 380, " 365*a*
" 381, " 604, *n.* 9
" 382, " 398
" 385, " 411
" 386, " 405
" 392, " 517
" 396, " 652
" 407, " 726, *n.* 6
" 408, " 726
" 409, " 733
" 415, " 767
" 416, " 795
" 417, " 815
" 423, " 854
" 424, " 856
" 426, " 852

The Foreign Office to the Legation at COPENHAGEN.
Telegram 25, No. 181
" 26, " 371
" 36, " 703

The Legation at COPENHAGEN to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 32, No. 250
" 41, " 532
" 42, " 616
" 48, " 846
" 49, " 855

The Foreign Office to the EMPEROR and the Minister in the Imperial Suite.
Telegram 77, No. 32*a*
" 79, " 18, *n.* 2
" 80, " 19, *n.* 2
" 82, " 67
" 84, " 69
" 85, " 29, *n.* 5
" 85, " 90 (Tel. 85 utilized twice)
" 86, " 24, *n.* 2
" 87, " 28, *n.* 2
" 89, " 129 and 111, *n.* 7
" 92, " 40, *n.* 2
" 108, " 81, *n.* 6
" 111, " 92, *n.* 5
" 114, " 99, *n.* 7
" 115, " 104, *n.* 7
" 116, " 121 (wrongly given as Tel. 132)
" 118, " 117, *n.* 8
" 120, " 130, *n.* 3
" 122, " 149, *n.* 2
" 123, " 139, *n.* 3
" 124, " 148, *n.* 2
" 125, " 151, *n.* 4
" 126, " 159, *n.* 2
" 127, " 158, *n.* 3
" 128, " 154, *n.* 2
" 129, " 147, *n.* 4
" 130, " 146, *n.* 2
" 131, " 155, *n.* 2
" 132, " 160, *n.* 4
" 133, " 157, *n.* 5
" 134, " 168
" 136, " 162, *n.* 2
" 138, " 178, *n.* 4

Telegram 139, No. 182
" 140, " 191
" 141, " 183, *n.* 5
" 142, " 185, *n.* 2
" 145, " 194, *n.* 5
" 146, " 197
" 147, " 194, *n.* 5
(Tel. 145 was repeated as No. 147)
" 149, " 201, *n.* 2
" 150, " 221
" 151, " 245

The EMPEROR and the Minister in the Imperial Suite to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 103, No. 30*a*
" 116, " 79
" 117, " 80
" 126, " 121, *n.* 3 on p. 123
" 128, " 141
" 130, " 149, *n.* 2
" 131, " 173
" 132, " 148, *n.* 3
" 134, " 231
" 135, " 157, *n.* 1 on p. 145

The FOREIGN OFFICE (Internal Transactions).
Telegram 1, No. 80, *n.* 4
" 3, " 116
" 11, " 19, *n.* 2
" 13, " 57
" 16, " 80, *n.* 4
" 18, " 115 and 111, *n.* 7
" 19, " 125, *n.* 2

The Consulate General at GENOA to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 7, No. 533

The Foreign Office to the Legation at The HAGUE.
Telegram 25, No. 674
" 26, " 671
" 27, " 677

The Legation at The HAGUE to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 27, No. 516
" 29, " 727
" 30, " 738
" 31, " 792
" 32, " 797

The Consulate at HONGKONG to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 10, No. 737

The Consulate at KOVNO to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 3, No. 264

The Foreign Office to the Legation at LISBON.
Telegram 53, No. 651
" 55, " 741

The Legation at LISBON to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 66, No. 617

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at LONDON.
Telegram 155, No. 36
" 159, " 48
" 167, " 126
Telegram 168, No. 140
" 169, " 153
" 170, " 148, *n.* 2
" 171, " 155, *n.* 2
" 172, " 154, *n.* 2
" 173, " 160, *n.* 4
" 174, " 164
" 176, " 192
" 178, " 199
" 179, " 248
" 180, " 238, *n.* 5
" 182, " 272
" 183, " 278
" 184, " 279
" 185, " 314
" 186, " 315, *n.* 6
" 187, " 310, *n.* 7
" 188, " 393
" 191, " 409
" 192, " 444
" 193, " 448, *n.* 2
" 196, " 488
" 199, " 513
" 200, " 529
" 202, " 527, *n.* 4
" 204, " 578
" 205, " 579
" 206, " 605
" 207, " 626
" 208, " 635
" 209, " 643
" 210, " 667
" 211, " 677
" 212, " 693
" 213, " 696
" 214, " 710
" 215, " 713
" 216, " 714
" 217, " 725
" 218, " 742
" 219, " 744
" 220, " 747
" 221, " 777
" 223, " 790
" 226, " 810
" 229, " 829
" 230, " 829, *n.* 6
" 231, " 848

The Embassy at LONDON to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 129, No. 43
" 133, " 52
" 134, " 55
" 138, " 85
" 143, " 92
" 145, " 118
" 146, " 124
" 147, " 129
" 150, " 152
" 151, " 157
" 152, " 163
" 153, " 165
" 154, " 180
" 155, " 179
" 156, " 186
" 157, " 191*a*
" 159, " 201
" 160, " 218
" 161, " 236

Telegram 162, No. 237
" 164, " 258
" 165, " 266
" 166, " 265
" 171, " 301
" 174, " 357
" 176, " 355
" 178, " 368
" 179, " 362
" 183, " 418
" 184, " 435
" 187, " 438
" 189, " 439
" 191, " 447
" 192, " 460
" 193, " 454
" 194, " 469
" 196, " 489
" 197, " 484
" 200, " 518
" 203, " 537
" 205, " 562
" 208, " 576
" 209, " 570
" 212, " 596
" 213, " 611
" 214, " 603
" 217, " 631
" 218, " 641
" 220, " 669
" 221, " 676
" 222, " 691
" 224, " 689
" 225, " 687
" 226, " 706
" 227, " 707
" 228, " 708
" 229, " 732
" 230, " 731
" 231, " 736
" 234, " 764
" 237, " 769
" 238, " 770
" 240, " 784
" 241, " 782
" 243, " 799
" 244, " 801
" 245, " 820
" 247, " 819
" 248, " 820, *n.* 7
" 249, " 831
" 250, " 835
" 253, " 853

The Foreign Office to the Legation at LUXEMBURG.
Telegram 12, No. 640

The Legation at LUXEMBURG to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 14, No. 486
" 15, " 606
" 16, " 619
" 18, " 647
" 19, " 684

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at MADRID.
Telegram 33, No. 741

The Embassy at MADRID to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 18, No. 615
" 23, " 851

The Consulate General at MOSCOW to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 4, No. 295
" 5, " 333
" 6, " 369

The Prussian Legation at MUNICH to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 29, No. 740

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at PARIS.
Telegram 160, No. 126, *nn.* 1 and 2
" 162, " 153
" 163, " 155, *n.* 2
" 164, " 160, *n.* 4
" 165, " 157, *n.* 5
" 167, " 200
" 169, " 215, *n.* 2
" 170, " 247
" 171, " 315, *n.* 6
" 172, " 341
" 175, " 461
" 176, " 415, *n.* 7
" 180, " 491
" 184, " 543
" 186, " 587
" 187, " 625
" 188, " 632
" 189, " 633
" 190, " 642
" 192, " 716
" 193, " 734, 734*a*

The Embassy at PARIS to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 210, No. 154
" 212, " 166
" 213, " 169
" 214, " 170
" 220, " 235
" 221, " 241
" 222, " 240
" 223, " 252
" 227, " 310
" 228, " 345
" 229, " 367
" 231, " 430
" 233, " 455
" 235, " 483
" 236, " 485
" 237, " 528
" 239, " 571
" 240, " 590
" 241, " 598
" 244, " 705
" 246, " 809

The Foreign Office to the Legation at PEKING.
Telegram 52, No. 785, *n.* 2

The Legation at PEKING to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 54, No. 796

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at PETERSBURG.
Telegram 116, No. 93
" 120, " 143
" 122, " 153
" 123, " 155, *n.* 2

Telegram 124, No. 154, *n.* 2
" 125, " 157, *n.* 5
" 126, " 198
" 127, " 184, *n.* 7
" 128, " 219
" 130, " 300
" 131, " 315
" 132, " 334
" 134, " 342
" 138, " 310, *n.* 7
" 139, " 380
" 140, " 387
" 141, " 391
" 142, " 392
" 143, " 397
" 146, " 413
" 148, " 420, *n.* 2
" 149, " 433, *n.* 8
" 150, " 462
" 151, " 415, *n.* 7
" 153, " 490
" 159, " 542
" 161, " 593
" 163, " 624

The Embassy at PETERSBURG to the Foreign Office.

Telegram 144, No. 108
" 146, " 130
" 147, " 134
" 148, " 148
" 149, " 160
" 152, " 190
" 153, " 194
" 157, " 217
" 158, " 216
" 159, " 215
" 161, " 217, *n.* 1 on p. 181
" 162, " 229
" 163, " 238
" 164, " 230
" 165, " 242
" 167, " 282
" 169, " 274
" 170, " 275
" 172, " 296
" 173, " 297
" 174, " 337
" 177, " 338
" 180, " 376*a*
" 183, " 343
" 184, " 344
" 185, " 365
" 186, " 370
" 187, " 378
" 189, " 401
" 190, " 412
" 191, " 410
" 192, " 421
" 195, " 445
" 196, " 459
" 197, " 449
" 198, " 478
" 199, " 473
" 202, " 521
" 204, " 535
" 206, " 527
" 208, " 531
" 209, " 536
" 210, " 551
" 211, " 564
" 214, " 588
" 215, " 666

The Consulate at RIGA to the Foreign Office.

Telegram 2, No. 294

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at ROME.[1]

Telegram 1, No. 33
" 4, " 44
" 5, " 47
" 10, " 99, *n.* 7
" 11, " 104, *n.* 7
" 13, " 135, *n.* 4
" 14, " 167, *n.* 1 on p. 152
" 16, " 190, *n.* 2
" 17, " 185, *n.* 2
" 18, " 187, *n.* 7
" 19, " 193
" 20, " 227
" 21, " 212, *n.* 2
" 22, " 239
" 23, " 235, *n.* 3
" 24, " 273
" 25, " 287
" 115, " 8, *n.* 4
" 126, " 145
" 127, " 131, *n.* 2
" 128, " 155, *n.* 2
" 129, " 154, *n.* 2
" 130, " 146, *n.* 2
" 131, " 160, *n.* 4
" 132, " 157, *n.* 5 on p. 143
" 133, " 158, *n.* 3
" 136, " 297, *n.* 4
" 137, " 325
" 138, " 328, *n.* 2
" 139, " 318, *n.* 7
" 140, " 310, *n.* 7
" 141, " 355, *n.* 2
" 142, " 362, *n.* 6
" 143, " 364, *n.* 5
" 147, " 457
" 149, " 501
" 150, " 492
" 154, " 519
" 155, " 530
" 156, " 541
" 159, " 607
" 160, " 613
" 161, " 628
" 162, " 664
" 164, " 665, *n.* 10
" 165, " 694
" 166, " 690
" 167, " 710, *n.* 5
" 168, " 713
" 169, " 725
" 170, " 774
" 172, " 806
" 175, " 815, *n.* 5
" 177, " 858, *n.* 3

The Embassy at ROME to the Foreign Office.

Telegram 2, No. 38
" 5, " 42
" 7, " 51

[1] The change in the numbering is explained by the fact that during the stay of the Ambassador at Fiuggi Fonte, telegrams from there to Berlin and in part from Berlin to Fiuggi Fonte were numbered differently.

Telegram 8, No. 54
" 9, " 59
" 10, " 60
" 11, " 78
" 16, " 109
" 17, " 119
" 19, " 136
" 20, " 156
" 21, " 167
" 23, " 196
" 24, " 211
" 25, " 225
" 26, " 220
" 29, " 249
" 30, " 261
" 31, " 260
" 149, " 363
" 152, " 414
" 154, " 419
" 156, " 446
" 158, " 458
" 160, " 481
" 161, " 534
" 165, " 530, *n.* 8
" 166, " 550
" 167, " 566
" 168, " 568
" 169, " 614
" 170, " 675
" 171, " 748
" 172, " 745
" 174, " 850
" 176, " 859
" 287(?) " 771

The Consulate at SERAJEVO to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 11, No. 6*a*

The Foreign Office to the Legation at SOFIA.
Telegram 23, No. 17
" 25, " 22
" 26, " 38, *n.* 2
" 32, " 147, *n.* 4
" 33, " 183, *n.* 5
" 38, " 259, *n.* 3
" 43, " 549
" 45, " 697
" 47, " 728
" 48, " 743
" 51, " 816
" 52, " 794, *n.* 2
" 54, " 865
" 57, " 873

The Legation at SOFIA to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 36, No. 162
" 37, " 251
" 39, " 318
" 41, " 548
" 43, " 673
" 45, " 697, *n.* 6
" 46, " 857

The Foreign Office to the Legation at STOCKHOLM.
Telegram 15, No. 123
" 18, " 319
" 20, " 406
" 25, " 552
" 32, " 703
" 36, " 843

The Legation at STOCKHOLM to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 30, No. 526
" 31, " 520
" 32, " 525
" 33, " 515
" 39, " 692
" 44, " 802

The Legation at TANGIER to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 88, No. 618
" 89, " 665

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at TOKYO.
Telegram 24, No. 545

The Embassy at TOKYO to the Foreign Office.
Telegram 40, No. 785

The Foreign Office to the Embassy at VIENNA.
Telegram 107, No. 6*b*
" 113, " 15
" 116, " 28, *n.* 2
" 117, " 31
" 120, " 60, *n.* 4
" 122, " 70
" 124, " 77
" 125, " 78, *n.* 5
" 126, " 89
" 127, " 91
" 129, " 97
" 130, " 112
" 132, " 118, *n.* 4 and " 121, *n.* 3 on p. 122
" 133, " 119, *n.* 3
" 134, " 142
" 135, " 136, *n.* 2
" 136, " 150
" 137, " 156, *n.* 2
" 138, " 154, *n.* 2
" 139, " 160, *n.* 4
" 140, " 171 and " 157, *n.* 5 on p. 143
" 141, " 159, *n.* 2
" 142, " 158, *n.* 3
" 143, " 147, *n.* 4
" 146, " 186, *n.* 4
" 147, " 185, *n.* 2
" 148, " 193
" 150, " 202
" 151, " 195, *n.* 7
" 152, " 210
" 153, " 183, *n.* 5
" 154, " 184, *n.* 7
" 156, " 226
" 157, " 228
" 158, " 217, *n.* 6 on p. 180 and *n.* 2 on p. 181
" 160, " 246
" 161, " 238, *n.* 5
" 162, " 220, *n.* 6
" 163, " 235, *n.* 3
" 164, " 241, *n.* 4
" 166, " 242, *n.* 6
" 167, " 269
" 168, " 267
" 169, " 277
" 170, " 262, *n.* 2
" 171, " 284, *n.* 6
" 172, " 309
" 173, " 299

Telegram 174, No. 323
" 176, " 315, *n.* 6
" 177, " 297, *n.* 4
" 178, " 318, *n.* 7
" 180, " 251, *n.* 6
" 181, " 361
" 182, " 310, *n.* 7
" 186, " 377, *n.* 3
" 187, " 385
" 188, " 383
" 189, " 377
" 193, " 384
" 191, " 604, *n.* 2
" 192, " 395
" 193, " 396
" 194, " 358, *n.* 3
" 195, " 363, *n.* 9
" 199, " 324, *n.* 3
" 200, " 441
" 201, " 442
" 202, " 450
" 203, " 464
" 204, " 479
" 206, " 501
" 207, " 507
" 208, " 503, *n.* 4
" 210, " 476, *n.* 9
" 212, " 586, *n.* 6
" 214, " 534, *n.* 2
" 215, " 544
" 218, " 436, *n.* 5
" 219, " 569, *n.* 4
" 220, " 607
" 221, " 613
" 222, " 620
" 223, " 627
" 227, " 698
" 229, " 750
" 232, " 771, *n.* 7
" 234, " 814
" 235, " 817
" 237, " 794, *n.* 2
" 240, " 818, *n.* 11
" 241, " 785, *n.* 2
" 242, " 864
" 243, " 854, *n.* 6
" 244, " 850, *n.* 2
" 247, " 868, *n.* 4
" 248, " 872
" 250, " 874
" 254, " 850, *n.* 1 on p. 548

The Embassy at VIENNA to the Foreign Office.

Telegram 80, No. 8
" 81, " 9
" 83, " 18
" 84, " 19
" 85, " 29
" 86, " 35
" 87, " 40
" 90, " 88
" 91, " 95
" 92, " 103
" 93, " 104
" 94, " 110
" 95, " 113
" 96, " 127
Telegram 97, No. 131
" 99, " 146
" 100, " 151
" 101, " 155
" 102, " 178
" 103, " 187
" 104, " 188
" 105, " 213
" 106, " 212
" 107, " 222
" 108, " 223
" 109, " 224
" 112, " 226, *n* 2
" 113, " 257
" 114, " 259
" 115, " 281
" 116, " 280
" 118, " 311
" 119, " 312
" 120, " 313
" 121, " 324
" 122, " 328
" 123, " 327
" 124, " 330
" 125, " 329
" 126, " 331
" 127, " 346
" 128, " 356
" 130, " 386
" 132, " 400
" 133, " 388
" 134, " 415
" 135, " 433
" 136, " 432
" 137, " 434
" 139, " 443
" 141, " 448
" 142, " 465
" 143, " 493
" 144, " 510
" 147, " 577
" 148, " 586, *n.* 6
" 149, " 561
" 150, " 569
" 151, " 567
" 152, " 573
" 153, " 585
" 154, " 597
" 155, " 668
" 156, " 672
" 158, " 704
" 159, " 709
" 162, " 772
" 163, " 798
" 164, " 818
" 166, " 840
" 167, " 841
" 168, " 844
" 169, " 861
" 170, " 862
" 171, " 858
" 174, " 877
" 178, " 878

The Consulate General at WARSAW to the Foreign Office.

Telegram 13, No. 276
" 14, " 335*a*

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